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Abstract 
This thesis investigates why extreme forms of personal rule arise and endure in the 
contemporary international system. More particularly, it seeks to answer the puzzle of why 
the regime of President Saparmurat Niyazov (Turkmenbashi), in the Central Asian republic of 
Turkmenistan, has paradoxically proven to be one of the region's most stable states between 
1992 and 2006, notwithstanding the fact that it is characterised by Niyazov's unchecked 
personal power, barely functional political institutions, endemic corruption and a pervasive 
cult of personality. 
The study develops the theoretical approach most commonly applied to this type of regime 
and produces an original empirical study of a strategically important gas-rich state that has 
hitherto received almost no attention from the academic community. Specifically, the thesis 
engages with two theories of sultanistic regimes advanced in 1990 by H.E. Chehabi and Juan 
J. Linz. The research findings demonstrate that, while the essential insights of the theories 
remain valid, they require careful revision and refinement if they are to successfully 
incorporate postcommunist regimes into their paradigm. 
The project uses a mixture of interviews, field observation, and primary and secondary 
documents to a nswer the research problem. It finds that the structural legacies of t he p re-
Soviet and Soviet period, allied to a favourable strategic context, et:labled Niyazov to secure 
power and sideline potential rivals. The thesis argues that a combination of different domestic 
control techniques, of which the cult of personality forms an essential part, has been deployed 
by Niyazov to maintain his position. Taken together, these techniques form a 'disciplinary-
symbolic' nexus aimed at preventing the emergence of opposition groups, while 
simultaneously promoting Niyazov as the sole guarantor of national unity and prosperity. The 
thesis also explores popular responses to sultanism, concluding that Turkmen adopt a 
complex and contradictory web of personal strategies in their dealings with the regime, 
ranging from engagement, accommodation and indifference, through to covert resistance and 
outright opposition. 
Finally, the thesis assesses the interaction between sultanistic regimes and external actors. It 
finds that, far from exposing rulers to greater pressure from the international community, the 
end of the Cold War actually increased the autonomy of many sultanistic rulers. No longer 
shackled by the disciplines of superpower patronage, most sultanistic rulers, including 
Niyazov, have been able to function with minimal constraints on their domestic behaviour. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Outline and Aims of the Study 
The dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in Decenlber 1991 
created fifteen new states, the subsequent political trajectories of which have since been 
substantively different. At one end of the spectrum, the Baltic republics of Estonia, 
Lithuania and Latvia effected the transition to parliamentary democracy and the market 
economy fairly rapidly, and have been absorbed into Euro-Atlantic security and 
economic institutions. By contrast, the five Central Asian republics (CARs) have been 
characterised by political stagnation at best, and outright repression at worst. In the cases 
of Uzbekistan and Turlanenistan, the political and cultural spaces opened by glasnost and 
perestroika in the late 1980s have been firmly closed, as former Communist Party bosses 
have moved to quell challenges to their rule from whatever quarter they may arise. Yet, 
while the office and the image of the presidency shape political life throughout the 
region, even in this context, the Republic of Turkmenistan is exceptional. 
President Saparmurat Niyazov, renamed as Turkmenbashi ("Father of the Turkmen"), 
completely dominates formal political structures within the country). Previously First 
Secretary of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan (CPTu) during the Soviet era, 
Niyazov is President for life, Prime Minister, leader of the only legal political party, and 
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. He also chairs the country's highest 
representative political organ, and has been known to intervene in the judicial process 
arbitrarily during Cabinet meetings and televised speeches. Niyazov personal1y 
negotiates all significant commercial contracts with state agencies and even decides the 
date on which cotton and grain, the country's principal agricultural crops, can be both 
sown and harvested, often with deleterious consequences. 
There is very little continuity or stability within Niyazov's govemment. He has dismissed 
in excess of 130 Cabinet ministers in the period 1992 to 2006, many of whom have 
subsequently been imprisoned. Regional governors and other senior officials are rotated 
with similar frequency. Cabinet meetings are frequently shown live on national 
television, and often consist of Niyazov berating and humiliating his ministers in the 
) Niyazov became known by the title Turkmenbashi in 1993, but is referred to as Niyazov 
throughout this thesis, apart from the citation of works where Saparmurat Turkmenbashi is 
specifically stated as the author. 
1 
most derogatory terms2• In short, Niyazov governs in a highly idiosyncratic fashion 
without any discernible accountability or restraint. 
In order to strengthen his control, a cult of personality has been constructed around 
Niyazov that pervades Turkmenistan' s cultural life. His book R uhnama ("Book 0 f t he 
Soul") is compulsory reading for all schoolchildren, university students and professional 
workers, and now must be studied instead of the Turkmen Highway Code by learner 
drivers. In March 2006, Niyazov suggested that those who read Ruhnama aloud for one 
hour every morning and evening would be more likely to go to heaven (IS 3). The 
Turkmen media is controlled entirely by the state and reports very little other than 
Niyazov's movements and pronouncements. Similarly, Niyazov issues frequent 
injunctions on the type of dress and personal appearance he considers acceptable (for 
example, commenting negatively on beards, men with long hair and women with gold 
teeth), which are then acted upon by his subordinates (TV First Channel, 23 February 
2004 in TWNB, 20-26/02/04)3, 
Niyazov's image and pronouncements litter the urban landscape of the capital Ashgabat, 
and are highly prominent in other cities, in the form of monuments, statues, slogans. and 
portraits, Niyazov has renamed the days of the week and the months of the year after 
2 Niyazov's eccentric policy of hiring and firing officials is demonstrated by the dismissal of 
Suhanberdi Bayramov, the Head of the Hydrometeorology Committee of Turkmenistan, on 30 
March 2004 for inaccurate weather forecasting, telling a Cabinet session on live television: "The 
meteorological service keeps giving all the same old weather forecasts every day. How is it 
possible to work that way? He [Bayramov] is cheating the state, the people. He said that it would 
be 29C yesterday but today he keeps repeating the same thing. However, there was no such heat. 
All of his weather forecasts are like that. You [Bayramov] are fired! How could you write a 
weather forecast like that? You said it was 29C yesterday and 29C today, Where is the heat? 
Where is yesterday'S heat? All of your information was not up to scratch even before this. You 
said there will be no rain but it rains. You could not forecast the recent three days of rainfall 
saying that there would be no rain in the near future. What are you doing there working as a whole 
team? You are fired! Leave the session. Let his forecast at least be somehow realistic. It does not 
even come close to reality. There is a guy who graduated from the Hydrometeorology Institute of 
Leningrad [Saint Petersburg], from Birata [eastern Turkmenistan], appoint him. He is publishing a 
magazine. He tries to do his best - but you pay no attention to that" (Altyn Asyr television channel, 
BBC Monitoring Central Asian Unit (CAU), in Turkmenistan Weekly News Brief (TWNB), 
26/03/04-01/04/04). Similar instances of unusual sanction abound. On 31 March 2001, Niyazov 
ordered his Deputy Minister for Energy and Industry Annaguly Dzhumagylydzhov to train for 
three months as an ordinary electrician to acquire a practical trade (Internet Source [IS] 1). 
Niyazov has a Iso specified that newsreaders should wear no make-up 0 n television because he 
found it impossible to tell apart men and women on national television (IS 2). 
3 Students and public sector employees reportedly were refused entry to lectures and workplaces 
unless their gold teeth were removed (International War and Peace Reporting [IWPR] Reporting 
Central Asia [RCA] No. 279,20 April 2004). Both Mustafil Kemal Ataturk and Benito Mussolini 
issued similar injunctions, in Mussolini's case dress, speech and greeting codes intensified after 
Achille Skrace became Fascist Party Secretary in 1931 (Falasca-Zamponi: 1997, 110-113). 
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himself and prominent figures from Turkmen history. The cult of personality is 
manifested toponymically through the renaming of countless towns, cities, natural 
landmarks and man-made projects either after Niyazov, or those figures comprising the 
extended vocabulary of his cult. Niyazov has introduced numerous unusual public 
holidays, marked by choreographed spectacles and ritualised processions, which are then 
subsequently relayed on television for days and weeks afterwards. In short, Niyazov has 
seemingly built a state around his own image and predilections. 
This project seeks to answer the puzzle of why the Niyazov regime, and others similarly 
characterised by their ruler's largely unchecked personal power, barely functional 
political institutions, weak civil society1 and endemic corruption, initially arise, and why 
they are able to remain such a durable form of governance in the contemporary 
international system. In doing so, this study develops the theoretical approach most 
commonly applied to this type of regime and produces an original empirical study of the 
Republic ofTurkmenistan. 
In order to answer the research questions, I utilise the theoretical framework developed 
by H.E. Chehabi and Juan 1. Linz in their seminal study of Cold War sultanistic regimes 
(1998c). Their work has frequently been cited in comparative government or specific 
country studies (for example, Hague and Harrop: 2001, 31-46; Eke and Kuzio, 2000; 
Kahn: 2002, 189-234; Cummings and Ochs: 2001) but, withthe exception of a series of 
articles on "durable authoritarianism" in the Middle East by Jason Brownlee (2002a, 
2002b, 2004), has rarely been subject to sustained critical analysis. In order to achieve the 
objective of developing our understanding of sultanism, sultanistic regime theory (SRT) 
is interrogated, revised, and refitted for the contemporary political environment. 
The empirical objective of the thesis relates to the chosen case study. Turkmenistan is 
arguably the least known of the former Soviet republics. To date, there has been no fulI-
length published work or completed doctoral thesis in English on Turkmenistan's 
contemporary political system, virtually nothing of value in the Turkmen language, and 
only a very limited selection of useful materials in Russian4• Apart from Adrienne 
Edgar's monograph on early Soviet Turkmenistan (2004), there has been no recent 
satisfactory study of the Turkmen people or lands. As such, this project aims to make a 
4 I collaborated with Dr Shokhrat Kadyrov in compiling the first full bibliography of English, 
Russian and Turkmen language materials on Turkmenistan for the Open Society Institute's 
Turkmenistan Project. I prepared the English language section, completed in spring 2005, which is 
available online at http://www.eurasianet.org/turkmenistan.project/files/Bibliography.doc. 
3 
substantial and original contribution to our knowledge of a country largely overlooked by 
scholars of all disciplines. 
Such a study also has significant policy relevance. Turkmenistan shares substantial land 
borders with Uzbekistan, Iran and Afghanistan, three highly unstable and conflict-prone 
states. It lies at the heart of a volatile and complicated Eurasian regional security 
complex, of great strategic importance to Russia, China, the US and other regional actors. 
Moreover, Turknlenistan possesses the fourth largest reserves of natural gas of any state 
in the world, and oil reserves of considerable regional potentials. It is emerging as a 
world-class supplier of gas to East Asia, through the construction of new pipelines 
(ITAR-TASS, 17 January 2006 in TWNB, 13-19 January 2006), and to Europe via the 
Russian gas transit system. Finally, political and religious instability in the Fergana 
Valley, allied to gradual improvements in counter-narcotics capacities in northern 
Afghanistan, has led Afghan heroin traffickers to shift their attention to the largely 
unpoliced desert border with Turkmenistan. According to the US Government's 2006 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report, "Turkmenistan remains a key transit country for the 
smuggling of narcotics and precursor chemicals" from Afghanistan to Europe, with 
"persisting reports that senior [government] officials are directly linked to the drug trade" 
(IS 6). 90% of heroin used in the UK can be sourced to Afghanistan (IS 7), and very little 
is known about the Turkmenistan-Caspian-Russia smuggling route into Europe. 
Turkmenistan is therefore worthy of study both on its own terms, as a fascinating country 
with a unique desert culture, shaped by centuries of physical isolation, and for its 
emerging strategic and policy importance both within Central Asia and the wider region. 
5 Accurate data on recoverable oil and gas reserves is difficult to obtain, and varies according to 
source. The estimate given in the BP Statistical Review of.World Energy (June 2005) of 2.9 
trillion cubic metres (tcm) of natural gas, or 2.9% of global reserves is almost certainly an 
underestimate, made because of the failure of the Turkmen government to publish verifiable data 
on the extent of its reserves (2005: 20). This is not unusual in the states of the former Soviet Union 
(FSU), which regard data on energy reserves as an issue 0 f national security. Nevertheless, the 
chairman of the Turkmen state agency for geological analysis did release a declaration on oil and 
gas reserves on 14 November 2005 (IS 4) that stated recoverable natural gas reserves at 20.415 
tcm or approximately 10% of global reserves, behind only Russia, Iran and Qatar. Given the gap 
between Qatar, the third highest proven reserve holders (25.78 tcm) and Saudi Arabia, the highest 
next highest proven reserve holder (6.75 tcm) by BP's estimates, it is likely that Turkmenistan 
falls in between and thus ranks fOUlih. VNIIgaz of Russia's estimate of 7.84 tcm would confirm 
this approach (Skagen: 1997, 6). A similar discrepancy exists between BP's very conservative 
estimate of Turkmen oil reserves at 500,000 barrels (2005: 4) and the 14 November 2005 
Turkmen declaration (see reference above) of 171 billion barrels. The US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) steers a middle course, estimating 1.7 billion barrels proven and a further 38 
billion barrels possible, which would put Turkmenistan in the same potential production league as 
Mexico and Brazil once offshore reserves are developed (IS 5). 
4 
The relationship between the theoretical approach and the case study is intended to be 
symbiotic. Careful analysis of the Turlanen case will assist in the reworking, 
development and refinement of the SRT framework which, in turn, will develop our 
understanding of Turlanenistan's transition from outlying Soviet republic to independent 
nation-state. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: in the next section, the three 
dominant theoretical approaches to the study of post-communist political behaviour are 
examined to consider how they might contribute to our understanding of post-Soviet 
Turlanenistan's political trajectory. Although retaining considerable value in their own 
right, none are considered to be appropriate for either the particular case study or 
objectives of this project. The following section critically examines regime theory as an 
alternative theoretical approach. Situating SRT within this literature, the case is made, 
firstly, for identifying this type of regime as a distinct sub-type and, thereafter, for 
adopting this theoretical framework for the project. The fourth part of this chapter 
elaborates on the rationale for the selection of Turkmenistan as the project's case study. 
The penultimate section explains the methodological orientation 0 fthe study, research 
design and techniques selected, and the sources utilised. The final section sets out the 
structure of the remainder of the thesis. 
Explaining Political Change and Behaviour in Post-Communist states6 
The theoretical approach chosen stemmed from dissatisfaction with prevailing 
explanations ofTurlanenistan's political trajectory after 1992. Prior t 0 developing our 
analysis, it is worth reflecting on why these frameworks, despite their value in other 
contexts, were not considered appropriate for this project. 
The relatively sudden collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the 
subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of a new Eurasian 
political and security architecture, attracted considerable attention from comparative 
political theorists. As a consequence, several theoretical perspectives have been 
operationalised in an attempt to explain the processes of regime collapse and subsequent 
consolidation, and transition to the market economy. The three most commonly used 
approaches can be categorised as transition theory (or transitology), theories of empire 
6 I am grateful to Dr. Neil Melvin for helping to frame my thinking on explanations of post-
communist political change. 
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and nationalism, and theories of political culture: transition theory emphasises the role of 
contingency and human agency, while theories of empire and political culture fall within 
the "prerequisites" school that privileges historical, path-dependent constraints on 
political behaviour (Rustow: 1970, 346-361; Posusney: 2005, 3). Nevertheless, these 
competing approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and scholars have argued 
for the integration of elements of each perspective in order to develop a synthetic analysis 
(Mahoney and Snyder: 1999). While transition theory has undoubtedly proven to be the 
most widely employed conceptual framework, none of the approaches has found 
anywhere near complete acceptance among scholars. For this project, it is contended that, 
while each has explanatory value, none provides a suitable theoretical framework to 
explain regime behaviour in post-Soviet Turkmenistan. 
(i) Transition theory: 
Although transition theory has gained great currency among scholars of post-
communism, an examination of its claims and flaws reveals it to be an unsuitable 
conceptual platform for this project. Transition theory deploys concepts and insights 
developed by comparative political theorists analysing the processes of regime change in 
Latin America and Southern Europe during the 1960s and 1970s. The central component 
of transition theory is its privileging of contingent factors above structural processes as 
critical drivers of regime change. Thus, while structural conditio~s at most delimited the 
possibilities of transition, they did not explain the determinants of democratisation 
(Przeworski: 1986, 48). Instead, the role of elite actors was emphasised, both in effecting 
regime change and in crafting new institutions. In empirical terms, transition theorists 
focused on the interactions of regime reformists ("softliners"), the military, and moderate 
opposition elements as the "craftsmen" of democratisation in Brazil, Peru, Uruguay and 
other Latin American states, and then in Greece (in 1973), Portugal (in 1974) and Spain 
(in 1975) (0' Donnell and Schmitter: 1986; 0' Donnell et at: 1986). 
Despite the often forcefully expressed misgivings of area specialists (Terry: 1993; Bunce: 
1995a; 1995b; 1995c), the transition approach has retained considerable currency in the 
CEE cases, and can be regarded as the dominant paradigm for analysing post-communist 
regime change (Bova: 1991; King: 2000; McFaul: 2002). From an early stage, 
transitologists were alive to the dangers of "conceptual stretching" in applying 
universalistic principles to cross-regional and cross-temporal comparisons of regime 
change. Schmitter and Karl also recognised that there were significant differences in the 
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timing, sequencing and modes of transition between the Latin American and the 
CEE/PSU cases (1994, 175). The withdrawal from power of the military juntas was 
exercised in a more choreographed, but ultimately less complete fashion, than the abrupt 
ruptures of political elites that characterised the Eastern European revolutions of 1989. 
Moreover, Schmitter and Karl concede that the process of successor regime consolidation 
in CEE has been, in many cases, lengthier and ultimately less conclusive than in the 
earlier cases (1994, 173-185). 
Notwithstanding these differences, Schmitter and Karl argued, firstly, that regions were 
cultural constructs and that there was no inherent barrier to cross-regional comparison 
(1995: 967-968). More specifically, they identified notable cross-regional similarities in 
the process of regime transition. These included the "diffusion" or "demonstration" effect 
of regime transitions generating political upheaval in neighbouring states; the generally 
peaceful, pacted transitions in CEEIFSU states from what were soft authoritarian/weak 
post-totalitarian regimes by the late 1980s; the important role played by international 
institutions in both cases (for example, Spain and Portugal's relatively swift admission to 
NATO and the EEC) to "pull" states towards democratisation and civilian control of the 
military; and, most importantly, the fact that the CEE regimes transited definitively 
towards democracy (Karl and Schmitter: 1995,973-976). 
Although the insights of transitologists do have considerable analytical value, principally 
in tracing modes and patterns of regime breakdown and reconsolidation, there are both 
general and specific objections to their use as a theoretical perspective for the study of 
Turkmenistan. As Terry (1993) and Bunce (1995a; 1995b; 1995c) have pointed out, the 
sheer number and diversity of post-communist states in CEEIFSU precludes generalisable 
conclusions. Each of the 27 states involved followed different post-communist 
trajectories, ranging from swift absorption in to Europe's largest economy in the case of 
the German Democratic Republic, to a protracted, clan-based civil war in rural, 
mountainous Tajikistan. Intra-regional comparisons were difficult enough without 
attempting to trace a monolithic transition path that could be compared to Latin America 
and Southern Europe. Moreover, the focus on elite pacting and contingency risked 
marginalising important structural and historical factors, such as earlier forms of political 
organisation, patterns of social stratification and economic development, and, crucially, 
differentials in the type of regimes from which the post-communist states were transiting. 
Moreover, whereas the earlier cases all had pre-existing capitalist economies and the 
process of transition was exclusively political, the post-communist states were also faced 
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with the simultaneous task of transition to market economies and, in several cases, of 
actually defining the borders of their states and fomlUlating new national identities. As 
Carothers notes, transition theory has assumed that democratisation was being 
constructed upon coherent, functioning states, when this was by no means a lways the 
case (2002: 8). Moreover, post-communist states were more industrialised and had 
inherited much more substantial state welfare provision than their Latin American 
counterparts, which would shape political expectations, priorities and trajectories. They 
were also far more ethnically heterogeneous than their Luso-Hispanic counterparts 
which, in turn, engendered specific challenges of assimilation and, in some cases (such as 
Moldova, Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh), civil and military conflict. The physical 
borders in the earlier cases were by and large settled, and so the question of "stateness" 
was less germane than in post-communist cases. 
The profile of civil society was also at variance. The Catholic Church and trade unions 
could be significant political players in Luso-Hispanic democratic transitions. With the 
exception of Poland, the role of these institutions in Eastern Europe was marginal. While 
civil society undoubtedly existed within communist states (either above or underground), 
associational life was defined, in many cases, by its relationship (good or bad) with the 
state, and its contribution to the overthrow of the communist order was markedly 
different. 
Specific factors also complicate the application of this framework to Central Asia, and 
Turkmenistan, in particular. Firstly, the focus of transitions research has predominantly 
been on CEE states. In effect, transitologists have sometimes self-selected their samples 
by declining to investigate seriously the more "difficult" cases further east. Thus, detailed 
analysis of post-communist institutional formation in Central Asia has largely been left to 
area specialists. Secondly, the lack of attention to "stateness" and nationalism misses the 
important nationalising role of political elites. Thirdly, transitions theory has made 
sweeping assumptions on the destinations of postcommunist regimes. As James Hughes 
has observed: 
Transition studies are a rather loose embodiment of political SCIence 
approaches and ideas about the nature of political and economic 
development. A transition is defined broadly as the interlude between 
one regime and another. The common thread uniting the diverse 
transition approaches is a central assumption that the historical 
experience of transformation from authoritarianism to democracy, and 
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the emergence of capitalism in the states of Western Europe and North 
America in the eighteenth century, provides generalisable lessons and an 
analytical framework for understanding and promoting similar processes 
of change and outcomes in other states. The basic premise is self-
evidently normative and linear (2000: 21). 
In the case of the Central Asian states, these assumptions simply cannot hold up, given 
their post-Soviet political trajectories. Political freedoms have declined in at least three 
out of five Central Asian states since the late Soviet era. In Turkmenistan's case the 
dissonance between the transitions paradigm and political reality is even starker. 
Finally, transitions literature tells little about how postcommunist regimes develop, 
operate, reproduce authority, and endure. In other words, it does not address a central 
component of the study, which is to discover the reasons for the seemingly paradoxical 
survival and durability 0 f t he N iyazov regime. There is, therefore, a fatal shortage 0 f 
scope in the literature for this project. Nevertheless, transitions literature has yielded 
important insights into the way in which agential factors can influence transition 
outcomes. Moreover, cross-regional comparison, when used sensitively and carefully, is 
a valid analytical tool which can do much to develop both theoretical and empirical 
insight. However, the range of variables involved in comparing such a large number of 
states undergoing diverse transition paths from very different types of regimes to very 
different destinations means that analytical depth has sometimes been sacrificed in the 
process. 
(ii) Theories of post-imperialism 
The second theoretical approach examined was the literature that frames the collapse of 
the Soviet Union as a breakdown of empire, engendering post-imperial legacies similar to 
those that have afflicted sub-Saharan Africa. Central to this approach is the contentious 
assumption that the Soviet Union was, firstly, an empire and, secondly, in some way 
analogous to that of earlier twentieth century European empires. Thus, according to 
Kolars, "Communism was a tool enabling Russia to resist successfully that liquidation of 
colonialism carried out elsewhere in the world" (quoted in Beissinger: 1995, 149). 
The first assumption to be examined is whether the Soviet Union can be properly 
classified as an empire, and whether Turkmenistan can be appropriately analysed within 
that paradigm. It is beyond the scope of this study to address this question fully. 
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Nevertheless, the balance of modern scholarship, based on newly opened Soviet archives 
in the outlying republics, has increasingly turned to the view that it did have particular 
characteristics of an empire, but that there were huge differences in the mode of 
governance, "colonial practices," and nationalities policy with other modern empires 
(Michaels: 2000; Slezkine 2000; Martin: 2001; Northrop: 2000; 2004). 
The Soviet leadership's anti-imperialist rhetoric required it to establish political structures 
that gave the non-Russian Soviet republics at least the nominal appearance of having 
joined the Soviet Union voluntarily. According to Suny (1993), it was the filling out of 
these "empty capillaries" with real political meaning during the systemic crisis of the late 
Soviet era that provided the platform and a rationale for rising ethnic consciousness and 
nationalism. Thus, by promoting indigenous cadres, transferring resources to the 
. periphery rather than to the metropole as previous imperial powers had done, and by 
framing the political organisation of state and society in terms of ethnic identity in order 
to forestall accusations of imperialism, the Soviet elite inadvertently created the 
instruments of its own demise? 
This perspective h as fed into explanations 0 fp ost-Soviet political behaviour, not least 
because of the continuing discourse of empire within the FSU. Russia is perceived by 
other former Soviet states as having imperial designs, exemplified in the pressure applied 
to Ukraine, the Baltic and the Caucasian states in particular, over ethnic Russian 
citizenship issues, military basing rights, peacekeeping operations, and hydrocarbon 
extraction and transit disputes. As Beissinger argues, perceptions matter and do have an 
impact on policy (1995: 150). The terms of political debate in Russia have also 
contributed to this discourse. At one level, right-wing Russian politician Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky has called for the re-establishment of Russian hegemony across the former 
Soviet space. At another I evel, the influential oligarch Anatoly Chubais advocates the 
creation of a "liberal empire", through the acquisition of strategic industries in the FSU 
states. Recent indications are that Chubais' vision is being realised as Gazprom, Vimpel, 
Unified Energy System (UES), Rosneft, Rusal, Alrosa and other Russian energy and 
industrial giants gain control over power networks, oil and gas reserves, 
telecommunications, metals, construction, mining and chemical sectors throughout the 
FSU states, often in exchange for state debt write-offs. 
? Soviet passports, for example, categorised holders according to etlmicity. Ethno-territorialism 
threw up some extremely complex border demarcations. The small, mountainous Republic of 
Adygeya sat as an enclave within Krasnodar krai, itself part of the Russian Soviet Federative 
Socialist Republic (SFSR) of the Soviet Union. There are seven ethnic enclaves in the Fergana 
Valley that persist, and have given rise to numerous low-level border conflicts. 
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Looking at the challenges faced by post-Soviet states through a post-colonial lens does 
yield some important insights, in that it brings to centre stage the issues of nationalism 
and ethnicity, and deep-rooted structural legacies of external domination that will prove 
to be of value for this project. Nevertheless, such explanations can be interpreted as 
somewhat narrow in range, particularly for an empirical study of Turk men is tan. 
Firstly, to classify the Soviet Union as an empire, at least in the orthodox sense, may be 
somewhat misleading. For much of the Soviet period, certainly before the discovery of 
natural gas reserves in Turkmenistan, Moscow expended considerable energy and 
expense in building an administrative, economic and educational infrastructure in the 
Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), and in developing its cultural identity, most 
notably through the standardisation of the Turkmen language. 
Secondly, the emphasis on the rise of nationalism, meticulously charted by Beissinger 
(2002), tends to obscure many other significant factors in the breakdown of the Soviet 
system, not least the gradual slowdown of the Soviet economy, and the inherent 
contradiction engendered by Gorbachev's attempt to liberalise the political system, while 
still retaining a hegemonic role for Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) 
structures. The post-colonial approach also downplays wider processes of economic and 
social change in post-Soviet Central Asia, and the influence of extra-regional factors such 
as external state actors (Turkey, the US, Iran) or Islam. 
Thirdly, the Turkmen SSR was notable for the almost complete absence of nationalist 
sentiment during glasnost and for its determined attempt to retain its political relationship 
with Moscow. Unlike most other Soviet republics, for example in the Caucasus and 
Baltic regions, the CPTu did not face a significant struggle to combat influential 
nationalist caucuses both inside and outside of Party structures. As a consequence, 
Turkrnenistan's experience does not tie in with central assumptions of the post-colonial 
approach. 
Fourthly, the predominantly structural approach in theories of imperialism downplays the 
role of contingent factors, such as the choices made by significant political actors, in the 
same way that the transitions approach does not generally accord sufficient weight to 
structural factors. A more integrative approach, proposed by Long (2002), and Posusney 
(2005), is required that produces a more rounded analysis, allowing for the self-conscious 
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deployment of structural resources by political actors, whose behaviour, in turn, is 
modified by changing environments (Mahoney and Snyder: 1999,25). 
Finally, theories of post-imperialism do not say enough about subsequent regIme 
trajectories or durability: Their principal focus instead is on the process of decolonisation, 
the struggles against the metropole, rather than any systematic study of its consequences. 
The central question of this project is to understand not only how and why sultanistic 
regimes arise, but also why they persist. 
Thus, while there is much of value, both empirically and methodologically, within the 
post-imperiallhistorical framework, the emphasis on structural constraints it imposes 
means that it is best suited as a contributory component to the conceptual ordering of the 
project, rather than as its theoretical platform. 
(Hi) Political Culture 
Theorists of political culture frame post-Soviet political dynamics principally in terms of 
the continuity of public and elite values, and of institutions, actors and policies within 
longstanding socio-political traditions. Thus, Broken (1996) and Shlapentokh (1996; 
2001) have argued that post-Soviet Russia retains features of early feudalism, pre-
Revolutionary authority relations, and Soviet political practices. Richard Pipes has argued 
that the "totalitarian" origins of the Soviet Union lay in Russia's national culture (1990). 
More recently, an analogy can be made with Daniel Goldhagen's controversially rooting 
of the Holocaust within a German tradition of anti-Semitism (1996),8 while Huntington 
has sought to explain political conflict between Western democracies and Muslims as a 
clash of civilisational cultures (1997). In the post-Soviet states, political continuity and 
engrained habits of political domination and psychological passivity are emphasised in 
culturalist accounts (Holmes: 1996, 26). Data on post-Soviet political attitudes is gained 
through surveys of public and elite opinion, and these are interpreted within a 
predominantly historical framework (Hahn: 1995, 112-136). 
The culturalist approach was not considered appropriate for this project for a number of 
generic and specific epistemological and methodological reasons. Firstly, political culture 
as an analytical tool is notoriously subjective and amorphous. It evades precise definition, 
and is therefore difficult to isolate as a variable. Secondly, assigning a set of cultural 
8 As Hay (2002: 97-100) has pointed out, this paradoxically absolves, at least partially, individual 
or group perpetrators of atrocities from responsibility in the Holocaust. 
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values to any state or nation is dangerously imprecise. It is extremely difficult to identify 
anything approaching universally held values within any society. Thirdly, political 
culture is a rather static explanatory tool. People change their attitudes, learn new ways of 
thinking, and develop their consciousness. Political culture explanations capture past 
rather than emerging agendas. Finally, culturalist explanations tend to overlook the 
interplay of political, economic and social factors. Early culturalist arguments, for 
example, emphasised the incompatibility of Catholicism and democracy in Spain without 
considering the range of other factors giving rise to the Franco regime (Linz: 2000, 18). 
More recent studies have posited. the incompatibility of Islam or Confucianism with 
democracy (Huntington: 1991, 72-85), despite contrary examples such as Turkey, 
Indonesia or Japan, or the positive participation of Muslims in democracies around the 
world. 
Aside from these a priori concerns, there are also specific objections to a purely 
culturalist analysis within the context of this study. Firstly, it is unclear how popular elite 
values either influence policy or attitudes within Turkmenistan given that state and 
society is almost entirely disconnected, and that there are minimal outlets for its 
manifestation or expression. Even during the Soviet period, letter-writing was a form of 
sanctioned feedback for the CPSU, and "tolerated feuds" could occur within the 
academic establishment through journals and conferences (Barghoorn: 1973, 53-70). 
None of this is now acceptable in Turkmenistan. Secondly, it is difficult to envisage how 
we can actually measure the claims made by political culture theorists in Turkmenistan. It 
would not be methodologically feasible to conduct formal surveys of either elite or 
popular values in Turkmenistan. Attempting to interview respondents without building up 
some form prior relationship, or at least confidence, would incur considerable suspicion 
and fear. It is also likely to result in almost immediate detention by the Turkmen 
authorities. Thus, not only is the data received likely to be distorted or compromised, the 
process of data collection itself would be hazardous to the researcher. 
Therefore, although theories of political culture can make an important contribution to 
our understanding of continuities and legacies from the pre-Soviet and Soviet eras, most 
notably in forms of political symbolism and the design of institutional structures used as 
instruments of regime legitimation, they do not carry the breadth or precision necessary 
to sustain a detailed treatment of regime behaviour9 • 
9 An example of the usefulness of political culture explanations in the Soviet context is the 
investigation of the messages, rituals and symbolism of revolutionary iconography, cinema and 
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Regime Theory 
Although the approaches previously outlined all contribute to our understanding of post-
Soviet political dynamics, they do not capture or explain significant and peculiar facets of 
the Niyazov regime - specifically, the emergence of a strongly personalist character to 
the regime, the conversion 0 f functioning public institutions inherited from the Soviet 
system into instruments of personal power, Turkrnenistan's deliberate disengagement 
from interaction with regional partners and international institutions and, most 
importantly, the paradoxical durability of the regime, notwithstanding its manifold 
dysfunctional characteristics. 
While other members of the CPSU nomenklatura adroitly donned the mantle of 
nationalism following the Soviet collapse, and some, such as Heidar Aliyev in Azerbaijan 
and Imomali Rakhmonov in Tajikistan, attempted to project themselves as the 
embodiment of their new republics as part of an exaggerated nation-building posture, 
none has gone remotely as far as Niyazov in actively trying to reshape the social and 
political dynamics of the state so extensively in their own image. 
To answer the Turkmen puzzle, this study has turned to theories of non-democratic 
regimes and, in particular, the SRT framework, which emanated from earlier seminal 
studies of totalitarianism and authoritarianism authored by Linz during the 1970s. Before 
we focus more closely on the work of Chehabi and Linz, however, it is worth situating 
sultanism within the wider theoretical literature on non-democratic regimes. 
Although no overarching theories of non-democratic governance have gained wide 
currency (Brooker: 2000, 7), particular sub-types of such regimes have been the subject 
of sustained theoretical development. The most widely accepted distinction between non-
democratic regime types is that between totalitarian and authoritarian systems, although 
the difference between the two may not always be as complete as theorists allow. 
(i) Totalitarianism 
The principal characteristic of a totalitarian system is its aspiration, and capacity, to 
mobilise its subjects, usually through the medium of a single, exclusionary party headed 
by a charismatic leader-figure, in order to participate in the attainment of the regime's 
art, in order to obtain a sense of the image of itself that the Soviet regime was attempting to project 
(Bonnell: 1994; 1997). 
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transformational goals. Although totalitarianism was described in 1952 by Hannah 
Arendt, writing in the aftermath of Nazi Germany and at the apotheosis of High 
Stalinism, as "permanent domination of each single individual in each and every sphere 
of 1 ife" (quoted in B rooker: 2000, 8), recent research 0 n t he Third R eich in Germany 
(Housden: 1996) and on the Soviet Union (Fitzpatrick: 2001; Merridale: 2000; Petrone: 
2000) attests that, even at the height of Nazi power and Stalinist repression in the late 
1930s, ordinary individuals maintained a private, and sometimes thriving, social life 
away from the eyes of the state. 
Under totalitarian conditions society was, to some extent, atomised, and "lonely" people 
often built social connections through the regime's own "civil society" structures, 
forming a kind of pseudo-community (Thompson: 2002, 82). Nevertheless, the extent to 
which this strategy shaped everyday life was clearly not total. Arendt also privileged the 
role of terror as a core constituent of totalitarian power; however, more recent theorists, 
including Linz, have argued that, while terror may have been inflicted by totalitarian 
regimes, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of their existence, given that 
some totalitarian regimes were able to function without consistent mass repression, and 
even with a substantial degree of popular support (Linz: 2000, 101). 
Although Arendt's classification of totalitarianism has enjoyed enduring popular and 
journalistic resonance, scholarly literature on totalitarianism has moved on. Three distinct 
strands of analysis have developed, most accurately summarised as the political science-
structural typology, the historic-generic version, and totalitarianism as a socio-religious 
phenomenon. Space does not permit an extended critique of these typologies, but they do 
provide an important backcloth to the subsequent framework of SRT, not least because 
Linz emerged as such an influential theorist within this paradigm. 
The political science-structural typology of totalitarianism was initially deVeloped by 
Friedrich and Brzezinski who identified six traits common to totalitarian regimes: an 
overarching ideology; a single party; a terror police; a monopoly on communications; a 
monopoly on weapons; and a centrally directed economy, all married and interwoven 
with a seventh characteristic, a mythical and heroic leader figure (1965). Schapiro later 
added in to this formula the capacity to mobilise society (1972). However, Friedrich and 
Brzezinski were exiles from both Stalin and Hitler. Their vested interest lay in nesting 
two essentially different regimes together in order to influence US foreign policy towards 
the Soviet Union during periods of intense Cold War confrontation. Moreover, their 
definition is static - it fails to explain persuasively, for example, how the Soviet Union 
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evolved during its existence. Important elements of Stalinist rule were not congruous 
with that of either Lenin or Brezhnev, much less Khrushchev or Gorbachev. 
The second strand of totalitarian regime classification is the historical-generic version 
advanced by Ernst Nolte, Richard Shorten and others, which argues that totalitarianism 
can be viewed as a response to structural conflicts and crises in specific societies facing 
an abrupt transition to modernity. Totalitarianism therefore results from a form of anomie 
brought about by rapid and dislocating economic change. It comes to embody a promise, 
and "consists in a once and for all event which represents a solution, however irrational, 
to unresolved problems of mass, industrial society" and, as such, it is "an outgrowth of 
modernity rather than t he simple antithesis 0 f liberal democracy" ( Shorten: 2 002, 2 5). 
From this perspective, totalitarian regimes are not a type as such, but rather as an 
"experience" or "deviation", attempting to bring into existence a utopia in which a new 
man is created (Nolte: 1998, 109-127). Although capturing the dynamic element of 
totalitarian regimes, this approach fails to account for their gradual institutionalisation. It 
would, therefore, appear to be more suited to descriptions of Nazi Germany or Fascist 
Italy, wherein the system could not outlive its leader, than the Soviet Union, where it did. 
Thirdly, totalitarianism has been categorised as a socio-religious phenomenon geared to 
mobilising and, in the process, transforming individuals in the pursuit of a utopian model 
of society (Girginov: 2004, 28). In this analysis, Marxism-Leninism is presented as a 
form of political religion combining a sacral and political monopoly of belief and power, 
in which an intelligentsia longs for an inner-worldly salvation brought about by the 
utopian design of a revolutionary community, and the creation of a socialist paradise 
(Riegel: 2005, 97-126). While t his a pproach can quite effectively capture some 0 f the 
cultural manifestations of totalitarianism - its rites, iconography, cults of personality, and 
use of certain practices such as confessions at show trials - it overlooks entirely the 
deeper political and economic processes that give rise to, and sustain, such regimes. 
Linz essentially drew from, and substantively developed, the political science 
perspective, firstly to liberate analysis of totalitarian regimes from the ideological 
reflexes of the Cold War and, secondly, to account for regime evolution by introducing a 
more sophisticated typological agenda. He stressed three crucial characteristics of 
totalitarianism: (i) a m onistic, but not monolithic, centre 0 f power, in which whatever 
pluralism exists is mediated through, or derives it legitimacy from, the centre, usually 
through the form of an exclusionary ruling party; (ii) an exclusive, autonomous ideology 
beyond a specific political programme, that encompasses some ultimate meaning, sense 
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of purpose, or interpretation of social reality; (iii) the encouragement, demand and reward 
of active citizen participation in collective social tasks that are channelled through either 
a party or monopolistic secondary groups, in which passive obedience or apathy are 
considered undesirable (2000: 70). Thus, although totalitarian regimes can and do 
commit acts of terror and widescale coercion, the unique feature of totalitarian episodes, 
according to Linz, is that these are ideologically driven and justified by a "law of the 
revolution" that supersedes legal-rational norms. 
Linz, along with Stepan, further significantly refined his typology by introducing the 
concept of post-totalitarianism to describe those "post-Thaw" CEE states in which a 
charismatic, all-powerful leader had been replaced by a collective bureaucratic 
leadership, guarding against the re-emergence of a single, dominating figure. According 
to Linz and Stepan (1996: 42), post-totalitarian regimes were signified by the persistence 
of outward forms of a totalitarian society, the formal hegemony of the Party and the 
continuation of political ritual, but where informal pluralism - a second, "shadow" culture 
that allowed privatisation 0 f individual space - had emerged. Conseque~tly, while the 
guiding ideology of the state was still formally intact, participation was increasingly 
perfunctory, with tendencies of duplicity, boredom, cynicism and withdrawal 
increasingly common. 
Therefore, Linz persuasively restates the case for totalitarianism to be retained as a 
political concept, but within a more refined and less ideologically charged framework, 
much more capable of tracing the changing coordinates and patterns of authority relations 
within the regimes in question. 
(ii) Authoritarianism 
In an early, influential essay critically analysing the regime of General Francisco Franco 
in Spain, Linz formulated the now classical definition of authoritarianism: 
Political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, 
without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, 
without either extensive nor intensive political mobilisation, except at 
some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally 
a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but 
actually quite predictable ones (quoted in Linz: 2000, 159) . 
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Essentially, Linz is distinguishing totalitarianism from regimes In which the 
ideological/mobilisational dimension is either not formally translated into policy, is much 
weaker, or is entirely absent (Linz: 2000, 129-139; Brooker: 2000, 163; Thomas: 1984); 
these often stable systems he describes as authoritarian. 
Brooker has developed this notion by identifying three broad types of authoritarian 
regime: party-based, military, and personalist (2000: 36-58). Party-based authoritarianism 
may originate in revolutionary or mass "movement-regimes" of the kind that 
characterises early post-colonial governance in Africa (a typical example being Zanu-PF 
in Zimbabwe), they may be exclusionary in nature such as the National Party in apartheid 
era South Africa, or they may simply be entrenched in power for decades, as was the 
Institutional Revolution Party (PR!) in Mexico between 1929 and 2000. 
Different typologies of authoritarian military rule have been developed by Perlmutter 
(1981), N ordlinger (1977) and Huntington (1967) among others. Such regimes can be 
categorised as having three broad sets of governing functions (the contemporary 
examples are my own): firstly, the military acting as direct ruler with ambitious reach 
across society, exemplified in Myanmar; secondly, the military as arbiter, moderator or 
guardian of a particular ideological path (such as secularism in Turkey) or ruler (for 
example, President Hugo Chavez in Venezuela); thirdly, what Huntington, drawing on 
the post-war history of Latin America, calls the "praetorian society" in which middle-
ranking officers stage coups to promote, and later protect, the interests of middle-class 
nationalists as opposed to oligarchic elites represented by the senior officer corps. 
The third form of authoritarian rule can be defined as personalist. Weber contrasted 
traditional or charismatic rule, where legitimacy is derived principally from the position 
or qualities of the leader, with "legal-rational" forms of governance, in which the ruling 
system can function impersonally, independent of the preferences and personality of its 
chief executive (Brooker: 2000, 52). 
Linz further classified personal rulership into four distinct sub-categories (Linz: 2000, 
143-157). Oligarchic democracy is used to describe the b lend between traditional and 
modem authority structures found in the Maghreb (particularly Morocco and Tunisia), 
and in South East Asia (notably Thailand. and Malaysia), in which strong, traditional 
authority figures, usually monarchs, are effectively buttressed by economic 
underdevelopment a nd an unmobilised population who, nevertheless, enjoy a range 0 f 
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circumscribed civil liberties, and are able to elect partially democratic political 
institutions as a weak and often temporary counterweight to executive power. 
The second group of personal regimes is described as caudillismo rule, found in Central 
and Latin America, and essentially consisting of rule by armed patrons, usually large 
landowners and nobles, whose authority is based on social ties of kinship and clientelism, 
in which the ruler would appear to provide a measure of security, conditional upon 
loyalty to him and his group. Linz observed such trends in Latin American military 
dictatorships and, although caudillismo rule is generally underinstitutionalised and 
characterised by violence, it can sustain relatively stable links with business, foreign 
governments and social forces, particularly the commercial middle classes, for significant 
periods (Linz: 2000, 156). 
Caciquismo forms 0 f r ulership can bed istinguished from c audillismo by virtue 0 f t he 
vertical links rulers have with local bosses or "chiefdoms". It thus stands as a more 
heterogeneous set of patron-client relationships in which centrally based political figures 
are connected through a chain of vertical interlocking patronage interlocking networks to 
the local "machine" boss or caciques. These political arrangements have formed the 
political infrastructure of m any Luso-Hispanic states (Linz: 2000, 156), and appear to 
mirror political arrangements in Sicily and Calabria (Catazanero: 1992). 
The fourth subcategory of personal rulership adapted by Linz from Max Weber's early 
typological breakdown of regime is described as sultanistic, a form of rule characterised 
by distinctive origins, manifestations and trajectories, and, unlike caudillismo and 
caciquismo, found across diverse regions and cultures. 
(iii) Terminological and Historiographical Issues in Suitanistic Regime Theory 
It is important at the outset of the study to clarify our use of the word sultanism. Given 
that sultanism invariably carries negative connotations of arbitrary, kleptocratic, bizarre 
and often brutal forms of governance when applied to recent or contemporary regimes, 
there is a danger that its usage may be perceived as orientalist or anti-Islamic. As Chehabi 
and Linz are at pains to note (1998a, 6), and I reiterate, no such intention is meant. The 
term was originally coined by Max Weber in the 1920s. Although Weber may well have 
had in mind certain Middle Eastern rulers when constructing the regime typology, he also 
applied the term "sultanistic" to rulers in China, which indicates that he did not intend the' 
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usage to be specific to any region. In the period since Linz revived the tenn in 1975 for 
his seminal study, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (2nd ed. 2000), it has been 
used to describe regimes in states as geographically and culturally diverse as Nicaragua, 
Haiti, Central African Republic, Zaire, Belarus, Romania, Iran, Libya and the Philippines. 
In this sense, sultanism as a term of political analysis appears to have outgrown any 
regional a ssociations it might 0 nce have (weakly) had. Finally, unlike the c aliphate, a 
sultanate was a secular office carrying no specific religious connotation. 
Chehabi and Linz fonnulated SRT from the earlier work of Linz on authoritarian regimes 
(1990; 2000), and a workshop of leading scholars convened by Samuel Huntington at the 
Center for International Affairs, Harvard University in June 1990. The workshop was 
planned and held at a point at which the bipolar international system was in the throes of 
breakdown, yet the contours of the post-communist political order were still unknown. 
The focus of SRT case studies was, understandably, on authoritarian regimes that were 
used as Cold War proxies to further the regional ambitions of the US and, to a lesser 
extent, the USSR. Several longstanding sultanistic rulers in fonnerly strategically 
sensitive regions of Central America, Africa and the Middle East found that their style 
and practices of authoritarian governance, which had been either overlooked, or even 
encouraged by their erstwhile superpower patrons during the struggle for global 
ideological supremacy, were now unacceptable to an international community that was 
holding to account regimes failing observe minimum standards of human rights and 
political pluralism. Accordingly, the context of SRT development was one of great. 
ideological fluidity, but its content was innately reflective and historical. An important 
task of this project is retune SRT into a very different geopolitical environment to that 
which prevailed at its fonnulation. 
(iv) What are SuItanistic Regimes? 
Although a full critique of SRT will be undertaken in the following chapter, establishing 
the characteristics of sultanistic regimes at the outset of the thesis has value in 
introducing the regime type, and establishing the parameters of the thesis. Building on 
the earlier work of Linz on presidential systems (Linz: 1990), and on Alfred Stepan's 
theoretical insights into differential revolutionary or democratic outcomes of regime 
change (Stepan: 1986), Chehabi and Linz recognised that t here existed vast structural 
differences between authoritarian regimes (Chehabi and Linz: 1998a, 6). They developed 
their analysis of sultanistic behaviour, therefore, to describe a system in which a 
predictable pattern of governance is subverted and even dismantled by the personal, 
arbitrary decisions of rulers, who feel they have no need to justify their preferences, 
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either on ideological or policy grounds. The broad initial definition of this regime type 
was adapted from Weber's path-breaking Economy and Society: An Ou~line of 
Interpretive Sociology, written in the mid-1920s. Weber defined a sultanistic system as 
one in which: 
Traditional domination develops an administration and a military force 
which are purely personal instruments of the master ... where domination is 
primarily traditional. .. it will be called patrimonial authority; where indeed it 
operates primarily on the basis of discretion it will be called sultanism. 
Sometimes it appears that sultanism is completely unrestrained by tradition, 
but this is never in fact the case. The non-traditional element is not, however, 
rationalised in impersonal terms, but consists only in an extreme 
development of the ruler's discretion. It is this which distinguishes it from 
every form of rational authority (1978,231-232). 
Using Weber's broad definition, Linz and Chehabi firstly enumerated the manifestations, 
characteristics and bases of sultanistic regimes - essentially a typological snapshot of a 
"typical" sultanistic regime, in order to create a theory of sultanism. They then developed 
a second theory, which essentially sought toe ncapsulate at eleological perspective, to 
explain the structural preconditions for sultanistic regime development, and account for 
their subsequent trajectories and patterns of regime breakdown. A supplementary 
theoretical chapter authored by Richard Snyder sought to combine structural and 
voluntarist perspectives to explain how both domestic and external political actors 
interact to negoti'ate paths out of sultanistic regime situations. 
Absence of legal-rational norms: According to Linz and Chehabi, the central 
characteristic of a sultanistic regime is !he absence, or erosion through time, of legal-
rational norms of governance (Chehabi and Linz: 1998a, 7-17). The ruler exerts power 
with minimal restraint, through a matrix of fear and rewards. Accordingly, administrative 
. and bureaucratic rules are disregarded or subverted by the imposition of arbitrary 
personal decisions. T he career paths of staff i n the civil service, state enterprises and 
armed forces, for example, are not determined by a set of abstract criteria that would lead 
to promotion on professional merit. Instead, the sultanistic ruler hires and fires staff on a 
personal whim, or on the basis of family connections. 
Government officials a re frequently rotated or dismissed to prevent the emergence of 
alternative power bases. Sultanistic rulers, such a s President Ferdinand M arcos in the 
Philippines, President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi in 
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Iran, did periodically bring in technocratic expertise to reorganise and streamline state 
structures. However, the principal purpose of this exercise was to extract foreign credits 
and aid from international lending institutions and, once these had been secured, the ruler 
effectively subverted or ignored International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank 
strictures by introducing sufficient exceptions so as to render the plans meaningless. 
Similarly, Jean-Claude Duvalier ("Baby Doc") brought in a number of technocrats to 
"impress the United States" but within " ... a short time ... he had dismissed a number of 
them, some due to his wife's objections, and others because they actually intended to 
fulfil the assignment" (Green in Chehabi and Linz: 1998a, 12). Ministers are frequently 
rotated, dismissed and reinstated in sultanistic regimes on the whim of the ruler, with 
Mobutu and Duvalier having a particularly high turnover of officials. 
Nepotism and Corruption: The subversion oflegal-rational norms is also manifested by 
a fusion of state and regime, specifically in the dispensation of privileges and favours. 
Thus, the regime is invariably endemically corrupt. Family members are placed in key 
political positions, the wives of such rulers often exert an inordinate influence on policy, 
and there is frequently a dynastic element to the regime, with sons especially playing a 
prominent, and often destructive, role in the political arena. Imelda Marcos, Elena 
Ceausescu, and both Simone Ovide Duvalier and Michele Bennett, married respectively 
to Francois and Jean-Claude Duvalier, all forged "conjugal dictatorships", politically 
dominating their husbands to an increasing degree as their regimes eroded (Thompson: 
1995; Behr: 1991, 139-142; Nicholls: 1998, 159). 
As in Haiti, where Jean-Claude Duvalier succeeded his father Franyois in 1971, there 
were dynastic successions in Nicaragua, where Anastasio Somoza Garcia was succeeded 
by his sons Luis and Anastasio Somoza Debayle in 1956, in North Korea, where Kim 
Jong 11 followed Kim 11 Sung in 1994 and, most recently in February 2005, when 
President Gnassingbe Eyadema, who ruled Togo for 39 years as a personal dictatorship, 
was succeeded by his son, Faure Gnassingbe, in direct contravention of the succession 
arrangements in the Togolese constitution. 
However, there has, as yet, been no successful dynastic transition to a third generation. 
The sons of first generation sultanistic rulers are, almost without exception, political 
liabilities. Having been born into privilege, they lack the political cunning of their fathers 
and, in the cases of Tommy Suharto, Nicu Ceausescu, Marko Milosevic, Uday and 
Qusay Hussian, among several others, squander both the resources and political capital 
their fathers acquire. By contrast, most first generation sultanistic rulers emanate from 
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socially marginal backgrounds which, for them, are a frequent source of insecurity and 
embarrassment. Leaders such as the Duvaliers, Fulgen9io Batista of Cuba, President 
Omar Bongo in Gabon, R eza Shah and A nastasio S omoza G arcia all" married up" to 
acquire legitimacy, to co-opt the support of traditional elites, and to access wealth and 
business connections (Chehabi and Linz: 1998a, 17) .. 
. The nepotism of the regimes is reflected in the corrupt activities of the wider families 
(Hartlyn: 1998, 95). Reza Shah's twin sister, Princess Ashraf, had "a near legendary 
reputation for financial corruption," as did her son (Katouzian: 1998, 199). Jean-Bedel 
Bokassa, President (and later self-designated Emperor) of the Central African Republic, 
allowed his wife and mistress to operate monopoly concessions on the manufacture and 
supply of school uniforms, which led to a rebellion by schoolchildren in April 1979, 
resulting in over 100 deaths (Decalo: 1989,8). The close relatives of Ferdinand Marcos 
controlled customs and taxation bureaus, the Central Bank, the Medicare Commission, 
and even Marcos' aged mother headed the monopoly supplying rice and corn 
(Thompson: 1998, 221). Among contemporary sultanistic regimes, Ali and Pascaline 
Bongo are Defence and Foreign Ministers respectively under their father, who has ruled 
Gabon continuously since 1967, and President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of 
Equatorial Guinea, the nephew 0 fPresident Francisco N guema, served a s head 0 fthe 
presidential administration before seizing the presidency by overthrowing and executing 
his uncle in 1979. 
Constitutional Hypocrisy: If the extended family represents the core political "unit" of 
the sultanistic ruler, the official political arrangements of sultanistic states are 
characterised by what Linz and Chehabi term as "constitutional hypocrisy" (Chehabi and 
Linz: 1 998a, 17). Formal political parties m ay exist b ut they a re normally devoid 0 f 
content or function. The opposition Martom party, for instance, existed only on paper in 
Reza Shah's Iran (Katouzian: 1998, 193). The programmes and policies of these phantom 
parties are essentially designed to provide a fig leaf of pluralism for external 
consumption and, as such, are simply instruments of the regime (Hartlyn: 1998, 94). The 
formal political arrangements of sultanistic states frequently embody the use of earlier 
constitutions or representative bodies to produce a fa9ade of democracy but, in reality, 
the regime remains securely in control of the political process, manipulating the 
outcomes of elections and referendums (if, indeed, they are held at all) to enhance its 
legitimacy (Chehabi and Linz: 1998a, 17; Booth: 1998, 141). Linz and Chehabi also note 
that some rulers exercise the "politics of understudy" (politique de doublure) by not 
always adopting formal positions of power. Kim Jong n, Manue1 Noriega in Panama, the 
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Somozas, and Trujillo, all preferred not to occupy the post of formal head of state 
(Chehabi and Linz: 1998a, 17; Buzo: 1999). 
The relationship between rulers and other public institutions can be problematic. 
Although, as has been noted, rulers might utilise the services of external technocrats to 
modernise and streamline the state sector, where the regular military has a tradition of 
autonomy and professionalism, and a defined career structure, it may present a 
significant problem to sultanistic rulers. In these instances, the military is either subject 
to close political control, or else marginalised. Instead, paramilitary forces, such as the 
Duvaliers' feared Tontons Macoute in Haiti, the security services and a personally loyal 
presidential guard, often function as a parallel set of security institutions (Nicholls: 1998, 
164-165). Unsurprisingly, therefore, the armed forces frequently occ~py the crucial 
interstices of power between opposition forces and the ruler should the regime begin to 
break down (Booth: 1998, 148; Thompson: 1998,226-229). 
Personalist traits: The cultural dimension of sultanistic regimes invariably revolves 
around glorification of the ruler. According to C hehabi and Linz, t he most prominent 
manifestations of this trait are the tendencies of sultanistic leaders to acquire or invent 
titles, and to construct a pseudo-ideology of self-justification (1998a, 14-15). Thus, Reza 
Shah became Aryamehr ("Light of the Aryans"), Ceausescu was named Conducator, Idi 
Amin awarded himself a CBE ("Conqueror of the British Empire"), and Bokassa 
proclaimed himself Emperor. Texts attributed to Reza Shah, Mobutu, Ceausescu and 
Marcos all became required reading in schools and universities. National movements and 
official ideologies, such as Francois Duvalier's noirisme, the Jamahiriyya regime of 
Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, and Mobutu's authenticite were created as exaggerated 
state-building projects. Sultanistic leaders have also left their mark through toponyms, 
naming cities after themselves, such as C iudad Truj illo and D uvalierville, a nd natural 
landmarks, notably Lake Idi Amin and Macias Nguema Island. 
In sum, sultanism has been identified by Chehabi and Linz, and adopted by other 
comparative political theorists, as a distinctive sub-type of authoritarianism in which the 
ruler acquires and exercises more or less unchecked power, governs with scant regard for 
legal-rational norms, subverts or remodels pre-existing political and security institutions 
for his short-term political interests, operates the state treasury as his own and his 
family's private exchequer, and constructs around himself a pseudo-ideological 
. framework, to justify his policies, predilections and prejudices. 
24 
Chehabi and Linz stress that no regime can conform to an "ideal-type" in all its 
manifestations. However, as a discrete categorisation of a subset of authoritarianism, 
there is a sufficiently distinctive set of common traits to warrant further investigation and 
study. It is true that sultanism is exceptional, but that should not preclude systematic 
investigation. The study of exceptional and unusual cases allows us to probe the limits of 
"normal" cases and the logic that governs them. It provides greater contextualisation for 
the study of orthodox authoritarian governance, generates new research questions, and 
may reveal a larger universe or pattern of exceptions than has hithe110 been realised, that 
in itself may be worthy of further examination (Schatz: 2004, 112). 
(v) Sultanistic Regimes as a Distinct Sub-Type 
Given the traits outlined above, it is important to pin down how and why the rule of a 
sultanistic leader including Niyazov differs from that of earlier totalitarian leaders, 
particularly Stalin, with whom Niyazov is most commonly compared (Kleveman: 2003; 
IS 8). Superficially, there are similarities. In fact, a favourite adjective used to describe 
Niyazov's rule among journalists and regional specialists alike is "Stalinist". In both 
cases, the style of governance is arbitrary. Rule is by fear or coercion (more so under 
Stalin it would seem), although favours are sometimes surprisingly dispensed. Unlike 
Hitler who, apart from specific military operations and urban planning, was often 
uninterested in policy detail, both Niyazov and Stalin immerse themselves in the minutiae 
of state affairs, including cultural policy. 
Both Stalin and Niyazov's worldview is one in which nature provides a tabula rasa for 
domination, exploitation a nd modification. For example, Stalin used G ulag inmates to 
built the huge and largely unused Stalin White Sea Canal (Applebaum: 2004), great store 
was given to making the Far North habitable (Widdis: 2003, 219-240; McCannon: 2004, 
241-260), Moscow was substantively redesigned (far more so than Hitler's Berlin) 
pursuant to a plan personally approved by Stalin in July 1935 (Overy: 2004, 223), and 
Stalin's architectural ambitions were manifested in the unbuilt Palace of the Soviets 
(Hoisington: 2003, 41-68) and the enormous domestic housing experiments such as the 
Narkomfin Communal Complex in Moscow (Buchli: 2000, 99-135). Niyazov shares this 
gigantomania, transforming the urban landscape of Ashgabat with miles of fountains, 
parks, monuments, statues and kitsch buildings. Niyazov insisted on the completion of 
the Karakum canal despite its disastrous effects on the ecology of the Aral Sea. A huge 
. 
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reservoir in the Karakum desert, one of the hottest places on earth, is under construction 
(IS 9). 
Similarly, extensive cults of personality have been constructed around both men, 
manifested in texts, rites, parades, slogans and portraits. An argument advanced later in 
this study is that Niyazov has consciously appropriated many of the appurtenances, 
instruments and iconography of Stalinism into his own regime, possibly as a result of 
peculiarities in his own upbringingto. 
Yet, despite these similarities in the manifestations of their rule, which might suggest that 
Niyazov is more appropriately studied as a totalitarian, there remain crucial distinctions 
with Stalinism in the regime's content that disqualify Niyazov and other sultanistic 
leaders from categorisation under this rubric. As a preliminary comment, although Linz 
disqualified terror as a necessary condition of totalitarianism, he did point out that it was 
a feature of many totalitarian regimes at some point in their existence. It is worth noting 
therefore that Niyazov has never resorted to the sort of mass terror t hat characterised 
Stalinism (regardless of whether it was personally authorised by Stalin [Fitzpatrick: 
2000]). 
Taking the characteristics of sultanistic regime behaviour set out above, it is clear that 
such systems differ substantively from both totalitarianism and other strands of 
authoritarianism in several fundamental respects. Firstly, sultanistic regimes do not 
possess the crucial mobilisational element or ideological dimension characterising 
totalitarian societies, most notably Stalin's Soviet Union, Nazi Germany and Mao's 
China. In a sultanistic regime, the "heroic" leader-figure embodied by, say, Hitler or 
Mao, is not present, nor is he backed by a powerful party that aims to transform society. 
This is certainly the case in Turkmenistan, where the only legal political party is 
effectively a shell. For a sultanistic ruler, by contrast, mere obedience is sufficient. 
Sultanistic regimes are therefore more likely to be characterised by a flattened political 
landscape and an absent or severely diminished civil society, than a party state of an 
orthodox authoritarian hue might be. 
Secondly, sultanistic regimes are singularly dependent on the personal network 
surrounding the leader, comprised principally of close and extended family and trusted 
acolytes, such as bodyguards and drivers drawn from the leader's personal retinue. This 
10 For recent, illuminating discussions on the cult of Stalinism see Ennker (2004a; 2004b) and, 
more generally, Plamper and Heller (2004). 
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network is instrumental both politically and economically in fusing state and regime, 
through their appointments to formal positions within government bureaucracy and their 
control over lucrative monopolies and trading concessions. In authoritarian systems 
based on military junta, party rule or revolutionary "movement-regimes", such overt 
nepotism is either absent or much weaker, and in totalitarian states, the party has an 
autonomous structure and rationale set apart from the leader. 
Thirdly, a sultanistic ruler's relationship with state institutions is much more problematic, 
particularly in societies where a pre-existing tradition of professional autonomy in 
government bureaucracy or the armed forces. The regime's penetration within both 
government and public institutions is much more uneven than under either totalitarian 
regimes or those linked to the military. They therefore represent a potential threat that 
must either be eliminated through continual purges and rotation of staff, or sidelined and 
bypassed by the creation of parastatal institutions such as a powerful presidential guard 
loyal to the ruler, or a shadow presidential administration that carries informal authority 
above the state bureaucracy. 
Fourthly, sultanistic regimes lack the predictability of authoritarian governments where 
power is diffused among a ruling oligarchy, the military or party structures. The caprice 
and whim of the ruler becomes an important calculation in domestic politics, as the ruler 
becomes less constrained by legal-rational norms. Inevitably such traits then impact on 
the coherence of the policy field itself, with frequently contradictory and confusing 
results. 
To summarise, Chehabi and Linz viably identify, within the various strands of non-
democratic governance, the distinct characteristics of a particular sub-type of regime. 
They stress that while no regime can completely confonn to an "ideal-type" in all its 
manifestations, t here do appear to be common traits a cross cultures, regions and time 
spans to warrant a discrete categorisation of a sultanistic subset of authoritarianism, 
worthy of further investigation. 
(vi) The case for using Sultanistic Regime Theory 
What, then, is the specific case for using SRT in this particular study? Firstly, SRT 
provides a valid macrostmctural framework, albeit in need of some renovation and 
development, toe xplain the emergence 0 f extreme personalist systems 0 f governance. 
Although SRT underplays the agential element in the formation of sultanistic regimes (an 
omission addressed in this thesis), partly understandable by the general nature of the 
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theory, it does provide a workable set of preconditions for the emergence of a discrete 
strand of extreme personalistic rule. 
Secondly, SRT captures the principal characteristics of extreme forms of patrimonial 
behaviour quite effectively, and convincingly makes the case for a distinctive sub-type of 
regime nested within the totalitarian/authoritarian regime classification. Unlike the other 
theoretical approaches, it actively engages with the influence of external factors on 
domestic political outcomes. It also draws out the centrality and implications of the 
rejection of legal-rational norn1S and the imposition of a "fear and rewards" culture 
within domestic politics. 
Thirdly, SRT offers an explanation for regime trajectories - how sultanism develops, 
regresses and disintegrates. Although SRT omits to analyse how those subjected to this 
type of governance respond to, or resist, sultanistic rule, SRT does capture effectively the 
process of regime collapse in those cases where sultan ism has collapsed. It therefore 
offers an opportunity to build into the theoretical framework those cases, of which 
Turkmenistan is one, where the regime has proven to be durable. 
Finally, SRT makes cross-regional and cross-temporal comparisons that invigorate and 
extend theoretical enquiry. In order for successful comparative political analysis to be 
conducted, a detailed appreciation of dynamics within each country is required. In other 
words, comparative theory is dependent on area studies specialisms. This project fits in 
with this paradigm. By developing what was an essentially reflective and historical 
theoretical framework into the contemporary post-communist context, supplemented by a 
detailed case study of intrinsic empirical value, the project aims to expand the data set 
and, by doing so, contribute to the development of comparative political theory generally, 
and regime theory more specifically. 
In sum, SRT has many of the elements missing from alternative explanations of post-
communist transition in Central Asia. It is situated within an established regime theory 
literature, captures the critical elements of regime behaviour effectively, and utilises 
sophisticated cross-regional and cross-temporal comparisons without undue conceptual 
stretching. It is therefore well-suited for adaptation to post-Soviet regime dynamics, both 
as an empirical analytical tool, and as a means to reinvigorate and develop the theoretical 
framework itself. 
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(vii) Case Selection: Why Turkmenistan? 
There were several candidates for a possible case study of the sultanistic regime type 
among the FSU states, including the regime of President Alexander Lukashenka in 
Belarus, Azerbaijan under the late President Heidar Aliyev, President Islam Karimov in 
Uzbekistan, and President Imomali Rakhmonov in Tajikistan. A dual or triple country 
analysis within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) between two of 
Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, was considered. 
However, it was rejected both on the grounds of feasibility (it was difficult enough to 
conduct fieldwork on one country), and because the principal aim of the project was to 
test a case study in order to develop the theoretical framework, rather than to undertake a 
regional comparative study of the processes of transition or systems of governance 
between former Soviet states. Accordingly, it is intended that the in-depth, intrinsic, 
single case study (Silverman: 2000, 111-112) can be extrapolated cross-regionally and 
even cross-temporally, rather than compartmentalised into a transitological paradigm. 
In terms of the parameters of the study, Turkmenistan was a good fit. To begin with, it 
has the most developed sultanistic traits of all of the regimes, illustrated by the examples 
of Niyazov's behaviour and policies provided at the start of the chapter. On a personal 
level, I had gained fairly substantial prior knowledge of the country through independent 
and business travel, previous postgraduate focus on Central Asia, and by working as a 
political analyst covering Central Asia for a business risk consultancy. 
In relation to the chosen theoretical framework, the current regime came to power in its 
present form after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union (and thus 
after the symposium that substantively developed SRT). The regime of Saparmurat 
Niyazov is not, therefore, a Cold War "holdout" of the sort that persists in sub-Saharan 
Africa or the Maghreb, and so is also an intriguing test of sultanism emerging within a 
post-communist and post-Cold War context. Furthermore, prior to incorporation into the 
Russian Emplre and the Soviet Union, Turkmenistan had no prior history of independent 
statehood and still retains very strong tribal allegiances, which frequently overlay 
nationalist loyalties. Since independence, Turkmenistan has pursued a policy of 
permanent neutrality and disengagement from regional security institutions and 
economic integration mechanisms. As a case study, therefore, it tests several of the 
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structural conditions for sultanism analysed in the following chapter pertaining to pre-
existing state cohesion, persistent crises of sovereignty, and external interference. 
Finally, Turkmenistan's economy is also highly dependent on revenues derived from the 
export of hydrocarbons. Natural gas accounts for approximately 70%, and crude oil and 
petrochemical products a further 23%, of the country's entire export earnings (IS 10). 
Turkmenistan is therefore a classic rentier economy of the type my hypothesis suggests 
are associated with sultanistic regimes. In sum, the Turkmen case appears to accord 
closely with the typology established by Chehabi and Linz, and fits well with the broader 
objectives of the thesis. 
Methodological Orientation and Research Techniques 
It was decided at an early stage that the most appropriate methodological orientation for 
the project would be to conduct qualitative research based on unstructured interviews and 
field observation, supplemented by analysis of official documents, domestic and foreign 
news sources, analytical reports, and a range of other seco~dary data. Given the subject 
matter of the thesis and restrictions on conducting fieldwork in Turkmenistan, 
quantitative methods were not deemed to be either practical or appropriate for the overall 
research strategy. Preparing questionnaires and conducting surveys on the opinions of 
Turkmen towards the regime was out of the question. Turkmenistan is ranked 1651h. out 
of 167 countries in the Worldwide Press Freedom Index 2005 prepared by Reporters 
Without Borders, above only Eritrea and North Korea (IS 11), and is designated as one of 
the world's least free states by Freedom House, scoring seven (the highest possible mark) 
for limitations on both political rights and civil liberties (IS 12). 
Access to the country would have been refused had notice been given of an intention to 
do survey work. Alternatively, attempting to conduct surveys without official permission 
would have undoubtedly resulted in not only my detention, but almost certain 
interrogation and punishment for any survey respondentsll. 
(i) Interviews 
The decision to conduct unstructured interviews was determined by several factors. 
Firstly, I did not want to "close off' the interview at the outset by restricting the 
11 A Swedish colleague, conducting quantitative research on ~he social legacy of "closed" cities in 
the mush less restricted environment of northern Kazakhstan in 2001, was investigated by the 
local security services in Ust-Karnenogorsk, detained for several days in prison, and had the 
entirety of his research notes confiscated. 
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infom1ation that I was seeking. Unstructured interviews often provide a richer array of 
data by encompassing issues that do not initially occur to the interviewer (Burgess: 1984, 
102). Secondly, I was conscious of the need to build trust with the interviewees, several 
of whom were very cautious a bout the process, fearing potential repercussions should 
knowledge of our discussion reach the Turkmen authorities. Accordingly, my questions 
were as flexible and conversational as possible in order to allow an opportunity for 
interviewees to relax, and offer uninterrupted responses in their own manner and time-
frame. Thirdly, in accordance with the methodological literature on interview techniques, 
I was conscious of allowing interviewees to develop their own chronology in order that a 
free-flowing, comprehensive, clear and contextualised picture of their understanding of 
events and processes could be developed (May: 1993, 101; Gray: 2003, 107-125). 
Sequential interviewing was particularly useful for the two interviews with respondents 
recently granted asylum status in the UK., both of whom were somewhat traumatised and 
alienated in their new surroundings (Interviews 1 and 22). 
The decision to undertake a small number of elite interviews with those artists, architects 
and sculptors responsible for the creation of the visible symbols of Niyazov's cult of 
personality was motivated by the rare opportunity to acquire knowledge on the secretive 
commissioning process, and to seek to understand how and why they became "court 
artists," and what their feelings were about Niyazov's regime. The value of elite 
interviews has been well-documented in the methodological literature (Ethridge: 1990, 
193; Richards: 1996, 200-201; Devine: 2002, 208-215), but there are also drawbacks to 
this approach, notably the difficulties in gaining access to the respondents, the more 
practised and skilled "closing down" of questioning that is perceived to be hostile, and 
the self-serving and hence unreliable responses of interviewees keen to either claim credit 
or shift the blame on particular issues. The interview data acquired in this manner has 
therefore been interpreted and used in a reflexive and cautious manner (Ekinsmyth: 2002, 
184). 
Almost all published studies of sultanistic regimes using in-country field interviews have 
been completed retrospectively, after the ruler has died or been deposed. The reasons for 
the limited number of contemporaneous sources on su1tanisti~ regimes became apparent 
as I began planning fieldwork in Turkmenistan. The country is effectively closed to 
foreign visitors, apart from a small number of tourist and essential business visas granted 
each year. All letters of invitation are subject to approval from the State Agency for the 
Registration of Foreigners (SARF). Having been granted two business and two tourist 
visas by SARF (probably because of the very low numbers of tourists to Turkmenistan), I 
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faced the problem of contacting interviewees, maintaining confidentiality in the interview 
process and obtaining permission for internal travel. I was able to enjoy freedom of 
movement in the capital city of Ashgabat without an official minder. I had obtained 
initial contacts in the city beforehand with the assistance of an academic and diplomatic 
network based outside the country, and these interviews provided the basis for the first 
set 0 f data. Telephone lines in Turkmenistan a nd I nternet activity a ~e subject to close 
monitoring by the authorities. The hotels in which I was staying were equipped with 
listening devices, and a member of the Komitet Natsionalnoi Bezopastmosti (KNB)12, the 
country's internal security service, was assigned to follow me covertly, although they 
were often not particularly competent or discreet in their work. The utmost care was 
therefore taken in arranging and conducting interviews, and all fieldwork notes were 
coded. 
Travelling outside Ashgabat city limits was not permitted without a guide appointed by 
an approved travel agency. Fortunately, the guide I was assigned was an ethnic Russian 
with no ties to the regime and who operated on the margins of legality13. He had little 
interest in monitoring my activities, and I was therefore accorded latitude in meeting with 
local residents in the places where we stayed. In four separate research visits, I was based 
in Ashgabat but also stayed in Mary, Turkmenbashi (formerly Krasnovodsk) on the 
Caspian Sea coast, Balkanabat (formerly Nebit Dag), Nokhur (a remote tribal village at 
the Iranian border in the Kopet Dagh mountains), and in the settlements of Erbent and 
Darvasa in the centre of the Karakum desert. Given the strong regional and tribal 
identities in Turkmenistan, it was important to visit and undertake interviews in a diverse 
number of locations in order to obtain an urban-rural, ethnic, tribal and geographical 
balance ofrespondents. Niyazov's home region is in the Ahal region, which includes 
Ashgabat. Travelling to other parts of the country was useful from the perspective of field 
observation in that it allowed me to gauge, to some degree, the reach and penetration of 
the cult of personality surrounding Niyazov. This, in turn, sheds light on both the scope 
of the government's ambitions and the cult's target audience. 
With the exception of meetings held with official national sculptors and architects, it was 
not possible to conduct interviews with Turkmen government officials. All interviews 
with Turkmen citizens in Turkmenistan were conducted without official permission and, 
in most cases, undertaken covertly. As noted above, two dissidents from Turkmenistan, 
12 The KNB is still known by this title throughout the country, despite being officially renamed as 
the Ministry of National Security (MNS) by the government in 2002. The KNB is the successor of 
~~e Komitet Gos~darstvellno~ Bezopasllosti (KGB), the State Security Committee of the USSR. 
For more details, see the biography ofInterviewee 24. 
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who fled the country following their involvement in the November 2002 coup attempt, 
and were subsequently granted political asylum in the UK, were also traced and 
interviewed in depthl4• Finally, a handful of interviews were conducted with foreigners 
who have had considerable experience of living and working in Turkmenistan. 
Information on the dates and locations of all the interviews used, and the biographies and 
ethnicities of the interviewees, is given in the Appendices Three and Four. 
(ii) Field Observation 
Field observation is a research technique more associated with the disciplines of 
anthropology, ethnomethodology and critical geography than political science (Shurmer-
Smith: 2002). However, it was considered the most appropriate method for understanding 
manifestations of the cult of personality, embodied in the processes of urban regeneration 
for monumental construction, the formulation of a hegemonic national political memory 
, 
(Etkind: 2004, 40), and the relationship between politics and public sculpture, 0 fficial 
ritual and national symbolism (Fowkes: 2004; 2002, 65; Kertzer: 1988, 175; Benton: 
2004b). Field observation was used on all four research trips: in 2002 and 2003 to 
observe the rush of new memorial complexes constructed in and around Ashgabat, 
including at Kipchak, Niyazov's birthplace; in November 2004 to observe the destruction 
of residential areas in Keshi and central Ashgabat to make way for new memorial 
complexes and projects; and in May 2005 to observe the remembrance ceremonies and 
celebrations in Ashgabat for the 60th anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War. 
Field observation proved to be an interesting and instructive method of charting the 
modulations in Niyazov's cult of personality. To take one example, at the observation 
level near the top of the Arch of Neutrality, Ashgabat's tallest monument, I recorded the 
entire urban landscape of Ashgabat in a series of photographs i~ October 2002 and 
14 Gunmen opened fire on Niyazov's motorcade on the morning of 25 November 2002 as it 
travelled from Niyazov's country residence to the presidential palace. Niyazov had gained 
intelligence of the plot and was not travelling with the motorcade. Following an intensive four 
week manhunt, former Foreign Minister Boris Shikhmuradov, believed to have been in exile, was 
arrested in Turkmenistan and charged with organising the coup. It transpired that Shikhmuradov 
had been in contact with the US embassy and had sheltered in the Uzbek embassy for several days 
after the incident. Turkmen a gents raided the embassy, searched diplomatic cars and bags, and 
interrogated embassy staff in breach 0 f diplomatic protocol. The details 0 fthe p lot have never 
been definitively established, with some analysts claiming that it may have been fabricated as a 
pretext to arrest potential opponents. The interviews conducted with those associated with the 
incident (Interviews 1 and 22), alongside analysis of textual sources, indicate that the coup attempt 
was genuine. The mass arrests and alleged torture of family members of those allegedly involved 
that followed triggered the OSCE's Moscow Mechanism, for the first and only time since 1993, to 
investigate alleged human rights abuses. 
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November 2004. Comparing the two records in montage revealed striking differences in 
the number of portraits of Niyazov visible across the city on each set of photographs, 
which corroborated evidence from interviews and other sources of the evolving 
symbolism and vocabulary of the cult of personality. This and other examples convinced 
me that undertaking an interdisciplinary research topic requires a researcher to adopt 
similarly flexible interdisciplinary research methods. 
(iii) Textual Sources 
The Turkmen government publishes only a very small quantity of official documentation, 
and even this is not openly available. For example, despite extensive research, 0 nly a 
handful of the country's official laws and official decrees could be located. The national 
archives are closed to all foreign scholars and are used by a handful of approved local 
researchers, loyal to the regime. The academic establishment in Turkmenistan has been 
decimated since 1991. The Turkmen Academy of Sciences was closed in December 
1997, and several universities and individual faculties have either been abolished or 
reorganised since 1993. An indication of this is the decline in the number of students in 
higher education from approximately 40,000 in 1994 to 3,500 in 2004 (IS 13). There are 
no research institutes pursuing projects independent of government, and the media is 
under close state control. 
All national television news programmes and newspapers focus almost exclusively on the 
daily activities of Niyazov, and there is very limited reporting of either domestic or 
international news. One of my research visits coincided with the Al Qaeda bombing of a 
Bali nightclub on 12 October 2002. This event received almost no coverage in the official 
media. Similarly, several murders in the southern city of Mary during June and July 
2005, believed to be the work of a serial killer, went entirely unreported in the Turkmen 
official media, leading to the proliferation ·of rumours and panic in the city (IWPR RCA 
40 I, 4 August 2005). 
Consequently, a patchwork of source materials has been used in order to construct a 
systematic picture of how Niyazov's regime operates. In addition to fieldwork interviews 
and official data, the texts ofNiyazov's speeches, published either in Miras, the country's 
only academic journal of note, or on the official website have been studiedls . 
Turkmenistan is highly unusual in that there appears to be no samizdat material 
IS http://www.turkmenistan.gov.tm. 
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circulating, at least not any that has come into the possession of foreigners. Checks were 
carried out with Turkmen nationals based both within and outside the country, and with 
sources from the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, but they also had no record of 
internally produced dissident documents, other than anti-Niyazov leaflets once placed in 
residential mailboxes overnight (THI Bulletin: 12 August 2004). 
The most comprehensive source of official data and analysis on the country is the 
Turkmenistan Weekly News Brief (TWNB) published by the Open Society Institute 
Turkmenistan Project (OSI TP). TWNB collects and reprints domestic and International 
news stories from official and unofficial domestic and foreign media sources ina weekly 
bulletin. Every bulletin of TWNB has been carefully analysed since its inception in 
February 2003. The principal sources used before (and after) this date include the 
Turkmenistan Daily Digest (TDD), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Turkmen Service 
(RFEIRL TS) and the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press (CDPSP). Every RFEIRL 
TS weekly bulletin published since 1997 has been scrutinised. 
There are inherent dangers in relying on these source materials. The OSI was founded by 
the billionaire financier and currency speculator George Soros with a defined political 
mission which "aims to shape public policy to promote democratic governance, human 
rights, and economic, legal, and social reform ... and build alliances across borders and 
continents on issues such as combating corruption and rights abuses" (IS 14). The OSI 
has either been refused entry or ejected from all the Central Asian states apart from 
Kazakhstan, where it is subject to close government scrutiny. 
Similarly, RFE/RL is funded by US Congress, and has operated in various forms since 
1949, firstly as an instrument of propaganda warfare against the Soviet regime, and 
latterly as a vehicle to spread democratic values across the FSU.The self-proclaimed 
mission of RFE/RL is "to promote democratic values and institutions by disseminating 
factual information and ideas ... based on democracy and free-market economies" (IS 15). 
Notwithstanding these qualifications, both TWNB and RFE/RL TS do report to a high 
standard and, in the case of the former, reprint without comment domestic sources on 
internal developments. Nevertheless, in case of selection bias on the part of the editors of 
these publications, I have supplemented and cross-checked their publication with weekly 
reviews of the CDPSP, the News Central Asia (NCA) agency, and the Lexis-Nexis 
Executive (L-NE) and Factiva news databases. International institutions such as the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions 
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and Human Rights (OSCE ODllIR), the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), the IMF, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) provided data on 
human rights issues and economic performance. Finally, I refer to reports and bulletins 
prepared by a variety of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as International 
Crisis Group (lCG), International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF), Turkmen 
Initiative for Human Rights (TIHR), Memorial Human Rights Centre (Memorial HRC), 
Institute for War Peace Reporting (IWPR) Reporting Central Asia (RCA) service, 
Transitions On line (TOL), Turkmenistan Helsinki Initiative (TI-II) , and items on 
opposition websites such as Gundogar (http://www.gundogar.org), Watan 
(http://www.watan.ru), and Dogry Yol (http://www.dogryyol.com/eng/). Accordingly, as 
complete a data set as possible has been assembled in the time available, covering 
political, economic, social and cultural developments in Turkmenistan since 1991. 
Thesis Structure 
The remainder of the thesis comprises six substantive chapters and the conclusion. 
Chapter two examines the theoretical framework used for the project in greater depth. 
The central argument advanced is that, while SRT provides some important clues for 
scholars seeking to explain the emergence of sultanistic b~haviour, the causal analysis is 
, 
substantively underdeveloped, both in the lack of attention paid to the (potentially) 
pivotal role of agency in effecting transition to sultanism, and also in their explanation of 
the structural basis of sultanism. The chapter interrogates the bases of sultanism with 
more rigour, and then goes on to consider the function and manifestation of power more 
abstractedly in order that we can identify explanations for the longevity of such regimes. 
Chapter three explores the structural conditions that facilitated the development of 
sultanism in Turkmenistan. Through historical analysis of the Turkmen peoples and 
lands, it locates several core factors linked to the traditional political and social order, 
patterns of economic development and the experience of external control under the Soviet 
system, which go some way to explaining how Niyazov was able to accumulate power, 
and the techniques and motifs he has deployed to maintain his position. The chapter takes 
care to link the Turkmen case with comparative societies and with the theoretical 
framework. 
Chapter four focuses down on the specific political ascent of Niyazov, and the political 
and policy choices made by both himself and the Soviet elite at critical junctures in the 
breakdown of the Soviet Union. It is argued that these help to explain how Niyazov was 
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able to sideline opponents and mould the new political order according to his particular 
conception of power and democracy. However, the chapter argues that power cannot be 
located in sultanistic societies purely through analysis of formal institutions. Accordingly, 
the chapter seeks to map some of the informal power networks that both sustain and 
threaten Niyazov's hegemony. 
Chapter five considers the techniques employed by the regime to exercise and reproduce 
power. It is argued that Niyazov uses three specific techniques - coercion, patronage and 
cultic symbolism - which, when combined, create a "disciplinary-symbolic" complex of 
power. In particular, the chapter considers how the cult of personality surrounding 
Niyazov is used to manipulate and activate space, symbols, texts and memory in support 
of the regime. 
The purpose of chapter six is to develop the theoretical framework substantively by 
looking at the complex and contradictory responses sultanism in Turkmenistan has 
engendered. Arguing that SRT's "top down" approach to looking at the regime misses 
out on important nuances of sultanistic rule, it suggests that the range of responses and 
typology of resistance that regime provokes is a significant factor in the Niyazov 
regime's paradoxical durability. 
Chapter seven places the Niyazov regime within an international context. It seeks to 
understand how the regime has successfully managed to avoid being subject either to 
sustained pressure from an external patron, or to severe international censure. The 
principal argument advanced is that Niyazov's strategy of disengagement, neutrality and 
pursuit of carefully circumscribed functional bilateral relations with specific partners, has 
paid dividends in effectively keeping him off the radar screen of the international 
community. The empirical findings of this chapter are then used to update and refine the 
theoretical framework. 
The concluding chapter aims tot ies up the strands of t he hypothesis by revisiting the 
central research question, in the light of the empirical investigations. It suggests that, 
while the theoretical approach selected is the most suitable and rewarding explanation for 
the emergence of sultanistic regimes, it requires development and refinement if it is to 
remain valuable in the contemporary environment. It briefly considers how the project's 
findings may contribute to emerging research agendas focusing on cross-regional and 
cross-temporal comparison, may also shed light for historians seeking to account for the 
rise and durability earlier personalist rulers, and help those seeking to explain the 
LEEDS UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 37 
rationale for, and e ffeets 0 f, superpower sponsorship 0 f such regimes during the Cold 
War. The conclusion also looks at Turkmenistan itself, assessing possible regime 
trajectories for Niyazov and the opportunities and challenges presented after he leaves 
office. It suggests that while the cultic paraphernalia associated with Niyazov might be 
quickly shelved and forgotten, the failure to a ttend to basic state-building tasks in the 
aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union is likely to create an egregious legacy for 
his successor. 
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Chapter Two: Sultanistic Regime Theory 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we situated the conceptual framework of the project within the 
wider theoretical I iterature, established the core tenets 0 f sultanistic regime behaviour, 
and set 0 ut the rationale for its application to a study of T urkmenistan. The principal 
objective of this chapter is to consider the theoretical framework in greater depth. In 
particular, the preconditions for the emergence of sultanistic regimes laid out by Chehabi 
and Linz are subject to critical interrogation. A critical component of SRT is the 
relationship between sultanistic rulers and external actors. The case is made for a 
substantial revision of the assumptions relating to the role of foreign "patrons" in 
sustaining contemporary sultanistic regimes. Finally, the chapter seeks to extend the 
scope of SRT by locating the sources of power and authority within sultanistic regimes 
and integrating them into the SRT framework, in order that we can attain a more 
sophisticated understanding of how sultanistic rulers operate and maintain their 
hegemony. 
While SRT has been operationalised by several scholars attempting to make sense of 
contemporary regime behaviour in Africa, the Middle East and the FSU, there has been 
only limited critical appraisal of either the content, or context, of SRT itself in order to 
assess its applicability to the contemporary political environment. This issue is especially 
salient given that SRT was developed in order to examine personalistic variants of 
authoritarian rule that emerged largely in response to the exigencies of the Cold War. 
The essential argument advanced in this chapter is that SRT remains a valuable 
theoretical tool for the examination of systems of extreme personal rule. However, the 
framework does have several important core deficiencies and lacunae that require further 
interrogation. In particular, SRT remains underdeveloped in its analysis of the basis and 
mechanics of sultanistic rule, and of the responses engendered by it: in essence,· how 
sultanistic governance arises, functions and maintains itself. In this chapter, I will 
specifically address the theorisation of the basis of sultanism offered by Chehabi and 
Linz, and tighten this up by sorting through, clarifying and substantively developing their 
analysis. 
Secondly, the chapter considers how SRT can be developed to account for the longevity 
of many sultanistic regimes. Thinking about the way in which sultanistic rule is applied 
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and reproduced led to wider reflection on the nature and practice of power. The 
maintenance of control is identified in sultanistic situations by the application of physical 
coercion, in combination with the extensive use of patronage and the cultural 
management of social relations through the production, appropriation and manipulation 
of space, concrete and verbal symbolism, ritual, texts, and memory. More specifically, I 
argue that this mixture of "hard" and "soft" techniques of control form a "disciplinary-
symbolic" complex in Turkmenistan that explains why Niyazov's seemingly 
dysfunctional regime remains surprisingly durable (Wedeen: 1999). These control 
techniques are then addressed in more detail in chapter five of the thesis. 
Thirdly, SRT remains silent on the reactions engendered by sultanistic rule amongst its 
recipients. Mapping out responses to sultanistic behaviour stimulated thinking about how 
complicated and highly personal strategies of accommodation and opposition to 
government could be in manifestly unfree societies, traversing a spectrum from outright 
and open hostility from a handful, covert resistance from a minority, and "the politics of 
duplicity" (Kligman: 1988) and accommodation from the majority, in which 
participation, compliance, deceit and resistance are practised by the same person, often 
on the same day. Analysis of responses to sultanism adopted by those on the receiving 
end of personalistic rule is vital, in order to tell us more about the regime-type itself, and 
how its power is reproduced or undermined. Chapter six extends this "resistance 
analysis" through fieldwork interviews and observation conducted as part of the case 
study. 
Finally, the relationship that Chehabi and Linz describe between sultanistic regimes and 
external powers requires careful evaluation following the reconfiguration of the global 
security environment engendered by the end of the Cold War. In short, what impact has 
the withdrawal of superpower sponsorship had on contemporary sultanistic regimes? The 
case is made in this chapter for a substantial revision of the assumptions relating to the 
role of foreign "patrons" in sustaining contemporary sultanistic regimes, notably in that 
for contemporary sultanistic regimes, the absence of an external patron now strengthens 
rather than diminishes the survival prospects of the ruler. This theme is developed 
empirically in chapter seven. 
Reconfiguring, and to some extent rebuilding, the theoretical framework has thus been an 
interdisciplinary exercise, embracing political economy, history, anthropology, urban 
geography, subaltern and cultural studies, undertaken with the aim of developing a 
rounded picture of a how an unusual variant of authoritarian rule emerges, functions and 
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survives. As a consequence, I have developed a solid understanding of the political 
dynamics in comparator states as discrete as Gabon (Yates: 1996), the Philippines 
(Thompson: 1995), Libya (VandewaIIe: 1998; Anderson: 1999), Chile (Remmer: 1989, 
149-170) and Romania (Kligman: 1998; Deletant: 1994; Behr: 1991); gained insight into 
the economic trajectories of states as diverse as Haiti (Nicholls: 1998), Congo-
Brazzaville (Bayart et al: 1999; Cl ark: 2002), Qatar (Chaudhry: 1994), Angola (Hodges: 
2001), Bahrain (Herb: 1999) and Venezuela (Karl: 1997); and acquired an appreciation of 
the cultural-political strategies of Stalinism (Dobrenko and Naiman: 2003; Plamper and 
HeIIer: 2004; Brooks: 2000; Fitzpatrick: 2001; Petrone: 2000), "mature" Eastern bloc 
socialism (Crowley and Reid: 2002; Crowley: 2004; Apor et al: 2004), Kemalism 
(Kinross: 2001), fascism (Falasca-Zamponi: 1997; 2004) Nazism (Spotts: 2000; Kershaw 
and Lewin: 1997; Housden:1996), Asadism (Wedeen: 1999, 1999) and Maoism (Terrill: 
1999)16. I have also glimpsed the terrain and tactics of resistance to repressive 
governance in Malaysia (Scott: 1985), the American Deep South (Scott: 1990), Equador 
(Korovkin: 2000), and the German Democratic Republic (Kopstein: 1996). Although not 
laying claim toe xpertise in any 0 ne 0 f these s ubdisciplines, condensing and distilling 
cross-regional and cross-temporal comparisons has enabled me to contextualise and 
theoretically ground the empirical in-country knowledge gained from the chosen case 
study. 
The Bases of SUltanism 
After setting out their typology of sultanism's defining characteristics, Chehabi and Linz 
attempt to identify the factors giving rise to this form of rule (1998b). Although this 
aspect of their analysis is somewhat underdeveloped, the conditions identified in 
facilitating the emergence of suItanistic tendencies do provide clues as to how and why 
such regimes can be so durable. 
Firstly, Chehabi and Linz place their emphasis on "macrostructural" factors common to 
sultanistic regimes, but overlook the agential factors, the idiosyncratic and personal 
motives which "often possess important explanatory value" (Decalo: 1989, 11) 
particularly in a context of underinstitutionalisation. This point is worth developing 
briefly, given that structure and agency each form part of a common ontology (Hay: 
2002, 113). Both structure and agency are interdependent and mutually constitutive. 
They should not be analysed, as Giddens suggests, as opposite faces of a coin, but rather 
16 As Jackson has pointed out, culture has emerged as u a domain in which economic and political 
contradictions are contested and resolved" (1989: 3), and is a key source for tracing the relations 
and negotiations of dominance and subordination. Where culture is, in its broadest anthropological 
meaning, so is there politics. 
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"as metals in the alloy from which the coin is forged" (Hay: 2002, 127; Marsh and 
Furlong: 2002, 17-41). Thus, although structure and agency remain analytically 
separable, agential factors should be woven into the analysis to make it more nuanced 
and textured, rather than set up as an alternative set of causal explanations. 
Decalo stresses the influence of contingent, behavioural dynamics in fluid societies with 
power vacuums, lifeless institutions, and a prostrate civil society (Decalo: 1989, 189). 
Such contexts are congenial to power plays and political gambits by aberrant and 
maladjusted personalities with political aspirations. Clearly, Chehabi and Linz could not 
realistically be expected to map out the circumstances of each sultanistic ruler's rise to 
power. However, their analysis misses something of the situational dynamic developed 
by Dogan and Higley (1998), which attempted to conceptualise elite choices a t acute 
regime crisis points, in order to capture the agential dimension of political rupture. 
Accordingly, in the case study of Turkmenistan that forms the central part of this thesis, 
Niyazov's patterns of decision-making during the period 1989 to 1991, when the Soviet 
government's reach across the Union republics began to recede, will be studied carefully 
in order to examine their subsequent influence on the mechanics and trajectory of the 
post-Soviet regime. A single case study is therefore valuable as "thick description" on 
which to base further comparative scholarship. 
Secondly, the analysis of factors "favouring the emergence of sultanistic regimes" 
(Chehabi and Linz: 1998b, 26) is somewhat thin. These factors are divided into two 
causal explanations: socioeconomic conditions and persistent crises of sovereignty, 
together comprising a "macrostructural" subset (Chehabi and Linz: 1998b, 26-33); and 
the breakdown of clientelist democracy, and the decay of authoritarian and totalitarian 
regimes (which is somewhat confusing given the claim made by Chehabi and Linz that 
sultanism itself represents a variant of authoritarianism), forming the second "political 
institutional" subset (Chehabi and Linz: 1998b, 33-37). The remainder ofthis section will 
seek to critique and develop these causal factors in order that we can anatomise 
sultanistic regimes more effectively. 
(i) Macrostructual factors in the emergence of sultanism: socio-economic conditions 
Chehabi and Linz isolate three economic conditions necessary for sultanism to develop: 
"a modicum of development" and "a certain modernisation of transport and 
communications"; the presence of "easily exploitable natural resources whose production 
is in the hands of one or only a few enterprises with high profits can provide the 
resources for such a regime, especially when elites are weak" (Chehabi and Linz: 1998b, 
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27); the influx of "massive doses of foreign aid or loans can encourage corruption, 
especially if the aid is unconditional" (Chehabi and Linz: 1998b, 27). 
The first of these conditions is too vaguely forn1Ulated to be testable, particularly as it 
could be argued that almost all nation-states now have "a modicum of development" and 
some degree of modernisation. The third condition does have a partial degree of 
explanatory power. It is true to say that massive. influxes of foreign loans and aid can be 
corrupting, but this has been the case regardless of whether the regime is, or becomes, 
sultanistic or not, as the case of Russia, where the Yeltsin administration received $22 
billion in IMF loans between 1992 and 1998, has amply demonstrated. However, such 
loans do constitute a form of economic rent which, when considered alongside the 
second condition, the high profits from a country's natural resource endowment, adds up 
to a more general proposition that unearned income, rather than aid or loans per se, 
might be a factor in the emergence of sultanistic regimes. To investigate this further, it is 
necessary to develop the passing reference Chehabi and Linz make to the "rentier 
economy" (Chehabi and Linz: 1998b, 27). 
Economic factors can impact considerably on the notion, fonn and development of the 
state and the efficiency of its functions (Beblawi and Luciani: 1987a, 5). Moreover, 
economic growth, as measured by a year on year increase in Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), does not necessarily reinforce or stabilise a particular government. In fact, if 
revenue is predominantly derived from external economic rents, GDP growth can 
generate such increased expectations as to require the government to "buy off' actual or 
potential opponents (Beblawi and Luciani: 1987a, 7). 
Rent can be defined in this context as "reward for ownership of land and resources -
income from the gift of nature" (Beblawi: 1987,49). Rents can take different forms: they 
can be extractive (e.g. the liquidation of finite reserves of resources such as oil and gas), 
locational (e.g. transit royalties on pipelines or waterways such as the Panama or Suez 
canals), portfolio (interest on existing investments), labour remittances from nationals 
working overseas (particularly important for developing countries), or capital receipts 
from drawdown of reserves (Stauffer: 1987,25-26). 
Where rents are derived from the extraction of natural resources, the state tends to 
mediate access to, and rewards from, the relevant sector. What emerges is a circulation, 
rather than a production economy, in which the principal aim of political actors is simply 
to access the rent circuit. Thus, rather than extracting tax from, and redistributing income 
to, its citizens, thereby creating a relationship in which the government can be held 
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accountable for its actions, the state's function in a rentier economy is simply to allocate 
rents received. Economists classify allocation (or exoteric) states as those which receive 
more than 40% of their income from one source and where government spending 
consists of a substantial share of GDP. Luciani cites Oman, where oil accounts for 90% 
of government revenues and t he state expends 5 5% 0 f G DP, a sac lassic rentier state 
(1987: 71). 
Economic dependence on one commodity derived from natural resource endowments 
particularly, has the capacity to greatly affect and shape political institutions. Bergesen 
and Haugland's comparative study of two petro-states, Angola and Azerbaijan, bears this 
out: 
Natural resource endowment has not been positively correlated with 
economic development and social progress. Rather the contrary, 
international statistics show that countries rich in natural resources had a 
performance which is markedly poorer than those countries that have 
possessed few natural resources (2000). 
The principal economic impact is in the form of "Dutch Disease", named after the 
sudden influx of revenues from North Sea natural gas exports in the Netherlands during 
the 1960s. In this scenario, the domination of foreign export earnings causes the 
exchange rate to appreciate, which then negatively affects other sectors of the domestic 
economy. Domestically manufactured goods become increasingly uncompetitive, leading 
to an increase in imports, and the decline of the non-resource sectors of the economy 
(Hodges: 2001, 3). Moreover, the government's focus on the resource base providing the 
rental income frequently leads it neglect these other sectors, leading to what Gelb (1988, 
8) cans "dual depletion" of both the prime commodity reserves themselves, and also 
those of the neglected sectors (Cl ark: 1997, 67-68). 
In political terms, the ready stream ofrental income frees the state from the need to enact 
fundamental political and economic reforms, to extract revenue and, in extreme cases, 
even to formulate a basic macroeconomic policy. If the state does not require anything 
from its citizenry, it has no need, in turn, to consult with them, leading to a breaking of 
the accountability linkage between government and people (Ross: 2001, 332). 
The political outcomes of such a fracture between government and citizenry have several 
facets. Firstly, government, with the ruler at its head, becomes the apex of a pyramid of 
patronage networks, granting monopoly concessions or licenses to favoured supporters, 
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and buying off potential or actual opposition. To take one example, the political loyalty 
of historically prominent trading families who might come into conflict with the oil 
monarchies of Kuwait or Qatar is thus purchased through the granting of exclusive 
sponsorships for foreign goods, such as luxury car dealerships, or through preferment in 
lucrative government construction contracts (Crystal: 1989, 430-432; Beblawi: 1 987b: 
53-62). Similarly, the leaders of Congo-Brazzaville expanded the civil service massively 
with meaningless jobs to furnish extensive patronage networks once oil rents began to 
accrue (Cl ark: 1997: 68). 
The case of Libya, in which the Jamahiriyya regime of Colonel ~u'ammar al-Qadhafi 
exhibits many classic sultanistic tendencies, offers an instructive case study of an 
extreme oil/gas rentier state: 
In distributive states such as Libya, where rulers make few compromises 
with their citizens to obtain revenues, the nature and structure of political 
and economic institutions reflect that relative autonomy of the state ... in a 
highly peculiar fashion. Because of the unique way in which revenues 
accrue, rulers do not have to create elaborate tax gates, rules, or 
mechanisms to help decide whom to tax, or when, or at what level. 
Creation of wealth in such states does not rely on the traditional categories 
and mechanisms of nature, markets, or effective economic statecraft. It 
does not require the state to elicit more than perfunctory loyalty or enforce 
good behaviour. Conflicts over distribution and welfare can be avoided as 
long as distributive largesse can be maintained; the state only adjudicates 
in rudimentary fashion" (VandewaIle: 1998, 171-172)17. 
The tendency to expand patronage networks is exacerbated by the limited lateral linkages 
natural resource extraction has to other sectors of the economy. Firstly, a resource 
nomen/datura (Hodges: 2001, 139) emerges, often related by marriage or clan, to patrol 
and modulate access to the rent circuit. Secondly, limited lateral linkages leave 
untouched, pre-existing patronages networks in the rural economy, inhibiting 
development or reform of that sector (Karl: 1997, 63). Thirdly, limited linkages to non-
resource sectors mean that there is great polarity in income between those who are part of 
11 
However, there are inherent limitations in extrapolating Libya's case further because, with 
Qadhafi's aim being the pursuit of statelessness, and the Jamahiriyya's failure to advance a 
national political idea, allied to sparse institutional resources and the absence of political 
participation, the country's post-oil future may be uniquely bleak (Vandewalle: 1998, 181-183), 
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the rent circuit, together with those who work in the relatively small number of technical 
professions associated with resource extraction, and those who have been excluded from 
the rent circuit altogether. 
The concentration of revenue streams from a single, defined (and therefore much easier 
to control) source in to a state apparatus that lacks strong, well-developed institutions, 
usually leads to a fusion of state and regime. The ruler becomes the sole provider in the 
dispensation of national wealth. State coffers and the personal treasuries of the ruler 
become intertwined, leading to the emergence of a kleptocratic economy based on 
plunder (Bayart et al: 1999, 71). President Bongo of Gabon was conservatively estimated 
to be worth $500 million in 1996 (Yates: 1996,210-212). The assets ofReza Shah's 
Pahlavi Foundation, a charitable front group fostering official corruption, were calculated 
at $1.05 billion in 1977 (Katouzian: 1998, 1999). Mobutu's nationalisation of Zaire's 
diamond and copper mines enabled him to accumulate personal wealth estimated at 
between $4 billion and $7 billion by the time he was deposed in 1997 (Wrong: 2001, 92-
93). 
Senior military officers may be co-opted into the rent circuit by being given lucrative 
concessions to control the process of arms procurement but, otherwise, the middle-ranks 
of the regular military may be excluded from patronage networks. Instead, rulers use 
resource revenues to create parastatal forces, such as a Presidential Guard or paramilitary 
militias to protect the rent circuit and its chief patron. Resource economies are 
characterised by t heir abnormally high spending 0 n internal security functions, giving 
rise tow hat R oss terms" the r entier-absolutist" state, characterised most 0 bviously by 
Pahlavi Iran and contemporary Saudi Arabia. The social base of the regime is eroded as 
dialogue between civil society and government diminishes or ceases (Najambadi: 1987, 
218). Democracy, to the extent that it exists, becomes "stultified" (Yates: 1996, 36), not 
least because there is no political pressure to sustain the educational levels and 
occupational specialisation that nurture a pluralist society (Ross: 2001, 337). 
Instead, the government tends to undertake large-scale capital projects as a means to 
absorb domestically the influx of petro-( or other resource) dollars. Karl' s detailed study 
of the effects of oil on Venezuela found that many of these projects are ill-conceived, 
poorly planned, and disastrously executed (1997, 64). 
The management of resource wealth is a challenge for any society, regardless of its 
institutional strength. However, rulers of rentier economies almost always fail to 
adequately sterilise revenues abroad to alleviate the economic distortions inflicted by 
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large inflows of extractive rents (Karl: 2000, 37-40). Even fewer attempt to enhance the 
state's underlying capacity by creating an interlocking institutional infrastructure that 
protects property and contract rights, and undercuts entrenched patronage networks 
(Chaudhry: 1994, 1-7). 
Thus, although Chehabi and Linz do not develop their hypothesis of the socio-economic 
causes of sultanism with any great rigour, one of the three conditions they cite, albeit 
with the one treated in an extremely abbreviated form, is likely to be an important 
structural precondition of sultanistic regimes. Rentier economies provide rulers with the 
economic "insulation" and concomitant freedom to effectively dispense with political 
institutions and any form of accountability. They furnish rulers with the means to either 
subsidise or, through heavy investment in internal security functions, neutralise potential 
opponents. Rentier economies sustain and nurture patronage networks. They enable 
rulers to acquire the instruments of internal repression that represents "hard power" as 
well as the financing of elaborate "soft power" techniques associated with cults of 
personality. In short, they enable a ruler to introduce the techniques of "disciplinary-
symbolic" control that are the defining modes of political domination in sultanistic 
regimes. 
(ii) Macrostructual factors in the emergence of sultanism: crises of sovereignty 
Chehabi and Linz contend that a common factor in sultanistic regimes is that "throughout 
their contemporary history their independence was ambiguous and often not respected by 
more powerful neighbours" (Chehabi and Linz: 1998b, 28). Most of the states cited in 
this respect are located in Central America. Haiti, Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama and the 
Dominican Republic have all been subjected to official or unofficial interference by 
successive US governments in the twentieth century. Pahlavi's Iran and the Philippines 
under Marcos were de facto us protectorates, whose economic and foreign policies 
coincided with US interests. Francophone Black Africa was, and still is, subject to 
considerable political and economic influence from France. The case made for Romania 
is weaker. Under Ottoman rule until the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Romania 
nevertheless was one of a number of Balkan, and indeed European, countries which 
gained sovereignty as a result of the parcelling out of spheres of interest by the Great 
Powers after the Russo-Turkish War ended in 1877. It is difficult to argue that this event 
precipitated the extremes of Ceausescu's rule, particularly as Bulgaria and the territory of 
what was to become Yugoslavia, had equal if not more traumatic infringements to their 
independence in the same period. Instead, the persistent weakness of the Romanian state 
might be a more useful explanation. 
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The substantive argument therefore appears to be that states with a history of extemal 
interference, be it in the context of formal or "informal" empire, are more predisposed to 
sultanism. Chehabi and Linz give two possible explanations for the intervention oflarger 
states. Firstly, the intervention by more powerful states arises from their sensitivity to the 
strategic location of the client state (Chehabi and Linz: 1998b, 31). For example, the US 
has long been aware that, for all its historic strategic immunity, Central America is the 
one "soft underbelly" susceptible to left wing movements acquiring political power. 
Secondly, the inability of the client state to service its debt invites external subsidy, in the 
form of loans or aid, in order to prop up the regime (Chehabi and Linz: 1998b, 31-2). 
This, in tum, forms part of the rent circuit that sustains sultanistic behaviour. 
Neither of these two explanations appears to be entirely satisfactory. Both would appear 
to describe situations that might sustain a sultanistic ruler in situ, but not account for the 
emergence of sultanistic behaviour in the first place. However, as with their analysis of 
the socioeconomic basis of sultanism, Chehabi and Linz may be making an important 
point that requires further development. 
Theories of empire, as Michael Doyle has argued (1986: 22-30), have tended to be either 
metrocentric, focusing on the disposition of forces in the metropole that leads to imperial 
expansion, or pericentric, focusing on the colonial experience from the perspective of the 
colonised. Doyle suggests understanding of the continuous process of interaction 
between metropole and periphery, within a dynamic intemational system, is also crucial 
to developing a comprehensive and nuanced theory of imperialism. Part of ,this entails 
tracing the influence that formal imperial rule has on the structures and reach of post-
colonial govemance and, secondly, the continuing relationship between the former 
imperial power and its colony after decolonisation - for instance, the transfer from 
formal to informal empire that characterises the political structures and processes in 
contemporary Francophone Africa. 
Where e xtemal power is projected into a region, t he shape, reach and textures of the 
political institutions created match the requirements, predilections and ideals of the 
external power. In the European colonial experience, this translates, most notably, into 
the creation of territories that served the administrative needs of empire but did not 
reflect the heterogeneity of the populations within that territory. Once decolonisation 
occurred, these administrative territories then emerged, often ill-suited to the task, as new 
nation-states. A second problem was that colonial government only engaged with a small 
elite of the titular population. Consequently, early post-colonial elites were faced with the 
task of melding fractured and politically disengaged societies into viable nation-states, 
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without the overlay of empire to arbitrate and mediate between internal differences. 
According to Decalo, authoritarianism was, "for insecure political elites, the preferred 
(easiest) and possibly most culturally sanctioned modality of governing complex, 
multicleavaged societies'~ (1989, 3). 
Thus, the activation of "culturally sanctioned" patronage and clientelist networks within 
a weak and "unembedded" institutional setting, bequeathed by departing colonial powers, 
proved to be a congenial political setting for rulers to develop distinct, more or less 
"institutionless" and often dysfunctional polities based around the will of the chief 
patron, thereby creating a "dynamic world of political will and action that is ordered less 
by institutions than by personal authority" (Jacks on and Rosberg: 1982, 12). Sultanistic 
regimes are therefore more likely to emerge from "artificially" constructed weak states, 
stretched across ethnically, politically a nd economically inchoate spaces, wherein p re-
modern political technologies, clustered around traditional authority structures in which a 
single political leader predominates, might be the most amenable forn1ula for 
governance. 
If fOm1al empire sets an important condition for sultanism's emergence, the role of the 
'subsequent informal relationship has, as Chehabi and Linz point out, been important in 
accelerating the emergence of existing sultanistic tendencies. Early post-colonial political 
elites quickly learned to exploit the strategic salience of their countries during the proxy 
struggles between the US and USSR for political dominance in the developing world. 
African leaders played off potential patrons in order to maximise aid and loans with 
minimal constraints on their use. In the minds of US strategic planners, the exigencies of 
the Cold War necessitated political choices between regimes of varying degrees of 
congeniality. Concerns over domestic corruption or abuses of human rights assumed a 
lower order of importance, which allowed sultanistic practices to flourish. Rulers such as 
Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire (later the Democratic Republic of Congo) played upon 
concerns of internal fragmentation by successfully repeating the mantra "Mobutu or 
Chaos?" to the US and France in order to secure and then misappropriate vast amounts of 
aid and loans before his overthrow in 1997 (Chabal and Daloz: 2001, 115-119). The 
exploitation of strategic salience was particularly acute in Central America, where the 
likes of the Duvaliers in Haiti were supported both by successive US administrations 
fearful of the spread of Communism from Cuba, and by France's attempts to prop up its 
declining influence in the Caribbean region. 
The relationship between sultanistic rulers and the US government was undeniably close 
during the Cold War. To take just three examples, Marcos was supported by five 
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successive US presidents; President Richard Nixon's Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
described Reza Shah as "an unconditional ally"; the US Navy deployed warships in 1971 
to prevent the return of political exiles who opposed the transfer of power from Franyois 
Duvalier to Jean-Claude Duvalier in Haiti (Chehabi and Linz: 1998b, 31). In 1977 and 
1: 
1978, French, Belgian and Moroccan troops saved Mobutu from incursions by Angolan 
mercenaries into the Shaba region of Zaire (Snyder: 1998, 66) Relationships of mutual 
dependence developed: sultanistic leaders provided ideological correctness and domestic 
quiescence, and the US and regional powers secured a favourable strategic environment. 
If sultanistic leaders were sustained by Great Power sponsorship during the Cold War, 
the withdrawal of external patronage could also lead to their demise. Some, like Manuel 
Noriega of Panama and Jean-Bedel Bokassa, outlived their usefulness to the US and 
France respectively. Some, like Duvalier, became an embarrassment and were abandoned 
before they were overthrown. Others, such as Marcos, were eased out to prevent 
moderate opposition forces being outflanked from the left. What is clear, however, is that 
US patronage could, and did, either cause or accelerate the collapse of several sultanistic 
regimes. 
In this respect, modes of termination of sultanistic regimes would appear dissimilar to 
that of other authoritarian regime transitions. O'Donnell and Schmitter contended that: 
"it seems fruitless to search for some international factor or context which can reliably 
compel authoritarian rulers to experiment with liberalization, much less which can 
predictably cause their regions to collapse" (1986: 18). In contrast, Snyder, whose 
contribution to the volume edited by Chehabi and Linz stands as the third component of 
SRT, argues that "a focus on international 'actors is crucial" because "sultanistic dictators 
are often dependent on foreign patrons, who supply critical military aid and material 
resources that can help fuel their domestic patronage networks" (Snyder: 1998, 58). 
Snyder's analysis, backed by a series of comparative case studies of regime breakdowns, 
appears to hold for the sultanistic regimes described by Chehabi and Linz. 
However, B rownlee points 0 ut, that the focus 0 f the case studies chosen by C hehabi, 
Linz and Snyder is on those regimes that collapsed (2002b; 2004). What, Brownlee asks, 
about the survivors - sultanistic states such as Libya, Syria and Iraq (until removed by an 
overwhelming external invasion in 2003), or more moderate neopatrimonial regimes 
such as Egypt and Tunisia? Brownlee argues that these states survived serious crises 
principaIly because their income streams were not significantly disturbed and they had no 
superpower patrons and, as such, were far less subject to external interference or 
conditionality. In fact, he argues that the lack of international leverage proved to be 
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decisive, for example, in Asad's bloody suppression of the Brotherhood rebellion in 
Hamah in 1982 that claimed up to 25,000 lives, or Qadhafi's quelling of an army 
rebellion in 1993. The case of Saddam Hussein's ouster from Iraq in 2003, is exceptional 
because, in many ways, the US-led invasion of Iraq that led to it was wholly exceptional. 
Accordingly, the scholarly explanations for paths out of sultanismlneopatrimonialism are 
contested, with Snyder, Linz and Chehabi arguing that the dependence of sultanistic 
regimes on external patronage is decisive for their continued survival. Brownlee, 
following 0' Donnell and Schmitter, argues that domestic factors, principally the 
importance of maintaining rent circuits and patronage networks, are the decisive factor. 
However, Brownlee (2002b; 2005) takes as his case studies what could be called "Cold 
War hold-outs", states which may have had relationships with one, both or neither of the 
superpowers during the Cold War, but which fell short of a relationship of full 
dependence. This is understandable, given that the focus of Brownlee's research is on 
durable authoritarianism. 
What of those sultanistic states that came into being after the end of the Cold War, 
notably in the former Communist bloc? Does their relationship with external powers 
affect their longevity? The answer, from a small dataset, would appear to be yes, where 
the rulers impinge on the interests of external powers and no, where they do not. The 
regime of President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia descended into sultanism after 1997, 
but its actions in Kosovo in 1999 generated sufficient ire in NATO member countries to 
precipitate the chain of events that I ed to his eventual downfall in October 2000. By 
contrast, those sultanistic states which tend to maintain a relatively low foreign policy 
profile such as Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have endured relatively mild 
censure from the international community. 
To summarise, therefore, Snyder's argument that superpower sponsorship could make or 
break a sultanistic regime appears to have weight for the Cold War era. In fact, the 
domestic misdemeanours of sultanistic rulers might even lead them to be jettisoned, as 
was the case with Marcos and Duvalier. Paradoxically, despite the rhetoric from 
international institutions about holding despotic regimes to account, sultanistic rulers are 
much safer in the post-Cold War era, so long as they do not upset the international 
community through breaches of the diplomatic system (for example, by invading a 
neighbouring state or region). It can, therefore, be argued that, although the US 
frequently sustained sultanistic regimes, it also constrained and disciplined them, a 
function now no longer undertaken by anyone. 
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Thus, an element of SRT that requires testing and possible revision is whether 
Turkmenistan's self-imposed foreign policy isolation, exemplified by its failure to 
participate in regional security institutions and its declaration of permanent neutrality and 
non-alignment, represents a successful survival strategy for sultanistic leaders not 
factored into the framework of SRT developed by Chehabi, Linz and Snyder. The further 
implication of this hypothesis is that sultan ism therefore persists, not because of the 
granting 0 r withdrawal 0 f external support, but because the I eader is able to keep the 
system ticking over internally, through the maintenance and supply of elite rent circuits 
and patronage networks. 
(iii) Political Institutional factors in the emergence of sultanism: decline of clicntclist 
democracy 
Chehabi and Linz contend that where "clientelist d~mocracies" have begun to 
disintegrate, the conditions exist for sultanistic tendencies to emerge (Chehabi and Linz: 
1998b, 33). They frame this explanation in the context of those countries that 
experienced sultanistic rule after a period of democratic government. Cuba's government 
was democratic between 1939 and 1952 until "c1ientelistic politics that revolved around 
personal attachments rather than doctrinal commitments made the system vulnerable to 
shifting partisan a rrangements and manipulation from above" (Aguila in Chehabi and 
Linz: 1998b, 33-34), resulting in the usurpation of power by Fulgen9io Batista in March 
1952. Similarly, the Philippines enjoyed a rough and ready democracy, dominated by 
alternations in government between t he fluid, patronage-based Liberal a nd Nationalist· 
parties, until Marcos declared martial law in 1972 (Thompson: 1998,208). 
Chehabi and Linz do not elaborate on the role of clientelism or patronage (the two terms 
are often used interchangeably) beyond these rather bald observations. However, looking 
more closely at how government functions when administrative bureaucracies are 
transformed from instruments of policy into clientelist networks dispensing favours and 
patronage without rational basis (Chehabi and Linz: 1998b, 34), reveals that they are 
virtually indispensable to the development and functioning of sultanism. 
According to Lemarchand and Legg, c1ientelism is: 
a personalised and reciprocal relationship between an inferior and a 
superior commanding unequal resources; moreover, in contrast with the 
"ideal type" of bureaucratic relationship, the norms of rationality, 
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anonymity and universalism are largely absent from the patron-client 
nexus ... Political clientelism, in short, may be viewed as a more or less 
personalised, affective and reciprocal relationship between actors or sets of 
actors, commanding unequal resources and involving mutually beneficial 
transactions that have political ramifications beyond the immediate sphere 
ofdyadic relationships (1972,151-2). 
Loyalties in clientelist networks are unstable and somewhat conditional because the 
friendship is asymmetrical and driven by resource exchange. Clientelism can work in the 
absence of institutional structures, or become nested therein although, in the latter case, it 
is likely to work against the grain of statutory frameworks and official bureaucratic rules 
(Lemarchand and Legg: 1972, 153), perhaps replicating Lemarchand's view that 
clientelism cuts across the boundaries of tradition and modernity (Lemarchand: 1972, 
69). This insight has been developed by leading theorists of African politics, who argue 
that African leaders (and many Africans more generally) operate in dichotomous 
registers, fusing pre-modern and post-modem sensibilities, epitomised by successful and 
cosmopolitan African elites consulting with witchdoctors in their home towns by mobile 
telephone (Chabal and Daloz: 2001, 144-147; MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga: 
2000). 
The crucial elements In clientelistic relationships are their regularity and 
multifunctionality. They encompass different components of social existence, are 
fundamentally hierarchical and, in some degree, competitive. Patrons must compete for 
clients. If patrons cannot deliver material resources and/or security, clients are likely to 
switch to those patrons who can. If patrons can deliver, clients may compete with one 
another in their allegiance to "the patron (Clapham: 1982, 6-7). Ultimately, however, 
clientelist networks hinge upon one group having access to a material surplus that they 
can sell in order to purchase power, loyalty or acquiescence. 
In the contemporary political environment, material surpluses have usually come from 
state revenues. The patrimonial model therefore "implies an instrumentally profitable 
lack of distinction between the civic and personal spheres" (Chabal and Daloz: 2001, 5). 
The implications for policy lie in the insertion, entrenchment and, frequently, 
predominance of informal networks in formal policy making structures. Stable patterns 
and trajectories of policy-making are subordinated to the requirements of the patron-
client relationship, and legitimacy resides not in political office itself but "in nourishing 
the clientele" on which its authority rests (Chabal and Daloz: 2001, 15). The state, 
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according to Chabal and Daloz, gradually becomes a "decor masking the realities of 
deeply personalised political relations ... [political] legitimacy is firn1ly embedded in the 
patrimonial practices of patrons and their networks" (2001: 16). 
The effect, a s these authors point 0 ut, c an lead to a retraditionalisation -0 f society - a 
reversion to tribal identity, superstition and ritualism (Chabal and Daloz: 2001, 45-83). 
Yet, such networks can also be very fluid, not least because where private patronage 
networks do exist, they are contingent and conditional, relying in the first instance on a 
favourable context for the patron to exercise his authority, for a patron who is himself 
subject to higher political authority will find his actions circumscribed, and secondly, on 
the continued provision of benefits to both sides in the transaction. As William Reno 
discovered in his illuminating study of the impact of "warlordism" on the African state, 
where the political and social fabric of the state is strained or disintegrates, patrons and, 
to a lesser extent, clients can quickly withdraw from mutual commercial/security 
alliances (Reno: 1998). 
However, clientelist networks can also be remarkably durable. Their essence lies in the 
deferred consideration for goods rendered. A favour done must be repaid, but as long as 
there is the expectation of the favour being repaid, the patron-client relationship can 
endure. If the clientelist relationship is embedded within an institutional framework, the 
likelihood of repayment is enhanced by virtue of the security which the institution's 
permanency provides. Thus, "neopatrimonialism does undermine formal rules and 
institutions... nevertheless... when patrimonial logic is internalised in the formal 
institutions of neopatrimonial regimes, it provides essential operating codes for politics 
that are valued, recurring, and reproduced over time" (Bratton and van de WalIe: 1997, 
63). 
In practice, friends a re placed" in the strategic synapses 0 f power and mechanisms 0 f 
control" (Roniger: 1994, 10), their positions based around resource extraction and 
allocation rather than abstract notions of equality and conformity with bureaucratic-legal 
norms. Neopatrimonial rule becomes, in short, "an extension of the big man's household" 
(Bratton and van de Walle: 1997, 61). Politics exists as a business, with control 0 ver 
appointments bought and sold. "Governmental authority and the corresponding economic 
rights tend to be treated as privatc::ly appropriated economic advantages" (Medard: 1982, 
179). The state becomes analogous to the ruler's private estate, and the wider clientelist 
system that is personalised, vertical, and ultimately disordered. 
54 
Patronage dovetails with rent- seeking behaviour to form the bedrock ofpatrimonial rule. 
In unconstrained form, patronage subverts legal-rational norms and is conferred with 
legitimacy above that of the law. Where the ruler himself uses patronage without restraint 
and has access to high rents, distortions within the polity arise that create the conditions 
for sultanistic behaviour. To return to the original proposition offered by Chehabi and 
Linz, that sultanism arises in states where clientelist democracies deteriorate, the key 
component is not that the state was a democracy, as Chehabi and Linz go on to say by 
discussing the propensity of post-authoritarian or post-totalitarian regimes to degenerate 
into sultanism. Rather, it is the existence of patronage networks per se, buttressed by the 
resources available from rent seeking in the context of weak, inchoate state structures, 
that provides the basis for sultanistic regimes. 
(iv) Political Institutional factors in the emergence of sultanism: decay of 
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes 
The fourth factor leading to the emergence of sultanistic behaviour arises from regime 
degeneration, usually associated with a ruler staying in office for many years. Chehabi 
and Linz argue that the post-colonial regimes in Africa assumed an authoritarian 
. character because of their I ack of traditional legitimacy. This i s linked to the cultural 
heterogeneity of the state's composite population, allied to the legacy of colonial 
government, which bequeathed an authoritarian form of governance into which new elites 
had been socialised (Chehabi and Linz: 1998b, 35). Although the former claim about 
cultural heterogeneity has substance, it is effectively a variant of the 'crises of 
sovereignty' argument advanced previously. The secondary hypothesis about the impact 
of colonialism does not enable us to distinguish between those post-colonial 
governments, like Botswana, which have made a rather effective transition to democracy, 
from those, such as Senegal or Benin, which had an authoritarian streak but did not 
generate in sultanism, to those which have acquired a sultanistic caste, for example the 
Central African Republic under Bokassa, Zaire/DR Congo during the presidency of 
Mobutu and, perhaps, the regime of President Robert Mugabe in contemporary 
Zimbabwe. 
Chehabi and Linz do not provide an explanation as to why certain reglmes are 
predisposed to lapsing into sultanism. Puzzlingly, they cite Francoist Spain in this 
category, although the country would appear to conform to the sultanistic in few respects 
during the post-war period. They also cite three examples of totalitarian regimes 
degenerating into sultanism: Romania under Ceausescu, the Soviet Union in the last days 
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of Communist Party First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, and Saddam Hussein's Baathist 
regime in Iraq after the first Gulf War of 1991 (Chehabi and Linz: 1998b, 35-37). 
These examples are problematic too. Firstly, Chehabi and Linz do not say why these 
regimes became s ultanistic, except that they d id. The implied reason is that the rulers 
went on too long, and simply "lost the plot". How or why is not explained. The 
observation would appear to be purely descriptive. Secondly, no distinction is drawn 
between totalitarian or authoritarian regimes, and why it was necessary to divide them. 
Thirdly, it is highly debatable whether all of the regimes could be categorised as 
totalitarian 0 r s ultanistic. In the Soviet case, it i s correct that certain m embers 0 f the 
Brezhnev regime were corrupted, notably Yuri Churbanov, Brezhnev's son-in-law, who 
was imprisoned in 1988 (Vaksberg: 1991). Moreover, the Soviet leadership at that time 
was undoubtedly senescent. However, the system itself was very far from the 
deideologised, deinstitutionalised regimes that characterise the sultanistic model. 
Moreover, Soviet specialists have questioned whether the Soviet system at this point 
could actually be described as totalitarian (Hough: 1983, 37-60; Brown: 1983, 61-80). 
Instead, Chehabi and Linz might have focused on whether command, or at least centrally 
directed, economies associated with post-totalitarianism, m ight develop predispositions 
towards suItanism, given the resources at the state's disposal, once the 
ideological/mobilisational component has been lost. 
This point is particularly salient for the analysis of post-Soviet regimes. Communist Party 
bosses effectively headed pre-existing patronage networks, where Party control overlaid 
rather than replaced engrained c lientelistic hierarchies, particularly in Central A sia, as 
will be discussed in chapter five. In this sense, the situation of Party elites in certain patis 
of the former Soviet Union was analogous to indigenous elites primed to assume control 
of their states as part of the wave of post-War decolonisation. 
Reflecting on causal factors of Sultanism 
To summarise, while the identification by Chehabi and Linz of natural resource and 
external dimensions in the emergence and functioning of sultanistic regimes is useful, it 
remains an underdeveloped tool in explaining the structural preconditions for this regime 
type to emerge. Fleshing out their "crises of sovereignty" hypothesis further, the lack of 
pre-existing statehood, usually through a prior experience of imperialism, or the chronic 
brittleness of a weak state, exacerbated by a subsequent informal imperial relationship 
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with a former metropole, goes some way to explaining the emergence of sultanistic 
tendencies in the first instance. 
Sultanistic regimes are thus a legacy of formal and informal empire, in states where there 
is little pre-existing ethnic, social or economic cohesion. Subsequent "crises" of 
sovereignty, exemplified in the utilisation of sultanistic regimes by more powerful states 
for their own geostrategic interests, assists in explaining how external resource flows 
supplement other revenue streams to help sustain sultanism, but do not by themselves 
explain why sultanism arises. Similarly, the mere receipt of income from external rents, 
from whatever source, does in itself not solely account for the emergence and durability 
of such regimes. Instead, large rents purchase the opportunity for leaders to shape 
polities, and as will be considered below, buy in "hard" internal security capacity and the 
materials to formulate "soft" control mechanisms. Thus, it is what leaders do with rental 
income, rather than its existence per se, that determines the longevity of sultanistic 
regimes. 
As with their analysis of macrostructural factors, the political institutional conditions of 
sultanism cited by Chehabi and Linz require further development and refinement. Their 
political-institutional focus is on a teleological argument, describing how regimes break 
down from a pre-sultanistic situation to a sultanistic regime, without elaborating on the 
reasons for degeneration. However, they do touch tangentially on important 
conside~ations. Clientelism is clearly an important structural prerequisite for sultanism, 
as it is the mechanism through which a 'fear and rewards' culture can be operationalised. 
However, clientelism is not anatomised and nor is it explicitly related as a causal factor 
in facilitating sultanistic behaviour. Similarly, the predisposition of certain pre-sultanistic 
regime types is also crucial to build a path-dependent explanation for sultanistic 
behaviour, yet no substantive attempt is made to discuss how this might occur. 
Analysis of the causes of, and conditions for, sultanistic behaviour can be distilled into 
three main factors, with the option of a fourth where the state involved is a command 
economy. 
Firstly, sultanistic states are able to exist only by virtue of their access to a steady stream 
of external rents, which alleviate their dependence on popular support, and enable them 
to govern with very limited accountability or, in exceptional cases, with virtually none at 
all. These resources can then be used to create a rent circuit that can be expanded or 
retracted to include or exclude potential supporters or rivals. 
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Secondly, patronage networks are used to operationalise the rent circuit by purchasing 
support and buying off rivals. However, where regime opponents are recalcitrant, rents 
also enable the ruler to purchase internal security hardware to suppress potential 
opposition. 
Thirdly, sultanism is allowed to flourish because of certain defects wired in to the state. 
There may, for example, be limited consensus over the boundaries or membership of the 
state, or conflict between different ethnic or tribal groups. These deficits can usually be 
attributed to external interference in the form of formal or informal empire. As rulers 
may provide a degree of overlay that offers a chimera of state cohesion, external patrons 
might provide further rental income in the form of aid or loans that sustains and 
encourages sultanistic behaviour. The larger state is usually motivated by concerns over 
state collapse, regional instability or, from a more realist perspective, the geopolitical and 
economic advantages that might accrue from sponsoring a strategically well-placed 
regime. 
Fourthly, the salience of the pre-existing economic system remains problematic. Chehabi 
and Linz were writing in 1990-1. There was little evidence that they had 
comprehensively updated the c ore tenets 0 f t heir analysis by the time their work was 
published in 1998. Thus, they were not in a position, or chose not, to comment on the 
impact of transition out ofa command economy might have on sultanistic behaviour. The 
examples explored in the volume were all authoritarian capitalist or mixed economies, 
although subject to erratic intervention by the state. Chehabi and Linz hint in their 
references to Ceausescu and Brezhnev that Communist societies could descend into 
sultanism and, even briefly mention the regimes of Niyazov and President Alexander 
Lukashenka of Belarus as potential candidates,' but the specific legacy of the command 
economy or Party control is not explored. 
Having thus attempted to rework sultanistic regime theory to account for the emergence 
and existence of this type of governance, it is necessary to look in greater detail at the 
specific techniques used by suItanistic rulers to remain in power. Why, if regimes such as 
that of Qadhafi aim at a condition of statelessness, or like those of Mobutu and Marcos, 
systematically subvert or dismantle state institutions and loot the country for their own 
ends, do their regimes remain so consistently durable? How do such manifestly erratic, 
unpredictable and underperforming regimes operate? Chehabi and Linz do not explore 
the specific techniques used by suItanistic rulers to maintain themselves in power. 
Extending sultanistic theory further, therefore, will equip us to examine this paradox in 
greater depth. 
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Locating and Exercising Power: Hard and Soft Techniques of Political Control 
So far, I have argued that if contemporary sultanistic rulers avoid becoming too 
dependent on external patrons, or entangled in incidents that stimulate international 
controversy, and if they have access to externally derived rents that keep pre-existing and 
new patronage networks serviced, they have in place the instruments that ensure the 
longevity of their regimes. These components of sultanistic rule are specifically explored 
in relation to the case study of Turkmenistan in chapters five and six of the thesis. 
However, what they only partially explain is how the regime actually functions and 
maintains control. Exploring the techniques used by personalistic rulers to sustain their 
regimes requires a closer look at the nature of power itself. 
Foucault identified the locus of power in practice as m uch as in institutions (Gordon: 
2002, xxv). He argued that the emergence of threats to power networks after the 
eighteenth century led to the development of a new architecture and technology of 
power, both material and psychological. New surveillance networks were complemented 
by a disciplinary architecture in the form of factories, hospitals, schools, asylums, 
barracks and penal colonies. Foucault may overstate his case. Espionage, imprisonment 
and education existed throughout Europe and elsewhere from the Middle Ages onwards 
(Groebner: 2002). What changed, in fact, was the rate at which such institutions 
multiplied after the Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution. 
However, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault correctly identified that the state began 
consciously to treat "the body as object and target of power" (1990, 136). The attempt to 
make bodies docile proceeded from the state's ability to distribute individuals in space 
(Foucault: 1990, 136). This acquired several forms (the examples are my own, not 
Foucault's): enclosure in prison and psychiatric institutions; prevention of citizens from 
leaving the country through visa regimes; partition and classification through identity 
cards and 0 ther documents, and the consequent checking 0 f the same; the creation 0 f 
functional sites such as factories, barracks and schools; the ranking of groups and 
individuals in classes, hierarchies and through state imposed targets; the timetabling of 
work, education and leisure; body-object exhaustion through excessive labour demands, 
military drills, travelling and waiting; body-object articulation through gestures, salutes 
and physical coding; and elaboration of the act through marching, drills and 
choreography (Foucault: 1990, 142-156). Thus, through the play of spatial distribution, 
coding, organisation of time and a combination of all three, the state was able to 
dissociate power from the body and practice discipline, what Foucault calls "normatising 
individuation" (Foucault in Hirst: 2005, 168) 
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Although James C. Scott made only fleeting reference to Foucault's work in Seeing Like 
a State: How Certain Schemes to improve the Human Condition Have Failed, he 
effectively developed the point by arguing that the drive for administrative order was 
driven by the need of the state to construct a "map of terrain and people" (1998, 2). By 
rationalisation, standardisation and simplification, society becomes more legible to the 
state, and governance becomes more effective and convenient. Such a social order is, of 
course, constructed for the benefit of the state rather than society, and without regard to 
what Scott calls metis, the practice and knowledge of everyday life. Instead, it consists of 
sweeping, hegemonic social engineering informed by high modernist ideology. Scott was 
also concerned with the visual and aesthetic implications for t he urban order 0 f such 
schemes, the social alienation caused by the static urban grid ( a debatable hypothesis 
given the vibrancy of, for example, Manhattan), and the displacement of the poor. 
If Foucault expressed power in terms of the body and its arrangement in space, Scott and 
Henri Lefebvre (1991: 401-423) expressed power in terms of its control of absolute 
space, social s pace a nd abstract space. According to L efebvre, s patiality is not 0 nly a 
product, but also a producer and reproducer of the relations of production and 
domination, an instrument of both allocative and authoritative power (Soja: 1985, 110). 
Space, a term used by Lefebvre literally, metaphorically and allegorically (Shields: 
1988), is therefore simultaneously the object of power and an instrument of power. The 
power of architecture in an urban setting exemplifies this. Power therefore operates as a 
technique to arrange bodies in space, and to control absolute space, social space and 
abstract space. Finally, space itself is used to reproduce and distribute power. Thus, 
politics has spaces, and spaces have politics. 
Applying these' concepts in practice, what implications do they have for the practice of 
power by sultanistic regimes? If we take the Foucaultian perspective, analysis of the 
manner in which regimes operate - what will be called "hard" power - involves direct 
coercion, imprisonment, restriction, purging of officials, forced movement and 
resettlement, political hospitalisation, limitations on travel and movement, restrictions on 
freedom of worship, injunctions on conduct, dress and bodily appearance, persecution of 
minorities and dissidents, restrictions on media activity and information flows; and 
requires examination of how the regime and leader functions, and what the formal and 
informal parameters exist to itslhis rule. 
However, Scott and Foucault do not explicitly identify the cultural imprint of power. 
Foucault is aware, in Power/Knowledge, that: 
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If power were anything but repressive, if it never did anything but say no, 
do you really think one could be brought to obey it? What makes power 
hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only 
weigh on us a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things; 
it includes pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be 
considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social 
body, much more than a negative instance whose function is repression 
(Foucault in Hirst: 2005, 168). 
Foucault does not develop this point but appears to be referring to the cultural 
transmission of power: the use of symbols, naming, rituals, texts, memorials and 
monuments, buildings, music, art, movement, spectacle and the manipulation of memory 
to produce desired political outcomes. 
These modes of transmission do not involve explicit physical coercion, although there is 
clearly some cross-over between hard and soft power in the mass choreographed 
propaganda spectacles, sometimes involving thousands 0 f children, which characterise 
sultanistic regimes such as North Korea (DPRK) and Turkmenistan. Instead, they rely on 
symbols to forge a relationship, a unity, between representer and represented (Blomqvist: 
1987, 7); to activate, and to articulate in public space the regime's construction of it s 
own self image (Bell: 1998, 207); to restate official memory through visual symbols of 
power (Vale: 1999); to order, through art, the way in which people look at the world in a 
specific manner so as to create a homogenous and docile political body (Falasca-
Zamponi: 1997, 5); through insistent rhetoric, to establish a grammar and register 
through which people learn to speak (Wedeen: 1999, 32); in organised political 
spectacles, to "show that the authorities are able to compel citizens to enact the 
choreographed movements that iconographic ally configure worship of the leader, 
representing his power both visibly (in the display) and tangibly (in each participant's 
body)" (Wedeen: 1999, 21-22). At their most cynical, such symbols simply "clutter 
public space with monotonous slogans and empty gestures, which tire the minds and 
bodies of producers and consumers alike" (Wedeen: 1999,206). 
Cultural power is a strategic resource which, when effective, "may, by conveying the 
impression of actual power and the will to use it, economise on the actual use of 
violence" (Scott: 1990, 9). Political symbolism, as practised by sultanistic leaders and 
totalitarian dictators, therefore represents much more than a leader's path to immortality 
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(Mornement: 2003, 54), a representation of desired self-image, or an aestheticisation of 
politics; rather, it is a political technique used as an alternative to, or augmentation of, 
material coercion in order to induce loyalty and negate dissent. Michael Walzer argued: 
"the state is invisible; it must be personified before it can be seen, symbolised before it 
can be loved, imagined before it can be conceived" (Walzer in Kertzer: 1988, 6). 
In sultanistic states, however, the adage that 'men possess thoughts, but symbols possess 
men' needs to be adjusted. The paradox of these regimes is that, in contradistinction to 
mobilisational and heavily ideological regimes such as Maoist China, Stalinist Russia or 
Nazi Germany, popular belief levels in regime rituals, texts and symbols actually appear 
to be much lower. Performance at mass spectacles can be often (but not always) 
perfunctory, attendance begrudging and, if the regime degenerates as, for example, that 
of Ceausescu did, such rituals increasingly become more a source of comfort to the ruler, 
than a tool of political persuasion. 
If the grandiose claims made by the regimes are not believed and, indeed are often half-
heartedly propagated, then what role does "soft" power have in sustaining the sultanistic 
ruler? Chehabi and Linz touch on the issue only tangentially. They argue that the cultic 
dimension of sultanistic power is purely for self aggrandisement, and therefore, imply 
that it carries little weight as a persuasive instrument. They cite the propensity of rulers to 
self-award titles as described in the preceding chapter, and to write (or have ghost 
written) ideological treatises such as An Ideology for Filipinos, The White Revolution or 
Les grands texts du Mobutisme by Marcos, Reza Shah and Mobutu, respectively 
(Chehabi and Linz: 1998a, 14-15). However, these are regarded as a craving for charisma 
and exaltation, rather than being a component of a wider strategy to transmit regime 
legitimacy and control. Yet the projection of soft power, despite being often innately 
ridiculous, even to its recipients, can remain strangely effective in sultanistic regimes, 
perhaps tying ruler and ruled together in the complicity of a lie. Exploring this anomaly 
may indicate the hold retained on power by sultanistic rulers. 
Cultural power in sultanistic regimes is manifested most commonly in a cult of 
personality surrounding the leader. Modern personality cults, "the organisation of society 
around a single person and the symbolic expression of this organisation through cult 
products in multiple modern media" (Plamper: 2003: 45), have complex origins rooted in 
national politico-religious culture, the ideological template set out by the regime, the 
personal characteristics of the leader himself, and also in more functional attributes of the 
polity, such as under-institutionalisation of the state. The cult-building that was a feature 
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of the Bolshevik regime, for example, was rooted in a "special inflection" of pre-
revolutionary monarchical cults, and a culture rooted in patriarchy, allied to a complex 
Stalinist dialectical dissolution of the individual into the many, that promoted lichnost 
(personality) as an exemplar of collective potential (Plamper: 2004, 20)18, producing the 
reification of Stalin, his acolytes, and selected heroes such as the miner Alexei 
Stakhanov, the aviator Valery Chkalov and the polar explorer Otto Schmidt (McCannon: 
2003,241). 
The sultanistic personality cult varies from those surrounding, say, Stalin or Maoism in 
the sophistication of their content, the breadth of their vocabulary, and the level of 
popular participation they require. Communist cults fitted into a larger transformational 
ideological system, which could outlast the ritual dramas and monuments performed and 
constructed for the individual leader. The goals of sultanistic leaders are more modest: 
the preservation and p~ojection of power, economisation on the use of violence - what 
Marin called "the placing in reserve of force in signs" (Marin: 1977, 7) - nation-building, 
and the invention of tradition. 
What is missing from the very sparse literature on cults of personality, however, is 
recognition that, in sultanistic regimes at least, they spawn an economy of cult 
production in the public and private sectors, which can sustain cults even when they are 
latently dysfunctional and disbelieved. In effect, leader cults may retain their prominence 
because there is a segment of the population that retains an interest in their continuation. 
The cult of personality surrounding Niyazov, and the possibilities that it opens as a 
potential terrain of resistance to the regime are explored in chapters five and six 
respectively. 
Responses to Sultan ism 
A major omission of SRT is that it overlooks the question of how the subjects of 
sultanistic governance respond to and resist this form of rule. In this, SRT mirrors recent 
empirical studies of authoritarian regimes, which likewise give only very cursory 
treatment to the responses engendered by authoritarian governance. 
One task of t his thesis is to address this gap by mapping out some of the forms that 
resistance has taken to sultanism in Turkmenistan. By building a typology of resistance in 
18 Stalin reportedly told his son, Vasily: "You are not Stalin and I am not Stalin. Stalin is Soviet 
power" (Davies: 2004, 30). 
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Turkmenistan, we can attain two separate objectives. Firstly, our understanding of how 
the regime in Turkmenistan operates is enhanced. Tracking resistance patterns allows us 
to examine both the claims and actions of Niyazov's regime from a different, "consumer" 
perspective. It locates and gauges strengths and weaknesses of the regime, in essence 
where it is effective in stifling dissent and thus contributing to the regime's durability, 
and where there is infrastructural and institutional brittleness that prevent the regime from 
eradicating resistance. This, in turn, opens the potential for regime opponents to identify 
the most favourable terrain for resistance. The second objective is theoretical. We have 
noted how strikingly common the characteristics of sultanism are between regimes that 
emerged in different geopolitical, institutional, historical, economic and cultural contexts. 
Mapping resistance in Turkmenistan opens the possibility that these findings can be used 
to build up a typology of resistance to sultanistic regimes more generally. 
Thus far, accommodation and dissent under conditions of sultanism has rarely been 
broached, much less systematically examined. Accordingly, chapter six aims to. bridge 
both an empirical gap in relation to Turkmenistan by providing the first synthesis of data 
on 0 pposition a ctivity, and to contribute to theory development both in the context 0 f 
SRT and resistance to non-democratic regimes more broadly. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to interrogate critically and thereafter extend the theoretical 
framework used in the thesis. Chehabi and Linz offered a series of explanations for the 
emergence, continuation and collapse of sultanistic rule. Although they signposted 
important structural causes of sultanism, this chapter has argued that their explanatory 
framework should be substantively revised if it is to be of continued relevance within the 
contemporary political environment. 
Specifically, this chapter has suggested that the key to understanding the emergence of 
sultanism lies in an "alloy" of structural and agential factors. These include the political 
choices available to, and selected by, the leader at critical junctures, working in 
conjunction with underlying structural causes - principally access to, and utilisation of, 
external rents which "fill the capillaries" of new or pre-existing domestic patronage 
networks in order to maintain loyalty and buy off potential opponents. It also suggests 
that these rents have two further functions: firstly, they provide the means to buy in 
internal security capacities for coercive purposes; secondly, they enable rulers to 
construct a repertoire of "soft" cultural power, often .taking the form of the cult of 
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personality, in order to bind the populations fate to that of their leader, even if that ties is 
based on complicity in a lie. 
Thirdly, the chapter has also addressed the issue of external involvement in the 
emergence and demise of sultanism. Whereas Chehabi, Linz and Snyder have argued that 
superpower patrons had the capacity and, just as importantly, the will to make and break 
sultanistic regimes during the Cold War, I argue that despite the reinvigoration of 
rhetoric about global standards of human rights within international institutions, 
sultanistic leaders who "keep their heads down" on the international scene, retain access 
to rents, and are willing to use force domestically to retain power, are actually much 
better placed to survive in situ than their Cold War predecessors. 
Finally, we made the case that responses to sultanism ought to be integrated within the 
SRT framework, in order to increase our understanding of the effects and implications of 
sultanistic rule and to chart a potential terrain of resistance that might either undermine a 
sultanistic ruler, or transform a sultanistic situation in some way. 
The next two chapters both extend and focus the project by introducing the chosen case 
study in depth. Chapter three provides the essential context for Turkmenistan's 
emergence as an independent nation-state by looking at some of the structural issues that 
impacted on, and facilitated, the form of governance that the Niyazov regime has 
imposed, while chapter four focuses on the specific political and policy choices made by 
Niyazov, essentially the agential factors, on his route to power before and after 
Turkmenistan attained independence. 
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Chapter Three: Turkmenistan - The Historical and Structural Context 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the necessary historical and political context for 
the development of the chosen case study. The chapter provides an analytical historical 
overview of the Turkmen people and state from their earliest origins up to the late Soviet 
period. In doing so, it has four functions integral to the project. 
Firstly, it engages with the theoretical framework, by exploring whether the underlying 
structural preconditions for sultanistic regimes, discussed in the previous chapter, are 
applicable in the Turkmen case or, indeed, whether there are additional historical-
structural characteristics in Turkmenistan, which may be important to our understanding 
of the Niyazov regime, and possibly even salient to other sultanistic situations. 
Secondly, the chapter sets out the wider historical context for the emergence of the 
Republic of Turkmenistan and the regime of Saparmurat Niyazov in the post-Soviet 
period. This, in conjunction with the following chapter, will enable us to consider the 
extent to which Niyazov's variant of sultanistic governance is dependent on the strategic 
options chosen by Niyazov, and the degree to which these options were either constrained 
or facilitated by deeper allegiances and identity patterns within Turkmen society. Thus, 
the chapter will allow us, in due course, .to pose such questions as whether Niyazov's 
style of rule has any form of concrete precedent in Turkmen society, whether there exist 
peculiar national circumstances in Turkmenistan that have given rise to a lack of 
institutional constraints on Niyazov's authority, or whether Niyazov's regime is 
principally a product of political opportunism. Therefore, in order to understand how the 
Turkmen system under Niyazov functions, and to explain the continuing failure of any 
substantive, coherent, organised political opposition or civil society to emerge, it is 
crucial to examine the long-range patterns of political, social and economic activity in 
Turkmenistan, both as important building blocks for the explication of contemporary 
regime dynamics and, also, to illumina'te the deeper structure - agency debate at the heart 
of explanations of political continuity and change. 
Thirdly, substantive historical analysis allows us to interrogate more carefully the content 
of the cult of personality; in essence, why certain motifs, slogans, symbols, texts, and 
rituals are selected, used, adapted and manipulated by the ruler as political techniques in 
sultanistic situations. The small literature devoted to political personality cults has largely 
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focused on cult development, form, process, and aftermath. Comparatively little attention 
has been given to the messages that cults seek to project. There are two feasible 
explanations for this omission. One is that constraints on undertaking fieldwork while the 
regime is in power means that almost all accounts of leader cults are written after their 
demise (an important exception being Lisa Wedeen's (1999) influential study of the 
personality cult of President Hafiz Al Asad of Syria). As most modem regimes with 
leader cults have collapsed in ignominious circumstances, the content of the cult is 
viewed solely in retrospect, and is frequently presented as kitsch, banal, or simply pitiful. 
Comparatively little attention has been given to the very real power that cults can 
exercise when they are in currency. Secondly, apart from the cases of Nazi Germany and 
Stalinist Russia, limited work has been conducted on responses to regime propaganda in 
societies where political personality cults have operated, with the consequence that the 
very complex interaction between cult production, transmission and reception, which is 
often genuinely ambiguous, as the fieldwork for this thesis will illustrate, is underplayed. 
In order to undertake analysis into the appeal, or "pull", of personality cults, an 
appreciation of the national historical metanarrative, from which the raw materials for 
political cults are so often drawn, becomes a prerequisite. 
Finally, unlike virtually all other states where sultanistic regimes exist, or have existed, 
there is no extant, satisfactory historical overview of Turkmenistan available that could 
contextualise the case study. There are, in short, no scholarly short cuts to introduce the 
case study. This chapter therefore attempts to weave a coherent narrative from a 
patchwork of Western, Russian and Turkmen sources, all of which are, in themselves, 
incomplete for a variety of reasons. 
V.V. Barthold's short study, A History of the Turkmen People (1962), part of his wider 
Four Studies on the History of Central Asia, was largely, but not completely, free of the 
ideological straitjacket imposed on Soviet historiography from Stalin onwards. Moreover, 
Barthold's account effectively concludes in the early nineteenth century, ~md glosses over 
the Russian conquest of the Turkmen lands in the late nineteenth century in most cursory 
'fashion. Mehmet Saray's The Turkmens in the Age of Imperialism (1989) provides much 
useful material on the Russian imperial conquest, but is an explicitly pan-Turkish work, 
which t ends to d ownplay accounts 0 f inter-tribal feuding in the nineteenth century, in 
favour 0 fad eterministic account 0 f the coalescence 0 f T urkmen tribal confederations 
against Russian aggression. 
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Soviet sources, as Yuri Bregel comprehensively demonstrated, systematically 
subordinated accurate historical scholarship to ideological conformity, particularly in 
their accounts of the extent of the nomadic economy in Turkmen society and, from the 
Stalin era onwards, the terms of Russian imperial conquest of Central Asia (Bregel: 1981; 
1996). However, these sources can provide useful data, albeit requiring careful critical 
evaluation, on the extent of socio-economic development during the Soviet period. 
Little if anything of scholarly note has been published in Turkmenistan since 
independence was attained in 1992. The standard textbook used in Turkrnen schools and 
universities is Niyazov's Rulmama, which is more of value for what it tells us of 
Niyazov's own methods of governance, than what it says about Turkmen history. 
Niyazov's casual disregard for historical accUracy is illustrated by his decree, issued in 
September 2000, recalling all copies of a new high school history textbook because it 
traced the ethnogenesis of the Turkmen to the Mongolian Altai region, while Niyazov 
erroneously insists instead 'that Turkrnen were of European ethnic origin (RFEIRL TS, 5 
October 2000). As Bregel, referring to the scholarly trends for historical revisionism 
under post-Soviet leaderships in Central Asia, states, "such theories and statements are 
not part of scholarly enquiry: they are just examples of the continuing tendency to use 
history for building national identities - a purpose which the authors of such works do 
not try to conceal" (1996, 26). The' glorious past' invented by politically compliant post-
Soviet scholars "belongs to the realm of politics not history as its main goal is not to 
clean the history of Central Asian nations from the stains of Soviet distortions, but rather 
to repaint it in fresh nationalist colours. It is not a rediscovery of history but an invention 
of nationalist mythology" (Bregel: 1996,26). 
However, three recent works have, in part, filled the scholarly lacunae in the field of 
Turkmen history. Yuri Bregel's own magisterial Historical Atlas of Central Asia (2003) 
is extremely useful on the period up to 1917, but frames the region'S historical 
development in terms of military conquests and the ebbs and flows of empire, rather than 
providing detail on the fabric of social and economic existence. Paul Georg Geiss has 
done much to illuminate Turkmen tribal structures in the pre-Tsarist period (2003). 
Adrienne Lynn Edgar's Tribal Nation is excellent on the period from 1917 up to 1940 
(2004). There is little reliable historical scholarship on the later Soviet period. Therefore, 
the overview ofTurkmen history in this chapter constitutes the first synthesis, in English, 
to the writer's knowledge, ofTurkmen history from its origins to the present day. 
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The remainder of t he chapter i s structured into six sections. Initially, the chapter will 
focus on the migration of the forerunners of the Turlanen people from the Altai region of 
Mongolia, across the southern Siberian steppe, to the Aral Sea delta, and from there to the 
Mangishlaq Peninsula on the eastern seaboard of the Caspian. The crystallisation of 
distinct Turkmen tribes and their interaction will be traced with the great Eurasian 
empires of the medieval period, notably the Mongols, Timurids and Persians, alongside 
. the emergence of distinct, often inimical, Turkrnen tribal confederations in this period. 
The second part, covering the Early Modern period, charts the ambiguous relationship 
between Turkrnen tribes and the proto-states of Persian-ruled Khorasan (contemporary 
northern Iran) and Arabshahid-ruled Khorezm (the region centred on the southern Aral 
Sea delta - now part of Uzbekistan), followed by the impact of waves of tribal migrations 
between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries from Mangishlaq to the southern, 
southwestern and eastern regions of what is now Turkrnenistan. The migrations, along 
with the encounters with imperial Russian forces, are critical to the authorised historical 
metanarrative of"Turkrnen national unity, shaped and propagated by the Niyazov regime. 
The period between the first substantive Russian imperial expedition to Turkmenistan (or 
Transcaspia as the Russian Tsarist administration called it) to the Bolshevik Revolution 
of 1917 is, therefore, a crucial antecedent to Turkrnenistan's independence. 
The third section focuses on the Turkmen political, social and economic order prior to the 
Bolshevik Revolution. It is to this period that Niyazov has turned for inspiration in the 
development of political culture and concrete institutions in the post-independence era. 
Niyazov's claim to be reconstructing the traditional and "natural" Turkmen political 
order can therefore be tested against what is known of socio-political and economic 
structures prevalent in the period. 
The fourth section comprises an analysis of political and economic developments in the 
Turkmen SSR, essential in order to interpret the emergence and crystallisation of 
Turkmen self-identity during the Soviet period, and to explain the context for Niyazov's 
own political ascent to First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPTu in 1985. 
The penultimate section of the chapter summarises the historical overview by suggesting 
that, despite some similarities tot he other Central Asian republics emerging from the 
rubble of the Soviet Union, important historical, cultural, religious and socio-economic 
characteristics developed that are peculiar to Turkrnen state and society, and that the 
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country must therefore be analysed within this perspective, rather than absorbed in to a 
general narrative of Central Asia's historical development. 
The final section tracks back to the theoretical framework of SRT used in the previous 
chapter. It considers how closely the Turkmen state conforms to the patterns on which 
sultanistic regimes are predicated, and how the peculiarities of the Turkmen path to 
independent statehood may not only help explain the emergence of sultanistic governance 
under Niyazov, but may also have furnished him with both the practical and symbolic 
tools to consolidate his authority. 
Westerly migration and the emergence of Turkmen identity (5th Century CE - 985) 
From information based on archaeological discoveries and the chronicles of -the tenth 
century geographer Maqdisi (Barthold: 1962, 77), the ethnic origins of the Turkmen, like 
those of other Turkic peoples, are believed to lie in the emergence of a Turkic qaghanate 
in the Mongolian Altai region in the middle of the sixth century Common Era (CE). The 
qaghanate can itself be traced to the Ashina clan, part of the Xiongu tribes who 
nomadised in western China in the early fifth century CE. The Ashina" were attacked by 
the rival Rouran clan, and subsequently resettled in the Altai, uniting with local, tribes and 
adopting the name Turk. 
In common with other Central Asian qaghanates and empires through to the Early 
Modem period, the Turk qaghanate adopted a bipartite structure, splitting into Western 
and Eastern wings, the latter coming under pressure from the Tibetan and Tang empires 
in eastern Central Asia during the early seventh century, before finally collapsing in 630. 
During this period, most of the territory of modem day Turkmenistan is thought to have 
been uninhabited. Even the Arabs who conquered Sasanid Iran, absorbing it into the 
Umayyad Caliphate in 651, rarely ventured beyond the Kopet Dagh mountains that form 
most of Turkmenistan's natural southern boundary with northern Iran. However, the 
ethnically Persian Soghdians in the ancient city of Merv (close to the southeastern 
Turkmen city of Mary) did feel Arab predations in the seventh and eighth centuries, as 
the latter raided down the course of the Amu Darya to the Aral Sea delta (Bregel: 2003, 
16). 
While the Turkmen lands were largely unaffected by the interaction of warring armies 
across Central Asia from the seventh to the tenth centuries, the successors of the Western 
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wing 0 ft he Turkic q aghanate, self designated as 0 ghuz by the ninth century, roamed 
westwards across the southern Siberian steppe to north and east of the Aral Sea between 
750 and 1000, occasionally encroaching into the Samanid empire further south, but 
principally based in the region of Ifsijab, near the modem city of Chimkent in southern 
Kazakhstan. 
The SeJjuk Empire (985-1194) 
One contemporary source, Ibn AI-Athir, suggests that the Turkmen had, by the early 
tenth century, already distinguished themselves from the Oghuz, as much by the 
construction of a distinct, but artificial, genealogy as by outward customs and 
appearances (Barthold: 1962, 80-81). However, the terms Oghuz and Turkmen also 
appear to have been fairly interchangeable in this period. Oghuz tribes nomadising 
between the Ust-Yurt plateau,19 Aral Sea delta and along the lower course of the Amu 
Darya, usually wintered at the settlement of Yangikent. In 985, an Oghuz army 
commander named Seljuk fell out with the tribal chieftan (yabghu) at Yangikent, and fled 
with his followers to Jend, 100 km upstream. Seljuk converted to Islam and founded the 
Seljuk dynasty which, through his sons, came to rule an empire which covered much of 
the Greater Middle East. The adoption 0 f I slam, according tot he seventeenth century 
scholar Abul-Ghazi, the principal source on the period, became a distinguishing 
characteristic between the Seljuks and the Oghuz (Barthold: 1962, 158-159). 
Seljuk's sons Musa, Mikail and Israel,' followed by Mikail's sons, Toghril Beg 
Muhammad and Chaghri Bek Dawud, enlarged the Seljuk state rapidly in the early 
eleventh century, defeating the Ghaznavids in decisive battles at Nissa (near Ashgabat) 
in 1034, at Serakhs and Nishapur (in northern Iran) in 1038, and finally at Dandaqagan 
(near Merv) in 1040. The Seljuk empire, forged on the battlefield, effectively inherited 
the renmants of the Ghaznavid empire, and expanded substantially in the ensuing fifteen 
years until Toghril Beg was able to enter Baghdad in 1055, marry the daughter of the 
Abbasid Caliph, and receive the formal title of 'King of the East and the West' (Soucek: 
2000, 95). Toghril's successors, Alp Arslan (1061-1072) and Malik Shah (1072-92), 
continued the growth of the Seljuk empire into Syria and Anatolia in the West, and 
against the Qarakhnid empire in the east, capturing Bukhara and Samarkand in 1089, and 
subsequently raiding as far as Uzgend in modem Kyrgyzstan (Bregel: 2003,28). 
19 The Ust-Yurt plateau is a remote region in south western Kazakhstan, close to the Mangishlaq 
Peninsula. 
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However, the Seljuk Empire suffered from a typical case of imperial overreach and 
decay. The steady demise of the Seljuk Empire under the reigns of Malik's successors, 
Bark Yaruq (1092-1105), Muhammad Tapar (1105-1118), and Ahmed Sanjar (1118-
1157), was caused a s much by internal dissent as by defeat 0 n the battlefield tor ival 
imperial powers. Independent OghuzlTurkmen tribes from the lower Amu Darya sacked 
Balkh in 1153, and the Khorezmshahs based in the Aral delta repeatedly rebelled, 
extending their power west toM angishlaq and south to K hiva, effectively creating an 
empire within an empire. Before this, Qara-Khitay tribes from Mongolia had expanded 
southwest, and threatened the eastern fringes of Sanjar's empire, defeating him at 
Samarkand in 1141. 
The Seljuk period has emerged as a symbolic centrepiece in contemporary Turkmenistan, 
one that confers greatness, legitimacy and potency on the Niyazov regime. Statues of the 
Seljuk sultans, while being nowhere near as common as those of Niyazov, are 
prominently situated in Ashgabat. The eight-pointed star of the Seljuks is used 
emblematically by Niyazov and inserted. inappropriately into virtually all state 
occasions20• The demise of the Seljuk state, which effectively occurred with the death of 
Sanjar in 1157 (although Seljuk rulers retained de jure authority until the death of 
Toghril III, the last Seljuk sultan, in 1194), is a theme frequently raised in President 
Niyazov's authorised reading of Turkmen history (Turkmenbashi: 2002, 218-223). The 
predations of OghuzlIurkmen tribes against Seljuk power are, according to Niyazov, an 
example of how a house "divided against itself will fall" - a warning to contemporary 
Turkmen of the consequences that flow from placing tribal preferences above national 
unity. 
Two important themes emerge from this period. Firstly, although Turkmen as an ethno-
tribal self-designation was in use, there was no clear distinction between Turkmen, Seljuk 
and Oghuz tribes. All were essentially nomadic groups seasonally occupying an arc 
sweeping from the Mangishlaq Peninsula, across the Ust-Yurt plateau to the Aral sea 
basin, southeast along the Amu Darya river course, and west to Merv and northern 
Khorasan. The heartland of modem Turkmenistan - the Karakum desert, the steppe north 
of the Kopet Dagh mountain range, and the area along the eastern Caspian seaboard -
remained either empty or barely inhabited and, crucially, separate from the network of 
20 An example of this tendency directly witnessed by the author was the commemoration 
ceremony for the 60th anniversary of the end of World War 11 in Ashgabat on 8 May 2005 
discussed in chapter five (Plates Eighteen and Nineteen). 
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overland trade routes connecting the Mediterranean ports to East Asia, known 
collectively as the Silk Road. 
The contemporary political significance of this demographic vacuum for the Niyazov 
regime is that the organic, primordial connection between "blood" and "soil" posited by 
Niyazov cannot be said to have meaningfully existed. Niyazov has therefore been forced 
to circumvent this inconvenience by claiming that the Turkmen people actually 
descended from a mythical warrior named Oghuz Khan, himself a descendant of the 
Biblical prophet Noah (Turkmenbashi: 2003, 79). Niyazov does not state with clarity 
when Oghuz Khan lived, but one can infer from Ruhnama that his empire existed in 
approximately 3000 BeE. Niyazov states that the reign of Oghuz Khan was a "golden 
age," which "illuminated the path of the Oghuz people, our ancestors, for thousands of 
years" (Turkmenbashi: 2003, 100). Crucially, the land that Oghuz Khan ruled is situated, 
according to Niyazov, almost coterminously with the boundaries of the modem state of 
Turkmenistan, suggesting an intimate connection between homeland and people lacking 
in orthodox historical accounts of the ethnogenesis ofthe Turkmen people. 
The second important theme is that, while the land of what is now Turkmenistan was 
largely uninhabited, a fact that would, in succeeding centuries, give Turkmen socio-
economic life and culture its regionally unique insularity, the Seljuk state interacted with 
civilizations from the Arabian Gulf to Herat (Afghanistan) in the south, Anatolia in the 
west, the Volga basin (Russia) in the north and the borderlands of China in the east. 
Although Seljuk rulers conversed in Turkic dialects, the language of court life and 
literature remained Persian. Thus, the political sweep and power exercised by the Seljuk 
empire exposed Seljuk Turkmen to much more cosmopolitan cultural systems and 
diffused them west and south, creating the broader ethnic Turkmen or 'Turcoman' 
communities that comprise significant minorities in the modem states of Turkey, Syria, 
Iraq and Iran. In contrast, the later generations of "pure" Turkmen, who came to comprise 
the c ore ethnic group of T urkmenistan, a nd with whom this study is concerned, were 
content to nomadise in isolation around the remote eastern Caspian seaboard and Ust-
Yurt plateau. 
The Mongol Conquest and the Timurid Empire (1194-1506) 
The Mongol conquest, begun in northern China a year after Chingis Khan was 
proclaimed the supreme ruler of the Mongols in 1206, impacted on Turkmen tribal lands 
in 122112 with the sacking and destruction of Merv and Nissa, and the incorporation of 
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northerly Turkmen nomadic lands into the Mongol empire (Man: 2005). However, such 
was the remoteness of the western plateaus around Ust-Yurt and Mangishlaq, that 
Mongol suzerainty was nominal. 
After the death of Chingis in 1226, his conquests were divided and subdivided into 
appanages and ulus, ruled by his sons and grandsons (Man: 2005). The northern half of 
modern day Turkmenistan fell under the supreme rule of, firstly, Jochi, the eldest son of 
Chingis, and then Jochi's second son Batu. The Western portion of the Mongol empire 
was divided into the Aq-Orda (White Horde) and the K6k Orda (Blue Horde). The latter, 
which nominally controlled the nomadic regions inhabited by the Turkmen, fell under the 
direct rule of Batu's older brother, Orda, although Batu remained in supreme authority. 
However, as the areas west of the Aral Sea delta to the Caspian Sea were unfit for horse 
breeding, the Turkrnen/Oghuz tribes nomadising there were largely left to their own 
devices. The youngest son of Chingis, Toluy, was given control of Khorasan, covering 
northern Iran and the southern part of Turkrnenistan. Toluy's son, Hulegu, founded the 
Ilkhan dynasty, and had largely inimical relations with the K6k Orda, prefiguring the 
fractures in the Mongol empire that characterized fourteenth century Central Asia 
(Bregel: 2003, 38). 
During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Mongol ruling dynasties converted to 
Islam, and became progressively Turkicised. The emergence of an Islamicised Turko-
Mongolian culture, increasingly interwoven with an urban, sedentary Sart (Iranian) 
culture and economy in the region's major trading centres, defined both the political 
order and socio-economic development of early modem Central Asia (Manz: 1994, 6). 
Tangible evidence of this is present in the rise of Turkicised Mongol tribes such as the 
Qongrats and Uzbeks in Khorezm (in northern Turkmenistan), and the Jawn-i-Qurban in 
the Atrek river basin of northern Khorasan (now southwestern Turkmenistan) (Bregel: 
2003,40). 
The demise of the Mongol aristocracy in Khorasan came with the death of Abu Said in 
1335, and was followed, after an interregnum of puppet khans controlled by Persian tribal 
amirs, by the rise of the Timurid empire after 1360. Tamerlane became head of the ulus 
of Chaghatay in 1360, before annexing the neighbouring regions of Khorezm and 
Fergana and then, in the period from 1370 to his death in 1405, expanding his empire 
through conquests as far afield as Iran, Georgia and Syria in the west, to Delhi and 
western China in the south and east (Marozzi: 2005). The Turkmen tribes nomadising in 
the Ust-Yurt and Mangishlaq regions, and along the Uzboi (the river connecting the Aral 
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Sea to the Caspian Sea that dried up in the sixteenth century), came under the nominal 
suzerainty of the Timurids but were, as with the Mongols, largely unaffected in practical 
terms by Timurid rule, either in Tamerlane's lifetime or in those of his successors, 
Shahrukh (ruled 1409-1447), Ulugh Beg (1447-1449), Abu Said (1451-1469), and Sultan 
Husayn Bayqara (1470-1506) (Soucek: 2000, 125-143). 
Thus, the Turkmen tribes nomadising in the Mangishlaq, along the Uzboi and, to a lesser 
extent, along the Amu Darya river, remained almost wholly isolated from the currents of 
political and social change enveloping the region, with the consequence that a much more 
purely Turkic (but, to the Turco-Mongolian mind, inferior) culture developed. Therefore, 
while Islamic learning and law was incorporated into the social and legal systems of the 
Chaghatay, Ilkhan and Timurid empires, the Turkmen, in the absence of madrassahs or a 
tradition of Islamic scholarship, continued to rely on adat, an essentially secular, 
unwritten, but nonetheless complex, code of customary law. 
Similarly, political continuity in Turco-Mongolian societies was maintained through the 
dynastic principle exercised by a Chingisid "white bone" noble caste (01cott: 1995, 14), 
whereas Turkmen tribes did not operate a system of hereditary khanship, but instead 
continued to elect their leaders, or yabghus, by consensus and on merit, and only then for 
specific periods, such as the duration of an alaman (raid on a neighbouring settlement) 
(Geiss: 1999,348). 
The insularity from the wider political, religious and socio-economic currents of Central 
Asia, which began with the demise of the Seljuk state, became embedded and entrenched 
over succeeding centuries with far-reaching implications for the Turkmen. The formation 
and crystallisation of lasting ethnically and culturally distinct identities differentiated 
Turkmen tribes not only from other individual Central Asian ethnic groups, but also, 
more broadly, from a loose, collective Central Asian political and social culture, a trend 
reinforced by the principal point of contact between Turkmen and the region's urbanised 
societies being almost solely in predatory or conflictual circumstances. 
This socio-political distinctiveness undoubtedly influenced early Soviet ethnographers 
and political commissars in their decision to give Turkmen full Union Republic status at 
the formation of the Soviet Union in 1924, in preference to absorption in to an enlarged 
Uzbek SSR, while denying much stronger prima facie claims from Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and 
Tajiks, who received full Union Republic status only several years later. It was also to 
influence the more liberal approach adopted by the Bolshevik leaders on religious, legal 
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and linguistic issues, which was to stress the importance of maintaining the isolation of 
the Turkmen SSR from potentially malign Islamic currents of thought emanating from 
the Uzbek SSR. This Turkmen "special case" mentality has also impacted on both 
external and internal perceptions of socio-political development into the post-Soviet 
period. 
Arabshahid Rule and the Migrations of the Turkmen (1506-1869) 
As Bregel points out, the isolation of the Turkmen tribes nomadising in the region east of 
the Caspian Sea, means that comparatively little is known by historians about the 
structure ofTurkmen society and economy and of tribal movements between the Mongol 
conquest and the rise of the Arabshahids in the early sixteenth century (2003, 72). 
Thereafter, however, the Arabshahid scholar Abul Ghazi furnishes us with important data 
on the history and genealogy of the Turkmen tribes, and their interaction with the 
Arabshahids, in his work, 'The History of the Mongols and the Tatars,' written in the 
third decade of the seventeenth century (Barthold: 1962, 158-159). 
The Turkic Arabshahid tribes gained control of Khorezm in 1511 with a formidable 
military force under the leadership of Balbars and Ilbars, the sons of Burge Sultan, thus 
enabling, for the first time in over three centuries, an external power to subjugate several 
core Turkmen tribes, albeit for only a brief period between 1511 and 1523. The 
temporary extension of Arabshahid power in to the vast, arid wastes of Mangishlaq, U st-
Yurt and the western Karakum desert disrupted long-established patterns of short-range 
nomadism with sheep and dromedary camels among the Turkmen, and prefigured a 
period of more extensive engagement with the other sources of political power that were 
gradually closing in on Turkmen tribes in western Central Asia. 
Uzbek military units under Arabshahid control were increasingly able to cross the 
Karakum desert on raids from north (Khorezm) to south (Khorasan), experiencing contact 
with outlying Turkmen shepherds (Bregel: 2003, 52). Nomadic Kalmyks and Kazakhs 
simultaneously exerted increasing pressure from the north, displacing smaller Turkmen 
sub-clans down the eastern Caspian seaboard, where the latter encountered outposts of 
Khorasanian power. Moreover, the fluid conflicts between the Arabshahids and the 
neighbouring eastern empire of the Abulkhayids in the late sixteenth century reached 
across the southern Karakum, to Durun, Merv and Nissa; and as far west as the Caspian 
Sea on occasion. These external pressures, together with the consolidation of Khorezm's 
political power around its new capital, Khiva, between 1603 and 1622, and a shortage of 
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available land in the Mangishlaq for livestock breeding, provided the rationale for the 
first of wave of Turkmen migrations commencing in 1639 (Bregel: 1981: 29). 
The great tribal migrations between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries effectively 
diffused the Turkmen people, hitherto concentrated in an area of what is now western 
Kazakhstan, and northwestern Turkmenistan, across the territory of contemporary 
Turkmenistan and beyond. The senior Salor tribe migrated down the Caspian seaboard to 
the Khorasanian mountains, themselves displacing smaller Turkmen tribes en route. 
Another ancient tribe, the Chowdur, split into two sections, the first migrating north to 
the lower Volga basin; the second moving west to Khorezm (Bregel: 1981, 32). 
Other tribes moved greater distances. The Ersari moved from the Garabogaz inlet on the 
Caspian seaboard, north of the modern city of Turkmenbashi (formerly Krasnovodsk), 
first to the northern Karakum desert, then to Khiva, and finally to the Amu Darya river. 
The Kara-Choqa branch of the Yomuts emulated the Salors by moving south along the 
Caspian seaboard, while the Bayram Shali branch moved northeast to Khorezm, where 
they embarked on a long and troubled relationship with the Khorezmian authorities 
culminating in periodic expulsions from the relatively new Khivan khanate, following 
rebellions in 1 744-7, 1 771-9 and 1 804-06 (Bregel: 2003, 72). The numerically 1 argest 
tribe, the Teke, moved southeast, displacing the smaller Yernreli tribe in the process, in 
order to settle north 0 f t he K opet D agh mountains (around the location 0 f t he current 
capital, Ashgabat), to a region nominally part of Khorasan, but which was, in practice, 
beyond the northern boundary 0 f effective political control. The 1 ess numerous E l-Ali 
tribe moved away from the dry bed of the Uzboi in the western Karakum desert, 
splintering into three groups, which migrated to the Murghab (in Afghanistan), along the 
Amu Darya to Khiva, and south to Khorasan, respectively (Bregel: 2003, 72). 
The Legacy of the Migrations 
The wave of migrations by Turkmen tribes, dispersing from their area of greatest 
concentration between the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea, had several enduring political, 
social and economic implications. 
Firstly, the broadly contemporaneous demise and collapse of the Arabshahid empire 
between 1694 and 1727, together with the weakness of the Safavid dynasties, enabled 
Turkmen tribes to emerge as a diffuse, entirely disunited, politically unsophisticated, but 
sporadically potent politico-military power in the region. In short, the emergence of 
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violent Turkmen nomadic raiding parties injected a further dose of anarchy into an 
already chaotic and combustible regional environment. Turkmen tribes thus represented 
an additional ingredient to be factored into the political calculations and machinations of 
local elites. 
Secondly, the patterns of distribution of the Turkmen tribes in this period have remained 
fairly stable since, apart from the further phased large-scale migration of Teke groups to 
the southeast region, around the Merv oasis, between the mid-1830s and 1857. Thus, the 
migrations 0 f this period have produced, and s till reflect, the spatial configurations 0 f 
different tribes in contemporary Turkmenistan, with their clear implications for 
contemporary political dynamics. 
Thirdly, the dispersal of different tribes, sub-tribes and clans across large distances, from 
southern Russia to contemporary Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the 
relatively large geographical space that constitutes the contemporary republic of 
Turkmenistan21 , illustrates the lack of political unity among the Turkmen. Not only were 
there no political authority structures binding together Turkmen tribes, there were barely 
any within individual tribal or sub-tribal configurations. Thus, the self-identification of 
individual Turkmen with t heir tribe rested 0 n nog reater a [filiation than that 0 f ( often 
imagined or invented) genealogical descent lines. A member of a Turkmen tribe or sub-
tribe was, until the mid-nineteenth century, far more likely to experience conflict within 
his own, or with other Turkrnen tribes, than with external political forces. Relations 
between tribes, as will be seen later, could be complex and punctuated by temporary 
alliances and rivalries, but the most common intra-tribal relationship, for the larger tribes 
at least, could probably best be categorised as "cold peace" (Geiss: 2003, 97-125). The 
legacy of tribal disunity was to prove a major challenge to the circumscribed nation-
building project instigated by the Bolsheviks, and remains an enduring characteristic of 
Turkmen domestic politics in the post-Soviet era. 
The fourth legacy of the migrations was to actively generate and fuel enduring inter-tribal 
hostility. Little is known about the incidence of inter-tribal conflict while Turkmen tribes 
were practising short-range nomadism in seclusion between the thirteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. However, there was likely to be some sort of internal "push" factor 
behind the waves of migrations, probably economic pressure, which is likely to have 
been manifested in violent conflict. The act of migration may have dissolved these 
21 Turkmenistan is approximately the same size as France. 
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tensions but certainly created new ones, as long-established but smaIIer tribes, along the 
Caspian seaboard and north of the Kopet Dagh mountain range, were displaced by larger 
groups. The principal perpetrators of tribal displacement were the most numerous tribe, 
the Tekes, who displaced the YemreIi from the Ahal oasis (proximate to Ashgabat), and 
the Sariq from the Merv oasis in the mid-nineteenth centuries (Saray: 1989, 20-23). The 
impact of these episodes resonated in the mixture of cooperation and resistance to 
Russian invasion between 1869 and 1885 (motivated by the possibility of tactical gains 
by other tribes against the Tekes), and in the delicate balancing act undertaken by Soviet 
officials in making senior political and academic appointments. It also stiII resonates in 
contemporary Turkmenistan, in the perception of many Turkmens that the Tekes are too 
politically dominant, a reality that, as a Teke himself, Niyazov is obliged to confront 
(Kadyrov: 2004). 
The fifth and final 1 egacy of the migrations was that they ended the I engthy political 
isolation of the Turkmen tribes. While the religious, cultural and legal characteristics of 
Turkmen society were formed and distilled in the long period of nomadising in the 
remote Mangishlaq, Ust-Yurt and Uzboi regions, with limited exposure to the cross-
currents of Central Asian socio-economic development of the period, the migrations 
effectively ended Turkmen i solation and a ccelerated greater engagement with political 
forces closer to the geographical heart of Central Asia which, in turn, shaped the 
Turkmen political order. ,The principal outcome of higher levels of interaction with the 
Arabshahids in Khorezm to their north and east and the Persians of Khorasan to their 
south, was periodic loss of political autonomy. The Turkmens had participated in the 
ouster of the Arabshahid sultan Abul Ghazi by Isfandiyar in 1631. After Isfandiyar died 
in 1642, and Abul Ghazi returned to power, he banished Turkmen tribes across the 
Karakum to northern Khorasan and the Tejen valley south west of Merv (now the border 
region between Turkmenistan and Iran) and, together with his son Anusha, continued to 
launch raids from Khorezm on the tribes for the remainder of the century. Similarly, 
Turkmen tribes in the southwestern Atrek valley and along the Caspian seaboard were 
pressured by raids from both the northern Kalmyk tribes and the Persian Governor of 
Astarabad during the later seventeenth century. 
However, although the Turkmen could be the victims of the expansion of their 
neighbours' military influence, equaIIy they could benefit from the concomitant political 
vacuums created by the retraction of this power. The fall of the Safavid empire in Iran in 
the late eighteenth century, for instance, offered opportunities for Turkmen tribes to settle 
unhindered in the areas around Nissa and Duran, north of the Kopet Dagh mountains. 
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The consolidation of Central Asia's sedentary regions under the control of the three 
khanates of Bukhara, Khiva (Khorezm) and Kokand in the early nineteenth century, also 
offered opportunities for Turkmen tribes to profit (Trotter: 1882, 539). Turkmen nomads 
became prolific suppliers to the infamous slave market at Khiva, and Yomuts emerged as 
a feared, quasi-autonomous core of the Khivan army, defending the khanate's 
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borderlands in a relationship broadly analogous to that enjoyed by the Cossacks with the 
Russian state. 
Thus, on the eve of Russian expansion into Central Asia in the mid-nineteenth century, a 
somewhat ambivalent and volatile relationship had developed between Turkmen tribes 
and the sedentary populations of Khorasan, Bukhara and Khiva, characterised by frequent 
raids, diplomatic hostility, mutual profit, and even, in the case of Khorezm, indentured 
service into the khanate's military forces. 
As noted above, however, there was little uniformity in the interactions between tribes, or 
often even within them. Thus, Yomuts in the service of Khorezm enjoyed tax privileges, 
preferential access to the slave market, and senior office in the Khorezmian army, and 
were likely to enthusiastically pursue alamans against the Tekes of Ahal and Merv 
(Saray: 1989, 101-105), while other Yomuts nomadising on the fringes of Khorezm may 
well have had inimical relations with the political centre in Khiva and, perhaps, 
intermittently friendly relations with other tribal groups. 
The end of Turkmen isolation therefore had a number of temporary and permanent 
consequences. It altered regional political dynamics by introducing highly mobile and 
effective nomadic raiders capable of disrupting the caravan trade and threateni~g military . 
outposts. It established a spatial distribution of tribes that has broadly held ever since. It 
fuelled both inter- and intra-tribal hostilities over economic issues (land and water usage), 
and in respect of the variegated relations tribes experienced with neighbouring sedentary 
communities. Finally, it led to the development of a network of fluctuating and 
contradictory relationships with Khorasan and the khanates of Bukhara and Khiva, which 
were to shape responses to Russian imperial expansion in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. 
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Russian Conquest and absorption into Tsarist military-political structures 
The Turkmen response to the expansion of Russian political and military influence into 
the lands on which they cultivated and nomadised was neither uniform nor coordinated. 
As there was no pre-existing history of political unity between Turkmen tribes, this was 
hardly surprising. However, the pincer-like nature of the Russian invasion is also an 
explanatory factor. The long-term strategic goal of the Tsarist administration in Central 
Asia appears to have been twofold. Firstly, Russia was keen to ensure that as much of 
Turkestan (as the region was then more commonly known) as possible came under 
Russian influence in the shortest possible time. The logic of imperial expansion was to 
pre-empt the projection of British power into the region from India and Afghanistan, 
which might, in its turn, threaten the southern rim of the Russian empire (Hopkirk: 2001). 
The second Russian policy objective was, in common with the other great European 
powers of the age, to secure an empire, potentially rich in resources and prestige, under 
the guise of political and social liberation. Each conquest then had to be reinforced by a 
strategic buffer zone. Consequently, the overland expansion of Russia's empire was 
driven by a self-fulfilling logic - it grew to protect the gains that that had been previously 
accrued. 
The conquest of Turkmen lands fulfilled both of these criteria. From the north and 
northeast, the attack on Khiva, notorious for its slave market, in June 1873 fulfilled the 
mission of liberation (Carrere d'Encausse: 1994, 147). From the west, the establishment 
of the port of Krasnovodsk in November 1869 established a strategic foothold east of the 
Caspian Sea that would protect Russian possessions in the Caucasus, and thwart the 
expansion of British or Persian power from the southeast. 
The Yomuts nomadising in southwest Turkmenistan, along the Caspian seaboard, 
generally welcomed the establishment of the Russian base at Krasnovodsk (Saray: 1989: 
85). Persian attacks on Yomut and Goklen tribes in the Atrek Valley in 1836 had led 
Yomut obas (headmen) to petition Russian merchants for protection. Moreover, the 
Russians proved willing to trade, buying camels and sheep from the Yomuts, and to make 
gifts to tribesmen as part of a non-aggression pact. Krasnovodsk and a base further north 
at Mangishlaq (later to become part of Kazakhstan) were incorporated in the Governor-
Generalship of the Caucasus, headed by Tsar Alexander H's brother Michae1, in February 
1870. An early test of the relationship came in October 1870, when Teke raiders launched 
an attack on a Russian party exploring the western Karakum desert. In order to repulse 
the assault and pursue the raiders, Russians bought or commandeered supplies from 
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Yomuts, underlining the lack of political unity among the Turkmens at this juncture 
(Saray: 1989,90). 
The military base established at Krasnovodsk by Col. G. Stoletov also served as an 
important point to launch one arm of the operation to defeat the Khivan khanate. The 
separate khanate of Kokand, centred on the Fergana Valley, incorporating parts of the 
modem states of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, had fallen in 1866 (Tashkendi: 
2003, 42-78), and been absorbed into the new Governor-Generalship of Turkestan. The 
emirate of Bukhara had been overrun in 1868. The emirate remained intact, but as a 
Russian protectorate. Russian pressure thus increased on Khiva, ostensibly because of its 
slave markets, many hundreds of whose victims were Russian, and because of the 
predations across Khorezm's western steppe of the northern branch of Yomuts, who 
formed a significant part of Khorezm's military forces, but who, in reality, functioned 
more as unreliable paramilitary irregulars. 
Simultaneous expeditions were launched from Krasnovodsk in the west and from the 
Kazakh lands in the northeast in April 1873 under the command of General Konstantin 
von Kaufman, the first Governor-General of Turkestan (Geiss: 2003, 198; Saray: 1989, 
106). Khiva surrendered in June 1873, but the Yomuts fought on. Kaufman gave the 
Yomuts an unrealistic ultimatum of two weeks for the payment of £42,500 as a war 
indemnity. When this was not paid, the Yomuts were pursued and, with their families, 
brutally massacred by the Russians at the desert settlement of Hazavat. Interestingly, the 
post-Soviet regime has not incorporated this encounter into the national historical 
narrative, in the way that the defeat of the Tekes at Geok-Deppe nearly a decade later, has 
become emblematic of Turkmen bravery against superior foreign arms. This may, 
perhaps, be because Khiva itself does not fall within Turkmen territory, but is more likely 
to be because the victims were northern Yomuts, with whom Niyazov has long had an 
uneasy relationship. 
The expansion of Russian influence into Turkmen lands was recognised by the creation 
of a Transcaspian military district in April 1874, headed by General A. Lomakin. The 
ambiguous relationship between Russian forces and the local population was exemplified 
by, on the one hand, frequent skirmishes between imperial forces and Tekes on the 
central steppe between 1874 and 1879, as the former steadily advanced eastwards, and, 
on the other hand, the fulsome provisioning of the same Russian expeditionary forces to 
the tune of 1000 camels by Yomuts in the west (Saray: 1989, 119). 
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The fate of the Tekes, and the Turkmen more generally, was decided at two battles, on 9 
September 1879 and 24 January 1881, both at the fortress of Geok-Deppe, 45 km west of 
Ashgabat, itself only a small encampment at this time (Matley: 1 ?94, 98). The Ahal and 
Merv (Mary) Tekes had come together and appointed Nur Verdi Khan as their serdar 
(military leader), and, in the first battle, he repulsed a force led by Lomakin, albeit 
sustaining heavy losses (Boulger: 1880, 234-250). Lomakin was replaced by General 
M.D. S kobelev in M arch 1880, a nd abetter prepared force secured relations with the 
Yomuts by purchasing 2500 camels (although some Yomuts refused to deal with the 
Russians and migrated across the Atrek river to Persia), and then offered punitive peace 
terms to the Tekes, which were refused (Carrere d'Encausse: 1994, 147-148). 
The death of Nur Verdi Khan in May 1880 dealt a blow to Teke fortunes and the Tekes 
proved unable to defend Geok-Deppe when Russian sappers mined its fortifications. 6500 
were killed in the battle, and a further 8000 were cut down, mainly women and children, 
fleeing into the Karakum desert (Saray: 1989,205-216). In later years, Soviet historians 
were to simply airbrush this battle from history, stating that Turkmens and Russians had 
come together amicably (Skozyrov: 1956: 18). 
Turkmen resistance to the Russian forces was effectively broken at Geok-Deppe. The 
Merv Tekes accepted peace terms more amicably on 31.January 1884. The only pocket of 
Turkmen land not under Russian control by now was the far southeastern area bordering 
Afghanistan. In order to secure this region, a nd complete the closure of the gap with 
British India and its client Afghan state, Russian forces assisted Saryk and Salor 
tribesmen in a dispute with Persians and Afghans over land and water use. After securing 
their rights, these tribes tendered their submission to General Komarov in January 1885. 
A joint Russo-Turkmen force inflicted heavy losses on the Afghans to claim a section of 
Penjdeh valley in March 1885, prompting the establishment of a joint Anglo-Russian 
border survey, which concluded its work in 1887 with a definitive border treaty that still 
forms the contemporary international border between the two states (Saray: 1989, 239). 
Thus, the subjugation of the Turkmen was finally completed, and the parameters of 
subsequent Turkmen statehood established, thereby formally delivering some of the last 
stateless peoples and territories into the international diplomatic and state system. 
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Turkmen society prior to the Bolshevik Revolution 
Constructing an accurate picture of Turkmen society prior to its incorporation into the 
Soviet Union is complicated by a lack of available sources. There are very few extant 
Turkmen materials available, as Turkmen society was almost universally illiterate, 
although the Turkish scholar Mehmet Saray has utilised Jakname, an important document 
authored by Abd-ul-Sattar Kazi (more commonly known as Ka~y) in the 1850s. Some 
materials on the pre-conquest era were also collected by the Soviets (Ma!erialii: 1968) 
and feature in Saray's work, but the bulk of evidence on the period comes from Russian 
and other European travellers, many of whom participated in the nineteenth century 
"Great Game" between Russia and Britain for geopolitical influence in Central Asia, and 
who lived amongst the Turkmen, observing the structure of their society, their customs 
and habits. The work of Paul Georg Geiss, who has analysed these materials in 
conjunction with the two major anthropological studies of the Turkmen undertaken by the 
East German ethnographer W. Konig in the mid-1950s (1962), and William Irons in the 
1960s (1975), has produced a persuasive, if somewhat unsystematic, picture of pre-
Tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia (Geiss: 2003). 
Synthesising the materials and interpretations of Saray and Geiss, together with the eye-
witness accounts of European travellers, in a critical fashion, we are able to develop a 
reasonably coherent picture of Turkmen political order, economic patterns and socio-
cultural development in the late nineteenth century. 
(i) The Turkmen political and social order before the Bolshevik Revolution 
Notwithstanding their formal incorporation into Tsarist military-administrative 
institutions, the structure of Turkmen society changed very little after the Russian 
conquest. The Transcaspian military district was given the civilian political status of an 
oblas!, which was then incorporated into the Turkestan Governor-Generalship in 1897, in 
place of the increasingly impractical and illogical jurisdiction of the Viceroy of the 
Caucasus. The main themes of this period were the creation by Russian administrators of 
a very small number of Russian language schools intended to educate an elite cadre of 
native bureaucrats, the completion of the Transcaspian railway, and the conversion of 
large tracts of Turkmen land along rivers and near oases to the production of cotton in 
order to supply the growing domestic Russian market. 
84 
However, there was little regulation or interference by colonial administrators in religious 
affairs, the court system and local forms of governance. In fact, there was actually very 
little evidence of a "civilising" imperial mission. Consequently, Turkmen political and 
social life remained relatively unaltered by the Russian occupation, particularly in 
outlying areas. 
Analysis of the available sources suggests several key characteristics of the Turkmen 
structure of authority relations and social practices in the periods before and shortly after 
the Russian conquest, which enable us to construct a picture of the internal dynamics of 
Turkmen society. 
Firstly, most sources agree that the Turkmen political order was acephalous - that is to 
say, it lacked a political leadership endowed with enduring authority and furnished with a 
permanent staff (Vambery: 1865,249; 0' Donovan: 1977, 166; Geiss: 2003, 7-8; Irons: 
1975). The British officer Lieutenant Colonel C. E. Stewart, for example, noted in 1881 
that the Merv Tekes had "no regular chiefs for internal affairs" (Stewali: 1977: 166). 
Order was therefore maintained by all adult males. Political representation did not exist 
because all males were roughly equal members of the political community. Leadership 
did exist but it was entirely situational - equally conferred and withdrawn by consent. 
The spokesmen (and sometimes women) appointed by each extended family group had 
no authority to make decisions or fix obligations on behalf of the group. Community 
decisions were taken by the maslakhat, a council with fluid membership comprising 
elders or aksakals ("white beards") and influential members of the community, 
occasionally including mature women. Maslakhat members were chosen not by dint of 
hereditary principle, but through experience, ability, wealth and standing in the 
community. As Adrienne Edgar notes: 
The Turkmen lacked a hereditary aristocratic stratum or tribe that 
monopolised positions ofleadership. Leadership within each community was 
based to a large extent on seniority; personal qualities, wealth and 
membership in a well-respected lineage were also important (2004, 26). 
In dealing with external groups, obas (headmen) were elected, but this position came 
without privileges and an oba could be summarily removed by the maslakhat. When 
embarking on an alaman, or military expedition, temporary authority for the duration of 
the campaign was invested in a serdar (military leader). A serdar had unfettered 
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authority over the life and death of his followers for the duration of the campaign, but 
once booty had been shared, his authority ceased (0' Donovan: [1884] 1977,202-203). 
Decisions of the maslakhat had to be consistent with adat, the code of customary law, 
and were binding. Geiss believes that the maslakhat "represented the condensed public 
opinion of the group which balanced the usurping ambitions of a single tribesman" (2003, 
98). Should a community member dissent from the opinion of the maslakhat, the decision 
was usually deferred, and then reconsidered at a later point. This may occur on several 
occasions until a consensus or compromise could be reached. Teke tribes had a slightly 
more hierarchical variant of this community structure in that the maslakhat might appoint 
a khan as a semi-permanent representative of the group. Nevertheless, Teke khans were 
not appointed on the Chingisid hereditary principle, but on ability and standing. 
F.R. Skrine and Edward Denison Ross, British travellers to the region m the late 
nineteenth century, noted that Teke khans were subject to immediate recall, with the 
maslakhat pronouncing "You are Khan!" to appoint a leader, but with the authority to 
pronounce "You are not Khan!" at any future meeting in order to terminate the 
appointment (Geiss: 1999: 349). According to Kady (quoted in Geiss: 1999, 349), the 
first Teke khans were only created in 1830, with the appointment of Oraz Khan; who 
organised and headed the invasion of the Tejen and Murghab regions to expel the Salor 
and Saryk tribes previously resident there. It would appear, therefore, that the 
fundamental difference between the position of serdar and khan lay in the duration of the 
post, with the latter being a more op~n-ended arrangement. 
Although a rough but effective form of democracy 'would appear to have operated, it is, 
however, worth noting that certain members of each group were, excluded from the 
political community. Women were usually excluded from the decision-making process, 
although where they were particularly capable, had great standing, or when males were 
absent, women might be given maslakhat membership. Interestingly, for example, in the 
negotiations for Russian annexation between the imperial forces led by General Skobelev 
and the Merv Tekes during the winter of 1883-4, the Merv delegation was headed by the 
widow of Nur Verdi Khan, a Teke leader, rather than by other senior male Teke khans 
(Saray: 1989,226-230; Field observation, Mary Regional Museum, 22 November, 2004). 
Moreover, slaves (guls) and individuals without the requisite pure proof of lineage, such 
as the offspring of unions between Turkmen and slaves or other low-status groups such as 
Kurds (yannicha), and even small "client" tribes, were also 'excluded from membership of 
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the political community (Edgar: 2001,271), although some elasticity was possible should 
circumstances dictate. Thus, although T urkmen communities were internally stratified, 
genealogies were malleable enough to enable new allies or community members to be 
"discovered" a nd "written in" to existing lineages (Edgar: 2004, 25). Moreover, small 
"saintly" tribes of Arab or Persian descent, who frequently fulfilled spiritual or healing 
functions were accorded separate respect and status. Thus, while Turkmen political 
identity was conceptualised to as ignificant degree through genealogy, it remained, as 
Edgar notes, essentially "a backward projection of present concerns and relationships in 
to the past" (2004, 25). 
If the form of Turkmen traditional political structures embodied an element of primitive 
democracy and afforded, to some degree, the ability for individuals to both assert and 
protect their rights within the group context, this was tempered by the joint liability of 
extended family members for the transgressions of individuals. Thus, the homicide of a 
slave required the payment of 'blood money' by all those who could trace their relation to 
the perpetrator as far back as seven generations, so called gan dushar ("blood reach" in 
Yomut Turkmen) (Geiss: 2003, 33). The killing of a pure Turkmen gave rise to a group 
responsibility to rectify the trespass, and a group liability for retribution, normally a 
counter-homicide that would restore amicable relations. This practice finds expression in 
contemporary Turkmenistan, through the detention and punishment of the relatives of 
criminals and dissidents, who are regarded by the government as being as culpable as the 
perpetrator himself for any transgressions (lliF Report: April 2004, 19), although the 
practice also has its antecedents in the Soviet era, particularly during Stalin's rule 
(Service: 2003, 210-253). 
Political authority was sanctified and legitimised through adherence to adat (or dap), 
Turkmen common law. Although Islamic shariat law was known to the Turkmens, its 
implementation was selective, and its strictures were subordinated to adat (Edgar: 2004, 
26). The preference for custom over religion crucially differentiates Turkmen from the 
sedentary communities ofUzbekistan, in particular, the mahallas (local Uzbek residential 
districts), in which shariat law was practised. Adat embodied community values and 
norms, covering social and family customs, criminality, together with the coordination 
and regulation of land, irrigation and livestock issues. Thus, adat provided a way of life 
as much as a legal code, functioning as a system of accreting, multi-layered and 
polyvocal expressions of social norms, gradually evolving and adapting to changing 
mores, social pressures and economic circumstances, in a manner not dissimilar to 
English common law. It also, as Geiss notes, reinforced patterns of kinship identity in 
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contrast to, say, Uzbek interpretations of shariat law, which served to reinforce 
residential communal commitment at mahalla (neighbourhood) level (2001, 102). 
Consequently, Turkmen political identity was fixed in n on-spatial terms, which would 
prove a challenge to Soviet officials and ethnographers in later years. 
The regulation of relations with other Turkmen tribal groups was also coded through a 
system of subtle, complex and dynamic socio-political norms. Following the work of 
Irons on the Yomuts who nomadise along the Perso-Turkmen borderlands in the Gurgan 
valley, Geiss has advanced the notion that the framework of inter-tribal interaction could 
be described as that of a "checkerboard order" (Irons: 1975, 64; Geiss: 2003, 101-102). 
For example, the Yomut tribe was subdivided in to Chony and Serefbranches, which 
were largely inimical to one another. However, conflict was relatively rare, because the 
branches resided in alternate strips between the mountainsides and the riverbeds in a form 
of checkerboard (Irons: 1975, 65). The group's joint liabilities in the event of conflict 
meant that any tribesman who transgressed social norms found that his tribal unit was 
hemmed in by inimical tribal units on either side, which were, in turn, contained by 
inimical units on their outer. Thus, Turkmen tribes maintained a complex strategic 
balance based on. an artificially created parity that Geiss describes as "segmentary 
opposition" (2003, 103). 
The observations of Charles Marvin, a Victorian traveller who witnessed the Russian 
military campaign against the Turkmen, and resided with the Merv Tekes in 1880-1, 
would appear to confirm the hypothesis advanced by Geiss (Marvin: 1881,30). Marvin 
noted that the Teke constructed over a hundred small canals on each bank of the Murghab 
river, the right being used by Otamysh branch of the Teke, and the left by the 
Tokhtamysh branch. Edmund O'Donovan, who lived as an honoured guest of the Tekes 
for a time shortly after Marvin's visit, confirmed these arrangements (O'Donovan: [1884] 
1977,201-202). Where a numerical imbalance arose that might cause a disagreement in 
the amount of water usage claimed by each branch, the deficient branch supplemented its 
numbers 'by drawing additional manpower from other regions, thus ensuring the 
continuation of strategic parity. 
Geiss therefore concludes that the acephalous structure of the Turkmen, combined with 
the system of customary law and the construction of a geographically arranged balance of 
power, placed constraints on inter-tribal conflict and ensured that responses to inter-tribal 
transgressions remained proportionate (2003, 106). What Geiss does not explain, 
however, is how relations were regulated between small tribes, between more or less 
purely nomadic groups who did not grow crops, or between those nomadic Turkmen 
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tribes living adjacent to, or amongst, sedentary communities of Turkmen or non-
Turkmen. However, it is clear that, in order for such complex systems of conflict 
prevention and resolution to evolve, enmities between tribal groupings were 
commonplace, if not prevalent. The Russian military commander, General Kuropatkin, 
appears to confirm this perception when he observed in 1879: "The hatred of the various 
Turkmen clans towards one another is scarcely less than their hatred towards other 
people" (Edgar: 2004, 17). Barthold, writing in the early Soviet period, in the present 
tense, arrived at the same conclusion: "Single clans, even those belonging to the same 
tribe, are often hostile to one another. They band together only when they come out 
against members of another tribe or people ... national consciousness is very slight" 
(1962,169). 
(ii) The Turkmen tribal economy 
In the same way that constructing a picture of the pre-revolutionary Turkmen political 
order requires the careful piecing together of data from diverse sources, so there is only a 
limited array of materials to assemble a picture of the traditional Turkmen tribal 
economy. 
To begin with, in the absence of census data, it is unclear how many Turkmen existed 
within or around the subsequent borders of Turkmenistan. Bregel analysed the 
suppressed, but "more or less reliable" data from the infamous Soviet census of 1926 
(1981, 11), concluding that the Turkmen population probably exceeded 700,000 in the 
mid-nineteenth century, of which around 30% were Teke, 21% Yomut, 16% Ersary, with 
the Goklen, Salor, Sariq, and Chowder making up a further 16 %, and smaller tribes the 
remainder. 
The extent to which Turkmen economy was nomadic is also unclear. Soviet historians 
and ethnographers were keen to underplay the degree to which the Turkmen engaged in 
nomadic stock-breeding, not least because nomadism itself was ideologically problematic 
for the Bolsheviks, due its lack of a clear distinction between an exploiter and exploited 
class. Stalin unconvincingly attempted to designate nomadic economies as "feudal-
patriarchal", which does not make sense in the Turkmen (or, indeed, possibly any) 
context (Bregel: 1996, 8). By claiming that they had sedentarised prior to the Bolshevik 
Revolution, it was possible to telescope the Turkmen economy into the capitalist age, and 
thus identify and remove the class of wealthier stockholders and landowners. The reality, 
however, appears to have been much more complex. 
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Firstly, Bregel rejects the Soviet analysis, arguing that, from the sources available, 
including Abul-Ghazi, the contribution of arable agriculture to the Turkmen economy in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was insignificant (1981, 28). The settlement of 
the A mu D arya by the E rsari and S alor tribes in the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries did introduce a significant minority of Turlanen to crop production. However, 
the Yomuts of western Turkmenistan and the Sariqs remained almost exclusively pastoral 
stock-breeders. Large numbers of Turkmen, in fact, became either 'semi-nomads', 
spending a proportion of each year nomadising in collapsible dwellings - a way of life 
still being conducted in remote Yomut areas of southwestern Turlanenistan (Interview 
11) - or 'integrated nomads,' living in one place but nomadising from their base year 
round. Bregel asserts that, as late as 1926, as many as 116,000 Turkmen (16% of the 
popUlation) could be described as "pure nomads" (1981, 37). The process of 
sedentarisation led to the emergence of distinctions between chomur (settled) and charva 
(nomadic) Turkmen, the latter being generally more prosperous, and viewing mobility as 
a source, symbol and ultimate guarantor of political freedom (Geiss: 2003, 58, Edgar: 
2004,23). 
A further significant obstacle for Bolshevik ideologues lay in the very limited incidence 
of individual land ownership. Observations of the Teke, for example, noted that the 
community a ccorded rights for I and and water u se on a temporary basis to individual 
family units on the basis of need, rather than permanent ownership rights (Massell: 1974, 
50). These usage rights were subject to reapportionment each year by consensus, 
depending on whether each family had expanded or contracted. The outcome was that, 
not only had enduring property relations not been established (undercutting Marxist 
preconceptions of economic development) but that enduring authority relations were also 
absent. The absence 0 f a permanent bureaucratic stratum to fix and enforce economic 
relations, and to distribute resources and favours, produced a remarkably egalitarian 
socio-economic system. 
However, this lack of orthodox economIC development had serious implications for 
Turkmenistan's later prospects, as the newly formed Turlanen SSR had almost no 
industrial base on which to build in the early Soviet period (Sivorov: 1962, 159, 162, 
170-171). There was little in the way of permanent infrastructure or even much more than 
subsistence agriculture. Thus, the Turkmen SSR represented something of a tabula rasa 
in which Soviet 0 fficials could introduce the S talinist p roductionist ethos (McCannon: 
2003), as well as a showcase to the developing world of the benefits of rapid industrial 
development along the Soviet model. As a result, underdevelopment led to an emphasis 
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on setting and attaining output targets above all other measurements, a leitmotif still 
informing the economic policy ofNiyazov's government in the post-Soviet era (IS 1). 
The economic activity for which the Turlanen were most widely known, however, was 
their participation in the slave trade. Turkmen raiding parties were notorious for attacking 
caravans travelling the Silk Road and for seizing villagers from alamans in Khorasanian 
territory. The captives wer~ often taken to Turkmen settlements where they were used as 
slaves, although some were subsequently integrated into the local community, albeit at a 
lower status than indigenous Turlanen. Alternatively, Turlanen tribesmen would pass 
them on to Uzbek slave traders in Khiva and Bukhara where, according to Lt. Col. C.E. 
Stewart's 1881 account, up to 100,000 slaves resided ([1881] 1977, 156). Stewart's 
estimate appears to be corroborated by the release of 30,000 slaves of Persian origin 
alone by Russian forces after the storming of Khiva in 1873 (Geiss: 2003, 227). 
The importance of the slave trade for the Turlanen lay not only in its economic function 
(or, indeed, for the human tragedy perpetrated on those involved), but in the rationale it 
provided for Russian expansion. An important justification in the European rush for 
empire that characterised the second half of the nineteenth century was the civilising 
mission that colonisers could perform. With the Turlanen, Russian imperial forces had, in 
the slave trade, found a reason for squeezing the diminishing zone between the Russian 
and British empires, notwithstanding the fact that Tsar Alexander II had only abolished 
serfdom in 1861 (Pipes: 1977), a mere eight years before Russia established its first 
outpost in Turlanen lands at the new Caspian outpost of Krasnovodsk. 
The Turlanen political, social and economic order at the eve of Russian imperial conquest 
was one in which complex unwritten political and social codes, clustered around an 
amorphous, elastic but effective body of customary law, adat, governed behaviour and 
conduct. There was little, if any, evidence of pan-Turlanen, much less pan-Turkic, 
nationalism at this juncture. The notion advanced by Saray that a Turkmen proto-state 
existed (1989, 50-55) is contradicted by a consensus of contemporary witnesses and 
subsequent scholarship. The boundaries of Turlanen identity were tribal or, more likely, 
sub-tribal, reinforced by broad linguistic differences between tribes. 
What then, did being a Turlanen, or 'Turkmenness' mean? One answer is almost 
certainly that it was meaningless until or unless Turkmen came into contact with non-
Turkmen, in which case Turkmen knew that the 'Other' did not share certain speech 
patterns and customs relating t 0 dress, religious 0 bservance, marriage rites and soon. 
'Turkmenness' was therefore defined by default, in effect what it was not. Ho~ever, one 
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thread that could be said to bind Turkmen together was the mythology surrounding their 
common genealogy. As Edgar notes, unlike neighbouring sedentarised communities such 
as Uzbeks or Tajiks, Turlanen identity was fixed by genealogy (2004, 22), in effect, by 
time rather than space. The adding of a spatial dimension by the Bolsheviks, through the 
creation of a n ethno-territorial T urkmen republic in 1924, did much to alter T urkmen 
self-perception and foster a nascent national identity. In the post-Soviet era, Niyazov has 
sought to fuse the two strands, frequently extolling the connection between the Turkmen 
and their landscape with topographical references and imagery, while also emphasising, 
through the publication of (fictitious) written genealogies, the blood ties between himself 
and the wider Turkmen nation, notably with Oghuz Khan, the Seljuks, and other 
illustrious figures such as the national poet Makhtumkuli. 
The Bolshevik Revolution and the creation of the Turkmen SSR 
Although the Turkmen experienced episodes of political violence during the 
revolutionary period (1917-1919) and subsequent civil war (1919-1922), they could not 
be said to have been at the epicentre of revolutionary events leading to the consolidation 
of Bolshevik power. As with the tumultuous tides of empire and warfare that swept and 
than receded across Central Asia over the preceding millennium, the Turlanen remained 
somewhat at the margins. Nevertheless, it could be argued that they did rather well out of 
the early Soviet period. Formerly an inchoate nation in an inchoate space, the Turkmen 
gained a territory, a capital, even one or two cities in Dashoguz and Charjou that could 
barely be described as Turkmen, a political infrastructure, and the prospect of substantial 
resources from the Soviet centre in Moscow. 
It is unsurprising, therefore, that the response of Turkmen Bolshevik leaders to the final 
national delimitation plan in 1924 was "ecstatic" (Edgar: 2004, 65). How then was an 
ethno-national territory of mutually inimical tribes formed so swiftly? Why were 
Turlanen able to readily adapt to Soviet nationalities policy, and with what 
consequences? What were the legacies of incorporation into the Soviet Union for 
succeeding generations up to and including the regime of Saparmurat Niyazov, himself a 
model of Soviet advancement and Communist Party loyalty until he was over 50 years of 
age? 
Although tension between the indigenous population and their Russian colonisers 
predated World War J, the declaration of war by Russia against Ottoman Turkey caused 
the Turkic peoples of Central Asia increasingly to question their loyalty to the Tsarist 
regime. The decision, made in late 1914, to fix cotton prices but to allow grain prices to 
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float freely, caused great hardship and discontent across the region. This was magnified 
by the lack of political direction from the colonial administration, caused by the recalling 
of the Governor-General A.V. Samsenov to lead the 2nd Army (Keller: 2001, 13). The 
trigger for widespread rebellion, however, came with the decree on the drafting of non-
Russians to the front. Opposition to the draft was widespread and violent among the 
Turkmen but, as Arne Haugen points out, "there was scant evidence of all-Turkrnen 
solidarity", and "patterns of mobilisation largely corresponded to tribal boundaries" 
(2003, 44), with the predominantly nomadic Yomuts of western Turkrnenistan now 
among the most militant anti-Russians. 
The growth of the Jadidist movement in other parts of Central Asia did not really 
penetrate Turkrnen areas. The Jadids were young, radical, secular reformers, aiming to 
modernise Central Asia rapidly through mass education and economic development. 
Although they were pan-Turkic in orientation, there was considerable scope for tactical 
alliance with Bolshevik revolutionaries in their mutual opposition to the Tsarist 
government and the quasi-feudal protectorates of Khiva and Bukhara. However, Jadidism 
was essentially an urban movement based' in Bukhara and sponsored by wealthy 
merchants (Haugen: 2003, 47-58). Although a tiny Turkrnen intelligentsia, educated in 
Tsarist Russian language schools, absorbed Jadidism, unlike among the other Central 
Asian nations, notably the Uzbeks, it never gained a hold over the predominantly rural 
and illiterate Turkrnen (Edgar: 2004, 33). 
The rupture between the Bolshevik leadership in Moscow and local Muslim radicals 
came in December 1 917 when the 4 th Muslim Congress 0 f Turkestan in Kokand took 
Bolshevik propaganda about national self-determination at face value, and declared 
Turkestani autonomy, in contravention to a preceding pronouncement from the 
exclusively Slavic Turkestan Council of People's Commissars (Turksovnarkom) a month 
earlier (Soucek: 2000, 212). Stalin took the decision to crush the Muslim Congress, and 
the city of Kokand was destroyed on 18 February 1918, paving the way for the eventual 
establishment of Bolshevik control across Central Asia. 
A renegade faction of Turkrnen Socialist Revolutionaries had seized power in Ashgabat 
in July 1918, however, and formed an unlikely alliance with a detachment of British 
forces, known as the Malleson mission, which had been despatched to northern Persia in 
order to prevent both Gern1an designs on India, and the expansion of Bolshevik influence 
along the Persian and Afghan borders. In a little known episode, the British army 
exercised de facto political control over the Turkmen for several months, before 
eventually withdrawing after the German surrender (Sargent: 2004). This facilitated the 
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eventual 0 ccupation 0 f t he entire T ranscaspian 0 blast by the Red Army in 1 919-1920 
(Carrere d'Encausse: 1994,232). 
A separate political dynamic was at work among the northern and eastern Turkmen. The 
Turkrnen tribal leader Junaid Khan gained effective control of the Khivan khanate in 
1916, only to be deposed by an alliance of Bolsheviks and Jadidist 'Young Khivans' in 
January 1920. The Emir of Bukhara was overthrown in October 1920, and in both 
territories, which had significant Turlanen minorities, People's Soviet Republics were 
declared. However, Bolshevik authority remained, at this stage, severely circumscribed 
and tenuous. 
In order to win over local support and implement Bolshevik nationalities policy, a more 
conciliatory line towards the Turkmen was pursued. Turkmen "sections" were created in 
the Kerki and Charjou oblasti of the Bukharan republic in October 1923, an executive 
Committee of Turkmen sat in the Khivan government, and Transcaspia was renamed as 
an autonomous Turkmen province (Carrere d'Encausse: 1994,236; Karriyeva et al: 1978, 
354-355). However, real authority was exercised by the Sredazburo (Central Asian 
Bureau) which, between 1920 and its disbandment in 1934, acted as the plenipotentiary 
of Moscow in Central Asia (Haugen: 2003, 3). 
The decision made by Lenin and Stalin, who was the Bolsheviks' principal expert 0 n 
nationality affairs, to create ethno-territorial republics in Central Asia owed much to 
Marxist ideology, or rather the lack of it on the national question. Both Soviet leaders 
adopted the view that nationalism among the colonised and oppressed could be both a 
progressive and reactionary force. The progressive element was that, as Edgar notes, "a 
people had to become a nation before it could move on to the more advanced socialist 
and internationalist stages of existence." (quoted in Haugen: 2003, 106). Thus, 
nationalism was an inevitable, historic step on the path to communism. 
However, Stalin was aware that the same sentiments could be used by opponents of 
Soviet power as a focus for resistance to the regime. This transpired to be the case in 
Central Asia, where so-called Basmachi rural guerrilla forces adopted a variant of 
nationalism to seriously disrupt Soviet governance across the region, including 
Turkmenistan, until the mid 1930s. 
Stalin was convinced that if nationalism could be harnessed and directed in the service of 
Bolshevism, it could be to the benefit of the Party. To get the Party's message across, the 
Soviet regime had to overcome mistrust, and utilise local languages. Thus, instead of 
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being, in the famous phrase of Robert Conquest, a "breaker of nations" (Conquest: 2000), 
Yuri Slezkine, Ronald Suny and others have persuasively argued have argued that the 
Soviets actually became "makers" or, at the least, "incubators", of nations, Slezkine 
going so far as to say that the Soviet regime suffered from "chronic ethnophilia" 
(Slezkine 1994 and 2000; Suny: 1993; Haugen: 2003, 16). h1 the Turkmen case, this 
would appear to be accurate. The Soviets first created and, during the life of the Soviet 
Union, nurtured a potentially independent state by virtue of the establishment of full 
Soviet Republic political and bureaucratic structures. To forestall the accusation of 
colonialism, these structures had to replicate those of an independent nation-state, 
regardless of their de facto powers. Donald Carlisle reaches the same conclusions in his 
analysis of the formation of the Uzbek republic: rather than a reaction to the 
crystallisation of national consciousness, "it would be more accurate to characterise the 
process as the establishment of state units in order to encourage emergent or artificial 
nations" (1994, 114). 
ill reality, as Francine Hirsch has demonstrated, t he Soviets implemented a variant 0 f 
Western colonial policy, assimilating the republics into both Communist ideology and the 
infrastructure of the Soviet Union, with almost no strategic input from the native 
populations, thereby creating what she calls an "empire of nations" (2000). 
The final decision to create ethno-territorial republics was made by the Bolshevik 
leadership in January 1924, and work proceeded quickly, resulting in the delimitation of 
republic borders by late summer 1924, adoption of the proposals in September 1924, and 
formal ratification, and thus incorporation of the new Turkmen SSR into the new Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, at t he third all-union Congress of Soviets in May 1925 
(Karriyeva et al: 1978,355-357). 
Why then, was Turkmenistan, unlike other Central Asian nationalities such as the 
Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Tajiks, accorded, with Uzbekistan, full Republic status, when there 
was almost no pre-existing nationalist movement, or even consciousness, among 
Turkmen, and why did the Turkmen so readily adopt nationalist discourse with Bolshevik 
officials? There is no straightforward answer to either question, but a series of possible 
explanations can be put forward. Edgar argues that the location of the Turkmen province, 
some distance from Russian territory, together with its size, militated against ready 
assimilation (2004, 50). The history of separate administration in Turkmenistan, through 
Transcaspia and the Caucasus rather than Turkestan, in the early years of Tsarist 
colonisation may have been a factor, as might the cultural and linguistic singularity of the 
Turkmen discussed earlier in the chapter. However, an important consideration may also 
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have been that the Turkmen shared highly sensitive international borders with Persia and 
. Afghanistan, both client states of the British Empire with substantial Turkmen diasporas. 
By upgrading the Turkmen province to full Republic status, the Soviets could seek to 
attract those T urkmen who, in the chaotic revolutionary period, had simply emigrated 
with their flocks to pastures south and southwest22• A Turkmen Republic could act as a 
showcase both to Turkmen and de facto subj ects of British rule of the benefits of Soviet 
power. 
The enthusiasm of the small cadre of ethnic Turkmen Communist Party officials, whose 
work was closely directed and supervised by Sredazburo, for ethno-territorial division is, 
perhaps, more understandable. The most obvious explanation for this is that the process 
was manifestly operating in their favour. In addition to securing the Turkmen heartlands 
during the delimitation process of 1924, Turkmen officials asked for, and obtained, 
Turkmen parts of KhorezmlKhiva, including the predominantly Uzbek cities of Konye 
Urgench and Dashoguz, and Turkmen parts of Bukhara, including the right bank of the 
Amu Darya and also the city of Charjou, on the grounds that the Turkmen required an 
urban market to trade livestock and buy produce (Haugen: 2003, 174; Edgar: 2004, 67). 
A second reason was the fear of, and need to counter-balance, Uzbek domination, felt by 
both Turkmen and Slavic officials. Inter-ethnic relations were already poor along parts 
the Amu Darya23, and further north in Khiva, especially after the Turkmen warlord Junaid 
Khan had seized the city in 1916. Lenin's successors were keen to adhere to his dictum 
that republics should remain as ethnically homogenous as possible in order not to oppress 
smaller nationalities. Incorporation of the Turkmen into an Uzbek dominated structure 
would violate that principle, as the Turkmen well knew. 
Finally, supporting a national republic was an entirely rational response to the struggle 
for resources from the Soviet centre. In order to secure funding, Turkmen officials played 
the "backwardness card", isolating Turkmen as a special ethnic case in need of urgent 
development (Haugen: 2003, 176-7). In other words, as Edgar notes, Turkmen 
Communists, most of whom had been educated in Russian language schools and, in many 
cases (through being orphaned), had "lost" their tribal identities, rapidly learned to "speak 
Bolshevik" to articulate their objectives (2004, 10-12). Thus, Haugen points out that "in 
an environment in which nationality appeared an increasingly important political 
category, it was rational to make nationality the currency of one's investments." (2003, 
22 The popUlation of Turkmenistan is estimated to have declined by 20% between 1915 and 1920, 
as a result of famine, war and emigration. 
23 As they still are in many regions. 
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178). That is not say that tribal affiliations withered after 1924. Far from it; rather, they 
were tactically subordinated by Turkmen CP officials for a period in their pursuit of 
greater political objectives. Between 1917 and 1924, Turkmenistan was still 
predominantly an arena of "clan struggle" rather than "class struggle" (Massell: 1974, 
69). 
Politics in Soviet Turkmenistan 
The organisation and conduct of political life in Turkmenistan during the Soviet period 
can be characterised by three overarching themes: the fluctuating influence exerted by 
European as opposed to native Turkmen CP officials and, thus, the concomitant direct 
influence over national political affairs exercised by the political centre in Moscow; the 
uneven extent of the CP's penetration into society, and the acceptance or resistance 
thereby engendered; and the policies adopted by Moscow to either eliminate or balance 
tribal differences - in essence, the formulation and implementation of Soviet "tribal 
policy .. 24. 
Even more than other Central Asian nationalities, the Turkmen lacked, at the outset of 
Soviet rule, a stratum of ideologically aware, politically committed, literate and pro-
Bolshevik native officials who could execute Soviet policy. The Turkmen SSR CP was 
dominated, until 1937, by three extremely able ethnic Turkmen figures, but lacked the 
depth of native personnel to effectively challenge European control of Republic CP 
structures. The three leading officials of the early Soviet period were: Gaigasiz Atabayev 
(1897-1937), who served as head of Sovnarkom; Nadirbai Aitakov (1894-1937), who 
was head of the Central Executive Committee; and, Halmirad Sahetmiradov (1898-1937), 
the First Secretary of the Turkmen CP Central Committee up to 1937. Although Aitakov 
was a Yomut, and Atabayev and Sahetmiradov were Tekes from Tejen and Ashgabat 
respectively, they shared several similarities, notably in their perspectives of how Soviet 
policy should be implemented in Turkmen society. All were young and carried no pre-
Revolutionary political baggage; all were Russophones, who could comfortably 
communicate and, most importantly, mediate between Moscow and their often sceptical 
Turkmen constituents; and Atabayev and Aitakov were both orphans, and so did not have 
the same depth of tribal affiliation that was felt by most Turkmen. 
Without compromising their Bolshevik credentials, all three canvassed for a moderate, 
cautious line on the implementation of religious policy, measures for emancipating 
24 Unlike the burgeoning literature on Soviet nationalities policy, very little scholarly attention has 
been given to Soviet policy on tribal differences. 
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women, the pace of collectivisation, and on language standardisation and reform. 
However, although they commanded significant local influence in that they were able to 
gauge how policy might be received, political authority undoubtedly resided with 
European Co-Chairmen ofthe Central Committee prior to World War n. A succession of 
Europeans appointed by Moscow therefore wielded real political power. 
Unlike in other republics, where Europeans held the post of Second Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the Republic's Communist Party, in Turkmenistan, Moscow 
simply appointed its nominee as Co-First Secretary, thereby demonstrating the lack of 
regard in which local cadres were held. In all, seven Europeans, from the Latvian Ivan 
Mezhlauk to the Russian M.M. Fonin, held the Co-Chair post between 1925 and 1947. 
Undoubtedly the most difficult period was the tenure of Iakov Pop ok between 1930 and 
1937. He sidelined or overrode the Turkmen 'Big Three' and demonstrated little 
appreciation of realities on the ground, most notably in relation to the violent resistance 
engendered by collectivisation between 1930 and 1932. He accused Aitakov. and 
Atabayev of pursuing a secret nationalist agenda with an underground organisation called 
Azadlig ("Independence"), but the allegations could not be made to stick, probably 
because the organisation was an OGPU (secret police) creation. However, Popok was 
instrumental in laying the groundwork for the 'Great Terror' of 1937-38, which claimed 
the lives of Aitakov, Atabayev and Sahetmiradov, as well as Popok himself, who was 
also later caught up in its excesses (Edgar: 2004, 126-128). 
The historiography of the Great Purges has, in general, neglected Central Asia. However, 
a short research article by Oleg Klevniuk based on archival research in Moscow has 
demonstrated that, at the height of the purges between August 1937 and February 1938, 
the OGPU in Turkmenistan not only reached, but exceeded its quotas for arrests and 
executions ( 1998, 1 99-200). This illustrates t he very real r each and penetration 0 f t he 
political centre into the most remote Soviet republics. However, Klevniuk's analysis also 
notes that the majority of the victims were not political, as in Party officials, as was the 
case elsewhere in the Soviet Union, but rather economic, that is to say, kulaks or wealthy 
peasants. There are various possible explanations for this phenomenon. One is that after 
the push for collectivisation was eased in 1932, there were still a number of wealthy 
farmers who had retained their position. Another feasible explanation is that the Purges 
were an overlay of tribal conflicts and revenge killings, concealed or wrapped up in 
ideological rhetoric - another example of Turkmen learning to "speak Bolshevik" in 
order to achieve short-term tribal advantage. 
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The period from 1947 to the rise to power of Niyazov in 1985 was characterised by an 
increase in the responsibilities of native cadres, exemplified in the reversion to the 
orthodox system of a native First Secretary. Although this indicates the emergence of a 
generation of Turkmen Party officials in whom Moscow had more confidence, the 
European Second Secretaries continued to hold significant political authority. The system 
used in appointing a local First Secretary also illustrates Soviet tribal policy in action. As 
Edgar notes, Soviet policy alternated between attempting to eliminate tribal differences 
(s/iyanie) in social policy, and to balance (sblizhenie) tribal differences in the political 
sphere (Edgar: 2001, 268). 
Collectivisation of agriculture, a uniform programme of mass education, and the creation 
of a standard national language in place of the numerous tribal dialects were examples of 
attempts to extinguish descent based affiliations in favour of a Sovietised non-tribal 
peasantry/proletariat. Simultaneously, however, appointments to Party posts were 
carefully regulated to ensure tribal parity and, particularly, to prevent the dominance of 
the Ahal Tekes, whose native region included the Republic's capital, Ashgabat. 
Thus, no Ahal Teke served as First Secretary of the Central Committee between 1958 and 
1985, and, between 1947 and 1985, the post rotated between representatives of five 
districts/tribes, culminating in the long tenure of the Brezhnev acolyte Muhammednazar 
Gapurov, from Charjou, between 1969 and 1985 (Geiss: 2004; Kadyrov: 2004). The risk 
in balancing tribal appointments was, ultimately to institutionalise differences, a situation 
not assisted by the division of the Turkmen Republic into five regions that closely 
corresponded to boundaries of tribal residence. 
The Soviets came to expect that each First Secretary would bring to the top post a retinue 
of retainers from their own region although, in the middle to upper ranks of the Party 
apparatus, there was representation from a mixture of communities. The solution, apart 
from Gapurov's period in office, was to rotate the First Secretary position between 
groups with relative frequency to ensure evenness of representation. The situation was 
therefore analogous to that in the Kyrgyz SSR, where the First Secretary position 
alternated between largely inimical northern and southern clans for the entire post-War 
period 25. Kadyrov also argues that the long gap between Ahal Teke First Secretaries 
25 The breakdown of the Kyrgyz system in the post-Soviet context occulTed when the presidency 
of Askar Akayev, a northerner, was seen to push the boundaries of nepotism too far. He was 
overthrown in March 2005 to be replaced by a southerner, Kurmanbek Bakiyev. The continuing 
instability in Kyrgyzstan is essentially the playing out of clan differences overlaid by contestation 
over representation, religion, and language, and even, in the protests of late October 2005, 
organised criminal activities. 
99 
testifies to the diminished importance of the city of Ashgabat for two decades after the 
devastating earthquake of 1948, although that assertion is difficult to verify (2004). 
Thus, the long period of the Turkmen Republic's political docility after the final 
extirpation of Basmachi groups in the 1930s, can be attributed to a rather pragmatic 
programme of privileging the accommodation of tribal differences in the Party apparatus, 
over their elimination, an approach that contrasts to the social and economic policies 
implemented in the same period. 
Society and Economy in Soviet Turkmenistan 
The configuration of Turkmen society and economy during the Soviet period can be 
characterised as a combination of rapid industrial development, a considerable degree of 
penetration of Soviet ideology into social practices and yet, at the same time, the 
continuing resilience of traditional beliefs, practices and structures. In essence, the 
Turkmen experience conformed in many ways to the concept of the "divided self' used to 
describe social existence under totalitarianism - outward accommodation and tactical use 
of the system for personal and family gain, often concealing inner non-conformity and 
the retention of traditional rituals and practices (Kligman: 1998). 
The growth of the Communist Party cells in the 1920s and 1930s, for example, appeared 
to be impressive but, on closer examination, often proved to be a simple continuation of 
the maslaklzat structure under a Party name, but with absolutely no ideological content 
(Edgar: 2004, 107-9). 
The campaign against polygyny, underage marriage and qalin, the tradition of bride-price 
which is still prevalent in rural areas, had similar results26• Although there were varying 
degrees of resistance to the Soviet project to emancipate women, a common tactic was 
outwardly to conform to Soviet policy but, often with the connivance of sympathetic 
local CP officials, work around or ignore the new laws. Thus, the criminalisation of qalin, . 
which became an imprisonable offence in 1928, was subverted by gashli/c, or bride 
exchange, between families (Edgar: 2003, 142-3). The creation of new laws to allow 
women the freedom to divorce in 1925 was undermined by the use of the legislation to 
repeat" sell" brides for profit (Edgar: 2003, 144). P attems 0 f popular response ranged 
from begrudging acceptance, partial accommodation, evasion and retribution (including, 
between 1925 and 1927, numerous riots and disturbances over changes to customary 
26 The author's fieldwork in the small mountain community of Nokhur on the Turkmen-Iranian 
border revealed that bride-price is set at approximately $1000, an enormous sum for livestock 
farmers. 
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law). However, as Douglas Northrop has pointed out, the fact that women in 
Turkmenistan were not veiled by the chachvan and paranji, or secluded (zatvornichestvo) 
deprived the Soviets of a public, even theatrical act of individual emancipation that 
symbolised the hujum, or assault on the veil, in Uzbekistan (Northrop: 2004, 69-101). 
Women were undoubtedly identified, in the absence of clear class development (and 
analysis), as a "surrogate proletariat" by Soviet reformers in Central Asia before World 
War II (Massell: 1974). As Massell notes, women could be and were used to create 
sexual and generational tensions that might engender conflict and provide leverage for 
the disintegration and reconstitution of the old system (1974, xxiii). This was to become a 
central political issue for the Soviet government across Central Asia in the 1930s, 
particularly in Uzbekistan. In the Turkmen case, however, the heritage of nomadism, with 
its historically more emancipated role for women, together with the lack of an Islamic 
scholarly tradition to provide theological justification for patriarchal gender roles, 
militated against the issue of women's emancipation becoming a potential "regime 
breaker". 
Similarly, Soviet attacks on Islam were met with a mixture of accommodation, evasion 
~nd opposition. The significant difference with Uzbekistan was that there were fewer 
waqflands (essentially similar to church estates) to confiscate, mosques to close, clergy 
to harass, and madrassahs (Islamic schools) to infiltrate. Consequently, opposition lacked 
a focus and a pattern of the type described by Shoshana Keller in her study of the Soviet 
campaign against Islam in Uzbekistan (2001: 175-212); nevertheless, as Keller also 
notes, "the Party could deal a tremendous blow to the public face of Islam but could not 
dislodge it as Central Asia's cultural centre" (2001, xvi). 
This was evident in the Soviet response to the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Turkmenistan 
was the Soviet republic with the longest border with Iran, a largely mountainous 
boundary that could be porous even during the Brezhnev period. David Nissman has 
charted intensified concern over the infiltration of radical Islamist ideas in the years after 
1979; notwithstanding that Iranians were Shi'ites and Turkmen Sunnis (1983, 53). The 
tenor of Soviet media reports suggested that the upheavals in Iran had awakened a 
general interest in Islam that had penetrated CP structures in Turkmenistan. It is difficult 
to gauge whether Soviet investigators found what was already there, having been 
prompted to look by the events in Iran, or whether there was a genuine upsurge in 
religious interest during the period. 
Nevertheless, Nissman's analysis of reports from the newspapers Soviet Turkmenistan 
and Adebiyat does indicate concern in the continuing surreptitious practice of qalin, study 
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of the Koran, and the popularity of "criminal", "swindling" "pseudo-mullahs" who took 
advantage of "continuing shortcomings in conducting atheistic propaganda appropriately 
and militantly" (1983, 54-57). In fact, the activities recorded indicate a revival of the 
Zoroastrian folkloric superstitions (over which, at times, the patina of Islam is very thin 
in Turkmenistan), such as pilgrimages to graves, or rituals at sites of natural importance 
usually trees and springs27. To counter this, there was a short-lived intensification oflocal 
lectures on atheism, although the impact of this must have been limited at best. 
If Soviet penetration into society could be uneven, the record of socio-economic 
development was, from the Soviet perspective, unambiguous. Soviet sources, if we are to 
fully accept them, point to a rapid and massive increase in the number of children 
educated (Skozyrov: 1956,21; /storii, Volume II: 1978, 112-113, 186-187). The number 
of higher educational establishments increased from none in 1927-8 to seven by 1955, 
with 12,160 students enrolled (Kulturnoie: 1958, 214-215). The number of schools 
increased from 58 in 1915 to 1186 by 1955, the number of teachers from 272 to 12,407 
and the number of pupils from 5283 to 224,743 in the same period (Kulturnoie: 1958,42-
43, 118-119). By the mid-1950s, Stalin's drive for industrialisation had transformed the 
Turkrnen SSR's economic profile. In 1952, according to official statistics, industrial 
production accounted for 75% of the republic's economy, and the cotton yield was 
expanding year on year, a 35% increase being posted between 1945 and 1954 (lstorii, 
Vol I, 1978,32-35, Skozyrev: 1956,21). 
However, economic expansion, especially in the highly water-intensive and wasteful 
cotton industry, brought with it problems of severe environmental degradation. The 
construction of the immense Karakum canal across southern Turkrnenistan from the Amu 
Darya, commenced in 1954 and only completed in 1988, in order to service the cotton 
sector, was a significant cause of the desiccation of the Aral Sea, described as one of the 
world's greatest ecological catastrophes. The creation of a cotton monoculture absorbed 
natural, material and human resources, but failed to diversify employment opportunities, 
damaged soil, wasted water and has incurred almost incalculable social and health costs 
across Central Asia (lCG Asia Report No. 93: 28 February 2005, 16-29). 
27 The folk practices and songs of contemporary Turkmen women have been superbly recorded by 
Carole Blackwell (2001). During the author's own fieldwork in rural areas, numerous examples of 
Islamo-pagan superstition were noted, ranging from the use of Evil Eye amulets, to complicated 
rituals involving the balancing of stones, circling of trees and sitting in small mountainside rock 
crevices at traditional fertility sites in the Kopet Dagh mountains (see also Bezanis: 2005). There 
appears to be no geographical concentration of these practices, as they were observed as far apart 
as Turkmenbashi (formerly Krasnovodsk), Ashgabat, Mary, Darvasa and Erbent in the central 
Karakum desert, and deep in the Kopet Dagh mountains close to the Iranian border. 
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Although the Turkmen S SR had evolved a sas ignificant domestic 0 il producer in the 
post-War period, the most significant economic development in the Soviet era was 
undoubtedly the discovery of major reserves of natural gas in the Turkmen SSR in 1951. 
The gas sector rapidly expanded, as a massive network of pipelines, collectively known 
as the Central Asia-Center complex, was constructed to connect Central Asian gas fields 
to Russia and, by extension, to the 'Friendship' and 'Brotherhood' gas pipeline complex 
in Eastern Europe. Turkmenistan's potential a sag lobally important gas producer was 
underlined by the discovery of the connected Dauletebad-DonmezlSovietabad fields in 
1974 and 1982 near Serakhs in southeastern Turkmenistan. These giant structures alone 
are believed to hold potential reserves in excess 0 f 6200 b cm 0 f natural gas (Skagen: 
1997, 13-14). 
The Soviet government quickly r amped up production in the field after engineers had 
resolved complex technical issues surrounding the structure's high formation pressure 
and sulphur content, so that, by 1989, production had reached almost 90 bcm per year, 
the fourth highest in the world at that point. Since that peak, a combination of poor 
management and deteriorating infrastructure has limited production capacity to around 50 
bcm per year. Although the current recoverable natural gas reserves of 20,415 bcm, as 
stated in the Turkmen government's 2005 national gas audit (IS 2; also see the review of 
Turkrnen oil and gas reserves on page 4), must be treated with great caution, the 
country's potential as a world-class natural gas supplier, with the requisite injection of 
capital and technical expertise, is clearly recognised throughout the global gas industry. 
In summary, the social and economic consequences of Soviet rule were, as was the case 
with the other Soviet Central Asian republics, complex and ambiguous. Significant 
improvements in industrial output, education, healthcare, the status of women and social 
services, had to be balanced against environmental degradation, an inefficient 
monocultural cotton economy, the assault on traditional lifestyles, the attack on religion, 
and the requirements to conform to Party edicts. Although objective accounts of life in 
Soviet Turkmenistan are extremely sparse, the picture would appear to be one in which, 
as the Soviet Union entered its period of final decline and decay, Turkmen took what they 
coul? from the new system, and kept what they could get away with from the old system. 
Turkmenistan in comparative historical context 
Several important themes therefore emerge from the foregoing overview of Turkmen 
history. The first is that Central Asia's historical development was largely shaped by the 
interaction between the sedentary Perso-Iranian (Sart) communities based in the regions 
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major urban centres, and the nomadic Turco-Mongolian culture of the steppe. Although 
the Mongol and Timurid conquests impacted on Turkmen tribes, to a large extent their 
isolation in the Ust-Yurt plateau and along the Mangishlaq peninsula insulated them from 
the wider currents of imperial expansion and contraction. The principal legacy of the 
strategic immunity enjoyed by the Turkmens was cultural and social. The Turkmen 
language, unlike other Turkic languages of the region such as Kazakh and Uzbek, 
developed in relative isolation as part of the separate Oghuz, southwestern Turkic family. 
Turkmen traditional music is of great interest to etlmomusicologists because the isolated 
nature of its development has produced extraordinary tonal peculiarities. Traditional 
Turkmen carpets are highly prized for their unique regional character. The nomadic 
lifestyle of the Turkmen inhibited the growth of madrassahs, or other sites of! siamic 
learning. Consequently, pagan beliefs were, and still are, only sketchily overlaid by 
Muslim theology. 
Secondly, the principal unit of social organisation and identity for the Turkmen was, and 
still is, the descent group (Kadyrov: 2003, 12). The Westphalian model of state 
construction, which is embodied in the international state system, fixes national identity 
in space. The long history of Turkrnen "statelessness" led to a chronic lack of national 
consciousness and little sense of ethnic unity. This presented a conceptual and practical 
challenge to Soviet "nation-builders" that has still not been fully resolved. Niyazov's 
attempt to engender a unified national identity around his own persona, can by its very 
definition, be only temporary. Thus, post-Niyazov political elites will, in the absence of 
viable alternatives, have to embark on nation and state reconstruction anew. 
Thirdly, the acephalous structure of political authority in traditional Turkrnen society 
stands in stark contrast to the relatively formal hierarchical systems of power, founded on 
Chingisid descent lines, present in sedentary Central Asian states, notably the emirate of 
Bukhara and the k hanates 0 f K hiva and Kokand. This, in turn, shaped the Turkmen's 
subsequent response to imperial and Communist rule, which was often complex, 
ambiguous, provisional and conditional. Russian/Soviet authority was also complicated 
by the historic lack of interaction between Turkmen and Russians. The first substantive 
contacts between the two nationalities were after 1869. Within 15 years, the Turkmen 
lands had been fully annexed, and within 50 years, a full-s~ale project was underway to 
completely remodel Turkmen society. By contrast, other Central Asian nationalities had 
either much greater exposure to Russian culture and had forged longstanding diplomatic 
relationships (e.g. the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz), or experienced stronger intellectual currents 
of modernisation and reform (e.g. Jadidism among the Uzbeks), whereas Turkmen lacked 
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elementary economic development, educational institutions, international commercial 
networks, or even population centres capable of generating intellectual exchange. 
The Turkmen are frequently analysed in conjunction with other Central Asian 
nationalities. All have their own distinct histories, customs, mores and perspectives. 
However, there are strong grounds for arguing that the Turkmen had and still have 
characteristics that substantively differentiate them from the other states and peoples of 
the region which, in turn, help us understand how the regime of Saparmurat Niyazov 
emerged, and why it functions as it does. 
Conclusion: Turkmenistan within the SRT framework 
Returning to the principal objectives of the chapter, we are better able to consider 
whether the historical experience of the Turkmen chimes in with the structural 
preconditions for later sultanistic behaviour identified in chapter two, and whether there 
may be other structural components that have facilitated the sultanistic traits of the 
Niyazov regime. 
The possession of globally significant natural gas reserves and the development of a 
substantial energy infrastructure in Turkmenistan under the Soviet regime clearly 
provides the rents, or unearned income, that forms the basis of most, if not all, sultanistic 
regimes. Even when operating substantially below capacity and charging its customers, 
principally Russia and Ukraine, only around 20% of global spot prices, Niyazov still has 
access to considerable sums of hard currency for very little input. Turkmenistan's natural 
resource endowment, developed in the Soviet period, is essential to the functioning of the 
regime. However, possession of easily convertible natural resources is, itself, insufficient 
to create a rentier economy. Arguably as significant is the historic lack of diversification· 
in the economy of the Turkmen. Prior to the Russian conquest, the Turkmen relied on 
subsistence pastoral and arable farming. Colonial and Soviet officials may have increased 
industrial output, but growth was lopsided in favour of a largely ruinous cotton 
monoculture, conversion from which has been extremely difficult for all of the cotton-
producing former Soviet Central Asian republics. However, cotton itself is currently a 
Source of only 6% of Turkmenistan's export earnings (lCG Asia Report No. '93: 28 
February 2005, 10) and thus, while effectively suppressing the development of other 
agro-industrial sectors, it does not provide a sufficient alternative to the dominance of 
natural gas in the national economy. 
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The second macrostructural factor precondition of SRT is persistent crises of sovereignty. 
Turkmenistan clearly conforms to this condition, not having experienced formal state 
sovereignty in any form prior to Russian conquest and the establishment of the Soviet 
Union. Turkmenistan emerges as something of an "artificial" state in this respect, 
reasonably homogenous ethnically but certainly not tribally and, most importantly, with 
little experience of mutual cooperation between its constituent communities. The historic 
emphasis on genealogy above geography, of time over place, a trait of many nomadic 
societies in the absence of fixed spatial landmarks of identity, has embedded tribal 
antipathies deeply into the Turkmen psyche. The legacy of the great migrations, frequent 
alamans, the differentiated response to Khorezmian overlordship, Russian conquest and 
Soviet power, allied to the institutionalisation of tribal difference within Soviet cadres 
policy and entrenched social practices such as endogamous marriages, has fixed identities 
within Turkmen society to the point at which overcoming entrenched tribal divisions is, 
according to Niyazov, of par am bunt importance for the Turkmen state28• 
Resilient tribal identity is also of great significance for the emergence and maintenance of 
clientelist networks, one of the political-institutional factors identified in SRT in chapter 
two. In a 13-year period, Niyazov had sacked over 130 ministers and dismissed the 
governors of each of the five regions on average eight times (IS 3). A significant 
proportion of the reasons publicly given for these dismissals is for tribal patronage and 
nepotism. Although these reasons cannot be externally verified, fieldwork interviews 
conducted in-country (Interviews 3, 10 and 24) indicate a strong clientelist dynamic, 
reinforced by the Soviet practice of creating collective farm units and work brigades 
coterminously with extended family units (Roy: 1999, 109-121). 
The final structural condition for sultanistic behaviour considered in our analysis of SRT 
was that of totalitarian/authoritarian regime decay. This factor is closely linked with the 
macrostructural issue referred to previously under the rubric of persistent crises of 
sovereignty, in that it accentuates the importance of the legacy of the presultanistic 
regime in creating the conditions amenable for sultanism to develop. It is, in effect, the 
"path dependence" explanation. The Turkmen people had no prior experience of unified 
nation-statehood, let alone common governing institutions, in the period prior to Russian 
imperial conquest. Between 1873 and 1917, some or all of the Turkmen in Turkmenistan 
were formally designated as colonial subjects. Between 1919 and 1991, Turkmen were 
28 The success ofNiyazov's attempts to downgrade tribal identity is debatable. There is very little 
independent data on contemporary tribal divisions, and Turkmen are generally extremely reluctant 
to discuss these issues. However, Interviewees 1 and grudgingly praised Niyazov for attempting to 
eliminate tribal differences, while Interviewees 11, 13 and 24 all recounted instances of inter-tribal 
conflict in markets over trading disputes, over marriage, and in student halls and army dormitories. 
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subject to Soviet authority. Regardless of whether the Soviet Union could strictly be 
described as an imperial state, this legacy, together with the absence of any common 
political norms and institutions or collective m emory associated with p re-imperial and 
pre-Soviet governance, can lead us to safely conclude that Turkmenistan after the demise 
of the Soviet Union conforms to the classically weak, artificial post-colonial state, of the 
type that enables sultanistic regimes to emerge. 
A further significant factor shaping Turkmenistan's subsequent development was, as 
noted above, the physical isolation of its people. A further line of research into sultanistic 
regime origins would be to explore if the period prior to crises of sovereignty and 
external domination (frequently the period to which post-colonial or post-totalitarian 
regimes refer in order to recraft and legitimise new political institutions), was marked by 
relative isolation from important international political and intellectual discourses. 
Contemporary sultanistic regimes such as Belarus (Eke: 2000), which was a quiet, 
landlocked backwater of the Russian Empire, and Libya (Vandewalle: 1998, 42-44) 
where, prior to Italian fascist occupation, its three provinces of Cyrencaica, Tripolitania 
and Fazzan were remote, undergoverned and underinstitutionalised outposts of the 
Ottoman Empire, were largely bypassed in the development of the modem state. In 
contrast, comparable post-colonial/post-totalitarian states that did not succumb to 
sultanism may not have had a deep democratic heritage but they did, at least, have some 
pre-existing national institutional hardware on which to build. However, to develop this 
structural consideration fully, further comparative analysis would be required, beyond the 
scope of this study. 
In addition to the historical-structural characteristics in Turkmenistan that appear to be 
salient to the subsequent development of sultanistic behaviour, Niyazov has selectively 
appropriated historic motifs and totems of traditional Turkmen society in order to 
enhance his political legitimacy. In other words, Turkmenistan's path of historical 
development is not only a structural cause of sultan ism, but has been used in an agential 
sense by Niyazov in order to actively develop sultanistic mechanisms of governance. 
This issue will be analysed in greater depth in chapters four and five, when we look more 
closely at how the regime functions and obtains compliance and acquiescence. However, 
it should be noted that Niyazov has selectively and symbolically revived (and subverted) 
traditional components of the pre-Tsarist Turkmen political and legal order, since 1992. 
He frequently refers to himself as Serdar, a term that can also be seen on the numerous 
billboards adorning public buildings in Ashgabat and other Turkmen cities, an appellation 
that has distinctive connotations of military leadership, particularly for Tekes. Niyazov 
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also created the Khalk Maslahaty (People's Council), elevating it to the status of the 
country's supreme legislative body in 2003, in order to reconnect the country's 
contemporary political order with its past, thereby legitimising his regime. However, 
unlike the original maslakhat, Niyazov's council is hand-picked by his circle; open 
debate and expressions of dissent are absent. The political unity that Turkmen prized is 
therefore achieved not by careful and patient discussion and compromise, but simply 
imposed from above. The Khalk Maslahaty exists only to symbolically affirm Niyazov's 
political will, reminiscent of the way that the Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) 
followed policies formulated by the CPSU during the Soviet period. 
Ruhama, Niyazov's philosophical treatise, is clearly intended to fulfil the function of 
adat, an all-encompassing code by which to live life and on which to base social and 
legal conduct. It is, for example, compulsory reading for workers on duty in all public 
institutions (Interviews 1 and 22). In penal policy also, for example, Niyazov announced 
the resumption of forced resettlement of "undesirable" elements, essentially unemployed 
young Uzbek men in Dashoguz region, stating that: "Turkmens' ancestors used this 
humane and effective measure in their time and that this measure helped to rid society of 
people who have lost respect, and at the same time helped them to clear their sins with 
hard but good work" (quoted in Decaux: 2003,38). The concept of collective culpability 
for misdemeanours has resulted in family members of political activists being arrested 
and mistreated (Interviews 1 and 22; llIF Report: 2004, 9-11; rCG Report No. 85,2004, 
4-5). 
Niyazov has also controversially raised the genealogical issue, stressing the need for 
ethnic purity for those in state service, notwithstanding the fact that Niyazov's own 
mother is widely believed to have been a Kurd, a suggestion given some credence by the 
fact that Niyazov's hometown of Kipchak, 25 km west of Ashgabat, is situated in an area 
of concentrated Kurdish settlement (Field observation, 10 August 2003). Niyazov has 
published as posters, family trees setting out his own patrilineal descent line, introduced 
background checks on state employees to ensure ethnic purity and, following the failed 
. attempt on his life on 25 November 2002, for which the half-Armenian fom1er Foreign 
Minister Boris Shikhmuradov stood accused, stressed in openly racist language, the 
superiority of "pure" Turkmen above those of mixed race (Decaux: 2003, 28-35). In 
common with traditional Turkmen society, mixed race or non-Turkmen are accorded 
fewer rights in society, particularly in the employment sector (Interviews 1 and 22; 
TIHR: Bulletin 163, 15 November 2005). On a symbolic level, Niyazov has plundered 
Turkmen history to appropriate the Seljuk Empire and the battle of Geok-Deppe in 1881 
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to legitimise his regime (Field observation: Geok-Deppe, 15 November 2002 and 
Ashgabat, 8 May 2005). Niyazov set out the rationale for his preference for 'traditional' 
structures and norms in a pamphlet prepared in 2004: 
We came to the conclusion that we would be better understood if the 
foundation of our state is based on the type of social relations that were 
historically traditional too ur people and served a s a backbone 0 fa 11 state 
entities of Turkmens [sic] throughout their history (Turkmenbashi: 2004,49). 
This chapter has sought to trace the development of the Turkmen people from earliest 
times to the late Soviet period prior to the ascent to power of Saparmurat Niyazov as the 
last First Secretary of the Central Committee ofthe Communist Party ofTurkmenistan in 
1985. Its purpose has been to provide substantive historical detail and analysis on 
Turkmen political, social and economic development unavailable elsewhere. It also 
provides essential context both for the rise of Niyazov and the functioning of his regime. 
The Turkmen case would appear to validate the broader SRT framework previously set 
out by confirming a close match between the macrostructural and political-institutional 
factors sketched by Chehabi and Linz, and then substantively developed and refined in 
this study. It also suggests new avenues of comparative theoretical exploration by 
pointing to the relative isolation of the Turkmen people as potentially an additional 
structural factor in the emergence of sultanistic regimes. 
In addition to the structural dimension, we have seen the agential opportunities the 
inchoate and fractured nature of Turkmen society offers for exploitation. Thus, in 
addition to the tools presented by a rentier state, c1ientelistic social practices and 
persistent crises of sovereignty - the absence of institutional strength, allied to particular 
elements of the Turkmen legal-political heritage, such as adat and the maslakhat could be 
actively converted to support sultanistic rule. The entire contextual picture is therefore 
one where the operational parameters, resources, and materials - in effect, the structures 
and the tools, Tor sultanistic behaviour were in place in Turkmenistan by the late Soviet 
era. That is not to imply, however, that a sultanistic outcome to the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union was inevitable. As emphasised in the previous chapter, sultanistic rule 
hinges to a great degree on the strategies, actions, opportunism and ambition of the ruler 
himself, particularly in a deinstitutionalised or deinstutionalising environment as that 
which existed in the Soviet Union in 1991. Thus, while the historical analysis points out 
the structural preconditions for Niyazov's regime, it also contextualises the agential 
choices available to Niyazov to forge, consolidate and sustain his authority. This theme 
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will be developed more fully in the discussion of the emergence of Niyazov's political 
hegemony, and Niyazov's own role in this process, in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Four: Sultan ism in Turkmenistan 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, we introduced the .case study. We identified notable 
congruencies between the structural preconditions for sultanism elaborated in the earlier 
critique of SRT, and the patterns of economic development, social organisation and 
national identity formation in Turkmenistan. Although there is no satisfactory historical 
overview of Turkmenistan extant, analysis and interpretation of the available sources 
therefore suggested that underlying conditions existed that could facilitate the emergence 
of a sultanistic regime. 
However, as we discussed in chapter two, structural conditions are, in themselves, 
insufficient to explain the existence of a sultanistic regime. It is difficult to improve upon 
Marx's famous dictum that "men make history, but not under circumstances of their own 
choosing." Marx may have been making a call for revolutionary practice, but his 
sentiments are also applicable to a state's journey into sultanism. Without a congenial 
setting, the leader's bids for power and subsequent actions would be impossible. Without 
the ambitions, calculations and manoeuvres of the rulers themselves, a sultanistic 
outcome would not occur. An important component of any analysis of a sultanistic 
regime, therefore, is both to elucidate the context that allows the leader to seize power, 
and to map out clearly the formal and informal calculations and processes created to 
sustain and reproduce his authority thereafter. 
The specific objectives of this chapter are threefold: firstly, to set out the immediate 
political context for Niyazov's rise to prominence in the Turkmen SSR; secondly, to 
consider how Niyazov has been able to skilfully position himself, firstly as a disciple of 
Gorbachev's reformist internationalism and then, after the demise of the Soviet Union, as 
the guardian of Turkmen national values; thirdly, to consider the options available, and 
strategies adopted, in the construction of t he new political order in T urkmenistan that 
gave increasingly free rein to Niyazov's sultanistic behaviour. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Initially, I set out the mosaic of 
inter-connected challenges that faced Niyazov upon his appointment as CPTu First 
Secretary in December 1985. Secondly, I look at Niyazov's record in the late Soviet 
period and argue that, despite the subsequent portrayal of him in the Western media as a 
Brezhnevite 'dinosaur' (Pope: 1992), Niyazov's career under Gorbachev in fact prospered 
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because he was perceived as an adherent of perestroika, who had also managed to 
successfully maintain order, and contain both nationalism and Islam. This, in turn, left 
him well-placed to assume the presidency as Moscow's hold over the republics receded. 
Thirdly, I look at the strategies adopted by Niyazov in the wake of the Soviet Union's 
disintegration, focusing specifically on the construction of new political institutions and 
processes that formally promised democratic evolution but, in practice, entailed 
increasingly a rbitrary and dysfunctional governance. Fourthly, I summarise the formal 
and informal configuration of power in the republic as it has developed, as a precursor to 
the discussion in subsequent chapters on the specific political strategies employed by the 
regime to consolidate and extend its reach. The concluding section revisits the SRT 
framework to tie in the findings with the broader objectives of the thesis. 
The Turkmen SSR in the late Soviet period 
In common with the 0 ther Soviet republics, the Turkmen S SR steadily a ccumulated a 
multitude of pressing problems in the long period of zastoi (stagnation) that characterised 
Leonid Brezhnev's tenure (1964-82) as Soviet leader. Brezhnev's successors, Yuri 
Andropov (1982-84) and Konstantin Chernenko (1984-85), respectively had neither the 
time nor the inclination to make an impression before their deaths. Ominously for the 
Party leadership in Central Asia, however, was a KGB investigation, instituted by 
Andropov in 1983, that used satellite imagery to uncover massive corruption and fraud in 
the Central Asian cotton sector, and led to the downfall (and probable death) of Sharaf 
Rashidov, the long-serving First Party Secretary of the Uzbek SSR (Anderson: 1997,56). 
The so-called 'Uzbek Affair' resonated across the Central Asian republics, not least 
because the incumbent First Party Secretaries, as beneficiaries of Brezhnev's 'stability of 
the cadres policy', had been in power for a considerable period, and each had created 
their own intricate, clan-based webs of patronage and corruption to cement their positions 
(Luong: 2002)29. As Andropov's favoured successor, Gorbachev's appointment in March 
1985 promised much closer scrutiny of Central Asian affairs than before30• 
Although over-reporting of irrigation and harvesting figures in the cotton sectors was 
undoubtedly a significant issue for economic reformers in Moscow, a review of sources 
29 Rashidov was First Party Secretary in the Uzbek SSR from 1959 to 1983. The other regional 
First Secretaries in Central Asia who served under Brezhnev were Turdakun Usubaliev (1961-85) 
in the Kyrgyz SSR, Dinmukhamed Kunaev (1959-86) in the Kazakh SSR, Jabbor Uljabaev (1961-
82) and his acolyte Rakhmon Nabiev (1982-85) in the Tajik SSR, and Mukhamednazar Gapurov 
(1969-85) in the Turkmen SSR. As with other senior Republic and regional officials, this 'Old 
Guard' was cleared out by Gorbachev within two years of his becoming leader. 
30 On patron-client relations within the Soviet elites, see the essays in Brown (1989). 
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of the period also indicates that a range of other factors, predominantly local in character, 
occupied CPTu elites at this time. Taking the texts of nine major speeches by Niyazov, 
from soon after his appointment as CPTu First Secretary in December 1985, up to 
September 1991, shortly before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, together with official 
data, and analysis of press reports from the late Soviet period undertaken by Murat and 
Simmonds (1977), M orison (1982), Brown (1988, 1990), Bohr (1989, 1990) and Ro'i 
(1991), a clear picture emerges of the critical issues that threatened to destabilise the 
Turkmen SSR. 
Of particular concern was the state of inter-ethnic relations, not least because this issue 
challenged Soviet policy on a number of levels, including the economy, education and 
language status, all of which affected the entire population of the Republic. The need for 
inter-ethnic stability is a central theme of more than half of Niyazov's speeches studied, 
and increasingly occupied the attention of journalists and Komsomol officials. The 
principal fault line was between ethnic Turkmen and ethnic Russians. 
Murat and Simmonds date the revival of "ethnic consciousness" among the Turkmen to 
the Khrushchev era "thaw" when local journals, such as Edebiyat we Sungat ('Literature 
and Art'), stated in 1963 that: "the Turkmen language constitutes our national purity ... we 
have no right to discriminate against it" (1977, 319). Although evidence of open inter-
ethnic conflict prior to glasnost is scant, Morison's (1982) comparison between Turkmen 
and Russian language newspapers' coverage of the Ashgabat centenary celebrations in 
1981 is particularly instructive. Sovet Turkmenistany, the Turkmen language newspaper, 
barely covered the celebrations at all, while the Russian language publication 
Turkmenskaia Iskra reported in detail on the preparations and content of the festivities. 
For many Turkmen, dating the existence of Ashgabat to 1881, the year of the battle at 
Geok-Deppe which saw the annihilation of thousands of Tekes resisting the Russian 
advance, was an affirmation of colonialism, implying that Turkmen history effectively 
began at the point at which the Turkmen were forcibly absorbed into the Russian empire. 
Interestingly, the celebrations were organised by Niyazov, then First Secretary of the 
Ashgabat Party Committee, and he felt compelled to pen an article in Turkmenskaia 
Iskra, entitled "In One United Family," extolling the importance of good inter-ethnic 
relations in the Turkmen SSR, a sure indication that this was not the case. 
The theme of national victimisation, aired by most of the non-Russian nationalities of the 
Soviet Union during Gorbachev's tenure, resurfaced during the glasnost era when the 
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small native Turkmen intelligentsia raised a number of cultural demands, including 
raising the status of the Turkmen language, rehabilitating the victims of Stalinist terror 
(an issue of increased salience following the discovery of a mass grave near the northern 
village of Dilevar in December 1990), reviewing Soviet teaching on the incorporation of 
Turkmenistan into the Russian empire, and reducing the number of Russian toponyms in 
the Turkmen SSR (Bohr: 1990; Draft Platform of Agyzbirlik Society in Forted and 
Chandler: 1992,577). 
Inter-ethnic conflicts were not confined to T urkmen and Russians, however. Tensions 
also surfaced between Turkmen and other minority nationalities, notably Armenians and 
Uzbeks. Riots in Ashgabat and Nebit Dag, on 1 and 9 May 1989, were allegedly caused 
by Armenian traders increasing bread prices during periods of shortage (Bohr: 1989), 
although Ro'i believes that these disturbances may have been manipulated by elements of 
the KGB in order to convince the Central Asian leadership to preserve their ties to 
Moscow (Ro'i: 1991, 22). Likewise, in April 1988, Turkmen officials in the eastern 
'province of ChaIjou suspended broadcasts of Uzbek television stations, probably over 
local land and water disputes between Turkmen and Uzbek farmers. The conflicts 
eventually necessitated an extremely rare bilateral high-level meeting between Niyazov 
and Uzbek Republic First Secretary Rafiq Nishanov in June 1988 to resolve matters 
(Brown: 1998). 
However, the main grievances of ordinary ethnic Turkmen were essentially economic. 
According to the Soviet census of 1989, ethnic Turkmen comprised 72%, and Russians 
only 9% of the Turkmen SSR's population of 3.5 million (Ochs: 1997,333), yet Turkmen 
only constituted 4.2% of the much higher paid industrial sector workforce (Bohr: 1990). 
Interviewee 24 explained to me how Russians, working at oil and gas fields near the city 
of Nebit Dag, thought I ittle of flying to Moscow for week-end drinking sprees in the 
1970s and early 1980s. This stranglehold of Russians over technical and professional 
appointments contributed to a sense that ethnic Turkmen were second-class citizens in 
their own country, exacerbated by a growing problem of hidden unemployment, poor 
health and chronic poverty in rural areas (Remnick: 1990). 
Economic grievances had several dimensions. Gosplan, the Soviet central economic 
planning organisation, complained in 1985 that the Turkmen SSR had failed to fulfil its 
five year agricultural plan, the formal reason given for the dismissal of CPTu First 
Secretary Mukhamednazar Gapurov in December 1985. Moreover, by 1989,21% of the 
Turkmen SSR budget was coming in the form of subsidies from Moscow (Bohr: 1990). 
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The insinuations were that the Turlanen were lazy, and not pulling their weight for the 
Soviet cause. 
Yet, in the Turkmen SSR, debate centred on the extent to which the Republic had become 
a raw materials appendage to the more industrialised regions of the Soviet Union. The 
local argument was that Moscow had distorted the Turkmen SSR's economic 
development by focusing on cotton production, at considerable cost both to the local 
environment and health of the ethnic Turlanen rural workforce and was, moreover, 
buying the Turkmen SSR's natural gas at only 10% of export prices. Local agronomists 
pointed to the salinsation of most of the soil around the zone of the newly constructed 
Karakum canal, and the disastrous impact of the chemical treatment of crops on infant 
and adult mortality, disease and livestock (Bohr: 1990; Remnick: 1990). A central 
component of t he platform of the nascent Agyzbirlik opposition group, issued in Ju ly 
1991, focused on the need to address environmental issues, for the Turkmen SSR to 
acquire full control over its natural resources, and for the sale of gas and cotton to be 
increased to world market prices (Draft Platform of Agyzbirlik Society in Forted and 
Chandler: 1992,579-581). 
Of scarcely less importance was the persistence of inter-tribal conflicts among the 
Turkmen. Very little information about the nature of these conflicts was published, but 
interviews with both Turkmen and non-Turlanen about this period suggest that fights in 
university halls of residence, military barracks and workplaces, particularly between 
Yomuts and Tekes, were a frequent occurrence (Interviews 1, 3, 10 and 24). 
Significantly, Niyazov alluded to such problems when he warned the Komsomol 
Congress in 1987 that incidents of "family-clan hostility" and "the creation of student 
groupings according to family and clan" would not be tolerated (Turkmenskaia Iskra, 15 
February 1987), and then returned to the theme in an interview with Turkmenskaia Iskra 
on 5 May 1988 when he said: "feuds between tribes are a ruinous occurrence in our life 
that hampers the development of the republic and often leads to tragedy" (cited by Bohr: 
1990). An important facet of Niyazov's determination to remain in t he Soviet Union, 
even after the failure ~f coup by Communist hardliners in August 1991, appears to be the 
fear that without strong political overlay of some forn1 from Moscow (and later himself), 
Turkmenistan would descend into innumerable inter and intra-ethnic conflicts (speech to 
the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies on 3 September 1991, reprinted by Reuters, 4 
September 1991). 
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A further issue of concern was the state of the CPTu itself. In common with other 
long standing Central Asian First Party Secretaries, Niyazov's predecessor, Gapurov, had 
surrounded himself with subordinates from his home region of Charjou, in effect a 
decampment of the Ersari clan to Ashgabat, the traditional centre of Teke power. There 
was no high profile scandal surrounding the CPTu analogous with the "Uzbek Affair", 
but the CPTu was investigated twice in the period between 1980 and 1984, without 
noticeable censure. However, Gapurov, like Kunaev in the Kazakh SSR and Usubaliev in 
the Kyrgyz SSR, had merely bought himself some time during Chernenko's interregnum. 
Pravda's highly critical article of the CPTu leadership on 19 August 1985 signalled the 
beginning of the end, and Gapurov was pensioned off in December of that year (Forted 
and Chandler: 1992, 584). Yet the problems did not lie solely with Party elites. Wider 
Party activities and organisation at this time reflected both a dearth of indigenous talent 
and embedded clan networks from work brigade and kolkhoz level, right up to the 
highest echelons of the republican Party structures. As a consequence, the Turkmen SSR 
was effectively run through a web of nepotism and corruption. 
The Turkmen SSR has been generally characterised as a quiescent, isolated Soviet 
republic, one of those least affected by glasnost and perestroika. Unlike the Baltic and 
Caucasian republics, it developed no articulate or widely supported nationalist 
movement, nor did it experience the extensive or prolonged inter-ethnic or inter-clan 
conflicts of the sort that claimed thousands of lives in the Kyrgyz and Tajik SSRs. 
However, serious economic and social problems did exist. The rates of infant mortality 
were the highest in the Soviet Union, pollution along the course of the Karakum canal 
had devastated the local environment, unemployment was a considerable problem among 
ethnic Turkmen, and inter-ethnic and inter-clan tensions bubbled under the surface. In 
this context, it is unsurprising that those Party officials, military and KGB officers, and 
others with access to resources, utilised them to benefit their family and clan, reinforcing 
pre-existing patronage and clientelist networks. 
None of this was particularly compatible with Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika 
initiatives, as Party officials discovered when investigations were conducted which led to 
confiscations of property, arrests, disgrace and expUlsion from the Party and, in at least 
one high profile case, retaliatory murder (Forted and Chandler: 1992, 594 and 597). For 
Niyazov, however, being something of a clan outsider, the appointment of Gorbachev, 
the instigation of anti-corruption investigations and the formulation of perestroika, 
represented a considerable political opportunity, which he was able to grasp with great 
success. 
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The Rise of Saparmurat Atayevich Niyazov 
Niyazov's political ascent in the late Soviet period, and the creation of a personalistic 
system of governance thereafter, was facilitated by a combination of his personal 
background and suitability, the condition of the CPTu and the Turkmen SSR more 
generally, and the broader Soviet political currents that ensued from Gorbachev's 
succession to the Soviet leadership in March 1985. 
Niyazov was born on 19 February 1940 to a Teke family in the village of Kipchak, 
approximately 30 km west of Ashgabae1• The village is now a shrine to both him and his 
parents. In addition to large monument complexes devoted to Niyazov and his mother, a 
huge mosque, the largest in Central Asia, was constructed and opened in 2004, within the 
grounds of which lies Niyazov's personal mausoleum32. Niyazov's father, Atamurat 
Niyazov, joined the Red Army and was captured and ki11ed in North Ossetia in 194333 
(Turkmenbashi: 2002, 31), and Niyazov was orphaned at the age of eight when the major 
earthquake that struck Ashgabat on 6 October 1948 claimed the lives of his mother, 
Gurbansoltan Eje, and his two brothers34• 
This tragedy had several enduring implications. On a psychological level, it would appear 
that Niyazov has never ful1y come to terms with the loss of his mother, with the result 
that she is the secondary figure in the extended imagery and vocabulary that comprises 
his cult of personality. To give two brief examples, both the Turkmen word for bread 
(chorek) and the month of April were renamed Gurbansoltan Eje in 2002. Moreover, 
surviving the earthquake appears to have inculcated the belief in Niyazov that he was 
destined to lead the Turkmen: "When I learned to read and write, I realised that my 
homeland was a captive and an orphan like me" (Turkmenbashi: 2002, 154). The more 
immediate and practical impact, however, was that the remainder ofNiyazov's childhood 
31 As noted in chapter three, Niyazov's political opponents in exile state that Niyazov's mother 
came from a Kurdish family, something Niyazov has subsequently attempted to conceal. Kipchak 
is situated close to Kurdish villages, and Kurds occupy a fairly low place in the country's social 
hierarchy. The "allegation" appears to be designed to discredit Niyazov, although the claimants 
say that there are still elderly people in the area who will confirm that Niyazov is half-Kurdish (IS 
1 ). 
32 In this respect, Niyazov appears to be emulating President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the former 
dictator of Cote d'Ivoire, who constlUcted the world's largest church in his home town of 
Yamoussoukro. 
33 Niyazov's political opponents contend that Atymrat's father was actually thrown to his death 
from a train on its way to the front, following a violent dispute. As such, he never saw military 
action in the Caucasus (reference as above). 
34 It is estimated that 110,000 people were killed in the earthquake, which measured nine on the 
Richter scale. 
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was spent in a state orphanage. Not only was Niyazov detached from Teke clan networks, 
he would have been exposed to the pervasive High Stalinist cult of personality. As we 
saw with Aitakov and Atabaev in the early Soviet period, the regime was keen to utilise 
and promote orphans in order to circumvent and break down traditional clan allegiances. 
For the young Niyazov, surrounded by the rituals and iconography of Stalinism, the 
Soviet leader would possibly have been viewed as a personal saviour and perhaps a 
substitute father figure. 
Niyazov graduated from the Leningrad Poly technical Institute in 1959, and returned to 
Turkmenistan to work as a n instructor in the Territorial Committee of the Geological 
Prospecting Workers' Union, joining the CPSU in 1962. From thereon he worked first as 
a foreman, and then senior foreman at the Bizmein power plant near Ashgabat (IT AR-
TASS, 15 July 1990). Moving into Party work full-time in 1970, he held a variety of 
posts, rising to chair the Industry and Transport Department of the CPTu, before 
becoming the First Party Secretary of the Ashgabat City Committee in 1980. In August 
1984, Niyazov was transferred to Moscow to undertake organisational work for the 
CPSU Central Committee for a period of six months. This placement was almost 
certainly used to assess Niyazov's suitability to lead the Party in Turkmenistan, and 
within six months he was appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the 
Turkmen SSR, a position clearly designed to presage his eventual elevation to First Party 
Secretary once Gapurov had been retired. 
The reasons for Niyazov's advancement are not entirely clear. However, several factors 
suggest themselves. Firstly, at 44 years old he was relatively young, at least by the 
standards of other First Secretaries, and had had a Russian education in Leningrad. 
Secondly, he had capably organised the Ashgabat centenary celebrations in 1981, no 
doubt bringing himself t 0 the attention 0 f the Moscow 1 eadership a nd, in the process, 
proving himself to be thoroughly "internationalist" (meaning Russified) on the 
nationalities issue. Thirdly, although Niyazov was not beholden to close clan networks, 
he was, nevertheless, an Ahal Teke from the Ashgabat region which, according to 
Kadyrov, would consolidate the chain of command from Moscow, create stability and 
ensure the executio~ of Soviet policy, without incurring the resistance that a 
representative of a smaller tribe might engender (2004). 
Niyazov has been portrayed as an old school survivor of the pre-Gorbachev era but 
analysis of speeches and interviews reveals that, in public at least, this was not the case. 
He spoke repeatedly of the unworkability of the "conventional forms and methods of 
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Party work that took shape in the seventies" (speech to the 2th Congress of the CPSU, 28 
February 1986 in Furtado and Chandler: 1992, 559), and the "historic irreversibility of 
perestroika - the need to implement reform" (speech to Supreme Soviet plenum on 
constitutional change, 30 November 1988 in Furtado and Chandler: 1992,563). Niyazov 
also pursued a resolutely pro-Moscow line on the issue of language and inter-ethnic 
relations at this time, stating that everyone should have an adequate mastery of Russian 
because "Russian is the language of Lenin" (speech to Komsomol Congress, BBC 
Monitoring CAU translation from reprint in Turkmenskaia Iskra, 15 February 1987). 
Moreover, Niyazov also supported Gorbachev's efforts to eliminate corruption within the 
Party. He instigated a wide-ranging investigation into Party activities in Tashauz 
(Dashoguz) oblast (coincidentally a stronghold of Yomuts and ethnic Uzbeks) in 1986, 
and dismissed several senior officials for "whitewashing and bribery, deceiving the state, 
and distortions in implementing personnel policy [code for clan-based appointments]" 
(speech to CPTu Central Committee Plenum on 18 October 1986 in Forted and Chandler: 
1992, 588). By 1988, 80 out of 330 members of the Turkmen Supreme Soviet had been 
removed, and 31 members of the CPTu Central Committee had been expelled (speech to 
the 19th All Union CPSU Conference on 2 July 1988, Pravda, 9 July 1988). As late as 
1990, Niyazov stated in an interview with Pravda that "we have declared an all-out 
struggle against the negative phenomena in the Party, against passivity and inertia. And 
we are doing all this openly, in the spirit of glasnost" (21 September 1990). 
A review of Niyazov's speeches after his appointment as Party First Secretary in 
December 1985 also suggests that he was attempting to respond to serious and sustained 
criticism of the CPTu in Moscow. In his first set piece speech to an all-Union audience at 
the 27th Congress of the CPSU in February 1986, Niyazov argued that the Turkmen 
economy had stagnated for the previous fifteen years because: 
In the late seventies and early eighties personnel in our republic were 
promoted on the grounds of personal devotion and local favouritism, 
which in turn led to the spread of servility and careerism, and produced an 
atmosphere of mutual protection, abuses, lack of exactingness [ sic] 
towards cadres, and irresponsibility (Furtado and Chandler: 1992, 559). 
The picture that emerges ofNiyazov in his first three years as CPTu First Secretary is of 
a loyalist and careerist, probably more in tune with Gorbachev's brief uskorenie 
(acceleration) drive, manifested in anti-corruption initiatives, than with economIC 
liberalisation. Although there was limited material to work with in terms of industrial 
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capacity in the Turkmen SSR, Niyazov's policy record on economic reform following 
introduction of the Law on Cooperatives in 1987 suggests that he was focused more on 
prestige infrastructural projects, such as completing the 35 year construction of the 
Karakum canal, rather than on encouraging small enterprises. Virtually all of the light 
industrial enterprises in the republic in 1989 had been established during the 1920s, 
during the initial wave of rapid industrialisation (Ashkhabad No. 5: 61, quoted in Bohr: 
1996, 352), and by January 1989, there were a mere 447 cooperatives registered in the 
Turkmen SSR, compared to 3616 in the much smaller, and conflict-prone, Armenian 
SSR (Bohr: 1990). 
Nevertheless, despite the lack of results in the economic sphere, Niyazov was effectively 
able to consolidate his dominance of thC? CPTu during the perestroika period for several 
reasons. Firstly, he received strong support from the all-Union government. Niyazov was 
both personally loyal to Gorbachev and could point to specific initiatives on corruption 
and Party reform in line with the Soviet leadership's agenda. 
Of equal importance was that the Turkmen SSR remained quiescent. Compared to rising 
anti-Soviet nationalism in the Baltic republics, inter-Republic nationalism in the 
Caucasus, and inter-ethnic violence between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the Fergana Valley, 
the Turkmen SSR remained an oasis of tranquillity. Moreover, when ethnic conflicts did 
surface in 1989, Niyazov adopted a resolutely orthodox line and did not succumb to the 
temptation to play the nationalist card that characterised Party elites in several other 
republics. 
Thirdly, Gorbachev had intended the process ofliberalisation to be managed by the Party 
and from the centre. In the event, this proved to be a contradiction in terms. Niyazov's 
approach to reform indicated that in the Turkmen SSR, the process of incremental 
liberalisation from above was being pursued without significant levels of disorder. 
Fourthly, unlike most other Soviet republics, there was neither a cadre within the Party 
ranks, nor a particularly strong movement outside, that was outflanking Niyazov with a 
nationalist agenda. The Party elite, many of whom were Tekes, had no desire to risk the 
imposition from Moscow of a non-Teke, or even a non-Turkmen, as Party First 
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Secretary35. At the same time, Niyazov was able to draw much of the fire from the 
Agyzbirlik movement by selectively implementing its platform. 
Yet, several trends emerged in this period that a Iso suggest N iyazov' s future political 
trajectory. Agyzbirlik was a collection of teachers and writers from the southern city of 
Mary, and did not represent a serious threat to the hegemony of the CPTu. While 
nationalist movements in other Republics began registering after the 19th Party 
Conference of June-July 1988 partially ended the CPSU's political privileges, Agyzbirlik 
was unable to secure the 700 signatures required to do so, and mutated into a weekly 
, 
political discussion club (Ponamarov: 2004). Nevertheless, Niyazov perceived them as a 
threat. He devoted a significant portion of his speech to the Republic conference on mass 
media on 28 April 1989 to an attack on Agyzbirlik, accusing it of being "an enemy of 
perestroika" and "pandering to fashion" by simply copying its programme from Baltic 
nationalist groups (Furtado and Chandler: 1992,564-566). Significantly, Niyazov argued 
that, as the CPTu had forums for debating issues such as ecology, inter-ethnic relations 
and the economy, why was there then a need to create "a blind and absurd imitation" 
outside Party structures (Furta do and Chandler: 1992,564-566). 
Niyazov clearly had not come to Gorbachev's conclusion .at the 19th Party conference 
that the CPSU was not only incapable of solving the country's problems, but had become 
part of the problem itself. Consequently, Niyazov emerges as a monist, unable to 
comprehend the validity of a multiplicity of different political perspectives or 
organisational forms. This is demonstrated in his intervention at the 28th Party Congress 
in July 1990, when he argued that "the unity of the party and the country provides us 
with the only way out of this crisis" (Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 6 July 
1990, retrieved from L-N E on 23 January 2006). 
Nevertheless, Niyazov clearly realised that the nationalist mobilisation affecting the other 
Soviet republics, including the neighbouring Uzbek SSR would sooner or later impact in 
some way on the Turkmen Republic, and took steps to capture and direct such sentiments 
through Party struc~res. Accordingly, Niyazov subsequently appropriated much of 
Agyzbirlik's programme, most notably in the adoption of the Law on Language on 27 
May 1990, which declared Turkmen as the official state language to be phased into all 
3S Gorbachev replaced Kunaev with Felix Kolbin, an ethnic Russian from Russia, as Party First 
Secretary of the Kazakh SSR in December 1986, sparking several days of intense civil disorder in 
Almaty, which was finally suppressed by troops drafted in from the Russian SFSR (Alexandrov: 
1999,12). 
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branches of the administration and schools within a decade36• Similarly, Niyazov pursued 
a cautious nationalist/glasnost agenda in revisiting debates over the incorporation of the 
Turkmen into the Russian empire, by acknowledging the defeat at Geok-Deppe in 1881 
as a national tragedy; by sanctioning the republication of Gorkut Ata, the chronicles 
tracing the mythological origins of the Oghuz Turkmen that had been banned in 1951; 
and finally, through the posthumous rehabilitation of 3500 victims of Stalin's Great 
Purges. 
Alongside these orthodox and nationalising trends, Niyazov convened a Council of 
Elders in 1989, scheduled to meet regularly at velayet level with Niyazov chairing each 
session. Although the body was entirely consultative, it marked a major departure in the 
principles of political organisation in the USSR and, moreover, allowed Niyazov a much 
greater level of contact than hitherto with opinion formers and senior community 
members in each region. The Council's novelty, and the prestige associated with 
membership, ensured that no member would jeopardise his seat by criticising Niyazov. 
As such, it became, and remains, a tightly controlled vehicle of ritual support for 
Niyazov's policies. When taken in conjunction with the opening of the first functioning 
mosque since World War II in Ashgabat, and the reinstatement of Kurban Bairam as a 
national holiday, both in July 1989, a pattern emerges of Niyazov starting to engage in 
the selective retraditionalisation of the Turkmen SSR's political life which would, by 
definition, exclude the minority nationalities within the Republic. 
What emerges from this fusion of specifically Turkmen elements, alongside cautious 
modernisation within a framework of broad Soviet orthodoxy, is a relatively 
underdeveloped nationalist ideology, in which the ethnic and civic components began to 
rest more uneasily with one another. Part of the reason for this was a rejection of 
Yeltsin's programme to remodel and promote Russian national identity on more 
progressive, civic lines. In effect, Russian liberal elites could afford a more generous and 
inclusive conception of "Russianness" by virtue of the relative dominance of ethnic 
Russians within the RSFSR, and its status as the core republic in the Union37• For the 
Central Asian republics, whose political experience consisted of domination from 
Moscow, and who had numerically and economically significant ethnic Russian 
minorities, such a stance would have been paradoxical - in a sense, symbolically 
36 Interestingly, the law also specifies that Arab characters be reintroduced, although 
Niyazov subsequently shifted to a Latin alphabet after independence. 
37 The official term rossiskii refers to citizens of Russia, regardless of ethnicity, and is used in 
constitutional documents. Russkii is used to describe ethnic Russians. 
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acknowledging the dominance of an external power that was in the process of abdicating 
its authority. In practical terms, fusing tradition and nationalism with loyalty to the 
Soviet elite, meant that Niyazov, like Heidar Aliyev in the Azerbaijani SSR, Mintimer 
Sarip ull Saymiev in the Russian Republic of Tatarstan and others, was quietly carving 
out his own fiefdom, nested within increasingly unstable and ineffective Soviet 
institutions. 
The Collapse of the Soviet Union 
In common with other Republic elites, Niyazov followed, in almost every respect, the 
Soviet leadership's lead in implementing the constitutional changes of the late Soviet 
period. Thus, following the all-Union elections to the newly empowered USSR cpn in 
March 1989, the Turkmen cpn held similar semi-competitive elections on 7 January 
1990, with two or three candidates contesting each of the 175 seats. Mirroring the all-
Union CPD elections, approximately 10% of seats went to non-members of the CPSU. 
The T urkmen CPD then elected a Supreme Soviet and, again following the all-Union 
example, which had elected Gorbachev as its Chairman, the Turkmen Supreme Soviet, 
duly installed Niyazov as Chairman of the Turlanen Supreme Soviet on 19 January 1990. 
Formally, the Turkmen SSR was staying in line with the other Soviet republics at this 
stage including the RSFSR. Elections to the Russian CPD on 4 March 1990 had resulted 
in 20% of the seats going to non-CPSU members, not a great advance on the Turkmen 
figure, but a sign that the political debate over Russia's role in the Union was running 
ahead of the other republics. This was reinforced by the Declaration of State Sovereignty 
of the RSFSR on 12 June 1990 which signalled, according to Alexei Zverev, "the Russian 
people's unwillingness to carry the burden of empire" (quoted in Sakwa: 2002, 17). The 
Turkmen SSR's Declaration of Sovereignty on 21 August 1990 should therefore be 
construed as a purely defensive and reactive measure to Yeltsin's declaration, rather than 
as a nationalising attempt move out ofthe Soviet orbit. 
In essence, if the Union's most important component (Russia) was signalling that it had 
the right to secede, the danger was that the USSR would continue to exist without its core 
member. The so-called "war of the laws" in 1990-1 was therefore an attempt to define the 
juridical status of the Union's constituent parts to the disintegrating centre, and put in 
place a legal mechanism, however imperfect, that would allow secession. 
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The consolidation ofNiyazov's personal authority within the republic is confirmed by the 
first direct election to the new post of President of the Turkmen SSR on 27 October 1990. 
The post had been created to follow Gorbachev's conversion of the Chairmanship of the 
Supreme Soviet to a presidency, although Gorbachev famously never stood in a direct 
election. Niyazov ran unopposed in the election gaining 98.3% of the vote, officially 
because no other candidate could muster sufficient nominations, but in reality because 
Niyazov's hold on Party structures ensured that not only was he nominated, but that no 
other candidate would be allowed to stand. In this respect, Niyazov conformed to a 
Central Asian pattern in that the Party leadership viewed the creation of the presidency as 
a formality, an exercise in confirming the Supreme Soviet elections earlier in the year. 
They also suggested that Niyazov's purges of regional party structures had been 
sufficiently successful to enable the installation ofloyal cadres in most regions. 
Niyazov's continuing commitment to an all-Union tier of governance is illustrated by the 
outcome of the referendum on the draft Federation Treaty held on 17 March 1991. In 
retrospect, the Treaty was doomed before the referendum. Six of the 15 republics 
boycotted the vote, which effectively condemned the Union to some form of split in any 
event. Of the remainder, the proposal to remodel the federation on the basis of a 
voluntary derogation ofrepublican powers to the centre was supported by 75.4% of the 
electorate, from a turnout of 76.2%. The Turkmen SSR was notable in that 97% of an 
almost unanimous turnout approved the draft Treaty. The results, although probably 
reflecting the broad will of the Turkmen republic's population, were notable not only 
because they indicated Turkmen enthusiasm for USSR membership, but that they also 
showed Party control of the political process remained monolithically complete. This was 
demonstrated by a further referendum on independence, held on 26 October 1991, after 
the failed August coup, in which 94% of the population voted in a diametrically opposite 
way for independence. 
Niyazov's response to the August coup underlines his reactive approach and lack of 
political self-confidence at this juncture. Initially he welcomed the coup, as a means to 
restore order, and portraits of Gorbachev began to be removed from official buildings. 
This stance was probably an act of political self-preservation by Niyazov, but also partly 
motivated by the recognition that Turkmenistan would still have to deal with whoever 
was in power in Moscow on fairly supplicant terms38• However, once the coup had 
failed, Niyazov swung back behind his erstwhile patron, pointedly arguing that "we've 
38 Anderson (1997) discusses the reactions to the August 1991 coup of the various Conununist 
Party First Secretaries in Central Asia. 
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thrown way too many stones at Mikhail Sergeyevich" at the Emergency Congress of the 
all-Union CPD in Moscow on 3 September 1991. 
This CPD session actually voted to abolish itself in favour of a new USSR Supreme 
Soviet (that never met). A State Council, chaired by Gorbachev, and comprising the 
heads of the 12 remaining Soviet republics was created instead to govern the Soviet 
Union in the period between September 1991 and the formal dissolution of the USSR on 
31 December 1991. Niyazov remained a strong advocate of a Union formula, was one of 
a dwindling number of Republic presidents willing to put his name to a new treaty 
creating a Union of Sovereign States (USS) in late November 1991, and was still arguing 
for a Soviet confederation during a five-day official visit to Turkey in early December 
1991 (IS 2). In the event, it was western Ukrainian nationalists who ensured Turkmen 
independence by refusing to participate in USS structures. Without Ukraine, the USS was 
deemed to be dead in the water by Russian president Boris Yeltsin, and he signed a 
trilateral agreement (the so-called "Belovezh Accords") on 8 December 1991 with 
Ukraine and Belarus to establish a Slavic Union. The reaction of the Central Asian 
leaders, who had received no notification ofYeltsin's negotiations, was to seek accession 
to the new body at a meeting convened by Niyazov in Ashgabat on 12 December 1991. 
This they achieved by virtue of the Alma Ata Treaty signed on 21 December 1991, which 
also effectively dissolved the USSR as a legal entity, thereby creating, by default, the 
new Republic ofTurkmenistan. 
Constructing the new political order 
Although independence was neither sought nor desired by the Turkmen leadership, 
Niyazov acted quickly in putting together the political framework of the new state as the 
old order collapsed. This consisted of five strands: the creation of a national constitution, 
the remodelling of political institutions and processes, the development of a new political 
party, establishment of relations with important regional actors, and managing the 
disentanglement of national structures from the web of Soviet economic and military 
institutions of which the Turkrnen SSR was formerly a part. 
The formation of a new political party of power was undertaken before the USSR 
formally ceased to exist. In contrast to Yeltsin, who banned the CPSU shortly after the 
August coup, the CPTu remained as the only legal and functioning political party in the 
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republic, with Niyazov at its head until December 199139• Only after the Belovezh 
Accords irrevocably doomed the Union did Niyazov decide to dismantle the CPTu. This 
was achieved in surreal fashion on 16 December 1991, when the 25th Congress of the 
CPTu formally voted the Party out of existence, and then reconvened later that day in the 
same venue as the founding conference of the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (DPT), 
with Niyazov as its Chairman (Ochs: 1997,323). 
Although the DPT, as the formal successor to the CPTu, inherited the latter's 
infrastructure and organisational networks and remains the only legally registered 
political party, its subsequent profile has been entirely marginal. Whereas President 
Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan has invested political capital in his successor party, 
Otan, and President Islam Karimov has sponsored several "official" political parties to 
project a formal semblance of multiparty politics in Uzbekistan (Yalcin: 2002, 168-176), 
Niyazov virtually disregards the existence of the DPT altogether. At the opening session 
of the third convocation of the Majlis on 1 February 2005, Niyazov explicitly ruled out 
the creation of political parties until 2020 (IS 3), indicating that the DPT is not really a· 
functioning political vehicle. 
The formal reasoning behind Niyazov's opposition to political parties is twofold. Firstly, 
he argues that they result in an unnecessary contestation for power that is contrary to the 
Turkmen tradition of unity. He considers that parties result in "fractured democracy" and 
could "generate the risk of infringement of interests of some groups," which perhaps 
suggests that local parties might become organised along clan or kinship lines. Secondly, 
Niyazov argues that as everybody knows "important" people in their neighbourhood, 
there is no reason to organise elections on a party basis. 
Yet through these arguments, Niyazov is allowing no space for genuine contestation of 
ideology or policy. He appears to be suggesting that communities s imply put forward 
their oba for affirmation. By doing so, Niyazov empties public institutions of their 
political content. This achieves compliance through the creation of a "prepolitical" 
consensus determined by himself, fusing political community, national ideology and 
government policy, and thereby closing out alternative prescriptions of governance or 
policy40. From a practical perspective, Niyazov is no doubt also aware that institutions 
39 No separate Communist Party existed for the RSFSR, because of fears that it would dominate 
the CPSU, and therefore Yeltsin simply appropriated CPSU assets on Russian territory. 
40 A ndrew M arch's study regime 0 fl egitimation in Uzbekistan was valuable for this argument 
(2003: 24-25). 
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such as political parties can, even if created "top down," generate a political momentum 
and autonomy of their own. Alternative parties entail alternative political leaders, which 
for N iyazov, is unacceptable. In contrast, N azarbayev inK azakhstan h as resolved this 
dilemma, by very effectively adopting the role of manager and arbiter between legal party 
and clan factions. Thus, although both leaders remain above domestic criticism, Niyazov 
has achieved this prior to, rather than as part of, the political process. 
Having defined and then circumscribed the parameters of party political activity, Niyazov 
moved quickly to formulate a new constitution. The process was commenced in late 
February 1992 and work began immediately. In fact, Turkmenistan was the first post-
Soviet state to put in place a new constitution, reflecting Niyazov's haste to cement his 
political position in the wake of the Soviet collapse. It also indicates that there was almost 
no discussion, comparable to the other new Central Asian states, over the balance 
between executive and legislative authority. Pauline Jones Luong describes an intensive 
bargaining game between central and regional elites in the Kazakh and Kyrgyz republics 
leading to the adoption of new constitutions in spring 1993 (2002: 156-188, 213-252). 
Even in Uzbekistan, where President Islam Karimov's control of the levers of power was 
much more close, the debate over the form of the constitution was not resolved until 
December 1992, after lengthy submissions had been received from powerful regional 
elites over the course of the year (Luong: 2002: 189-212). By contrast, Turkmenistan's 
constitution was prepared, approved and adopted by the Supreme Soviet (now renamed 
the Majlis) on 18 May 1992, less than eleven weeks after Niyazov had initially 
announced that a new constitution was required, and without any of the strategic 
bargaining that characterised constitutional formation in neighbouring republics41 • 
The Constitution itself describes Turkmenistan as a presidential republic (Article One), 
"based on the principle of the separation of powers into legislative, executive and judicial 
powers which function independently, checking and balancing each other" (Article Four), 
and guarantees" the right to form political parties" that 0 perate peacefully and don ot 
advocate racial 0 r national animosity (Article 28). This liberal formulation, essentially 
lifted from the French model, belies an internal contradiction caused by the powers of the 
Khalk Maslahaty (People's Council) established by Articles 48 - 53. 
The Khalk Maslahaty has a membership of over 2500, and consists of the executive, 
legislature, judiCiary, ambassadors, Council of Elders, and elected representatives from 
41 Tajikistan is exceptional having fallen into civil war in 1992. 
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the districts. It does not sit permanently but meets when called by the government usually 
for a week-long session once every year. It thus functions as a branch of the executive in 
approving the strategic direction of government policy, but also has the power to amend 
and interpret the Constitution, nominate presidential candidates, and even make oral 
submissions on sentencing in criminal trials for treason. T he unique fusion of powers 
enjoyed by the Khalk Maslahaty, described as a "the highest representative organ of 
popular power" is broadly analogous to the village meeting or maslakhat of the pre-
Tsarist political order, with Council members functioning as aksakals or obas. The 
significant difference, however, is t hat while the maslakhat was acephalous, investing 
authority only temporarily in a serdar (commander) for military purposes, Niyazov sits as 
the Khalk Maslahaty's permanent Chairman42• The exception to the traditional 
acephalous pattern of Turkmen authority structures was in nineteenth century Ahal Teke 
communities, where permanent khans or serdars were appointed. In this respect, the 
appointment ofNiyazov as permanent Chairman of the Khalk Maslahaty would appear to 
reflect symbolic Teke dominance of national political institutions, a complaint made by 
Turkmen dissidents (Kadyrov: 2003), and accentuated by the obligation of Khalk 
Maslahaty members to wear the tahya (skull cap), which historically differentiated Tekes 
from non-Tekes (Trotter: 1882,536). 
In theory, the Khalk Maslahaty is a form of traditional democracy, wherein each 
community sends its representative to a community meeting. However, the unwieldy size 
of the body, the large proportion of deferential political "backwoodsmen," and the 
preliminary vetting and selection of appointed members, ensures that Khatk Maslahaty 
sessions involve little more than members seeking to outperform one another in acts of 
ritual obeisance to Niyazov43 • 
The Majlis (the former CPD), which, after 1994, was reduced to 50 members elected in 
single-member districts every five years, h as been t rusted to a much lesser degree by 
Niyazov. Although entirely obedient to the Cabinet of Ministers (chaired by Niyazov) in 
42 By mid-1992, the term Serdar was already in use to describe Niyazov and has now become a 
popular alternative title used throughout the country. The word has been carved in giant white 
lettering across a mountainside in the Kopet Dagh range south of Ashgabat, and Serdar is the most 
popular vodka on sale in the country, the bottle carrying a mirror portrait of Niyazov on the 
bottle's interior. 
43 The Khalk Maslahaty is analogous to Colonel Mu'amrnar al-Qadhafi's Jamahiriyya (People's) 
committees, created as a form of extreme democracy to counterbalance state authority. In practice, 
these too are subject to close government control. 
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passing routine legislation44, many Majlis members had been CPTu officials, and some of 
these predated Niyazov's own rise to power. Whereas the Khalk Maslahaty brought into 
the political framework the heads of rural villages, many Majlis members retained both 
the internationalist perspective 0 f t he Soviet e ra, and residual ties to Moscow through 
links with the security services, the military, and economic planning structures. 
The three M ajlis elections held since independence, in 1 994, 1 999 and 2 004 have, 0 n 
each occasion, provided Niyazov with an opportunity to purge the chamber of any real or 
imagined hostile elements. In the first election in December 1994 (turnout of 99.8%), 51 
candidates stood for 50 seats to give a nominal impression of multicandidate competition. 
The 1999 election (turnout 98.9%) provided greater choice, with 104 candidates, all but 
one of whom were members of the DPT, contesting the seats, this time confirming 
nominally that the elections were not single-party in nature. The really significant change 
was in the December 2004 election, which was contested by 131 candidates, in that 
turnout fell back to 76.88%. The reduced official turnout has marked a significant break 
with the government's previous official policy of near unanimity, and may be intended to 
draw the sting from international human rights bodies, who have ridiculed previous 
claims of near unanimous turnout with anecdotal reports of virtually empty polling 
stations throughout polling day. 
Although putative Majlis members are screened prior to nomination for election, the 
chamber is perceived by Niyazov to be a venue for the so-called Euro-Turkmen (ex-
CPSU members) to coalesce. These fears were confirmed by the failed coup/assassination 
attempt of 25 November 2002, when its alleged organiser, former Foreign Minister Boris 
Shikhmuradov, apparently admitted that the plotters planned to intercept Niyazov en 
route from his country residence to the presidential palace, and then arraign him before 
the Majlis, where he would be formally impeached and forced to resign. 
There is no evidence to suggest how many MajIis members, if any, would have turned 
against Niyazov so suddenly. However, the fact that the plotters were willing to take this 
chance fuelled Niyazov's suspicions, and he quickly moved, at the emergency session of 
the Khalk Maslahaty convened in late December 2002, to shift the formal responsibilities 
for constitutional amendments and selection of presidential candidates from the Majlis to 
the Khalk Maslahaty itself. Given its new responsibilities, Niyazov has argued 
unconvincingly that the Khalk Maslahaty could be convened within one day should he be 
44 The first decree passed by the Majlis in 1992 was for the unlimited production of copies of state 
portraits ofNiyazov. 
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incapacitated. This is highly unlikely given the size of both the body and the country, 
and the remote location of many members. Should Niyazov die in office, therefore, there 
is, at present, likely to be a temporary constitutional vacuum in which potential 
successors might undertake an intense struggle for power. 
Following the promulgation of the constitution, Niyazov moved quickly to formalise his 
position as head of the independent state (rather than president of the Turkmen SSR) by 
calling a presidential election for 21 June 1992, whereupon he was elected unopposed, 
improving his vote from 98.3% in October 1990 to 99.95% on a turnout of 99.8%. 
Although Agyzbirlik had immediately announced Nurberdi Nurmamedov as their 
candidate, Niyazov had ensured that only the Majlis could nominate candidates, and they 
refused to allow any other candidates. This was the first and so far only presidential 
election in Turkmenistan. Yet the more completely Niyazov stamps out political dissent, 
either within or without political structures, the more magnified is even the slightest 
manifestation of opposition. 
This was demonstrated by the formation in Moscow of the Turkmenistan Foundation (or 
Fund) (TF) in July 1993. Led by former Foreign Minister Avdy Kuliyev and a senior 
apparatchik Murad Esenov, the group had negligible political support within 
Turkmenistan, but began smuggling in dissident materials on the train service connecting 
Moscow to Ashgabat (Ponamarov 2004). After some TF literature had been discovered, 
Niyazov decided to expedite a referendum to extend his presidency for a further eight 
years. This was rapidly organised and held in January 2004, receiving the approval of 
99.99% of the population, from a turnout of 99.99%. Esenov was abducted in November 
1994 for a period (Pannier: 2005, 12), and Kuliyev has been subject to beatings by 
unknown assailants in Moscow over the past decade (Pannier: 2005, 81). 
The near unanimous turnouts owe much to Soviet-era practice, but they also reflect the 
tradition of unanimity that characterised Turkmen community decision-making prior to 
the Soviet era. As Ochs noted in relation to the high turnout figures, "it appears more 
important for the regime to publicise the results as a show of unanimity and unity" than 
for any intrinsic political value (Ochs: 1997,322). An unequivocal result reflects not only 
the satisfaction people have with the government, but also the unity of both the political 
elite and the people, for from the perspective of the Turkmen regime, dissent does not 
only question government policy, but also institutions, territory and national identity, in 
other words, the legitimacy of the state. 
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To summarise, given the overt internal contradictions within the Turkmen constitution, 
and Niyazov's determination to frustrate a plurality of political parties from operating, 
the liberal elements of the Turkmen constitution may appear to be puzzling. The 
explanation for the anomaly appears to lie in a mixture of what Chehabi and Linz termed 
"constitutional hypocrisy" (1998a: 17) and the haste with which the constitution was 
adopted. In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse, the Central Asian 
republics were wholly ill-equipped for formal statehood. Insecurity over sovereignty, and 
the lack of both diplomatic representation and contacts abroad (in contrast to Russia, 
which simply inherited the Soviet diplomatic infrastructure), caused the new leaders to 
seek early acceptance fi'om international institutions, notably the UN and OSCE. Taking 
a liberal constitutional model "off the shelf' was part of the process of gaining 
international acceptance and achieving conformity as quickly as possible. 
However, Turkmenistan is unique among post-Soviet states in that there appears to be no 
record of a dialogue over the type of constitutional model to be adopted, even between 
Turkmen political e1ites. Nor does it appear that was there any domestic expectation that 
the content of the constitution would be realised even though, under Article 16, the rights 
of citizens under the new constitution were inviolable and inalienable, in contrast to 
Soviet constitutional principles, where individual rights were conditional upon 
conformity with socialist ideals and the policies ofthe CPSU4S• 
Niyazov's Conception of Power and Democracy 
This "democratic deficit" in national political life has been explained away by Niyazov 
on numerous occasions in speeches and interviews, often through the use of separate and 
incompatible arguments within the same context46• Arguably the most specious of these 
was the claim to the Russian newspaper Trud in March 1998, that there is democracy but 
that there is simply no opposition t~ the government (interview reprinted in Transitions: 
March 1998, l3). Whether Niyazov is being either consciously disingenuous or engaging 
45 Article 52 of the fourth and final Soviet Constitution of 1977, for example, granted freedom of 
expression as long as this was not in contravention of Party policies. 
46 Western media reports on Niyazov frequently refer to him as "crazy" in connection with some 
of the more unusual decrees and statements, but Interviewee 1, an experienced doctor, offered the 
opinion that, from studying his behaviour and speech patterns on television, Niyazov may have 
. organic symptoms of mental illness by virtue of his constant flitting between unconnected 
subjects. 
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in wishful thinking is open to question, but this line of defence tends to accord with other 
statements of the same type47• 
Niyazov has also framed his conception of democracy in terms of the provision of 
welfare and security, and quoted Socrates in that "real democracy presumes strong rule" 
(Khramov: 2001, 86), not to ensure democratic practice, but rather for its own sake. 
Democracy is connected by Niyazov to group and, more particularly, state interests rather 
than the alienable rights of the individual, rather like the Soviet constitution was. As 
such, Niyazov has argued that Turkmenistan enjoys a healthy democracy. 
The third argument asserts that the country is, in fact, democratic was used in a keynote 
speech to the Makhtumkuli Youth Congress on 7 May 2004. Here Niyazov baldly 
asserted that "any group m ay form an independent or non-governmental party" before 
adding that "it should not be an artificial formulation and let nobody look for a straw in 
another person's eye" (Miras: 2/2004,25). This would appear to be a straightforward 
reiteration of Article 28 of the Constitution (see above) although bearing little 
resemblance to reality. 
On other occasions Niyazov has conceded that Turkmenistan is not democratic, but has 
offered different explanations for this. The first is one of immaturity - Niyazov argues 
that European states have had 250 years to evolve into liberal democracies, whereas 
Turkmenistan has been in existence for barely a decade, and is only just putting laws onto 
the statute books that define the political process. Niyazov argues that the country needs 
time for political institutions to strengthen and evolve before entrusting voters with 
choices, and that society is not "ripe" enough to choose between different presidential 
candidates48• ' 
The second argument stresses that Turkmenistan's political model will emerge according 
to its own "history and condition". In an interview with Rossiyskaya Gazeta (26 October 
47 In his New Year address for 2005, for example, Niyazov stated that on Cl/dyr Cijesi (the Night 
of Omnipotence that marks the end of Ramadan), 9000 prisoners were amnestied and "since then 
no one in Turkmenistan has committed a crime" and every prisoner has "started a peaceful and 
constructive life," (IS 4) a statement flatly contradicted by interviewees and contacts in 
Turkmenistan, nearly all of whom reported a significant increase in petty crime and burglary 
following the anmesty, 
48 The clear anomaly is that the institutions will not evolve unless they are in some way 
accountable to the electorate. This is demonstrated by the indifference of many citizens to the 
Majlis elections despite the officially high voter turnout figures. 
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2005), Niyazov elaborated this explanation as follows: "Today, while developing 
democratic institutes in the country, we try to make sure that this process corresponds to 
the world outlook of our people, to the system of values tested by centuries." Part of this 
national tradition involves appointing a leader, obviously Niyazov, "with special powers 
and enjoying special trust" (Khramov: 2001, 86). Niyazov has elaborated on this theme in 
Ruhnama, likening the country to a ship, with each citizen an oarsman: "If all the 
oarsmen obey one captain, and row in accordance with the orders of the captain, the ship 
will be put out to sea" (2002: 68). 
The range of arguments Niyazov uses to explain and defend the formal political system 
are a mixture of functional explanations based on Turkmenistan's precarious sovereignty 
and internal stability, a shifting of the conception of democracy established in the 
constitution to a more group rights focus, analogous with the Soviet constitution, a 
messianic belief in the centrality of a strong leader and, finally, claims about the extent of 
pluralism and the opposition, which are insupportable by any objective analysis. 
In this sense, Niyazov therefore aligns closely with those sultanistic leaders described by 
Chehabi and Linz who "pay lip service to constitutions that provide for elected chief 
executives and parliaments, and in some cases even multiparty systems. The leaders often 
make a point of extolling democracy while redefining it," often by writing exten'sive 
treatises on the subject (1998a: 18). 
If Niyazov' s formal defence of the political system is intellectual1y incoherent, how then 
can we understand the rationale behind the construction of such a strongly personalist 
regime. The answers are likely to lie in a combination of personal and functional factors. 
Firstly, it is necessary to consider Niyazov's und~rstanding of the nature of political 
power. He conceptualises individual rights as subordinate to the requirements of political 
stability. He therefore places a premium on social cohesion. Multivocality in the political 
system threatens the unity of the community by engendering discussion, debate and 
disagreement. To avoid this, power should emanate from one source alone. As the 
incumbent source of power, Niyazov is responsible for the maintenance of social 
solidarity. He is therefore responsible not only for executing state policy, but for the 
production of a national ideology - an ideal for living - of which state policy forms a part. 
Any disaggregation of power threatens not only the legitimacy and efficacy of state 
policy ("who gets what, when and how") but also the rightness of national ideology and, 
ultimately, the nation itself. 
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In the bordering state of Uzbekistan, a similar fusion of state and regime has forged a 
highly defensive mentality which views reality· external to the state as comprising a 
multitude of threats - consumerism, permissiveness, radical Islam, airborne disease - all 
of which erode the traditional, organic unity of Uzbek society (Megoran: 2003). In the 
official version, only President Islam Karimov has the foresight and qualities to protect 
the community and guide the state through the minefield presented by globalisation and 
religious extremism. In Niyazov's conception, there is no such presupposition of organic 
Turkmen unity. By contrast, his historic mission is to save ethnic Turkmen from naturally 
inimical relations and the prospect of internal disintegration through the construction of a 
political system that privileges, even demands, complete political unity. 
Ironically, Niyazov's policy of frequently rotating or purging government personnel 
inadvertently reinforces and deepens the tribal solidarities that he is trying to dissolve. 
Officials know they have very limited time in post, and therefore extract everything they 
possibly can for themselves and their family/clan while the resources are available 
(Interviews 3 and 21). Indeed, it could almost be argued that the purges function as an 
equitable form of distribution of state resources between clan groups. 
Niyazov was helped by the fact that Turkmen political elites were neither well-travelled 
nor politically cosmopolitan in comparison to those of other Soviet republics. The Soviet 
approach to governing the Turkmen SSR, particularly after Stalin's death, was to allow 
existing authority patterns to persist so long as they did not conflict with the Party's 
broader goals or result in civil disorder. There was even less reason for extensive 
intervention in Turkmenistan than other Muslim republics because of its historically low 
levels of religious observance, and the fewer restrictions on women's appearance. 
After the Soviet collapse, the badges of socialism were taken off leaving traditional 
authority structures still intact. The physical and cultural isolation of the Republic left it 
somewhat adrift from the currents of political debate that penetrated the Communist East. 
This isolationism has since been perpetuated by the blanket ban on government officials 
from leaving the country, except on official business, the ban on foreign media and the 
very low levels of Internet usage. 
Although these factors might explain the ideological dimension of Turkmenistan's 
political framework, they do not explain why Niyazov finally designated himself as the 
sole, formal instrument for formulating, articulating and symbolising national ideology 
and government policy. The early influence of Stalin as 'a leader who negotiated periods 
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of rapid national trauma and transition is clear from the productionist ethos and 
gigantomania of the state, and many of the visual m.anifestations of the cult of personality 
that emerged from 1992 onwards, discussed in more detail in chapter five. However, 
Niyazov is a Iso 1 ikely well have derived significant political (as opposed to aesthetic) 
inspiration during the initial period of state formation in 1991-92 from the example of 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey. 
It is clear from his public statements and his commitment to Gorbachev's last-ditch 
attempt to form the USS that Niyazov hoped that some form of reconstituted Soviet 
umbrella could be salvaged as late as early December 1991, shortly before the Belovezh 
Accords. Only after that point was Niyazov required, by simple force of circumstance, to 
consider alternative options. Interestingly, during the first week of December 1991, he 
made his first recorded trip outside the Soviet Union to Turkey, for an unusually long, 
five-day visit. The formal purpose of the visit was to develop economic relations, secure 
short-term aid, and lay the groundwork for Turkey's eventual diplomatic recognition of 
Turkrnenistan. However, Niyazov's own published foreign policy diary records a visit to 
the vast Kemal Ataturk mausoleum complex and exposure to the posthumous cult of 
Kemalism that pervades Turkish public life. In the following year (1992), the Turkrnen 
government's most intensive foreign contacts by far were with Turkey, Niyazov 
receiving ten official delegations between December 1991 and April 1993, and personally 
visiting Turkey on a further three occasions during 1992 alone. 
There were mutual benefits to such intensive interaction. The Turkish government hoped 
to exploit the geopolitical void left by Russia's abrupt withdrawal from the region, and 
. President Yeltsin' s initial lack of attention to the "Near Abroad". Although ethnic kinship 
was an attraction in itself, Turkey is energy deficient and cultural synergies could be used 
as a card to gain access to the oil and gas reserves of the Caucasus and Central Asia49• 
The practical attractions for Niyazov lay in the willingness of Turkey to help cover 
shortages in staple goods in the chaotic afternmth of the imposition of "shock therapy" in 
Russia in January 1992, and the element of prestige in establishing diplomatic contacts. 
More substantively, however, Niyazov saw in Turkey a potential role model. Like 
49 Turkey's energy policy towards the region reached its fruition in early 2006 when the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan (B~C) oil pipeline, which has a capacity of one million barrels of oil per day, was 
filled, to be followed later in 2006 by the completion of the South Caucasus gas pipeline (SCP) 
linking Azerbaijan to the Turkish gas pipeline network. With proposals for a subsea oil pipeline 
link to Atyrau in Kazakhstan, and the expansion of both the oil and liquefied natural gas tanker 
fleets in the Caspian Sea, the B TC and S CP projects effectively 1 ink Turkey to Central Asia's 
hydrocarbon fields. 
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Niyazov, Ataturk had formed a new state from the rubble of a collapsed empire. 
Moreover, he had forcibly fast-tracked the country through a rapid process of 
modernisation and industrialisation through top-down, statist methods inspired by Stalin 
(and, toa lesser extent, by Benito Mussolini in Italy). Ataturk's methods involved a 
combination of strategic vision in the way that Turkey was projected abroad - nationalist, 
isolationist and secular - and also arbitrary and personal micro-management, for example 
by changing the calendar, issuing decrees on acceptable dress styles (criminalising the fez 
and v:eiling) (Chehabi: 2004, 214). These measures encapsulated a style of governance 
Niyazov could recognise, understand and imitate. N iyazov has publicly acknowledged 
Ataturk's achievements in subsequent speeches, not only in diplomatic settings with 
Turkish ministers, but also in general surveys of both domestic and foreign policy, 
singling out Ataturk as a leader of special significance in twentieth century state-building 
projects (Khramov: 2001, 76). 
The influence of Kemalism was immediately apparent in several of Niyazov's early 
policies. Like Ataturk, Niyazov swiftly acquired close control over the Islamic clergy 
(formerly the responsibility of the Soviet Spiritual Board for Muslims based in Tashkent). 
He formed a national kaziyat (state religious body) in June 1992 followed by the 
Gengeshli (Presidential Council for Religious Affairs) in April 1994, which brought the 
entirety of national religious activity under Niyazov's personal control. Even the Chief 
Mufti was appointed as a de facto Cabinet member, with a ministerial salary and car 
(Bezanis: 1995; Akbarzadeh: 2001). The role of political parties was also analogous. 
Although Turkey, like Turkmenistan, remained a one-party state throughout the Kemalist 
republic, the Turkish People's Party had a minimal input into policy, until it was 
reactivated in the 1930s to oversee a state guided revival of civil society and the 
organisation of ritualistic displays of support for the regime (Zilrcher: 2004, 106-1 o8io. 
The K emalist m odel a Iso stressed national self-sufficiency in explicitly s tatist, but not 
expansionist, form. Ataturk wa's not a pan-Turkist, his central foreign policy precept 
being "Turkey does not claim an inch, but will not concede an inch." Niyazov's swift 
detachment from the mechanisms binding the eIS, policy of permanent neutrality, 
relative lack of interest in the large Turkmen diasporas in Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq, and 
resolutely non-interventionist approach to regional security issues, are all policies in line 
with a Kemalist template. 
50 Kemalist political celebrations organised by the People's Party included mass spectacles, such 
stadium gymnastic displays and parades, largely imitating similar festivities in Fascist Italy 
(Ziircher: 2004, 110). 
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Most obvious, however, are the parallels in the way in which Ataturk's persona came to 
unite and embody the modem Turkish state. The name Ataturk means 'Father of the 
Turks'. By early 2003, Niyazov had formally adopted the name Turkrnenbashi, ('Head of 
the Turkrnen') or Serdar ('Military Commander'). Vital to this impression is likely to 
have been the manner in which Ataturk, more than any other secular leader of a modem 
Eurasian state, has been venerated after his death. His legacy is tangible, not only in the 
Turkish political and military establishment's continuing commitment to Westernisation 
and secularism, but also physically in portraiture, statuary and the urban landscape, 
symbolised most dramatically in the monolithic Speerian mausoleum in Ankara. 
Crucially, however, the cult of Ataturk is essentially posthumous, with Ataturk 
symbolically representing modernity, progress and national unity to Turks, whereas 
Niyazov's decision to sanction a living cult of personality around himself entails a 
different set of political dynamics intimately connected with his own predilections and 
idiosyncrasies, entirely distinct from the more formalised and structured collective 
memory of Ataturk. 
Mapping power in Turkmenistan 
The formal map of political power in Turkrnenistan provides for a strong presidency, 
balanced by an elected legislature (Majlis), and a unique political institution in the Khalk 
Maslahaty that comprises all three branches of government, and is designed to express 
the popular will, approve the broad direction of government policy, and undertake any 
necessary constitutional amendments. In practice, the Majlis simply puts executive 
decisions into a legislative format, with very little amendment or scrutiny. Political 
debate is entirely absent. Similarly, the Khalk Maslahaty does not formulate or evaluate 
government policy, and appears to meet principally to bestow ritual acclamation on 
Niyazov, and to receive his yearly report card on the government's achievements. 
If we are unable to gain a clear sense of where the sources of power lie from an analysis 
of forn1al institutions, it is necessary to look at informal political mechanisms in order to 
, 
establish how the Turkrnen regime functions in practice. This is a very difficult task. The 
media, which is completely controlled by the government, gives far less away than in the 
Soviet period, where letters from readers and certain approved articles provided an 
insight in to the flow of policy debate and clues as to the locus of power. Elite political 
culture in Turkrnenistan is almost entirely closed, not least because of the omnipresent 
threat of arbitrary arrest and detention for officials who speak out. Nevertheless, the 
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sources available do allow us to construct a picture, in some places rather sketchily, of 
how the regime operates. 
The most appropriate place to begin is the Cabinet of Ministers, chaired by Niyazov 
himself. Niyazov also acts as Prime Minister and does not have a Vice-President, having 
claimed that to appoint one might "poison" him politically (Pannier: 2005, 2). Niyazov is 
also the Prime Minister, having acquired significant additional powers in 1992, to oversee 
the initial process of disengaging from Soviet structures and implementing market 
reformS I . Beneath Niyazov are usually two or three Deputy Prime Ministers, usually 
whichever ministers are most in favour at any particular time. The fonnal Cabinet also 
includes the Turkmen Ambassadors to the US and UN, and the Chair of the Central 
Bank. 
Cabinet meetings are usually broadcast on state television, sometimes live. Cabinet 
ministers do not speak unless directly addressed by Niyazov, and sessions normally 
consist of long, uninterrupted monologues by Niyazov. Frequently, Cabinet ministers 
stand before him with their heads bowed, while he berates them for incompetence, often 
revealing intimate details 0 f t heir life in the process. There is nod ialogue 0 r detailed 
discussion of policy in the sessions. 
Niyazov clearly has strategic oversight over the main lines of government policy. There 
appear to be several strands to the way power operates. Niyazov frequently identifies a 
general preference without specifying when, how, or whether this should be translated 
into policy. 0 fficials t hen interpret a nd act 0 n N iyazov' s utterances as far as t hey a re 
able, particularly where it constitutes a relatively insignificant matter (such as students 
with gold teeth) over which officials are capable of exercising control, and which 
displays their attentiveness and loyalty. 
Related to this is the tendency to enact policy measures in expectation of Niyazov's 
preferences, and thus without his direct knowledge or assent. Kershaw's analysis of 
Hitler's style of governance described this as "working towards the Fuhrer", whereby 
Hitler would often layout the most general framework of strategic preferences at the 
outset, which would then be developed into detailed policy initiatives, and subsequently 
reinterpreted and reproduced further down the chain of command, until initiatives would 
SI Niyazov almost certainly followed the lead of President Boris Yeltsin, who persuaded the 
Russian CPD to confer additional powers on the presidency in 1991, to put into effect rapid 
economic reform. 
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be generated in anticipation of Hitler's wishes rather than on his orders (Kershaw: 1997, 
88-106). In the case of Turkmenistan, this is most often manifested in cultural policy, and 
most closely associated with the production of the cult of personality, discussed in more 
detail in chapter five. 
Thirdly, Niyazov will micro-manage policy in specific areas, often with disastrous 
results. Niyazov insists on personally setting the date on which cotton harvesting can 
officially commence each year. In recent years he has miscalculated, damaging the cotton 
yield, although mistakes are never admitted, and the blame is laid elsewhere. In 2002, the 
cotton yield was only 25% of the stated government target, prompting Niyazov to dismiss 
four out of five regional governors, the Agriculture Minister and a Deputy Prime 
Minister. Similarly, in November 2004, the Deputy Prime Minister and Governor of Ahal 
and a Deputy Prime Minister were dismissed for the poor harvest in the Ahal region. In 
recent years, farmers, in collusion with officials, have simply over-reported the cotton 
harvest by as much as 300% to avoid sanctions (lCG Report No. 93, 2005). 
A similar situation has arisen in the production of wheat. Niyazov initial1y sets wholly 
unrealistic targets for the grain harvest. He also notifies the dates for both sowing and 
harvesting. Many farmers a re forced to harvest unripe wheat, leading to a poor yield. 
Officials then seek to cover up their failure to reach state targets by either over-reporting 
or, in 2005, impounding without compensation a volume of imported flour from Russia 
and Kazakhstan. The importers are told that their flour is not required because the state 
targets for domestic production have been met. Subsequently, the imports are passed off 
. as being domestically produced (IWPR RCA No. 414,8 October 2005). In this way, the 
agricultural sector has become increasingly dependent on the manipulation of statistics 
and the multiplication of lies to cover earlier deficiencies. Niyazov also personally 
negotiates agreements to supply gas to Russia and Ukraine with officials from their state-
owned companies Gazprom and Naftohaz, and has detailed input into gas transit 
agreements a nd hydrocarbon exploration licensing, a n a rea in which he displays more 
technical competence (Interviews 3 and 12; Eurasia Daily Monitor, 24 January 2006). 
In between these two extremes, there is considerable inertia both in the formulation and 
execution of policy. Niyazov will often set out policy objectives in general terms, but due 
to a combination of reasons these are only erratically implemented. The most common 
reason for the lack of policy coherence is the rapid turnover of senior officials and 
constant reshuffling of ministers. This has several implications. Efficiency is diminished 
as each new post-holder has to master their brief. Moreover, many officials believe that 
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the only way that can retain their post is to initiate some noteworthy project, however ill-
conceived or unnecessary, that would convey the impression that they were competent, 
energetic and proactive. Few of these projects are completed and most simply absorb 
resources. Interviewees 3 and 21 described how several successive departmental heads in 
the Central Bank set about attempting to establish a national stock exchange within 12 
weeks without any significant progress. Finally, knowing that their time in post is limited, 
many officials seek to install as many friends and relatives as possible on the payroll, and 
embezzle as much money as they can before being found out or demoted. The banking, 
cotton and energy sectors are all synonymous with high-level corruption and nepotism. 
In some sectors, there appears to be either no control at all, or the chain of authority has 
been compromised all the way up to Cabinet level. The former Foreign Minister Boris 
Shikhmuradov, imprisoned in December 2002 for organising the November 2002 coup 
plot, allegedly sold five S u-17 military aircraft in 1 994 0 nap rivate basis (IS 5 ), and 
Yolly Gurbanmuradov, the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the Fuel and Energy 
Sector was imprisoned in May 2005 for allegedly embezzling $188 million from illicit oil 
trading. Other senior officials, many of whom are now part of the small, exiled 
opposition parties have been implicated in similar scandals. An investigation was 
launched by the Ukrainian Security Services in July 2005 into an international smuggling 
racket in the gas trade between Turkrnenistan and Ukraine that may involve losses to both 
countries of in excess of $1 billion (The Moscow Times, 28 July 2005). Niyazov himself 
has almost certainly profited from corruption and embezzlement, through the channelling 
of oil and gas revenues into the off-budget Foreign Exchange Reserve Fund (FERF) 
under his direct control. Given the extensive reach of the KNB and the Presidential Guard 
it is highly likely that Niyazov tolerates a significant degree of corruption among senior 
officials, secure in the knowledge that it can be used against them at any point. Those 
closest to Niyazov, such as Gurbanmuradov, who may have compromising material on 
Niyazov, do not even appear to face trial, but are simply imprisoned or, more likely, 
eliminated when they fall from favour. 
The Gurbanmuradov case is instructive on a number of levels. Firstly, it indicates that 
Niyazov's power is not absolute, and that he must take care not to overreach himself. 
Secondly, it sheds light on the corruption networks and the actual operation of ministerial 
power. Thirdly, it illustrates the central role of the General Prosecutor's Office in 
sustaining Niyazov in power. 
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Gurbanmuradov had been a powerful figure in the regime since 1992, one of only a 
handful of insiders to avoid Niyazov's purges. He was indisputably the most important 
figure in the country's energy sector, controlling upstream, downstream and trading 
operations. His principal rival was Rejep Saparov, the head of the Presidential 
Administration. Niyazov allowed each man to feed him compromising material about the 
other, and both were reportedly "beyond the reach" of the KNB. One or both may have 
overstretched themselves, and they were purged within weeks of one another in summer 
2005. Significantly, Niyazov did not feel secure enough to risk purging both rivals 
simultaneously, indicating fear of a possible backlash. 
Secondly, the removal of Gurbanmuradov was followed by a string of dismissals across 
the energy and financial sectors, including the heads of the state oil and gas companies, 
the country's largest oil refinery, and the Chair and Deputy Chair of the Central Bank, 
and a considerable number of lesser officials (IWPR RCA Special Report No. 402, 12 
August 2005). Gurbanmuradov had consolidated power by installing a whole chain of 
followers in different sectors, complicit in his large-scale embezzlement. Political power 
immediately below the presidential level appears to operate as a complex clientelistic 
network utilising income from external rents. Once Gurbanmuradov was removed, it was 
also necessary to remove a whole echelon of officials that comprised his entourage, and 
would not be expected to work with another patron. 
Thirdly, both Gurbanmuradov and Saparov were, in common with other ministers and 
dissidents, brought to book by the Chief Prosecutor, Kurbanbibi Atajanova, who retains 
the confidence of Niyazov and wields an enormous amount of power. Atajanova has been 
instrumental since 1997 in assembling compromising evidence and pursuing prosecutions 
against ministers and senior officials, including senior KNB officials. That she is 
indispensable is demonstrated by her political rehabilitation following removal from by 
armed guard from a Cabinet meeting in December 2003, in connection with allegations 
that she controlled a large-scale drugs trafficking operation from Afghanistan. Within 
weeks, however, Atajanova was reinstated and successfully assembled a case against her 
accuser, Poran Berdiyev, the head of the KNB. Her return to power, according to sources 
inside the regime cited by subsequent reports, was due to her unrivalled track record in 
extracting compromising material on senior government officials, although she also fell 
from grace again in April 2006 (RFE TS 28 April 2004; IS 6). 
Corruption unsurprisingly extends beyond licit goods into the narcotics trade. Smuggling 
is very likely to be sanctioned at a high level of government. Interviewees 23 and 24 gave 
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eye-witness accounts of official drug convoys travelling along the Ashgabat-Darvasa-
Dashoguz highway across the Karakum desert. Former officials report the storage of 
heroin at Niyazov's presidential palace, and one strongly documented case exists of the 
di~covery in 1997 of a container holding 400kg heroin at Ashgabat airport by a state 
border guard, Major Vitaly Usachev, who was immediately then court-martialled and 
shot (IS 7). 
Government policy is executed dysfunctionally and in some cases, with scant attention to 
legality by senior officials. There is little stability within government ministries or state 
enterprises. This filters down to lower levels because senior officials insert family and 
clan members into junior positions as soon as they are able. The principal reason given 
for dismissals at regional level, following the general terms of "shortcomings in work" is 
for clan-based appointments. The outcome is that policy is not developed and 
implemented with much degree of consistency or rationality. 
To enforce control in this environment Niyazov relies on an extensive internal security 
apparatus. Very little hard information is released about the various security agencies 
operating inside the country, and what does come into the public domain tends to emerge 
only in times of rupture and reorganisation. Protecting Niyazov personally is the 
Presidential Guard, the only agency apparently trusted completely by Niyazov. The 
Guard forms a bridgehead between Niyazov and other governmental agencies, and has 
gained oversight over the KNB, with which there is believed to be considerable 
bureaucratic rivalry and animosity. The Guard is comprised of elite former KNB agents 
and bodyguards, and retains significant privileges, with headquarters in the complex of 
buildings formerly housing the National Library (now closed) adjacent to the Presidential 
Palace. 
Wider internal security functions are controlled by the KNB, which reportedly runs over 
5000 full-time agents. The KNB operates with virtually no public oversight or 
accountability, and is believed collect to extensive records on public sector officials, 
foreign workers and tourists, aided by large network of informers (leG Report No. 44: 
2003, 8). This gives the KNB much greater reach into society, and it is therefore the most 
informed component of the internal security apparatus. Arrests can be made arbitrarily by 
the KNB, with suspects subject to incarceration in psychiatric hospitals and desert penal 
colonies. Interviewee 1 had inspected several of these facilities, singling out penal 
institutions in Tejen, Sady and Turkmenbashi as having extremely high mortality rates. 
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Although the security services are the cornerstone of internal security capabilities, their 
loyalty has been c aBed into question by N iyazov, most notably in M arch 2002, when 
most of the upper echelons were purged, and the KNB was reorganised into a 
government ministry to allow Niyazov more personal oversight into its activities. 
Conflicting reasons have been given for the purge. One interpretation is that there existed 
a cadre of senior officials who remained loyal to former Foreign Minister Boris 
Shikhmuradov and were willing to participate, or at least facilitate, a coup attempt against 
Niyazov (IS 8). The second version is that the head of the KNB, Mukhammed Nazarov, 
who Niyazov hitherto regarded as unimpeachably loyal, was plotting to succeed Niyazov. 
Nazarov was subsequently jailed for 20 years, and 80% of the leadership was removed. 
Niyazov presented the purge publicly as a populist measure to crack down on the KNB's 
illegal detentions, house searches and involvement in drug smuggling (ICG Report No. 
44: 2003, 9). Interviewee 1, who was part of Shikhmuradov's circle, offered the more 
mundane explanation that Nazarov and the bulk of the senior KNB were loyal, but had 
simply fallen victim to Niyazov's paranoia. Paradoxically, however, the act of thoroughly 
purging the KNB had disenchanted many of the remaining officers, some of whom were 
prepared to participate in the coup attempt of November 2002. 
The military is also regarded with suspicion by Niyazov, to the extent that it has been 
thoroughly deprofessionalised, and is now used as a source of cheap labour in hospitals 
and the municipal administration. Niyazov has, nevertheless, been careful to cultivate 
senior officers by earmarking luxurious apartments in Ashgabat for their exclusive use, 
turning over Ashgabat's Central Hospital to the military, and issuing decrees that officers 
and their families receive free medical treatment (IS 9). The relatively minor political role 
of the military is discussed further in the following chapter. 
Conclusion 
Returning to the theoretical framework established in chapter two, we noted that Chchabi 
and Linz underplayed the extent to which contingent, agential factors contributed to the 
emergence of sultanistic regimes. The two preceding chapters have sought to elucidate 
the process by which the Turkmen government assumed many of the characteristics of 
sultanism, and how the system functions. 
The country has many of the macrostructural and political-institutional factors elaborated 
in the critique of SRT. Combined with these underlying preconditions was the political 
strategy adopted by Niyazov. This entailed working within the Soviet system as an 
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orthodox operator, adapting to Gorbachev's perestroika reforms in order to consolidate 
personal power, and then moving quickly to sideline nascent opposition groups by 
selectively appropriating their reform programmes. Niyazov's remoteness from clan 
networks and willingness to apply coercion where required ensured that he has been able 
to secure loyalty and compliance across a relatively inchoate society. 
In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union, Niyazov effectively codified his 
supremacy through the rapid adoption of a favourable constitution, and by weighting both 
political institutions and processes heavily in his own favour. Although Niyazov acted 
opportunistically, his new political order also reflected Soviet and pre-Soviet political 
traditions in the requirement for political unanimity and unity clustered around a pre-
packaged ideology centred on Niyazov himself. The post-Soviet Turkmen political order 
is therefore a product of Soviet norms, political and cultural isolation, and the 
determination of a single ruler to imprint his own conception of authority on the 
institutional framework of governance. Once the regime was in place, Niyazov has had 
fewer and fewer checks placed upon his authority. With virtually untrammelled power 
and no tangible domestic opposition to visualise, Niyazov has, to some extent, faIl en 
victim to paranoia, which the result that his court is fuelled by intrigue, purges and 
rivalry. 
Several themes emerge from mapping these specific power structures. Firstly, the 
government is characterised by a general absence of trust - between Niyazov and senior 
ministers, between Niyazov and the instruments of internal security, and between the 
ministers and institutions themselves. Niyazov therefore profits as the only stable and 
fixed point in a shifting constellation of actors. Moreover, the opacity of government 
structures both helps and hinders Niyazov. Other political actors are not able to work in 
concert to challenge Niyazov because they are unable to make informed risk calculations 
about what is known of their activities by (other) security agencies. Chehabi and Linz 
correctly state that "sultanistic rulers typically maintain an atmosphere of distrust among 
various branches of the military and encourage mutual espionage to protect themselves 
from a coup" (l998a, 12). But cruciaIly, although the ruler has the greatest quantity of 
infornlation at his disposal, he does not necessarily "hold all the cards", but is still only as 
informed as his sources wish him to be. This has led to interviewees 1, 10 and 12 
questioning precisely how much Niyazov does know about the state of the country, and 
about the activities of senior officials. Niyazov may be the major player in the game, but 
he is stilI only a player nonetheless. 
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Secondly, formal political institutions, with the exception of the presidency, have been 
ascribed 0 nly a m arginal place in the system. Even within a n institutional framework, 
power is exercised almost without restraint by Niyazov, and with a disregard for what 
Weber described as legal-rational norms that was not the case in the Soviet period. In 
December 2005, for example, the journalist Khudaiberdy Kurbandurdyev was arbitrarily 
sentenced to eight years imprisonment by Niyazov in a Cabinet session without any sort 
of trial (IS 10). This tendency to play "fast and loose" with legal principle is not confined 
to the presidency. When Boris Shikhmuradov made a televised confession of guilt for the 
coup plot before an emergency session of the Khalk Maslahaty in December 2002, it was 
they who were called to decide upon his punishment, a legal procedure without 
constitutional or legislative precedent. 
Thirdly, political power is exercised in a profoundly dysfunctional and uneven fashion. 
While the regime is able to successfully control dress codes, ban recorded music at 
weddings and introduce Ruhnama into mosques, it is unwilling or unable to combat 
large-scale fraud, embezzlement and drug-trafficking, or effectively administer the 
economic sectors under its control. As a consequence, the regime and those affected by it 
become complicit in a web of deception over the perceived and real competencies of the 
government in which Niyazov also participates, either knowingly or not. 
The simultaneous over-control and de structuring of governance in Turkmenistan cannot 
be explained purely by the preconditions laid out in the previous chapter. High external 
rents, clientelistic networks and the legacies of the Soviet era have provided the 
opportunities, instruments and channels for policy (and often non-policy) to become 
material. The more immediate structural context, shaped directly by Niyazov's 
calculations, choices or selective inaction, since he came to power is also fundamental to 
any understanding of the regime's behaviour. With the Turknlen people short of a 
developed cultural identity, a unifying theme or symbol of national unity at the time of 
independence, Niyazov quickly settled on himself, as being the embodiment of the state. 
However, unlike Ataturk, whose persona symbolised a specific and separate refornl 
project with permanent consequences, Niyazov has been unable to articulate or enact a 
similar strategy. Instead, he has fallen back on the notion that state policy is simply what 
Niyazov orders, rather than a set of objectives towards which he is working. In this sense, 
the agential element provides a complementary analytical framework to the structural 
preconditions articulated in the previous chapter. 
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Having considered in detail how the regime operates, the following chapter builds on this 
platform by ,analysing specific techniques of domestic political control - coercion, 
patronage and the cult of personality - t hat enable t he regime to remain durable and, 
despite its clearly dysfunctional characteristics, relatively stable, 
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Plate One. Ruhuyet Palace, Ashgabat (August 2003). The Kopet Dagh mountains behind 
fonn the natural border with Iran. 
Plate Two. Ministry of Fairness (fonnerly Justice), Ashgabat (August 2003). A typical 
example of the new urban order in Ashgabat. Note the statue ofNiyazov' s mother, 
Gurbansoltan Eje, who has become the national symbol of justice. 
Plate Three. Houses demolished in Keshi (November 2004). Niyazov reportedly ordered 
their removal because he found them to be unattractive when he drove past. 
Plate Four. Houses demolished in central Ashgabat. People were still living in the ruins 
of their homes (November 2004). Residents were either offered unsuitable alternative 
accommodation, or none at all. 
Plate Five. Satellite dishes in central Ashgabat (May 2005). Russian television is the 
only access Turkmen have to foreign media. Niyazov has reportedly contemplated 
banning satellite dishes, but has not yet done so. 
Plate Six. The National Carpet Museum, Ashgabat (November 2002).Gurbansoltan Eje 
is pictured and is the symbol of the virtue and skill of traditional carpet-makers. 
Plate Seven. Niyazov immortalised in Balkanabat, formerly Nebit Dag (May 2005). 
The monuments to Niyazov are not as well-maintained in this city, which is a stronghold 
of the Yomut tribe. This ensemble, with the Little Balkan mountains behind, was situated 
in desert scrubland, completely decontextualised from its surroundings. 
Plate Eight. A graveyard in the mountain village ofNokhur, near the Iranian border (May 
2005). Nokhurli (Turkmenistan' s only blue-eyed tribe) were never integrated into the Soviet 
system, farming privately and exempted from the military draft. They marry endogamously, 
and follow a form of Islam fused with ludaic and Zoroastrian components. Graves are 
marked with the horns of wild sheep. 
Plate Nine. State Ritual, Ashgabat (2004). Public holidays, of which there at least 15 every 
year, are usually marked by state-sponsored rituals, fusing a mythical pre-Soviet past with 
lavish praise for Niyazov. The connection endows Niyazov with legitimacy and signifies the 
unity of the Turkmen tribes, despite the inimical relations that actually existed (and, to some 
extent, still persist). Behind the procession is the Arch of Neutrality. A golden statue of 
Niyazov mechanically revolves to face the sun. 
Plate Ten. Children's Concert, Mary in southeastern Turkmenistan (November 
2004). The children sing songs praising Niyazov and extolling Ruhnama. The girl 
is holding a board with the cover of the book. All the participants are obliged to 
wear traditional costume. 
Plate Eleven. Turkmen women chatting at the opening ceremony of the restored mausoleum 
of Sultan Sanjar, Merv (November 2004). Although participation in state celebrations is 
compulsory, the women appeared to enjoy the occasion and the opportunity it provided to 
meet up. 
Plate Twelve. Cult Production 1. Bronze busts ofNiyazov stored in the garden of a leading court 
sculptor, Ashgabat (November 2004). 
Plate Thirteen. Cult Production 2. A painting of Niyazov working on Ruhnama at the studio of 
a leading court painter, Ashgabat (November 2004). Providing inspiration for Niyazov is a 
fusion of the traditional (Oghuz, Islam) and the new (the modem cityscape of Ashgabat, the 
young woman, and the national flag). The bust of the national poet, Makhtumkuli, sits on the 
desk and the cup of tea reflects Niyazov' s sobriety. The framing of the background with a 
heavy red curtain curiously suggests that the images are a theatrical creation rather than a 
reflection of historylreali ty. 
Plate Fourteen. The mosque in Kipchak under construction (August 2003). Niyazov 
displays his religious credentials, although portrayed conspicuously in conservative 
Western attire, suggesting circumspection about wholesale identification with Islam. 
Plate Fifteen. Kipchak mosque (November 2004). The mosque attracted domestic and international 
criticism over its cost ($120 million), and because the minarets and interior are decorated with 
slogans from Ruhnama in Turkmen, rather than with Koranic inscriptions in Arabic. This 
indicates the ongoing fusion of Sunni Islam and Niyazov's cult of personality. 
Plate Sixteen. Darvasa, centre of the Karakum desert (August 2003). The village grew in the Soviet 
era with the development of a nearby potassium mine. The mine closed and the settlement lost its 
supply of gas and electricity after independence. Villagers subsisted on small-scale farming and 
supplying travellers crossing the desert. Lying on the major overland heroin trafficking route from 
Iran to Russia, drug addiction became endemic. Niyazov flew over the settlement in 2004 and 
ordered that the village be destroyed. Residents were reportedly given two hours notice to leave and 
not offered alternative accommodation. 
Plate Seventeen. A painting on display at a gallery in central Ashgabat (November 2002). A 
metaphor for domestic politics? 
Plate Eighteen 
Plate Nineteen. 
Remembering the Great Patriotic War, Ashgabat (2004 and 2005). Plate Eighteen forms part of 
a larger ensemble. The statue in the middle is of a grieving mother. The soldiers on either side, 
a Russian and a Turkmen, appear united in sorrow by the arch. Plate Nineteen is the new 
memorial, representing Niyazov's father Atamurat, strangely rendered with the features 
of a Teutonic warrior. The new memorial is not approachable, being surrounded by water. Note 
the Seljuk star, a symbolic Turkmen "intervention" in a traditionally Russian commemoration. 
Both memorials are the work of the same artist, S. B. (Interviewee Six). 
Chapter Five - Mechanisms of Control: Coercion, Patronage and the Cult of 
Personality 
Introduction 
The critique of the theoretical framework conducted in chapter two focused on the 
structural preconditions favouring the emergence of sultanistic regimes. These were 
distilled into the following factors: legacies of domestic political incoherence and 
external domination; an under-institutionalised political context favouring individual 
opportunism; and the availability of revenue streams from sources of unearned income 
(normally derived from a significant natural resource endowment) which, in turn, enable 
a ruler to: (i) buy in internal security functions, and (ii) lubricate pre-existing and newly 
formed patronage networks. However, SRT offers only a cursory account of the specific 
mechanisms used by sultanistic rulers to retain power for any significant period. The 
purpose of this chapter is to extend our understanding of how the domestic authority of 
sultanistic rulers is sustained and reproduced, notwithstanding the manifold dysfunctional 
characteristics of their regimes, by investigating the techniques used to maintain political 
control by the Niyazov regime in Turkmenistan. 
The theoretical framework set out by Chehabi and Linz does not dwell on this issue at 
any great length. The main orientation of their comments is on purely tactical 
manoeuvres, such as the forging of temporary alliances with established church or civil 
society groups, or the use of 'constitutional hypocrisy' (Chehabi and Linz: 1998a, 17-19) 
as apolitical instrument designed to co-opt domestic e lites, a nd secure the support of 
external sponsors. The discussion 0 f t he coercive functions 0 f t he state is confined to 
noting that internal security is frequently arrogated to irregular parastatal forces, such as 
the Tontons Macoutes in Haiti under the Duvaliers, or the "Mongoose Gangs" of 
Grenadan leader Eric Gairy (Chehabi and Linz: 1998a, 12l2. 
However, the findings of this chapter suggest that the "technologies of domination" 
constructed by sultanistic rulers, are far more complex and variegated entities than 
Chehabi and Linz allow. In particular, three interlocking mechanisms - the use of 
coercion, patronage and the cult of personality - are identified that, in combination, form 
52 The Army Veterans in contemporary Zimbabwe, and the popular militias formed by Qadhafi to 
enact waves of zalif[assault] against regime opponents in Libya (Vandewalle: 1998, 134), are 
contemporary examples of the tactic of using personally loyal forces to undercut the professional 
autonomy of the regular military. 
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a nexus increasing the reach and depth of control that the regime may exert. Taken 
together, they form a "disciplinary-symbolic" complex that goes some way to explaining 
why sultanistic regimes are likely to remain durables3 • 
The remainder of the chapter considers how these mechanisms have played out in post-
Soviet Turkrnenistan. The first section looks at the repertoire of coercive techniques 
brought to bear in order to assert physical control over the Turkrnen population. In 
addition to orthodox surveillance networks and the prevention of independent civic and 
political activity, the regime deploys a range of other coercive practices, including: 
restrictions on movement, residential settlement, and information flows; disruption of 
education, health and welfare provision; monitoring of religious belief; and regulation of 
the status and activities of ethnic minorities. Although sometimes unevenly implemented, 
these measures amount to a spatial ordering of individuals that very effectively prevents 
autonomous social interaction and cohesion, occupational professionalism, and freedom 
of worship. 
However, the Niyazov regime does not simply regiment and extract from society. In the 
absence of strong, functioning institutions, governance is also structured around 
clientelistic relationships, many of which are coterminous with regional and clan 
affinities. Chehabi and Linz principally view access to unearned income as an 
opportunity for rulers to seek self-enrichment: as they put it, "the main aim is to extract 
resources" (1998a: 22). While self-enrichment is unquestionably a motive for sultanistic 
rulers, of perhaps more importance is the opportunity that rental income affords rulers to 
act as "superpatrons" at the apex of a network of clientelistic arrangements permeating 
through the national economy, and thereby to reproduce the ruler's authority. 
Accordingly, the second section considers how Niyazov's exceptional access to oil and 
gas rental income has shaped the structure of the Turkmen economy, and contributed to 
the durability of the regime. 
The third section focuses on the "soft" control techniques used by the Turkrnen regime to 
engender discipline and unity. The ensemble of artefacts, rites and texts that comprise 
this source of authority is clustered into a pervasive cult of personality surrounding 
Niyazov. Interrogating the cult produces findings that challenge several assumptions 
53 This term is used by Wedeen (1999) in a much narrower sense to explain how obedience to 
some of the more absurd traits of the regime of President Hafiz al-Asad in Syria effectively 
disciplines Syrians by forcing them to "act as if' the regime's claims are true (see chapter six for 
more detail on this). However, the term is also fit for a broader interpretation that encompasses the 
explicit "discipline" function of the state's coercive apparatus. 
148 
made in SRT about t he purpose and function of cultural manifestations of personalist 
rule. Rather then being purely vehicles for self-aggrandisement, leader cults emerge as a 
complex phenomenon, working simultaneously as disciplinary devices, instruments of 
social integration, paradigms for good behaviour, and as strategic resources for a range of 
political actors, all of which variants combine to make the regime more durable. 
Finally, a short concluding section ties up the findings from the case study and assesses 
their implications both for development of the theoretical framework, and the durability 
ofNiyazov's rule in Turkmenistan. 
Coercion 
The focus of SRT analysis, and theories of authoritarian rule more generally, is on the 
role played by the panoply of security agencies at the disposal of the political elite. 
Brownlee (2005) and Bellin (2005; 2004) both argue that the longevity of authoritarian 
regimes in the Middle East and North Africa hinges on the robustness of their coercive 
apparatuses, and the willingness and ability of ordinary recruits to crush internal dissent. 
However, very little is said about the form that this takes. The aforementioned Middle 
Eastern specialists, along with the other contributors to the SR volume (such as Hartlyn: 
1998; Booth: 1998; Nicholls: 1998), all focus on the suppression by the regimes in 
que~tion of incidences of orthodox political dissent or revolt. The examples of regime 
coercion cited by Brownlee (2004; 2005, 43-62), for example, all involve major 
rebellions, such as the Syrian Hama revolt in 1982, the abortive Libyan army coup of 
1993, and the rebellion by Shias and Kurds in Iraq in 1991. 
However, as noted in chapter two, FoucauIt identified that the exercise of power 
constitutes a wider 'technology' and 'architecture' of domination that, at its most generic, 
involves the ability of the ruler to arrange, regiment and distribute individuals in space. 
Although political responses to suItanism, in the form of active protest and resistance, are 
undoubtedly important, and these form the basis of chapter six, a strong case can be made 
for interpreting the definition of coercion and control more widely to encompass the 
impact of government policy in a number of sectors, such as travel, education, health, the 
penal system, media and the treatment of ethnic minorities. By looking at the way in 
which people are regulated, restricted, defined, denied or channelled by and into certain 
activities, we can make a more rounded and textured assessment of the sultanistic state's 
coercive capacity and its durability. 
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(i) Setting Boundaries: movement and surveillance 
The most unambiguous manifestation of the Turkmen government's control over the 
population is the introduction of a range of decrees regulating the physical movement and 
activities of its citizens, and of foreign visitors. Connected with this are new mechanisms 
of surveillance aimed at tightening internal security. The aim of these measures is, 
without doubt, to improve the "legibility" (Scott: 1998) of society - to make it easier to 
read, classify and control. 
All governments do this, including what we perceive to be the most liberal states in the 
international system. However, the crucial difference is that for the great majority of the 
population in democratic states, surveillance in the form of closed circuit television 
cameras or a greater police presence, is normally a benign presence, activated only when 
something - a crime, an accident, or a disturbance perhaps - requires official recording 
and intervention. In Turkmenistan, the balance is shifted to the extent that restriction of 
movement is an everyday, active process, part of the quotidian. To take a mundane 
example, a simple journey to another velayet requires travellers to justify to KNB or 
internal border guards why the trip is necessary or reasonable. 
Internal movement. At the most basic level, the government has placed restrictions on 
internal movement, and has periodically introduced exit visas in order to curtail foreign 
travel. Several districts, particularly those situated close to international borders, restrict 
access to both Turkmen and foreign nationals (Interviews 11 and 24). The entire northern 
velayet of Dashoguz, including the city itself, remains a restricted area, off-limits to 
foreign nationals without a special permit granted a t the discretion of t he M inistry of 
Foreign Affairs. There are document checks by the military and KNB officials at each 
district border, and vehicles entering Ashgabat city are subject to routine searches54• 
Perhaps most restrictive of all is the requirement to register with the local police for any 
night spent outside the velayet of residence. 
Exit Visas. Foreign travel is regulated even more strictly. Exit visas were enforced 
periodically during the first decade of independence, but were introduced in more 
comprehensive form between January 2003 and February 2004, following the coup 
attempt of November 2002. The granting of exit visas in this period was at the discretion 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and normally entailed the payment of significant fees 
54 Observation, 2002, 2004, 2005. 
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and bribes (Nemeteskaya Volna, 27 May 2003 in TWNB, 01106/03). The restrictions 
were only relaxed in 2004, after the US State Department threatened to reintroduce the 
Jackson-Vanik amendment, which would have imposed damaging sanctions on the 
domestic textile sector (THI Report, undated February 2004). 
Even after the formal restrictions on foreign travel were formally lifted in 2004, the 
government continued to impose severe informal sanctions to prevent people boarding 
flights. Unmarried women under 35 years old, men of military draft age, journalists, 
serving and former government officials and their families, and military personnel were 
all ineligible to leave the country. Moreover, more than 700 travellers were recorded as 
having been removed from flights shortly before take-off in the month after exit visas had 
been officially abolished (Ataeva: 2004). Interviewee 11, an ethnic Turkmen, described 
the great difficulty in obtaining permission to travel to see friends in the US. When, after 
numerous attempts, approval was granted in 2005, it was conditional upon her leaving 
her two small children in Turkmenistan. Ataeva (2004), quoting well-placed sources from 
inside the KNB, described a blacklist of those not permitted to travel containing 30,000 
names, divided in to seven categories. In addition to those who had applied for visas and 
fell into the categories named above, the blacklist contained those wh~, though not 
otherwise categorised, had applied for exit visas while they were in force. Thus, people 
who sought to travel abroad during the period in which exit visas were in place were 
automatically deemed to be suspect. Moreover, there was no official procedure to 
challenge or remove oneself from the blacklist, except either by bribing KNB officials 
sums between $800 and $1000 to delete the name, or by paying between $200 and $500 
to a customs official to stamp a blacklisted passport, with the date and identity of the 
official smudged or obscured (IWPR RCA No. 278,20 April 2004). 
Cross-border movement. A decline in cross-border m ovement on foot or by car was 
achieved implicitly after 2002 with the introduction of a $6 fee for each land border 
crossing to and from Uzbekistan. This has led to a significant increase in local tension, 
not least because the fees were prohibitive for poor cross-border shuttle traders, but also 
because it prevented both Turkrnen and Uzbeks visiting family members and cemeteries 
situated across what used to be an internal border (ICG Report No.33, 4 April 2002, 10). 
Foreign travellers entering Turkrnenistan are also subject to stringent KNB monitoring 
and surveillance. Embassy staff and their families are obliged to notify the government in 
advance should they wish to travel outside Ashgabat (NCA, 12 June 2004), and a 
database was introduced in June 2003 to track the movements of all foreign visitors (TV 
First Channel, 3 June 2003 in TWNB, 08/06/03). 
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Evolution of policy and rationale. Two queries arise from this policy. Firstly, how do 
these restrictions compare with those in force during the Soviet era; and, secondly, what 
justification is provided by Niyazov for the prevention of foreign and internal travel? No 
data was found that specifically covered internal travel restrictions in Soviet 
Turkmenistan, but it seems reasonable to assume that the regulations enforced in the 
Turkmen SSR were similar to those applicable in other parts of the Soviet Union. 
In this case, citizens of the Turkmen SSR received an internal passport at the age of 
sixteen, and movement inside the country was regulated through the popriska system, the 
Soviet record of residence. Officially, there were no restrictions on internal travel, but the 
Soviet authorities determined that the requirements of central economic planning dictated 
that free movement of the population was impractical. In reality, popriski had three 
functions: firstly, they were an instrument of surveillance; secondly, they prevented 
uncontrolled internal migration to urban areas, specifically Moscow, in times of scarcity; 
thirdly, popriski carried data, entitling the holder to higher education and health care, but 
also providing information on the holder's political record, such as whether they 
belonged to the CPSU, or had been convicted of any ideological misdemeanours. 
Movement around the Soviet Union and, later, the Communist CEE states was not 
necessarily discouraged for its own sake though. As Gorsuch (2003, 760-785) has found 
in her study of travel in late Stalinism, Soviet tourism was actively promoted, albeit 
oriented towards purposeful sightseeing in contrast to the "aimless" bourgeois tourism of 
the West (2003: 781). 
There are, however, crucial distinctions between the Soviet period and the situation in 
post-Soviet Turkmenistan under Niyazov. The first lies in motive - Niyazov's restrictions 
on travel are neither based on an economic imperative nor on channelling and controlling 
the forms of internal movement for any higher purpose, such as education, work or 
tourism. In the Soviet period there was often positive encouragement to travel, obviously 
on the terms of the system, and many older people from the FSU recall with great 
affection their trips to Eastern and, occasionally, Western Europe. In Turkmenistan, 
travel is discouraged outright. Presidential Decree No. 126, signed in April 2004, for 
example, invalidated all degrees gained outside Turkmenistan since 1 January 1993, 
unless specifically authorised under an interstate agreement (www.ricn.rll, 2 June 2004 in 
TWNB, 03/06/04; Tracz: 2004; RFElRL TS, 7 May 2004). 
152 
A further distinction lies in degree. Notwithstanding the restrictions of the popriska 
system, there was still latitude to travel around the Soviet Union. In post-Soviet 
Turkmenistan, Niyazov has brought into the service of the regime a whole range of new 
technologies, including relatively sophisticated IT systems installed by Israeli companies, 
which enhance the regime's ability to regulate internal movement. According to 
Interviewee 24, who travelled regularly across the Soviet Union . and within 
Turkmenistan, the number of internal border controls and the frequency of documentation 
checks multiplied greatly from the late Soviet era. Thus, the reach and intensity of 
regulations has altered and the purpose of the restrictions has shifted to focus purely on 
the security 0 fthe N iyazov regime, as distinct from the broader social, economic and 
security requirements of the state itself. 
The rationale behind the travel restrictions is rarely enunciated, and official reasons for 
the refusal of visas are not given. When visa restrictions were formally (but not 
informally) lifted in early 2004, Niyazov announced on television that "you can move 
within this country as freely as you can beyond its borders" (Ataeva: 2004). This 
statement was, of course, double-edged. However, in the same address, he stated that 
"dishonourable people" would be excluded from the easing of travel restrictions, a loose 
and puzzling definition, implying that the government reserved the right to regulate the 
movement of individuals on an arbitrary basis. Niyazov's second justification was more 
disingenuous, stating that there was no need to travel abroad because "foreign lands 
cannot compare with our country" (NTV, 13 June 2005 in TWNB, 16/06/05), a reference 
to the country's natural beauty rather than, as would be perhaps the case in the Soviet 
period, the superiority of the political and economic system. 
Several themes emerge from the regime's control over the movement of Turkmen 
citizens. Niyazov has clearly built on a pre-existing infrastructure inherited from the 
Soviet period. However, whereas the Soviet system h ad ani deological, economic and 
security rationale (no matter how misplaced and repressive), it did at least have an 
internal logic. However, the Niyazov regime's overlay of this inherited infrastructure has 
been, by turns, quixotic, arbitrary, often capricious, and yet simultaneously open to abuse. 
Corruption among customs and KNB officials also provides a strong institutional 
incentive for the system to remain in place. Allied to this, there is no legal redress for the 
aggrieved. As a consequence, the system remains oddly effective, sustained by its 
unpredictability, unaccountability and the incentives it offers for embezzlement. 
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In more abstract terms, the forcible restriction of movement means that the regime 
determines spatial boundaries. It is able to compartmentalise the population within 
physical parameters set by the state. Theorising space more generally, the prevention of 
travel reduces the exposure of Turkmen to other cultures, peoples and ideas - in other 
words, the finding and development of mental/ social space (Lefebvre: 1991). Connected 
to the strict controls on the importation of media, the curtailment of academic endeavour 
and extensive internal censorship, discussed below, the bounding of physical space 
available also quite effectively prevents the emergence of possible space. 
(ii) Controlling space: housing, prisons, psychiatric detention and 
harassment of minorities 
If restrictions on internal movement and travel abroad set the boundaries of physical 
space available to Turkmen, and contribute to closing off potentialities of mental/social 
space, Niyazov's policies on housing, the penal system, and the treatment of ethnic and 
religious minorities illustrate the coercive capacity of the state to direct, arrange and 
control people, physically and mentally, within the set space allowed by the regime. 
At first glance, there are appears to be little to connect these issues. However, what 
unifies them is the regime's use of forcible relocation or detention as a coercive political 
tactic. Adapting the infrastructure of the pre-perestroika Soviet state, the Niyazov regime 
has learned that resettlement to remote penal colonies, political hospitalisation, informal 
harassment, house arrest, and continual physical interference and pressure from the KNB, 
all atomise potential or suspected regime opponents, prevent autonomous socialisation, 
and dismantle networks of solidarity based around ethnicity or belief. 
Housing and relocation of minorities. The rapid destruction of residential housing 
without formal redress is examined more substantively in chapter six, because it is one of 
the few issues that has engendered a substantive political response to the regime between 
1992 and 2006. However, it is worth noting that a common pattern has emerged since 
2003, in which established residential areas in Ashgabat, Turkmenbashi and other towns, 
are subjected to arbitrary demolition with minimal if any compensation for householders. 
The numbers of those affected can be considerable. The homes of 500 Kazakhs resident 
in Turkmenbashi were reportedly destroyed in 2003 (IS 1). The whereabouts of the 
community is unknown but it is assumed it was relocated to the remote Kazakh village of 
Bekdash near the Turkmen-Kazakh border. 180 houses, affecting 300 families, were 
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demolished in Tyaze Oba near Ashgabat in February 2004, in order to make way for a 
new park in honour of Niyazov's mother. Residents were reportedly given 24 hours to 
leave by KNB agents (THI bulletin, 16 February 2004). The land between u.Bitaraplyk 
and u.Garashsyzlyk in central Ashgabat was cleared in summer 2004 to make way for a 
children's theme park. Visiting the site to record the damage in November 2004 (Plate 
Four), residents confirmed to me that they were provided with inadequate alternative 
accommodation or, if they lacked the requisite papers, no compensation at all (Interview 
15). Some residents were still residing in the ruins of their homes in OctoberlNovember 
2004. 
Most of the Kurdish village of Baghir, close to the ruins of the Parthian city of Ni ss a, was 
demolished in July 2004 (RFEIRL TS, 21 July 2004). The town of Keshi, also near 
Ashgabat, was subject to arbitrary demolition with ten days notice, affecting between 500 
and 900 people (Plate Three; IWPR ReA No. 301, 21 July 2004), generating the protests 
discussed in chapter six. The settlement of Darvasa in the Karakum desert, which was 
visited as part of the research project in August 2003 (Plate Sixteen), was demolished in 
its entirety in August 2004, reportedly after Niyazov flew over the village and was 
displeased by its sprawling, untidy appearance. 200 soldiers gave the residents an hour to 
leave, and most were relocated to Yerbent and Bokurdak, two other desert settlements 
over 100 km away. It is not known how this affected the grazing rights and water usage 
of the residents, or of those in the villages to which they were displaced. 
What emerges from these episodes is that the areas targeted appear to be 
disproportionately occupied by ethnic minorities. This links to other reports of forced 
resettlement of ethnic Uzbeks away from border areas on the right bank of the Amu 
Darya to unpopulated desert and salt marshes inland. In December 2003, Russian and US 
sources reported the forced relocation ofUzbeks into the interior of Dashoguz and Lebap 
velayets to ease high unemployment and housing shortages (USDSIIP, 10 December 
2003 in TWNB, 18112/03; www.centrasia.ru. 15 December 2003 in TWNB, 18/12/03). 
There has been no published follow-up on the state of these communities, but given the 
harsh terrain and lack of resources and basic facilities, it is difficult to envisage that the 
settlements are sustainable. Some Uzbek communities subsequently opted to save their 
homes by self-redesignation as ethnic Turkmen rather than suffer the same fate (TllIR, 
29 June 2004). 
Minority rcligious congrcgations. The spatial reordering and displacement of minority 
ethnic communities is mirrored on a more intimate level in the treatment meted out by 
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government officials to religious communities, particularly those of minority faiths. As 
noted in the previous chapter, close scrutiny of officially approved Islam, increasingly 
incorporating elements of R uhnama, was a feature of Niyazov's religious policy after 
1992. Nevertheless, in common with other FSU states, the increased interest in religious 
observance following the collapse 0 f the Soviet Union splintered into 0 ther faiths and 
denominations. 
Niyazov has followed a dual-track approach in dealing with these groups. Firstly, the 
Law on Religion passed in 1997 necessitated the re-registration of all religious 
establishments. This allowed the government to eliminate any mosques which were 
showing signs of Wahhabite influence (RFEIRL TS 20 May 2000). Only mosques 
preaching official (i.e. government approved) Islam a nd the Russian Orthodox Church 
were registered and allowed to function. However, in both cases, pressure has been 
increasingly placed on clerics to incorporate elements of Ruhnama into religious services. 
For example, an order was issued in February 2005 that all mosques and churches must 
display copies of the book prominently, and incorporate readings from Ruhnama into 
sermons (IS 2). The exaggerated profile of Ruhnama in religious worship is illustrated by 
the inlay of passages from the book around the minarets and in the interior of the huge 
mosque at Kipchak (Plates Fourteen and Fifteen). The main entrance to the Kipchak 
mosque has an inscription in Turkmen across a gateway that states ambiguously: 
"Ruhnama is a holy book: the Koran is Allah's book"ss. 
Those clerics and congregations not using Ruhnama have been subject to harassment and 
intimidation. Seven mosques were demolished in 2004, reportedly because of their failure 
to use Ruhnama with sufficient frequency (Forum 18 - 2004 Yearly Summary: 4 January 
2005). Similarly, the trigger for the removal and imprisonment of long-serving Chief 
Mufti Nasrullah ibn lbadullayev was his refusal to describe Niyazov as "a messenger of 
God", although officially he was caught up in the backwash of the failed November 2002 
coup attempt (IWPR RCA No. 401: 4 August 2005). Niyazov also decreed in March 
2004 that no more mosques would be built and that all imams and prayer leaders must be 
appointed and screened by the state (Altyn Asyr: 30 March 2004 in TWNB, 01104/04). 
ss The site was visited twice, while under construction in August 2003 and when completed in 
October 2004. The interior is lavishly appointed and is capable of holding 10,000 worshippers, all . 
of whom could dine at a huge outdoor complex adjacent to the mosque. However, there were only 
a handful of worshippers and visitors to the mosque during my attendance. 
156 
A revised Law on Religion, which came into force in February 2004, ostensibly 
liberalised the position of minority denominations by enabling them to register on 
payment of a $100 fee. Possibly hoping to capitalise on this shift, EU and OSCE 
representatives bestowed praise on Niyazov. The small Seventh Day Adventist, 
Jehovah's Witness, Baptist, Bahai and Hare Krishna congregations all duly sought and 
eventually obtained registration, although other congregations, such as Lutherans, the 
. Armenian Orthodox church and the Catholic church were all refused registration and, in 
fact, the long-established Armenian church in Turkmenbashi was subsequently 
demolished without explanation or compensation (IS 3). In practice almost nothing 
changed. Harassment of all these groups continued unabated throughout 2004 (IS 4) and 
individual worshippers have either been imprisoned or incarcerated in psychiatric 
institutions, should their religious beliefs be compounded with some other 
misdemeanour56• 
Although the treatment of religious dissenters has entailed some physical relocation, 
Niyazov's religious policy is essentially predicated on the almost complete closure of any 
space for unapproved religious worship. Any freedoms granted appear to have been 
tactical manoeuvres to increase Niyazov's personal prestige or to appease international 
campaigners. Notwithstanding the restrictive, but still rational, official legal frameworks 
surrounding religious worship, Niyazov has thus effectively sought to prevent any form 
of uncontrolled religious worship from legally taking place. The persecution of religious· 
minorities is not uncommon in other FSU states. However, the activities of approved 
churches, providing that they do not stray into political territory, have normally been left 
undisturbed. The unusual aspect of Niyazov's approach therefore is that it seeks to 
actively shape the content of purely religious worship in previously sanctioned settings, 
for example, by introducing Ruhnama into ordinary religious services and weekly 
prayers. Thus, the regime may have successfully neutered freedoms and powderised 
religious dissent domestically but, in doing so, has paradoxically turned both clergy and 
congregations into doctrinal dissenters within their own wider religious communities. 
Penal policy. The atomisation that characterises government policy in other sectors is 
also evident in the legal and penal system. Little is known about the structure and 
functioning of Turkmen criminal procedure. Neither crime itself nor criminal trials are 
rep?rted in the media as a matter of government policy. Ordinary criminal trials are 
56 An Amnesty International report on Turkmenistan identified other minority believers, mainly 
Jehovah's Witnesses who had been imprisoned for their beliefs (2003). 
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closed affairs. However, following the pattern of other post-Soviet states, the conviction 
rate of those defendants arraigned before the court is almost certainly around 100%. 
Similarly, there is limited data on conditions in Turkmen prisons, but the sketchy reports 
that have emerged suggest that they are extremely poor. A German newspaper reported in 
May 2004 that the bodies of prisoners beaten to death by a special punishment battalion 
were left to rot in the prison yard at Turkmenbashi's maximum security prison to serve as 
a deterrent to other prisoners (Deutsche Welle, 24 May 2004 in TWNB, 27/05/04). 
Women prisoners at the D31K8 prison colony in Dashoguz were reportedly forced to 
sleep in the open air or in the mortuary. Their work tasks included sorting wool, in 
. conditions which subsequently caused severe lung complaints (Tll-IR Press Releases 123 
and 151, 24 July 2005 and 24 October 2005). Interviewee 1 undertook medical 
inspections at both army barracks and prisons during and after the Soviet era. He 
described conditions at the prisons in Tejen, Sady and Turkmenbashi, where political 
opponents of the regime are housed, as being "truly terrible" (iskrenniye uzhasniye) and 
"much worse" (khuzhiye) than in the Soviet period. 
Two significant features of the penal system under the Niyazov regime illustrate the 
arbitrariness of the judicial procedure. The annual amnesty of around 60% of the total 
recorded prison population, defined very broadly as petty criminals, at the end of each 
Ramadan, is designed as an act of mercy to showcase Niyazov's religious credentials and 
his magnanimity as a traditional, patrimonial ruler. Although the crime rate in Ashgabat 
reportedly climbs exponentially in the weeks after the amnesty, and those slated for 
release are included only after the payment of hefty bribes to prison officers, Niyazov 
frequently uses the amnesty in setpiece speeches as an example ofthe state's lenience and 
concern' for prisoner welfare. 
Parallel to this, is the activation 0 f Soviet m ethods of psychiatric detention to contain 
political and religious dissenters. Data is again sparse, but the leading studies of the 
Soviet period suggest that political hospitalisation was very rarely used as a means of 
stifling opposition in Central Asia. Nearly all of the recorded detainees in Smith's survey 
of Soviet psychiatric practice were of European (i.e. Slav, German or Baltic) extraction 
(1996, 82). W OJ'king through Smith's statistics further, although Turkmen and U zbeks 
together amounted to 5.8% of the Soviet population in 1970, they constituted only 0.4% 
of psychiatric detainees (1996, 82-88), and only one of' 674 recorded hospitalised 
dissidents in the 1970 survey was an ethnic Turkmen. Bloch and Reddaway's register of 
victims of Soviet psychiatric abuse (1977, 347-398), the definitive published source in 
158 
English, supports this analysis. The vast majority of listed detainees were nationalists or 
Jewish, Orthodox and Buddhist activists from the European SSRs, and no ethnic 
Turkmen are listed in their record. 
The explanation for this bias against using psychiatric detention in Central Asia is not 
given. However, possible reasons might be that dissent in Central Asia took the form of 
continued observance of Islam, rather than expressions of nationalism. Practising Islam 
is, perhaps, easier in private. Other possible explanatory factors might be the greater 
proportion of the population living" in rural areas, different community norms of deal.ing 
with dissent, or the lack of surveillance and detention facilities which prevented 
"dynamic observation", the process of surveillance and harassment by which a case was 
covertly built up by the KGB. 
The instrumental use of psychiatric hospitalisation against political dissidents and 
worshippers from minority faiths in post-Soviet Turkmenistan therefore appears to be 
somewhat puzzling. One possible explanation is that state psychiatric abuse was ongoing 
in the CARs during the Soviet period, but was simply not picked up in the major Helsinki 
Commission (1989) and Medecins sans Frontiers (1990) reports which produced such 
devastating indictments of Soviet psychiatric practice. However, this is unlikely because 
Muslims in other Soviet republics, including those in the Russian SFSR, were also not 
subject to psychiatric detention. Therefore, it would appear that Niyazov has acquired a 
Soviet practice after it had become redundant in most other FSU states. 
The main distinction between use of political hospitalisation in the Soviet period and 
under the Niyazov regime is that, in the former case, the process of detention was 
systematic, notwithstanding the great variability in the standards and definition of 
diagnosis. In the Turkmen case, there is minimal data available, but what there is 
suggests that psychiatric incarceration is, firstly, entirely punitive and, secondly, 
unsystematic. In the recorded Turkmen cases, there appears to be no attempt at political 
re-education or, at a clinical level, punitive/rehabilitative use of pharmaceuticals. 
Turkmenistan's Law on Psychiatric Care (1993) could have been lifted in entirety from 
the statute books of most liberal democracies. It guarantees the right of patients to receive 
legal representation, to contest involuntary hospitalisation, and to receive regular 
examinations to determine the continuation of inpatient treatment. In practice, however, 
the rare cases that have been fully documented suggest that those incarcerated for 
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political/religious reasons are simply deposited in the institutions with t he mentally ill 
and the criminally insane, without either serious diagnosis or re-education. 
Hare Krishna Consciousness Society member Cheper Annaniyazova was committed to 
detention in July 2005 without apparent cause or subsequent diagnosis (IS 5). The 
Jehovah's Witness, A.B. Soyegov, refused to undertake military service on the grounds 
of conscience. He was interrogated for ten days before being removed to a psychiatric 
hospital. He was diagnosed by Dr Altyn Amanova, the hospital's psychiatrist, as being in 
good health but was simply moved to a high security ward with other mentally ill patients 
(Forum 18, 19 December 2005).The most comprehensively documented case is that of 
Gurbandurdy Dyrdykuliyev, an elderly opposition activist held in psychiatric 
confinement for over two years until his release in April 2006. Dyrdykuliyev reported 
that his appeals against incarceration were not acknowledged, and that he was visited by 
a health commissioner on only one occasion, whereupon he was pronounced as neither 
physically nor mentally ill (RFEIRL TS 12 April 2006). 
The prevalence of political confinement in Turkmen psychiatric hospitals is not knownS7, 
but its existence appears to represent a departure in practice in the Turkmen SSR from the 
Soviet period. Contrasted with this approach is the indiscriminate release of anti-social 
and sometimes dangerous criminals every year without regard for public safety, or 
recognition of rehabilitation. The profile that emerges from analysis of the penal system 
under Niyazov mirrors policy in both the housing sector and towards minority groups. 
Government policy is uneven and often unstructured. Co-existing with severe and 
arbitrary infringements on the freedoms and rights of indiyiduals and specific groups are 
underlying inefficiencies, neglect and endemic corruption that combine to create an 
inchoate mixture of policy. 
Formally, the legal framework in all three sectors (housing, penal and minorities policy) 
could be described as soft authoritarian. Articles 22, 105 and 108 of the Turkmenistan 
State Constitution respectively guarantee that "the home is inviolable", that criminal 
proceedings are open, and that there is the right of access to professional legal advice at 
all stages of the judicial process. In new states, constitutions are aspirational documents. 
and should not necessarily be taken at face value. What is peculiar to Turkmenistan, 
however, and definitively distinguishes the Niyazov regime from the governments of 
comparable FSU states (for example, Uzbekistan) is that the government does not feel the 
57 THI has repeatedly argued that official statistics stating the prison population at around 15,000 
are inaccurate. 
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need to justify either domestically or internationally the disparity between its legal 
obligations and its policies. Instead, there is closure and denial. As a consequence, the 
absence of any platform for dialogue is one of the regime's most effective instruments of 
coercion. 
(iii) Manipulating social space: media and education policy 
Restrictions on movement and forced relocation/detention enable the Niyazov regime to 
coercively patrol the boundaries of permissible physical, social and political space in 
Turkmenistan. Taking Lefebvre's (1991) conceptualisation one stage further, we can 
enquire how the regime floods, dominates and manipulates the remaining sanctioned 
social space available in order to reinforce its control. 
A significant part of this strategy is directed through the cult of personality surrounding 
Niyazov, discussed in greater detail in the third section of this chapter. However, there is 
also an important coercive corollary, designed to eliminate as far as possible sources or 
manifestations of autonomous social activity that might offset, or detract from, both the 
cult of personality and the broader project of identity creation developed by the Niyazov 
regime following the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Media Control. The manipulation of cultural, political and social space can be seen most 
clearly in the regime's strict control of media outlets. The state broadcasting company 
TMT has a monopoly on television and radio broadcasting. The four state television 
channels produce a monotonous diet of traditional music and encomia to Niyazov. The 
importation of, and subscription to, foreign print media has been incrementally banned, 
ostensibly on moral grounds, Niyazov stating in 2004 that they publish "images unworthy 
ofTurkmen citizens," presumably nudity (TeA: 28 October 2002; THI: 23 August 2004). 
However, a more persuasive explanation might be that they carry schedule listings for 
Russian satellite television, upon which Turkmen depend for their knowledge of external 
affairs (RIA Novosti: 15 April 2005 in TWNB, 21104/05). The strategies used to receive 
foreign media by Turkmen are discussed in more detail in the following chapter, which 
analyses responses to the regime, but the issue of Russian satellite television and the 
possession of satellite dishes more generally is clearly an important and vexed question 
for Niyazov. 
The regime's approach has generally been to maintain a close eye on foreign broadcast 
output and to intervene periodically and incrementally where it feels necessary. 
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Therefore, radio broadcasts in Russian were ended in 1998 and Radio Mayak, an 
independent radio station broadcasting from Russia, had its license revoked and its 
transmitter dismantled in June 2003, officially for technical reasons but, in reality, almost 
certainly for its occasionally critical output (ITAR-Tass: 12 July 2004 in TWNB, 
15/07/04). As of 2006, the Russian television channel ORT can be received 5-6 hours a 
day, while anodyne history and culture programmes have been purchased for one of the 
state channels from the Turkish Eurasia channel (Interviews 14 and 24). The issue of a 
possible crackdown on Russian television has been periodically raised by Niyazov in 
Cabinet meetings. Comments made criticising the output from cable channels did lead to 
the temporary sequestration of satellite dishes in some apartment blocks by KNB agents, 
but the campaign never gained momentum (RFE/RL TS: 22 July 2002; RFEIRL TS: 25 
July 2002), partly because increased state control over the Russian media under President 
Vladimir Putin, with whom Niyazov maintains an important gas trading relationship, has 
ensured that critical news items about Turkmenistan are rarely aired in Russia. However, 
Niyazov may also be wary of the potential repercussions of such a move for regime 
security. Several interviewees (1, 8, 10, 14 and 22) were sure that cutting access to ORT 
by forcibly seizing satellite dishes would constitute a major risk that might le,ad to 
sustained protest. 
In contrast, restricting the flow of print media has been achieved more easily. According 
to TCA's media review (28 October 2002), there were 20 state owned printed media 
sources in the country in 2002, with a combined circulation of 112,000 which, at 22 
copies per 1000 citizens, representing one of the world's lowest circulation figures. 
Crucially, however, these publications may only print news from two sources - Turkmen 
Khabarlay (the state information agency) and the Presidential Press Service - and there 
are no accredited foreign correspondents officially allowed to file copy in the country. 
However, even approved print media and publishing outlets have progressively 
diminished. Niyazov reduced funding to state newspapers by 50% from 1 January 2005 
(Altyn Asyr: 18 August 2004 in TWNB, 26/08/04) and, in March 2005, all public libraries 
across the country, with the exception of Ashgabat Central Library, were summarily 
closed (TllIR: 3 March 2005 in TWNB, 03/03/05). 
The accumulated impact of these measures has ensured that Turkmenistan remains one of 
the world's lowest ranking states in terms of media freedom (see Chapter One), 
compounded by very low levels of internet usage (see Table 1). The closure of media 
space means that Turkmen have diminishing sources of knowledge about the world 
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outside their country, and very little reliable information about events occurring 
domestically. 
Table 1: Household PC Penetration and Internet Usage in Turkmenistan: 2000-2003 
(Source: Euromonitor International Global Market Information Database) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 
Internet users ('000) 6.0 8.0 64.2 98.0 
PC penetration (per 100 households) 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.5 
PC households online (% of PC 
households) 27.0 33.1 41.8 49.7 
Euromonitor sources: National statistical offices, International Telecommunications 
Union, W orId Bank, Trade source, Jupiter Research, 
The effects of this policy were discussed at length with Interviewee 10, a South Asian 
expatriate political journalist resident in Ashgabat. He suggested that the effective media 
blackout in Turkmenistan could have contradictory consequences. In the absence of 
reliable information, information spreads verbally and, as a result, is frequently mixed up 
with rumour and exaggeration. Because the state media is not trusted, official rebuttals 
are actually taken as confirmation that something has occurred, intensifying the earlier 
speculation. The potentially destabilising consequences of strict censorship were in 
evidence among the traders of Tehran who precipitated the overthrow of Shah Reza 
Pahlavi in 1979 and, more recently, during the Andijan rebellion of May 2005 in eastern 
Uzbekistan, when rumours of casualties multiplied to tl1e point that as of May 2006, it is 
still unknown how many deaths occurred. 
The alternative 0 utcome, and the 0 ne t hat a ccords m ore closely with the dynamics 0 f 
Turkmen society (which are substantially different from those prevailing in the Fergana 
Valley region ofUzbekistan), is that Niyazov's policy of closing autonomous social and 
cultural space, and flooding the media with sanctioned messages, has actually been 
extremely effective. Censorship means that potential dissidents a re unable to make an 
informed risk-calculation about whether to come out onto the streets. Without any 
established, broad-based opposition party or an explosive trigger factor, there is little 
incentive to take the requisite risk. In contrast, the relatively free media that prevails 
across the Caspian Sea in Azerbaijan has allowed opposition groups to mobilise and 
focus on their objectives much more effectively than is the case in Turkmenistan. 
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Education. The reorganisation of the education sector has also formed a crucial 
component of the Niyazov regime's "technology of domination" and has closely reflected 
both the regime's broader priorities and Niyazov's personal predilections. Changes to the 
content 0 f t he curriculum to incorporate rote learning 0 f R uhnama, and the wholesale 
physical and legislative reordering (or disordering) of the system have represented some 
of the most dysfunctional characteristics of the Niyazov regime. 
The basis of post-Soviet education reform in Turkmenistan lay in the formulation and 
adoption in 1993 of a new educational philosophy and programme instituted under the 
umbrella term Bilim. The legislative basis of Bilim was provided by two of Niyazov's 
most important presidential decrees signed on 1 October 199358 and the overarching aim 
of t he programme is twofold: to" play a key role in the national economic and social 
development of the state" and "to promote native Turkmen traditions and national 
spiritual values,,59. The first objective is uncontroversial. However, the second raised a 
number of practical questions about the status of minority languages, and that of ethnic' 
Russian and Uzbek students more generally. 
The implementation of the Bilim programme has had deleterious consequences for the 
education sector. Funds have drained out of higher education, reducing the number of 
higher education students in university in 2004 (approximately 3000) less than 10% of 
their number of a decade earlier60• 12,000 school teachers have been dismissed, the length 
of schooling has been cut from ten to nine years, and the length of degree study reduced 
from four to two years, with a compulsory two year gap between school and college 
enforced in 2003 (TH! Report: May 2004, 2). Instruction in the Kazakh, Uzbek and 
Russian languages had all but ceased by 2006. Equally damaging has been the decimation 
of the vocational school and college system. The Oil and Gas Institute was closed in 
1994, a number of technical and music colleges followed and the medical schools in 
Mary, Turkmenabat and Balkanabat all ceased to admit students after 2003 (TIHR Press 
Release 180: 19 December 2005). Those that remained devote 17 hours out of a 34 hour 
week to studying Ruhnama or about Niyazov's life, philosophy and achievements (nIl 
Report: May 2004, 5-7). The shortage of school books and equipment, lack of repairs or 
lighting in schools, and the late payment of teachers' salaries are commonplace across the 
58 These are the Decree on Education and the Decree on Ratification of the State Programme on 
Implementation of New Education in Policies of President Saparmurat Niyazov in Turkmenistan, 
1993-1997. 
S9 S ourced to a report for E urasianet (www.eurasianet.org) entitled Turkmenistan Wrestles with 
Child Labour Issue as Cotton Harvest Approaches, 1 September 2004. 
60 See notes 58 and 59 above. 
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poorer FSU states, but the practice of using child labour to pick cotion between 
September and November each year remains a particular problem in Turkmenistan 
(TllIR Press Release 154: 25 October 2005). The running down of state educational 
provision has led parents to look to the small number of private Turkish schools operating 
in Turkmenistan. However, these have also come under close government scrutiny 
because of fears that they have become vehicles for the propagation of Islamist ideology 
(IWPR RCA No. 395: 11 July 2005). 
The running down of state education provision conforms to a wider pattern of 
dysfunctional practice in the public sector in the period 1992 to 2006. Similar problems 
beset other CARs, notably Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, but whereas, firstly, the decline of 
standards was caused by economic factors and, secondly, the quality of education 
"bottomed out" in the late 1990s in these countries but then began to recover, government 
policy in Turkmenistan has severely compounded unavoidable structural deficits. 
Disruption to the education sector has been mirrored in other public services. In 2005, for 
example, all hospitals outside Ashgabat were closed, to be replaced by inadequate 
regiol1al diagnostic clinics, and 15,000 medical orderlies and nurses were summarily 
dismissed, to be replaced by untrained military conscripts (RCA NO. 356: 11 March 
2005). The report prepared by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Health 
(Rechel and McKee: 2005), while admittedly not based on first-hand access, was a 
devastating indictment of the unchecked spread of infectious diseases, ranging from HN 
to bubonic plague, confirmed by Interviewees 1 and 22, both of whom are experienced 
medical specialists. 
Media censorship and public sector policy, particularly with regard to education, intersect 
in several ways. The most obvious is in the secrecy that prevents the practical recording 
of declining educational standards or, say, the public reporting of infectious diseases. 
However, the underlying commonality lies in the conscious decision to deny the 
popUlation information that might be of personal value, but which might also lead either 
to the expression of dissatisfaction with government policy, or the forging of horizontal 
communicative networks. Although not, therefore, entailing overt violence by the state, 
these practices constitute a core component of the regime's coercive apparatus. 
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Patronage 
(i) Theoretical and Historical Context 
In chapter two we evaluated the macrostructural and political-institutional factors 
identified by Chehabi and Linz as instrumental in the emergence of sultanism. These 
insights, while valuable in establishing a template, required further focus an~ refinement. 
In particular, the observation that the presence of easily exploitable natural resources 
appeared to be associated with sultanism was developed, in conjunction with the 
economic literature on rentierism, to establish the proposition that access to uninterrupted 
unearned income flows was an essential instrument in allowing sultanistic rule to emerge. 
According to Chehabi and Linz, a critical political factor in the emergence of sultanism 
was the breakdown of clientelist democracy. This may, .indeed, have been the case. 
However, this condition was too narrow in that it failed to encompass numerous cases of 
sultanism in weak post-colonial states with no democratic heritage to draw upon. 
Accordingly, drawing on recently published work on post-colonial African politics, we 
made the case that the presence of clientelist networks more generally, dovetailed with, 
and furnished by, revenue streams from rents, provided the economic platform for 
sultanistic behaviour. 
Collating the disparate materials on the Turkmen economy from first-hand accounts of 
travellers, Soviet statistical committee reports and the small amount of published work 
available, we were able to construct a picture of the absorption of the traditional Turkmen 
tribal economy, based principally on nomadic stock-breeding, into the Soviet system. The 
most important feature of this transformation was the large-scale shift towards a 
damaging cotton monoculture and, in the later Soviet era, the extraction of large 
quantities of natural gas. 
However, we also noted in chapter three that certain social patterns and practices from 
the p re-Soviet era remained resilient. The most important 0 f these was the continuing 
salience of tribal identity. Throughout the Soviet period, the "line of least resistance" was 
followed by Soviet officials (many of whom had only a tenuous hold on the loyalty of 
rural communities) through the creation of work brigade and kolkhoz units which were 
coterminous with pre-existing family and tribal hierarchies. Thus, despite the wrenching 
modernisation experienced under. Soviet rule, patronage networks based on real and 
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fictive tribal allegiance continued to flourish both economically and administratively 
right up to the senior echelons of the CPTu bureaucracy. 
Given that rentier economies normally function through the allocation ~fresources by the 
state, most obviously through the distribution of public sector posts, it is hardly surprising 
that the pre-existing structural disposition of the T urkmen economy would favour the 
entrenchment of cIientelist networks in the post-Soviet period, with Niyazov functioning 
as a form of "superpatron" in dispensing favours in exchange for political docility. The 
shifting balance of population growth away towards urbanisation might, in the longer-
term, affect patronage patterns (see Tables 2, 3 and 4), although the likelihood is that pre-
existing networks are transplanted or projected from rural areas into the city. 
Table 2: Population by UrbanlRural Location: 1990-2015 (Source: Euromonitor 
International Global Market Information Database) 
Population 
Urban 
Rural 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
1,632 1,8502,0622,2922,6122,987 
1,9862,3072,541 2,6842,7592,791 
TOTAL ('OOOs) 3,6184,1574,6034,9765,371 5,778 
Euromonitor sources: National statistical offices, UN 
Table 3: Population by Urban/Rural Location (% Analysis): 1990-2015 (Source: 
Euromonitor International Global Market Information Database) 
% of total 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 population 
Urban 45.1 44.5 44.8 46.1 48.6 51.7 
Rural 54.9 55.5 55.2 53.9 51.4 48.3 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Euromonitor sources: National statistical offices, UN 
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Table 4: Population by UrbanIRural Location (Growth): 1990-2015/2000-2015 
(Source: Euromonitor International Global Market Information Database) 
% change 
Urban 
Rural 
TOTAL 
1990-2015 
83.05 
40.51 
59.70 
2000-2015 
44.85 
9.85 
25.53 
Euromonitor sources: National statistical offices, UN 
Augmenting this legacy, Niyazov, in common with other post-communist leaders, 
enjoyed two distinct advantages over Cold War sultanistic rulers. The first was 
incumbency. By the time the Soviet Union collapsed, Niyazov had already been in 
control of the Turkmen SSR for over six years. He knew the system inside-out, and 
indeed had been able to shape its political development in his own favour during the late 
Soviet era by sidelining any political rivals. Other sultanistic leaders, who came to power 
through coup, revolution or election, operated from a "standing start" and had to cut deals 
and make compromises with other significant actors or corporate elite interests. 
The second advantage lay in the particular economic legacy bequeathed by the Soviet 
system. While other sultanistic rulers, located in the Middle East, North Africa and 
Central America, were required to construct, appropriate or, through tactical alliance and 
marriage, buy into patronage networks, Niyazov essentially inherited control of the entire 
national economy when Turkmenistan attained independence in 1992. In this respect, 
post-communist sultanistic leaders such as Niyazov, Aliyev, Karimov and Lukashenka, 
have been uniquely favoured. Rather than struggling with large (usually foreign) 
corporations over the terms of production rights, mineral royalties and taxation regimes, 
the new sultanistic regimes have been a ble to a ppropriate I arge revenues m ore 0 r less 
completely unchecked. This distinction represents one of the key differences separating 
Cold War and post-Cold War sultanistic regimes. 
However, in Turkmenistan, N iyazov has gone even further than 0 ther post-communist 
leaders by personally taking over the functions ofGosplan (the Soviet economic planning 
ministry). Thus, it is Niyazov who sets production targets for state commodities, 
negotiates export volumes with foreign customers directly, signs individual commercial 
contracts with foreign investors and, as noted in the previous chapter, personally sets the 
date for crops to be sown and harvested. As a consequence, Niyazov departs from the 
archetypal sultanistic ruler in that he is not content simply to allocate the resources of a 
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rentier state. Instead, he is actively involved in key investment and production decisions 
as well. Given that these decisions are often not reached according to any rational criteria, 
the legacy of Niyazov's economic mismanagement is likely to be deleterious to say the 
least. 
(ii) The Structure of the Post-Soviet Turkmen economy 
The first point to make in any survey of the Turkmen economy is that reliable data is 
extremely hard to come by. According to the government's official web site, GDP growth 
has averaged 0 ver 2 0% p er annum since 2001, reaching 23.1 % in 2003 before falling 
back to 20.7% in 2005 (IS 6) (Table 5). 
Table 5: Key Macro-Economic Data - Turkmenistan Official Sources (Source: 
Global Insight) 
Economic Projections 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
GDPGrowth % 23.1 21.4 20.7 20.2 17.4 14.5 
GDPUS$bn 15.2 18.8 23.2 31 38.7 45.3 
GDP P/Capita US$ 3,041 3,695 4,480 5,902 7,277 8,404 
Inflation (CPI) % 11.7 12.0 11.8 11.5 11.1 10.6 
Global Insight Sources: Historical data from selected national and international data 
I sources. All forecasts provided by Global Insight. 
!NOTE: Global Insight forecasts are based on official Turkmen statistical sources, which 
I may not be reliable. . 
---.-M--· _____ . ____ .. __ . ____ .M __ . __ . ________ ._M_. ___ . ________ .M_. __ ._M ... " 
None of the major international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank, IMF, 
EBRD, ADB or established analytical sources, concur with the government's own figures 
but, given the paucity of information released about the economy, can themselves only 
make broad assessments as to economic growth (See Table 6). The EBRD estimated that 
a more realistic figure would be around 11 % per annum for 2004 (Strategy Report: 23 
June 2004, 1), almost wholly attributable to the global spike in oil and gas prices since 
2002. 
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Table 6: Key Macro-Economic Data - Turkmenistan (Source: World Bank) 
Economic Projections 1984-94 1994-04 2003 2004 2004-08 
Average annual GDP -4.5 9.8 16.9 17.0 7.5 
Growth % 
GDPUS$bn (199~) 2.8 - 5.8 6.2 -
The precise explanation for the production of such inaccurate official data is unknown, 
but the most likely explanation is that officials report inflated output and exports all the 
way up the government chain in order to preserve their posts and better the previous 
year's target, and senior officials, presumably including Niyazov, are happy to maintain 
this fiction. The breakdown of IF! analysis on the Turkmen economy accelerated after 
2002, prompting the Economist Intelligence Unit (EID) to note in 2004 that "almost no 
budget data have been released since 2002, suggesting that the government is finding it 
increasingly difficult to present the budget accounts in such a way as to hide a growing 
structural deficit" (Country Profile: 2004,33). 
What is known, however, is that the Turkmen economy has all the structural 
characteristics of a rentier economy. Natural gas and petrochemical products account for 
in excess of 80% of all export earnings, with the remainder comprised of cotton yam, 
textiles and the small-scale export of quantities of wheat and grape products (IS 7). As 
would be expected with an oil/gas rentier state, however, the energy sector absorbs very 
little employment, notwithstanding the very tight local content stipulations with foreign 
investors (Interview 12). Agriculture remains the dominant employment activity, 
comprising 48.2% of the active labour force, in comparison to only 13.8% occupied in 
the industrial sector (IS 8). Turkmenistan was the least industrialised Soviet republic and, 
apart from a few flagship projects, there has been little further development in the 
production of finished goods6\ • Although unemployment has officially remained stable at 
around 2.5 % since the Soviet era (IS 9), the reality is wholly different, as even a cursory 
. walk around the country's cities would confirm. The CIA Fact Book assessment of 60% 
6\ One of the industrial enterprises, which I visited as part of field observation, is the textile 
factory established by the influential Turkish businessman Ahmet Chalyk near Ashgabat. Chalyk 
gained Niyazov's confidence in 1993 and since then has been a hugely influential domestic 
entrepreneur, to the extent that Niyazov appointed him Deputy Minister for Textiles, despite 
Chalyk not having Turkrnen citizenship. Along with Niyazov's other favourite foreign 
businessman, the Israeli YosefMaiman, Chalyk acts a broker to western companies seeking to 
invest in Turkrnenistan. Maiman's company, Merhav, and Chalyk's company, GAP (not the 
western clothing firm), are lead contractors on a variety of projects (Interview 10). 
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unemployment is not verifiable (IS 10), and ignores the shadow economy, put it may not 
be too far from reality. 
The structure of the Turkmen economy departs from previous sultanistic norms by virtue 
of the economic legacy of Soviet socialism, principally through the state's domination of 
the economy, but also in the deeply engrained expectations for welfare provision. This 
has shaped Niyazov's subsequent strategy in that, through unfettered control of state 
revenue streams, he has not only been able to appropriate a great proportion of national 
wealth under his direct control, it has enabled Niyazov to position himself as a 
'superpatron' both directly through subsidies to key commodities and, indirectly, through 
a cascade of patronage networks operating informally throughout the public sector. 
(Hi) Niyazov as patron and kleptocrat 
One feature that distinguishes the Turkmen economy from nearly all others in the 
international system is the extraordinary state accounting procedure that enables Niyazov 
manipulate and siphon off nearly all foreign currency earnings. Essentially, most of the 
country's revenues from natural gas and other exports do not enter the state budget at all, 
but have been systematically transferred to a private account with Deutsche Bank, 
directly controlled by Niyazov. 
An important Global Witness (GW) report released in April 2006 revealed that Niyazov 
held two private acco"unts, respectively named the Foreign Exchange Reserve Fund 
(FERF) and the Oil and Gas Development Fund (OGDF). The FERF receives 50% of all 
hard currency gas revenues and 30% of oil and cotton revenues. The OGDF receives 25% 
of gas revenues (2006: 16). GW investigations were conducted over a four year period,62 
and the gas price used to calculate the amount siphoned off was the 2002/2003 contract 
price of $44 per 1000 cm, of which only 50% was payable in cash. The yearly contract 
for gas sales to Ukraine in 2002 was worth $1.68 billion. Split 50:50 into cash and barter, 
means $840 million was payable in cash, and so $420 million was paid into the FERF 
and $210 into the OGDF. However, by 2006, Turkmen prices had risen to $60 per 1000 
cm, all payable in cash, meaning that well in excess of $1 billion is being transferred into 
the FERF alone during 2006. The balance of the Deutsche Bank account was confirn1ed 
62 It should be noted that I was interviewed by GW researchers and responded to a series of 
questions by email between 2002 and 2004 during the research for this report. However, I did not 
supply any of the data cited in this project. GW specialises in investigating the misuse of oil and 
gas revenues by state officials. 
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to GW by a confidential source at around $1.8 billion and rising (GW Report: 2006, 16), 
and a second known private account in Switzerland holding a further $1 billion is also in 
existence (GW Report: 2006, 16). Neither the FERF nor the OGDB are subject to any 
formal accounting procedures, and it widely assumed that the FERF funds the 
construction of the prestige monuments and statues prevalent in Ashgabat, all of whom 
have been constructed either by Bouygues or Polymex, the French and Turkish 
construction companies. 
The FERF and OGDF appear to be classically sultanistic ruses for the appropriation of 
state revenues as the ruler's own private estate, conforming to the patterns of kleptomania 
associated with Mobutu, Ceausescu, Bongo and others. Following Chehabi and Linz, 
self-enrichment is deemed to be the ruler's primary goal. Niyazov is clearly no exception. 
Even though relations with other members of his family are known to be strained 
(Interviewees 10 and 24), they have been allowed access to state coffers. Niyazov's son 
Murat has been involved in an unprofitable hotel construction'scheme and reportedly lost 
$8 million in one night at a Spanish casino (Scott: 1996). 
However, rental income streams do not only signify self-enrichment. They also have 
profound implications for the regime'S longevity. By retaining exclusive access to 
substantial funds that ought to be an integral part of the state treasury, Niyazov is able to 
project himself as a "superpatron", at the apex of a pyramid of lesser patrons, dependent 
upon his largesse. 
Without doubt, a substantial proportion of FERF funds are used for costly projects 
associated with N iyazov's cult 0 f personality. $ 120 million was spent 0 n building the 
largest mosque in Central Asia in Niyazov's home village of Kipchak (Plates Fourteen 
and Fifteen)63. The gigantic reservoir under construction in the Karakurn desert, which is 
likely to cost upwards of $6 billion over 10 to 20 years, will absorb significant off-budget 
funds64• 
However, the significance from a governance perspective is that Niyazov is able to 
control a far larger resource base than any potential domestic rival and, in comparative 
terms, more than many previous sultanistic rulers, due to the state's inherited ownership 
63 This estimate was provided by Interviewee 18, the First National Architect. 
64 This project may be Niyazov's "White Sea Canal". Environmental experts predict that given the 
intense heat in the Karakum desert, there will be substantial evaporation problems and significant 
saline pollution (RFEIRL TS, 30 August 2004). 
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over economic assets, further reinforced by ongoing control over economic activity, 
through the compulsory state purchase of cotton and wheat. 
Niyazov is therefore in a strong position to arbitrate on the allocation and distribution of 
resources to each sector. For those with public sector posts, salaries are, by regional 
comparison, not ungenerous, averaging $250 per month, although many are paid late and 
some not at all. However, the most direct use of state patronage is in the subsidisation of 
many essential goods and services. Despite significant difficulties caused by the degraded 
infrastructure and natural climate, water supplies are free to most city dwellers. Rents on 
state owned apartments have historically been low. Gas is provided to all residential 
homes free of charge and to industrial users at nominal cost. Fuel for motor vehicles is 
essentially free with only a nominal charge levied to cover the wages of attendants. Salt is 
free and flour is sold at very low cost. Once permission has been obtained to travel 
internally, the cost of airfares and train tickets is also nominal, a flight from Ashgabat to 
Turkmenbashi typically costing no more than $2 in 2005. The minimum living standards 
effectively guaranteed by these subsidies have probably blunted some internal and 
international criticism of the regime. 
At the same time, expectations of subsidies are socially embedded and regarded as part of 
a trade-off for the relative lack of political freedoms and civil liberties enjoyed in 
comparator states. In chapter two, we described how theories of patronage describe a 
compact between patron and client. Should that be broken in a far-reaching way through, 
say, price liberalisation on subsidised goods and services, the client would be tempted to 
withdraw from the relationship. Absent the subsidies and Niyazov would be able to offer 
little more than internal stability. Symptoms of social unrest caused by the rising prices 
would negate even that guarantee, which would make the regime still more vulnerable. 
Therefore, even though revenue streams were disrupted by trade disputes over gas 
exports in 1997, Niyazov was more willing to risk temporary shortages of bread and fuel, 
rather than lift price controls. 
Patronage networks also play out within government ministries and regional 
administrations on a much more constrained scale. It is expected that regional officials 
with the power to make staff appointments bring in members of their family and, if 
possible, wider clan networks, who then donate a proportion of their salary to their 
immediate patron or provide some other favour. For those officials who manage to stay in 
post for any length of time, their demise is usually followed by accusations of tribalism 
and nepotism. The extensive purging and reorganisation of the state oil and gas sector in 
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mid-ZOOS, for example, brought to light a system of tribally based appointments 
throughout the bureaucracy and refining complexes situated in western Turkmenistan 
(RFEIRL TS: 24 August 2005). Similarly, investigations into the poor cotton harvest in 
autumn ZOOS led to the discovery of a complex cross-regional patronage network 
between regional and district governors to enable each district to reach its allotted state 
target of cotton and wheat production (NCA: 7 October 2005)65. 
Patronage has evolved into an essential tool of governance under the Niyazov regime. 
The ready availability 0 f relatively large inflows 0 f revenue from gas export earnings 
absolves Niyazov from the responsibility of enacting economic reform and development 
of any serious productive capacity in the industrial sector. He is also able to sidestep the 
construction of effective bureaucratic structures or the development of a set of 
administrative procedures for orthodox fiscal management. Finally, the creation of a 
framework of commercial law and competent judicial function is obviated by the 
arbitrariness of macroeconomic decision-making. As a consequence, it is in the economic 
sphere that the sultanistic elements of the Niyazov regime correspond most closely to the 
template laid down by Chehabi and Linz, and developed in our earlier critique ofSRT. 
Running an economy as a personal fiefdom leads to chronic structural instabilities, deep 
contradictions and, in certain non-energy sectors, systemic failures (Gunes-Ayala: 1994, 
19-28). These can, just about, be masked and managed under Niyazov's rule. Exceptional 
and exclusive access to rents enables Niyazov to prevent the emergence of alternative 
patrons and therefore forms an essential explanatory tool for the longevity of his rule. His 
cadre policy, perhaps unwittingly, reinforces his primacy. On a basic level, the permanent 
revolution in the staffing of key ministries removes potential rivals. However, it also 
keeps different factions, usually coterminous with tribal affiliation, interested in the 
"game" and provides them with reasonable expectation of restocking their patronage 
networks with regularity. In other words, the very instability that characterises economic 
management under the N iyazov regime, in conjunction with basic subsidies, serves to 
keep the system afloat. Behind this there lurks the omnipresent contextual dependency of 
access to export markets. Yet, the intensified search for energy security that has 
increasingly characterised the global energy market means that such a threat has become 
an increasingly second order consideration for the regime between 2003 and 2006. 
6S Niyazov sacked two regional governors and 11 district governors in a cabinet session devoted to 
the affair on 6 October 2005. 
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Cult of Personality 
The third instrument m the complex of teclmiques used by the Niyazov regime to 
reinforce control and engender support is the pervasive cult of personality surrounding 
Niyazov66. Although portrayed in the popular media as a project of warped self-
aggrandisement67, the objectives, content and outcomes of the cult are complex and 
multi-faceted. What emerges from a more detailed investigation of the cult is a 
multiplicity of motives, actors and structures that serve to define the vocabulary of the 
cult and "enact" cultic practices in a variety of settings, often for quite separate and even 
contradictory purposes. The study of such discourses reveals much about the operation of 
power, how categories of inclusion and exclusion are constructed and, particularly in 
societies under personalist rule, how power itself is exercised (Petrone: 2000, 9). 
The existing scholarly literature on political cults of personality, as opposed to those 
associated with new religious movements,68 is still relatively sparse, although new 
material has begun to emerge on the Stalin cult and communist leader cults in post-war 
Eastern Europe (Plamper: 2004; Rees et al: 2004; Dobrenko and Naiman: 2003). Plamper 
has argued that the leader cult belongs to a western tradition of anthropomorphising the 
centre of political power that began in the modem era with the cult of the Tsar and Louis 
Napoleon (2004a, 19; 2004b, 303). Following World War I, cults recharged the political 
arena with some of sacredness lost due to war, atomisation and rapid industrialisation (the 
death of God, leading to the deification of Man), successfully feeding off the emergence 
of a consumer society and modem mass communication techniques to channel sacral aura 
66 There is no standard definition of a personality cult. The first recorded use of the term, 
according to Plamper (2004a, 25), is by Karl Marx in 1877. Marx was rejecting the idea of a cult 
forming around himself and Friedrich Engels. As noted in chapter two (page 64), Plamper 
describes a personality cult as "the organisation of society around a single person, and the 
symbolic expression of this organisation through cult products in multiple modern media" (2003: 
45). A more extensive definition is that provided by Rees: "A leader cult is an established system 
of veneration ofa political leader, to which all members of the society are expected to subscribe ... 
It is a deliberately constructed and managed mechanism, which aims at the integration of the 
political system around the leader's persona" (2004, 4). This definition does not assume the actual 
depth and reach of the cult that Plamper does, but captures more closely the systemic features of 
the cult, rather than its very varied outcomes. 
67 Broadsheet newspapers periodically send journalists to Turkmenistan to file short pieces on the 
Niyazov regime. The implications for those sponsoring their visa entry are never discussed. 
Examples of such articles are: Michael Jack "His Own Little USSR", Financial Times, 7 
December 2002; Robert G. Kaiser, "Personality Cult Buoys 'Father of all Turkmen"', Washington 
Post, 7 August 2002; Justin Huggler, "Is this the world's craziest dictator?" The Independent, 14 
April 2004. 
68 Recent scholarship on religious cults has focused on their relationship with the state and 
propensity for violence (Bromley a nd M elton: 2002; Reader: 2000). While leaders 0 f religious 
cults tend to have an apocalyptic mentality, political leader cults revolve around a much more 
optimistic conception of nation and community. 
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into the political sphere. While the collapse of communism saw the end of several 
remaining personality cults (such as those surrounding Tito, Hoxha and Ceausescu), they 
have persisted in several states such as North Korea, Cuba, Libya and Equatorial Guinea, 
and new personality cults have emerged in Chechnya (Ahmed Kadyrov), Azerbaijan 
(Reidar Aliyev) and, possibly, Venezuela (Rugo Chavez). 
Utilising the small specialist literature on cults, alongside contributions on the political 
use of urban space, art, ritual, text and memory, and in conjunction with field 
observation, interviews and regime texts, it is possible to develop a relatively 
comprehensive appreciation of the cult dynamics of the Niyazov regime. In order to 
structure the analysis, I look in turn at specific political objectives within the context of 
their particular manifestations. 
(i) The Niyazov cult as an expression of visual-spatial power 
The most immediate and obvious attribute of the personality cult is its visual power. 
Personality cults dominate space, particularly urban space. As Paul Hirst (2005: 3) and 
Renri Lefebvre (1991) have argued, space can be configured and used as an important 
strategic resource by power. In the case of Turlanenistan, the Niyazov regime (I do not 
attribute the decision-making about cult production directly to Niyazov himself, for 
reasons examined below) has used space for b oth ani mmediate and tangible political 
objective - that is, to render the physical landscape more legible and amenable for the 
exercise of control- and also for the longer range and less material objectives associated 
with the r~gime's cultural dynamics. 
The visual manifestations of the Niyazov cult are indisputably centred on Ashgabat. The 
expansion of small-scale private trading, the possibility of finding work, and the city's 
proximity to the country's arterial transport routes means that Ashgabat's economic and 
political importance has increased after the Soviet period. The new Ashgabat city 
landscape (Plate One) is a draw for many Turlanen based in, or originating from, 
provincial areas. It has become a source of national prestige and pride (Interviewees 11 
and 21). As the centre of political and commercial activity, the home region of the 
country's largest tribe and Niyazov's native city, Ashgabat is the national showpiece and, 
thus, the point from which the personality cult is projected. None of the other major cities 
visited (Turlanenbashi, Balkanabat and Mary) had been subject to urban remodelling in 
any way comparable to Ashgabat since 1992. 
176 
Ashgabat during the Soviet era was typical of many small to medium sized cities in the 
Soviet Union. In common with two other Central Asian capitals, Almaty (1908) and 
Tashkent (1966), Ashgabat suffered a devastating earthquake, in 1948, which effectively 
destroyed the existing city. Consequently, the urban centre was physically rebuilt around 
a standard grid pattern and organised according to Soviet principles (Harloe: 1996, 1-30; 
Garriyev et al: 1974). Mikroraions, or neighbourhood districts, were constructed, 
comprising an aggregate of neighbourhood living spaces, usually low-rise apartments or 
traditional one-storey apartments in Ashgabat, and serviced by local welfare, leisure and 
public transport facilities. As Smith points out, urban living had particular significance 
for the Soviet system as "a progressive force encouraging collective rather than 
individual identity" (1996: 71). Thus, city planning had an important political function in 
the Soviet period, even in outlying CARs (see also Young and Light: 2001, 941-955). 
However, cities were not only venues for the practice of socialist living. They also had an 
important symbolic function. Crowley and Reid's study of 'socialist spaces' in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union between 1947 and 1991 argues that "the architectural form 
of the city and the planning of urban space were vested with a social-transformative role 
in the· lives of its residents. The configuration of cities was the strongest factor 'for 
organising the psyche of the masses'" (2002: 11). 
Niyazov has developed both of these aspirations in the post-Soviet era by using urban 
planning both as a form of social control and as the visible symbol of the new state 
realised in his image. This parallel process has enhanced the Niyazov regime's "reading" 
of the city and allowed it to advance its own desired self-representation - how it wants 
itself to be seen both domestically and internationally. The physical landscape of the city 
has been transforn1ed since 1992, and Ashgabat has been justifiably described as one of 
the world's fastest changing capital cities. The visual theme is white marble and glass 
throughout (Plate Two). Vast spaces in the city centre have been cleared to be replaced 
by shadeless parks, one of the largest fountain systems in the world, and huge monument 
complexes devoted to Niyazov and various cult accessories, notably as his mother and his 
book, Ruhnama. The colossal scale of the construction projects might evoke comparison 
with such high modernist projects as Brasilia or Chandigarh, but there is no comparable 
sense of aesthetic unity behind the urban redesign of Ashgabat. 
The clearance of complex urban spaces, which are commonly characterised by more 
traditional housing and their autonomous community life, described earlier in the chapter, 
has broken up Soviet utopian geography and replaced it with another less equitable and 
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accessible imagining. The paradox is that the city has given its residents new places to 
gather - typically parks and squares - but their overwhelming size, even by Soviet 
standards, is such as to be alienating, and there is no supportive commercial infrastructure 
or facilities (water, shade, toilets, play areas, picnic tables) that would make them 
amenable. The result is rather bizarre - swathes of the city centre, dedicated to the leader 
cult and replete with immaculately maintained grass and fountains, are completely devoid 
of human life. The result is in no way comparable to Ceausescu's disfigurement of 
central Bucharest in 1977, which bankrupted the state and displaced 40,000 inhabitants, 
but the rationale behind the project is similar in that the superimposition of monumental 
complexes has been a political choice rather than an urban solution (Cava1canti: 1992, 
283; Barris: 2001). 
The new structures have been derided as dictator kitsch, and the designs of the Arch of 
Neutrality (background of Plate Nine) and the Monument ofIndependence have some of 
the c1unky retro look of other monuments from the Communist bloc such as Berlin's 
Femsehturm, albeit making references to traditional Turkmen objects69• Combined with 
the multiplicity of golden and bronze statues of Niyazov, the regime is not so much 
inviting identification, as impressing its power through the spatial order. The new spaces 
created also act as a venue for the exercise of power. The performative dimension of state 
ritual transforms the city into a stage and shrine of power (Schatz: 2004, 127; Anacker: 
2004,515-533). 
The Turkmen state has also micro-managed the spatial order toponymically. Street names 
"concretise and reflect specific power relations and ideological dispositions" (Azaryahu: 
1997, 480) to produce a natural order of things. If street names are approved rendition of 
the past, the decision to decommission an original name is also an overtly political act. 
Azaryahu (1997: 479~, in his analysis of street renaming patterns in postcommunist East 
Berlin, considers renaming "a demonstrative act of substantial symbolic value and 
political resonance, introducing the political ideological shift into ostensibly mundane 
and even intimate levels of human activities and settings." As Gill notes in his study of 
urbanism in post-Soviet Moscow (2005: 480), the renaming of streets and parks therefore 
entails the manipulation of symbolism in order to generate legitimacy. 
69 The Arch of Neutrality represents the tripod on which a traditional Turkmen cooking pot rests. 
The Monument of Independence (nicknamed the sink plunger) represents a traditional pointed hat 
. wom on special occasions by Turkmen girls. 
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In the case of Ashgabat, the city administration originally renamed streets from the usual 
panoply of literary figures and Bolshevik heroes to more "Turkmen" names, before, in 
August 2003, ordering that all except nine streets, those bearing the names of Niyazov 
and his family, be replaced by a four digit number system (IS 12). The regime therefore 
used toponyms initially to loosen residents from the familiar moorings of the Soviet era, 
before deciding that no names unconnected with Niyazov were acceptable. The numerical 
grid system chimes in with Scott and Yiftachel's observation about the desire to 
rationalise and classify terrain through urban (re)design in order to increase the power of 
the state (Scott: 1998,2; Yiftachel: 1998,395-406. See also Grant: 2001,219-241). 
Accordingly, the Soviet urban order in Ashgabat has been decisively replaced. The new 
city-form has acquired two functions: to be amenable to social control, and to showcase 
the Niyazov cult. As such, it constitutes the most visible segment of the cult project and 
attempts to render permanently the symbols of sultanistic rule. 
(ii) The Niyazov cult as instrument of social integration 
A secondary function of cults of personality is that they promote social integration. This 
occurs in several ways. Stalin's cult, for example was a product of the "Great Break" of 
1928. Young people of peasant background "came in" to the Soviet system through the 
process of rapid urbanisation and industrialisation. They brought with them a much more 
conservative moral outlook, opposed to the abstraction and streak of social libertarianism 
that characterised early Bolshevism (Stites 1989). Plamper (2004a: 40) notes, "the Stalin 
cult was both made for them and by them [industrialised peasants]" using the visual 
techniques and traditions that could appeal to a stratum of the population with still limited 
levels of literacy (Bonnell: 1997, 4). As such, the Stalin cult became an instrument of 
unity, "the single expression of general will, the synedochic expression of the state in one 
person" (Plamper 2004a: 38). 
This could function on many levels. Socialist Realism, for example, was neither an 
egalitarian nor a commercial art form, but was created by an elite for the masses. Yet, 
artistic representations of Lenin and Stalin perfonned an integrative function "by making 
visual kitsch the vehicle of elitist ideas (Groys: 1992, 11). Similarly, the ritual of Red 
Funerals "joined horizontal and vertical space [the holding of icons] in a web of 
sensations and impressions" (Smith: 2003, 99) that fused successfully the sacred and the 
secular, the traditional and the revolutionary. Tumarkin (1983: 2) and Paltiel (1983: 49-
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64) record how enacting the cult of Lenin through an organised system of rites and 
symbols created an emotional bond between participants, spectators and the CPSU . 
. Nor was this phenomenon confined to the Soviet Union. Falasca-Zamponi explains how 
the symbols and uniforms that led to the auratic mythicisation of Mussolini as an "envoy 
from God," would help establish an orderly world and ensure "the cohesion of otherwise 
inchoate 'masses", and their shaping into a homogenous political body" (1997: 5). 
Cults order national history by appropriating cultural memory. In doing so, they lend the 
ruler I egitimacy and gravitas, embedding them within a national m eta-narrative. Thus, 
Hitler was the apotheosis 0 f the thousand-year Reich and Reza Shah Pahlavi was the 
"Light of the Aryans". As a result, cult producers draw on traditional cultural motifs and 
continuities. Rolfe (2004, 198) views Soviet cults as the secular veneration of saints, 
seeing "striking homologies of icon corners in peasant huts and their Soviet equivalents, 
the Lenin and Red Corners", thereby providing a comforting bridge between the 
batiyoshka Tsar and the fatherly Lenin of the Soviet era. 
Yet paradoxically, the repudiation of the previous political order also requires an 
unambiguous rejection of the trappings of the old regime and the creation of a new set of 
symbols, such as the calendrical revisions, liberty trees and cockades that became sacred 
signs of the French Revolution (Hunt: 1986, 54). Connerton believes that control of 
memory conditions the hierarchies 0 f power, legitimising 0 r d elegitimising past social 
orders accordingly. Thus, where institutions are revoked, new rites emerge marking their 
revocation. However, such rites can also implicitly recall what was revoked (1989, 9-12). 
Thus, the "new beginning" of the post-Soviet era of national independence also requires 
"concerted forgettings" (Gillis: 1994b, 7). Inimical tribal relations, the Soviet past and 
Niyazov's service as a Communist Party boss are all consigned to organised oblivion by 
the revision of national memory (Koonz: 1994, 258). 
The Niyazov regime has thus used the cult of personality as a vehicle to re-imagine a past 
of national unity, organic connection with the Turkmen lands and, through spatial and 
temporal commemorative loci (Zerubavel: 2004, 233) such as monuments, rituals and 
national holidays, insert Niyazov into that drama as the culmination of the national meta-
narrative. Spatially, foundation myths are expressed in monuments, littered around the 
parks and squares of Ashgabat, to Seljuk sultans such as Alp Arslan and Sanjar. By 
themselves, however, these are insufficient. Reuben Fowkes is correct, when discussing 
the role of public sculpture in Stalinist Hungary, to say that monuments demonstrate the 
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strength and permanence of a new political order and allow regimes to dominate public 
space (2002: 65)70. However, it is the process of articulation and "telling" of these myths 
that gives them flow, organisation, dynamism and power (Comey: 2004, 3), in a way that 
a static monument cannot. 
Accordingly, ritual and text are brought into play as part of the multiple commemorative 
forms (ultimately clustered around Niyazov's identity) deployed to develop the cult's 
integrative function. National holidays a re a ttended by choreographed processions and 
parades in (sometimes newly invented) national costume (Plates Nine, Ten and Eleven). 
These spectacles have overlapping functions. They recall and embody the aesthetics of 
discipline and principles of order that characterised the synchronised mass movement 
displays of late communism (for example, the gymnastic displays and sportsfests 
common in Romania and the German Democratic Republic). 
Moreover, as Edensor (2005: 17) and Roubal (2003, 8-9) have persuasively argued, they 
create an analytical time and space. Each participant occupies a space, often in an 
invisible geometric grid, and conforms, through music, to a disciplined rhythm that 
orders bodies in that time and space to make them legible and docile. Thus, while the 
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spectacle itself conveys the Niyazov regime's power to spectators, the participants within 
the spectacle are themselves the objects of that power71. Simultaneously, the purpose of 
the spectacle is to reach into an imaginary history of ethnic and tribal unity in order to 
overlay Turkmenistan's historic internal divisions. While the following chapter discusses 
the emotions and attitudes of the participants in more detail, it is sufficient to say that 
while they may enjoy participation in the spectacles, there was little tangible evidence to 
me of the regime's larger message being internalised. 
The manipulation of national memory can also be seen in the commemoration of World 
War· II which, of course, looms large in Soviet consciousness. I attended the 60th 
anniversary celebrations of VE day in Ashgabat on 8 May 2005. The main celebration 
was held at the Soviet memorial, an ensemble comprising four huge obelisks and, to its 
side, an arch stretching over a statue of a grieving mother. Under each end of the arch are 
statues of Russian and Turkmen soldiers (Plate Eighteen), an expression of Soviet 
"friendship of peoples." The celebration was very well-attended by an ethnically mixed 
70 See also Ladd's discussion of political monuments in East Berlin in the late German Democratic 
Republic (2002: 91-104), Forest and Joh11son's excellent analysis of national identity and Soviet-
era monuments in post-Soviet Moscow (2002: 524-547) and, more generally, Knauer and 
Walkowitz (2004: 1-18) 
7t On political spectacle, and its relationship to art, see Edelman (1995; 1988). 
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crowd of all ages. Long processions of people came to leave flowers at the obelisks and 
be photographed with proud medal-wearing veterans of both sexes. Tellingly, however, 
an official wreath of the Seljuk eight-pointed star was strategically placed in front of the 
Soviet memorial. Thus, the flowers had to be laid before a symbol of Turkmen rather 
than Soviet power. 
Interestingly, the celebration was not conducted before the new War Memorial completed 
in 2004 (Plate Nineteen), which depicts Niyazov's father as the Hero of Turkmenistan 
(somewhat improbably rendered as a Teutonic knight). Indeed, there were no flowers 
spontaneously left there at all by ordinary people. Returning to the site later in the day, a 
similar Seljuk star had been placed before the new memorial, together with an orderly 
arrangement of official bouquets that, of course, had none of the emotion or resonance of 
the disorderly placed offerings at the Soviet memorial. This tells us that with a genuinely 
important and "popular" commemoration of national memory, there is an instinctive 
attraction to the comfortable sites of memory associated with the pre-Niyazov era. 
Confronted with this, the regime makes a strategic intervention (the Seljuk star) by 
ensuring that this commemoration cannot physically be directed at the Soviet past and 
must be mediated through a newly constructed Turkmen identity. Meanwhile, the symbol 
of "Niyazov's war", the new memorial, is furnished with flowers from official sources to 
conceal popular neglect. Thus autonomous memory, as opposed to the contrived public 
holiday spectacles, emerges as a site of negotiation and struggle for the Niyazov cult to 
impose itself. 
The "telling" of history in Ruhnama72 is a device that fuses the construction of the 
nation's historical narrative with Niyazov's own persona - using an integrative fom1ula 
to simultaneously bind national identity in with the legitimacy of the incumbent regime. 
Niyazov stresses that Ruhnama is "a book about the lessons of philosophy and the moral 
experiences of past generations" but is emphatically not a history book or religious book 
(Turkmenbashi: 2002, 7, 21, 44). This assertion is directly contradicted by its 
incorporation into religious observance, detailed earlier in the chapter and by the 
confirmation of two interviewees (8 and 9) that it is used as the sole history text in 
schools. Its content is a loosely structured mixture 0 f T urkmen genealogy, mysticism, 
72 The stringent requirements to incorporate readings of the book into disassociated educational 
and professional settings have been recounted. For non-Turkmen particularly they cause 
resentment. Interviewee 22, an etlmic Uzbek paediatric neurologist from Dashoguz, described the 
exasperation felt by her colleagues when the compulsory two hour Saturday morning Ruhnama 
sessions interfered with ward rounds. The practical imposition of the book, in this case, has the 
opposite of the intended effect. 
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history, memoir, homilies a nd moral injunction. However, there a re consistent themes 
that run both explicitly and ob!iquely through the text that coincide with the broader 
agenda of the personality cult. 
The first integrates N iyazov into the national narrative. He is the a rchitect of national 
independence who "did not rest by day or night until your [the Turkrnen people's] head 
could be held high" (2002, 252). He is not just part of Turkrnen history, he actively 
shapes its destiny. Turkmenistan is likened to a galley, with each citizen an oarsman: "If 
all the oarsmen obey one captain, and row in accordance with the orders of the captain, 
the ship will be put out to sea" (2002, 68). 
The second theme emphasises Niyazov's role as guarantor of national unity, the heir of 
the mythical founder of the Turkmen race Oghuz Khan (2002, 92), without whom the' 
country might fall prey to the various dangers that Niyazov describes, of which regional, 
tribal and sectarian discord are the most serious (2002, 270). Niyazov argues that 
Turkrnen should "give up the idea of tribe from now on. Debates on tribe should be 
things of the past" (2002, 52). Significantly, Niyazov refrains from making reference to 
specific tribal fault lines (such as between Teke and Yomut), probably to avoid giving 
them credence or solidity. Instead, there are repeated abstract references to how the 
timelessness of the country's varied landscapes (themselves metaphors for regional/tribal 
differences) are metaphors for the eternal Turkrnen spirit. 
Thirdly, Ruhnama seeks to locate a unified Turkrnen identity and then, in turn, place that 
identity within both world history and the contemporary international environment. It is a 
didactic attempt to construct a national s pace and a monolithic 0 fficial history a round 
which Turkmen can and should coalesce. Central to both this text and official ritual is 
Niyazov as an indispensable medium of social integration. Thus, Ruhnama and other cult 
paraphernalia are not a contribution to history, identity and destiny as such. Rather, they 
actually define the parameters, character and content of these sentiments and then 
promptly closes the debate, closing down any alternative conception or explanation for 
national identity and, of course, any alternative prescriptions of governance or policy. 
(Ui) The Niyazov cult as instrument of political socialisation 
An important facet of cults is their use as an instrument of political socialisation. 
Deployed in this way, the regime is able to establish a paradigm for good conduct and 
determine the limits of acceptable behaviour. Lenin's monumental propaganda scheme 
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launched in 1918, through which Bolshevik heroes were immortalised in localities across 
Russia, were not only about "spreading the word", they concretised exemplary 
revolutionary conduct into the regions (Stites: 1989, 90). Lenin himself quickly became 
the embodiment of socialist virtues after his death. The cult surrounding him had a strong 
normative function, especially for children who were encouraged to follow 'Volodia's' 
industrious example at school (Tumarkin: 1983,225; Kelly: 2004, 102-122). The cult of 
Stakhanovism that commenced in 1931 idealised workers as an attempt to increase 
industrial production, and the vocabulary of Stalinism in the 1930s was gradually 
broadened to include notable individuals, such as explorers and aviators, as "positive 
heroes" (Clark: 2003, 4) encapsulating cardinal public v irtues, although Stalin himself 
was not to be, and could not be, emulated. Political cults in post-War Eastern Europe 
fulfilled similar functions (Behrends: 2004,161-178; Wien: 2004,194-207; von Klimo: 
2004,47-62). 
In the case ofTurkmenistan, although Niyazov's fortitude after being orphaned as a child 
is sometimes played on, Niyazov himself is essentially elevated beyond comparison or 
emulation. For example, Presidential Administration spokesman Kakamurat Balliyev 
wrote an article on 21 May 2001 in Neutralny Tiurkmenistan, the country's widest 
circulation newspaper, entitled 'The Spell of the Prophet', in which he claimed that 
Niyazov was semi-divine (RFEIRL TS: 23 May 2001), while government propaganda 
routinely refers to the "Holy Life of Turkmenbashi". The function of political 
socialisation is therefore arrogated into the broader vocabulary of the cult. The principal 
subjects of emulation are Niyazov's parents, and the mechanism through which 
socialisation is pursued is Ruhnama. 
Chehabi and Linz state that, after the cult of personality, dynasticism is the second most 
significant trait of extreme personalist rule (1998a, 13-15). Their focus, however, is on 
the role that wives, brothers and children play in a political capacity. In Turkmenistan, 
dynasticism 0 f this type is not present. N iyazov's wife (a Russian Jew) a nd daughter, 
resident in Moscow and Israel respectively, are invisible. His son, who is domestically 
unpopular on account of his spendthrift habits, may conceivably emerge as a compromise 
figure to succeed Niyazov, but between 1992 and 2006 has had no political profile to 
speak of. The extended lexicon of the cult has therefore not been generation ally projected 
either laterally or forward. Instead, Niyazov's long deceased parents have been elevated 
as exemplars of traditional Turkmen values of courage, honour, sacrifice and the strong 
family unit. 
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The cult, at least partly, would appear to stem genuinely from Niyazov's own initiative. 
He has, for example, had constructed a mausoleum at the huge mosque in his home 
village of Kipchak (Plate Fifteen) at which he has conducted ceremonies to symbolically 
re-inter the ashes of his parents. The Turkmen word for bread (chorek) and the month of 
April has been renamed Gurbansoltan after his mother. His book Dear Friends, released 
in October 2005, is a 350 page meditation on his mother. In this, Gurbansoltan is woven 
into the mythic narrative ofNiyazov as national saviour. Niyazovrecalls how he was 
discovered by a doctor in the aftermath of the 1948 Ashgabat earthquake in which she 
died. Asking how he was found, the doctor replied: "The spirit of your mother asked me 
to save you" (AFP: 25 October 2005). 
The episode is most spectacularly immortalised in the Earthquake Memorial in central 
Ashgabat, in which a huge bronze bull tosses the earth on its horns. Out of the earth, a 
dying mother holds up a golden child to be saved for the world. Gurbansoltan's sacrifice 
is only matched by her womanly virtues. She is the perfect mother, outstanding carpet 
maker (Plate Six)73, symbol of justice analogous to the Greek goddess Themis (Plate 
Two), and inspiration to the women of Turkmenistan during World War H. By contrast, 
Niyazov's father, Atamurat, is an altogether more shadowy and unpromising candidate 
for cult status. In 2004, declared officially as the Year of Atamurat Niyazov, some of the 
details of his I ife were fleshed out. In Turkmen "scholarly" journals he emerges as a 
school teacher and accountant in the service of the Soviet bureaucracy who nevertheless 
stands up to the KGB whe~ they requisition his father's sheep and grapevines 
(Amansaryyev: 134-135). However, it is as a martial symbol of courage, derived from his 
death in World War H and bound up in Soviet war iconography, that he is most 
frequently projected. 
The incremental elevation of Niyazov' s parents to be the secondary figures of the cult of 
personality and, as such, the primary instrument of the cult's socialisation function has 
two principal explanations. The first is that a cult surrounding them is politically safe, 
both for its producers and for Niyazov. Initiatives by subordinates to promote 
Gurbansoltan and Atamurat are likely to meet with Niyazov's approval. However, the 
cult also represents no political threat to Niyazov. Family members enjoined to leadership 
cults have the potential to. become rivals. President Francisco Macias Nguema of 
Equatorial Guinea was overthrown by his nephew Teodoro Obiang Nguema in 1979. 
President Hafiz AI-Asad's brother Rifat attempted to engineer a coup during his brother's 
73 Carpet making is still the base economic and household skill required ofTurkmen women. 
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indisposition in 1984. The power and profile of Rakhat Aliyev, the son-in-law of 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev, increased to a dangerous level until he was 
diplomatically "exiled" to Austria in 2001. Sharing public space with long deceased 
family members, however, alleviates the monotony ofNiyazov's cult without diluting his 
personal authority. 
Secondly, Niyazov's parents fill a void in Niyazov's own curriculum vitae. A significant 
proportion of Ruhnama is devoted to the retraditionalisation of Turkmen family life. The 
theme of unity in the family is repeatedly used as a metaphor for the unity of the state, as 
well as being a desirable objective in its own right. The absence of Niyazov's own family 
(which, in any event, is ethnically diluted) could therefore create comment. Niyazov's 
parents function as a model of kinship and duty, rendered movingly by their own 
'martyrdom'. Similarly, the absence of military service in Niyazov's biography is 
leavened by the hagiography of his father Atamurat, notwithstanding the latter's rather 
contentless form. 
While the names and images 0 f both parents a re pervasive both toponymically and in 
school texts, magazines, television music recitals, portraits and other media, socialisation 
is principally conducted through Ruhnama. Its penetration into professional, military and 
educational life is necessary because it "cultivates per"sonality" and sets out "the moral 
obligations of society" (Turkmen: 2003, 130-131). It is "a bridge to the world of moral 
values and the rich cultural heritage of the Turkmen people" (Nepesova and Tugiev: 
2001, 127), a "mirror of the national souL.making the heart wiser and kindcr" (Odekov: 
200 I, 131) and will be "a source of power and striving to reach the [economic] targets of 
Turkmen's Golden Age" (Amansariev: 2003, 117). 
Although very few interviewees had read Ruhnama, Interviewees 8 and 9, from different 
perspectives, confirmed its centrality as an educational tool. Interviewee 8, a British 
archaeologist, had worked for three years with schools No. 13 and 6 in the Bairamali 
etrap (district) of Mary velayet, which educated age groups 6 to 11 and 11 to 16 
respectively. In these schools, Ruhnama was used as a core text book. The book had to be 
purchased by parents and was taught for at least one hour per day or in a block lesson of 
four hours per week. It constitued one of the very few teaching materials and was used 
separately in history lessons. Teaching followed a very didactic Soviet pattern with a 
passage being chosen for recital and instruction. Some teachers voiced private opposition 
to its use but not in a group environment for fear of losing their jobs. For a number of 
teachers, Ruhnama was not viewed as a teaching opportunity but as a task to be 
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completed before teaching could properly commence. After 2001, Ruhnama has been 
increasingly embedded into the school curriculum, but such was the shortage of 0 ther 
teaching materials, Interviewee 8 considered that the appearance of a second volume in 
2004, was probably gratefully received as an additional resource to alleviate the 
monotony of teaching solely from the first volume. 
For Interviewee 9, a young teacher in a primary school in central Ashgabat (name not 
given to avoid identification), Ruhnama was a source of inpiration and was used liberally 
outside of its fixed place in the curriculum. Situations from Ruhnama were incorporated 
into mathematical problems and, most conspicuouly, into art lessons. Walking around the 
school, most of the artwork displayed on the walls portrayed themes from Ruhnama, 
particularly those reifying family life or the unity of the Turkmen people. For this 
teacher, a strong supporter of Niyazov (at least to me, a foreign researcher), Ruhnama 
was viewed an opportunity for teaching national culture, rather than a protocol to be got 
finished as quickly as possible. 
Thus, from these interviews, the cult as an instrument for the political socialisation of 
children appeared to be relatively well advanced. The cornerstone of this cult function is 
undoubtedly Ruhnama, but a complex of images, increasingly centred on Niyazov's 
parents and diseminated in various media, also provides a significant proportion of the 
cult content used for this objective. 
(iv) The Niyazov cult as a strategic resource 
Although cults typically signify the lofty ideals that their creators seek to communicate, 
they also have very practical political uses central to their creation and evolution. They 
are used both by elites seeking to position themselves within the political elite and as a 
tool to gain resources by those lower down the chain. Rolfe argues that, in the Soviet 
context, "leader cults ... can be understood as multiple strategies by very different 
political protaonists, strategies to defend a self-interest within hierarchies of power and 
influence" (2004a, 204). 
The cult of personality as a political resource dates at least back to the early Soviet 
period, when Stalin's famous "oath" speech at Lenin's funeral in January 1924, signalled 
his intention to manouevre for the Soviet leadership. Stalin's panegyrics were designed to 
position himself as the sole guarantor of Leninism just as, a decade later, cult-building 
around Stalin by leading Bolsheviks was an important survival strategy during a period of 
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intense bureaucratic upheaval (Ennker: 2004a; 2004b), as it was in post-war European 
states (Sretenovic and Puto: 2004, 208-223). 
In Turkmenistan, the cult-building process is conducted in a similar way. Interviews with 
the regime's leading architects and sculptors illustrated this process. Interviewees 2 and 
18 were respectively the Chair of the Architecture, Faculty of the Turkmen Polytechnical 
Institute and the First National Architect a Iso based at the Institute. Given the radical 
changes imposed on Ashgabat's urban landscape under Niyazov's rule, and the weight 
placed on visual representations of the cult in the city, they occupied powerful and 
politically sensitive positions within the elite. 
Interviewee 2 described how Niyazov would look at aerial and ground photographs of 
Ashgabat from different perspectives before giving general comments about how the city 
might be developed. Senior officials (including the interviewees) then developed the 
outline plans in conjunction with representatives of Polymex and Bouygues. This 
intermediate stage appears to be the point at which officials insert the cultic component. 
Crucially, the designs are then formally approved or altered by Niyazov. Interviewee 18 
separately confirmed t hat this process was followed with the construction 0 f the huge 
Kipchak mosque. 
Given the rapid turnover in ministerial personnel and crossover between employment in 
state agencies and ministerial positions, competition in the production of cult content 
between elites can be swiftly transformed into political influence if the outcomes please 
Niyazov. Interviewees 5 and 6, both of whom occupy privileged positions as Niyazov's 
favoured court artists, similarly discussed the process of commissioning public sculpture, 
which is the focal point of the cult in Ashgabat. Public organisations, often government 
ministries, petition for a portrait or sculpture in a particular place. If the Ministry of 
Culture approves the request, the sculptors are approached and the latter then submit 
various preliminary sketches for consideration by the Ministry and Niyazov himself. Two 
or three ideas are then chosen and detailed designs are prepared from which Niyazov will 
choose one. There are no competitions between the 'sculptors or between designs. Thus, 
the idea for a new public sculpture does not originate with Niyazov, but the initiative 
from within ministries is clearly a pitch for political favour. Nevertheless, Niyazov is 
quite intimately involved in choosing the final design, suggesting that while cult products 
might originate autonomously, their output is subject to relatively close control. 
Supplementing formal commissions are private initiatives, such as that shown in Plate 
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Thirteen, whereby powerful individuals might seek to increase their prestige and 
influence by commissioning portraiture not necessarily destined for public consumption. 
However, the inner circle of officials is not the only source of cult production and its 
propagation in approved journals (Odekov: 2001, 130-132; Amansariyev: 2003, 116-118; 
Amansaryyev: 2004, 134-136; Nepesova and Tugiev: 2001, 127-129). Provincial officials 
also use such tactics as part of a strategy for bargaining resources from the political 
centre. T he propagation of cults for local adavantage is not new. A cult grew a round 
Lazar Kaganovich in Voronezh in the 1930s, on the basis of his one visit there, because 
local officials were seeking an elite patron to secure additional resources. Similarly 
Valerian Kuibyshev, the head of Gosplan, was adopted by various Siberian towns 
through which he had passed, in recognition of the importance of personal connections in 
the Soviet economy (Rolfe: 2004a, 200). 
This regional dimension is important for understanding the genesis and development of 
the Niyazov cult. Former Foreign Minister Avdy Kuliyev (1997, 60) described how the 
promotion of the Governor ofMary velayet, when he had named a Peasants' Union after 
Niyazov in early 1992, quickly galvanised regional and local officials into producing 
portraits and commissioning their own sculptures, renaming factories, collective farms, 
streets, hospitals and squares after him in order to secure promotion and material 
resources. The first decree passed by deputies of the new Majilis formed in May 1992 
was to order the mass production of portraits of the president. The Council of Elders, 
unsure of its position in the new constitutional framework, passed a resolution in May 
1993 for the erection of monuments to Niyazov in every village. Located in a non-Teke 
region, the Krasnovodsk city administration, probably fearful of political and economic 
marginalisation, voted to rename itselfTurkmenbashi in November 1993. A similar wave 
of renaming came into currency after the secondary cult of Niyazov's parents developed, 
providing further opportunities to solicit resources. 
Rolfe (2004a, 205) argues persuasively that originating and participating in a leader cult 
means engaging symbolic resources to secure other types of resources. Not only are cults 
a powerful communicative strategy of the leader to legitimate authority, they are used 
within elite structures to gain political influence and favours. Within local and regional 
contexts they reinforce the position of existing power structures and are used to secure 
the patronage upon which the Turkmen system economically hinges. The imagery and 
vocabulary, and the 0 bjects and narratives 0 f cult behaviour therefore conceal a fairly 
orthodox struggle for resources. Crucially, they also provide the impetus for the 
189 
continued reproduction and reinvention of cult products, as different actors seek to gain 
leverage or an edge over rivals similarly bargaining for resources. 
(v) Cult dynamics 
There is a temptation in examining different facets of leader cults to consider them as 
static entities, probably connected with the strong asociation of leader cults with 
monumental public sculpture. However, cults have strong spatial and temporal dynamics. 
Clark's (2003, 8) study of the spatial content of Stalinism suggests that the Soviet Union 
was organised into a "cartography of power" in which there was a hierarchy of spheres of 
political sacredness. Reflecting the monism of power, cults are focused in capital cities 
and, ifit is different, the leader's home region. Resources are poured into magnifying the 
cult where it can be a showpiece. In outlying or economically unimportant regions, the 
trappings of a leader cult are often less evident. Research trips to the more remote regions 
of Turkmenistan bear this out. The photograph I took of Darvasa from a nearby hill in 
August 2003 (Plate Sixteen) does not show any visual evidence of the cult. Apart from a 
slogan over a footbridge, there were no statues or public sculptures of Niyazov visible in 
the mountain village of Nokhur (Plate Eight). Some of the variation may be connected to 
tribal differences. Niyazov's support in Yomut regions is considered to be weaker than in 
other areas (Interviewee 24), and the rather unkempt site of the monumental complex in 
the western city of Balkanabat in May 2005 (Plate Seven) would apparently bear this out. 
However, the lack of visual representation in outlying regions is, to some extent, 
compensated by the countless renamings of natural I andmarks, farms and villages but 
these names take some time to percolate into common usage. 
Cults also have shifting temporal co-ordinates. The cult of Lenin waxed and waned in 
counterpoint to that of Stalin, whose own cult varied in intensity at various points 
between 1928 and 1953 (Shukman: 2003; Thompson: 1988, 99-128; Walker: 2004,45-
59). With Mao, the shifts were even more complex both within and beyond his lifetime. 
As a leader, he was viewed as a "genius" and a "saviour" but in the period 1961-1964, he 
was gently disregarded. The 'Thought of Mao' enjoyed a separate life of its own, raging 
as "the brightest red sun" in 1969, to being derided as "a harmful influence" in 1979, 
before being subsequently resurrected (Terri1l: 1999, 322, 469). More recently, portraits 
of Kim Jong Il were removed from ministry buildings in November 2004 (AFP: 25 
November 2004, Christan Science Monitor: 1 December 2004) and the cult surrounding 
Colonel Mu'ammar Q adhafi has been subtly reconfigured during h is tenure as Libyan 
leader. 
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In Turkmenistan, there has been some variation in intensity of cult display, and the trends 
are probably analogous with those of the North Korean leadership. Interviewee 12, the 
most long-term Western expatriate resident in Ashgabat, described in 2003 how the 
portrait ofNiyazov directly opposite his apartment was sometimes changed, removed and 
replaced, always during the night. There were significant variations in the number of 
portraits on display in Ashgabat in the four research trips conducted over a four year 
period, and some bronze statues, such as that of Niyazov outside the Majilis building, 
were lodged back at the gardens of the sculptors who created them (Interview 6; Plate 
Twelve), before being returned for display. Inexperienced journalists have speculated 
whether these might presage a regime change (IS 12) and, while the removal and 
restorations are never fully explained, Turkmen sources have suggested that Niyazov 
himself is the intiator, believing that Turkmen will tire of his image if he is over-exposed 
(RFEIRL Central Asia Report, 31 May 2004). 
Cults of personality have shifting co-ordinates, by turns anticipating and responding to 
external stimuli. In order to remain effective, the vocabulary, imagery, frequency and 
distribution of cult objects require constant revision. Just as the cults of early Stalinism 
and late Stalinism, the latter forged by victory in World War n, can be readily 
distinguished, so it can be expected that Niyazov's own cult, which has aleady undergone 
variation of tone and content, will also continue to evolve. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to move SRT forward by looking in more depth at 
the techniques used by sultanistic rulers to stay in power. Chehabi and Linz identify the 
coercive capacity of regimes as a factor in their longevity, but do not develop their 
analysis to look at the range of specific tactics, beyond the suppression of open political 
dissent, deployed by rulers at a stage prior to the emergence of political opposition. 
Similarly, they correctly identify kleptocratic practices and the fusion of public and 
private wealth as a distinguishing feature of sultanistic behaviour, but do not link this to 
its political use as a technique to maintain the allegiance of a compliant client base and to 
eliminate potential claimants to the ruler's throne. Finally, SRT assumes that the principal 
function of leader cults is self-glorification - a technique to bridge a fatal charisma 
deficit. However, cults of personality work in complex ways, not acknowledged in the 
theoretical literature, that do a great deal to reinforce a ruler's hegemony, while also 
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providing opportunities for a range of other actors to acquire political and material 
leverage. 
Although considered separately, these three very disparate teclmiques of political control 
are interwoven through quite complicated relationships. Readily accessible material 
resources a re necessary top urchase the practical and symbolic instruments 0 f control. 
The chain 0 f command in government bureaucracies, security a gencies a nd the armed 
forces c an mirror and "play out" existing patronage networks. T he cult of personality 
surrounding Niyazov can become a strategic resource for those excluded from existing 
networks. The teclmiques of hard and soft control can merge. To take one example, 
choreographed spectacles involving hundreds of schoolchildren are designed to express 
the monumentality, harmony and aesthetic aspirations of the regime. Yet mass display 
also involves intensive discipline and synchronisation of bodies sufficient to make them 
"docile" and "legible", a practice more associated with coercive control teclmiques than 
symbolism. Thus, while process and output can be distinguished, they can also be 
conflated into an overall strategy designed to protect existing configurations of power. 
The Niyazov regime is far from alone in deploying a disciplinary apparatus for its self-
preservation. That is the nature of power. The tools for the setting of permissible space, 
and its subsequent penetration and manipulation, were inherited from the Soviet period. 
On this, Niyazov has superimposed his own template through a much more active, 
interventionist approach that provides fewer of the trade-offs in terms of education and 
self-betterment that were offered by the Soviet system. In fact, the deterioration of the 
health and education sectors signifies an almost wilful attempt to dismantle some of the 
infrastructure that made Soviet life comfortable. What is left is a reduced menu of 
subsidised essentials and the promise of periodic access, through patronage and clan 
networks, to the largesse of the state's export earnings. Patronage therefore disciplines as 
much by expectation as by provision. 
The symbolic part of the complex of control aims to make sense of the past and present 
for Turkmen cut adrift from the certainties of communism. The focus on Turkmen 
identity, ethnically defined, immediately marginalises minority communities. It seeks to 
fashion an exclusive Turkmen political community and to regulate the behaviour of that 
community through devices of varying sophistication and adequacy. The dominant 
medium is, of course, Niyazov himself, but other features of the cult have become 
increasingly important and, as the following chapter illustrates, can even be turned back 
against the regime for the political and economic advantage of their recipients. 
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Chapter Six - Opposition and Accommodation: Popular Responses to Sultanism in 
Turkmenistan 
Introduction 
SRT provides a useful theoretical and analytical tool to explain the emergence, 
functioning, and durability of the Niyazov regime in post-Soviet Turkmenistan. 
However, it only takes us so far. It does not give us, to any rigorous degree, a ground-
level perspective on how the regime's policies are received by its consumers, and does 
not provide answers to a series of fundamental questions: are sultanistic leaders popular 
or disliked outside their close circle of cronies and the security forces in receipt of their 
largesse? To what extent is sultanism opposed and, if so, how successful is resistance? 
Can opposition groups force concessions and tactical retreats, or does the regime silence 
and fragment resistance effectively? How can we account for covert "hidden transcripts" 
of resistance (Scott: 1990), genuine ambivalence towards, or even accommodation with, 
the ruler and the regime? Not only is the existing theoretical literature on sultanistic, 
authoritarian and extreme patrimonial regimes not particularly helpful in dealing with 
these queries, recent empirical studies (for example, Yalcin: 2002; Herb: 1999; 
Vandewalle: 1998; Karl: 1997; Yates: 1996; Thompson: 1995) have also given only 
cursory treatment to the responses engendered by non-democratic governance. 
Chehabi and Linz say nothing about popular responses to sultanism in the elaboration of 
their theoretical work. Linz subsequently recognised this lacuna in the introduction to the 
second edition of his classic study Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes: "one gap ... in 
my work i s the neglect 0 f t he unsuccessful but not nonexistent, dangerous and heroic 
resistance against totalitarianism" (2002: 26). Although Linz excluded authoritarianism, 
principally because he had previously published a substantial study of opposition to the 
Franco regime in Spain (1973), he might well have counted sultanistic regimes as an 
omission. Snyder's supplementary contribution to SRT does consider paths out of 
sultanism, but focuses on the interaction between political elites and foreign actors. In the 
process, he overlooks popular responses to sultanism during the currency of the regimes 
(1998: 53-74). As such, Snyder's analysis is retrospective, working backwards from the 
collapse of the regime, rather than developing a critique of attitudes to sultanistic regimes 
while they are in power. 
Consequently, the principal objectives of this chapter are to bridge both a theoretical and 
an empirical gap. By examining responses to sultanism, we can develop our 
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understanding of the regime-type, assess its strength and durability, and whether any 
brittle components or control chokepoints prevent the regime from eradicating resistance. 
We noted in chapters one and two how startlingly common the characteristics of 
sultanistic behaviour are between regimes that emerged in disparate geopolitical, 
institutional and cultural contexts. Mapping out patterns of opposition to sultanism opens 
the possibility that broader patterns of resistance to non-democratic regimes can be 
detected. In his seminal anthropological study of the Malaysian peasantry (1985), and his 
further work on patterns of "offstage" resistance in the American Deep South and 
elsewhere (1990), Scott has argued for the development of "a technology and practice of 
resistance analogous to Michel Foucault's analysis of the technology of domination" 
(1990: 21), discussed in chapter two. 
Aside from the broader theoretical objective, there is a narrower but nonetheless 
important empirical task. There is no published compendium of opposition activity in 
post-Soviet Turkmenistan available, and there has been no published survey of popular 
opinion carried out on any subject in Turkmenistan since 1991. What information there is 
in the public domain is scatte~ed, patchy and must be carefully sifted and evaluated. What 
this chapter aims to do, within the severe constraints imposed on in-country fieldwork, is 
very tentatively to sketch a picture of how Turkmen view the regime, and to what lengths 
they have gone to oppose or adapt themselves to a sultanistic political environment. 
It should be stated at the outset, however, that empirical findings in this chapter can be no 
more than guarded and provisional. Open expressions of political dissent in Turkmenistan 
are rare. The consequences are usually severe. NOOs such as Memorial HRC, IHF, OS! 
TP, Amnesty International and others have accumulated evidence that dissidents and 
protestors have been subject to psychiatric hospitalisation, imprisonment, forced 
resettlement to uninhabited desert regions, and victimisation in the workplace. Relatives 
of those involved have also been targeted, regardless of their age or vulnerability. In 
March 2006, for example~ two local journalists who gave a fairly anodyne interview to 
RFEIRL TS were detained for nearly a fortnight and, upon release, one was diagnosed 
. with serious kidney problems consistent with sustained beatings (RFEIRL TS, 22 March 
2006). 
Given these outcomes, and the constant KNB surveillance of foreign visitors, the 
opportunities to locate and conduct substantive interviews with Turkmen were severely 
circumscribed. Respondents were extremely reticent to begin with, even when discussing 
non-political subjects, no doubt fearing serious consequences should their views be 
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recorded and reported to the authorities. However, once a rapport had been established, 
and the respondents were secure in my identity and intentions, several offered their 
opinions on the regime unprompted. The interviews were normally conducted in 
Turkmen and Russian, sometimes with an interpreter, or in English, and were written up 
carefully in code as soon as possible, prior to full transcription back in the UK. 
Nevertheless, the limited n umber of interviews conducted over a three-year period on 
four research trips is testament to the dangers entailed in establishing and arranging in-
country contacts. Formal survey work would have created formidable practical and 
methodological difficulties. Instead, focus was placed on interviewing as large a cross-
section 0 f interviewees as possible. These covered urban and rural I ocations, different 
ethnic and tribal groups, and a range of professions. Four out ofTurkmenistan's five 
velayets (regions) were visited. There is no attempt to suggest that I have obtained 
sufficient interview data to present general conclusions on public opinion in 
Turkmenistan. The conclusions from this source alone are necessarily impressionistic and 
provisional. Nevertheless, they represent a modest start and, when combined with 
participant observation and scrutiny of reliably sourced reports compiled by NOOs, 
dissident groups and reputable news sources, a more rounded, complex, and ambivalent 
picture of popular responses to the Niyazov began to emerge. 
The substance of this chapter is predicated on the assumption that the locus of response 
and resistance can be found in the terrain of power. The technologies and tactics of 
control deployed by Niyazov's regime structure the patterns and forms of dissent. 
Interviews, opposition web sites and printed sources all testify that responses to authority 
cluster and fixate on the personality and actions ofNiyazov. That in itself is a significant 
finding, for although on a daily basis Turkmen treat the propaganda and paraphernalia of 
the cult surrounding Niyazov as "wallpaper", largely irrelevant to their lives, when they 
do engage with political issues, Niyazov's persona looms large. This is equally true of the 
opposition in exile. Dissident politics is constellated around the 'Niyazov problem', 
frequently to the detriment of substantive policy issues. 
The remainder of this chapter follows this theme but attempts to broaden out the analysis 
by examining responses to Niyazov's rule as against its own claims, ambitions and 
actions. In doing so,it is structured in to five further sections. 
Firstly, the totalising nature of the regime, that is to say, the implications of its conscious 
strategy of closing down any and all public space, is briefly outlined in order to frame 
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discussion of efforts to develop an ideological, programmatic opposition both 
domestically and in exile. 
Secondly, the bleak story of attempts to open some formal political space in the system 
by opponents of the regime is told. Its failures are deemed to reflect deeper trends and 
divisions within Turkmen society, and the comparative strength of the coercive apparatus 
at Niyazov's disposal. 
The third section looks at patterns of political activity engendered by the regime's own 
performance claims. These have led to scattered and sporadic incidents of open issue-
based dissent, normally from previously apolitical sources. This response has often taken 
the form of "rightful resistance" (0' Brien: 1996), that is to say, holding regimes to 
account against their own claims. While often effective against other non-democratic 
regimes, such tactics have enjoyed much less success in Turkmenistan. This section 
offers possible explanations as to why this has been the case. 
The government's ritualisation of political power, and the concomitant disconnection 
between state and society that is assumed to ensue, forms the fourth part of the analysis. 
The rentier economy has allowed the regime to jettison all but the most rudimentary 
forms of formal political accountability. The linking mechanisms between the state and 
citizenry are principally to be found in the imagery and vocabulary of Niyazov's cult. 
How does this play out? This section finds that while the classic repertoire of offstage 
dissent in the form of satire, backhandedness, duplicity and stiob74 exists, a more 
ambivalent attitude to the regime, redolent of developed Brezhnev-era socialism, is also 
in evidence. 
The final section of this chapter ties up these strands by formulating the reasons why, 
despite the uneven but persistent incidences of resistance in various guises, Niyazov's 
regime has, uniquely among FSU states, managed to inoculate itself almost completely 
against sustained popular opposition. Returning to the theoretical framework, we can then 
begin to approach the broader possibilities and difficulties that confront opponents of 
durable sultanistic regimes, and consider with greater sophistication, how popular 
responses to sultanistic behaviour can be more effectively mapped. 
74 This is a Russian term best described as ironic over-identification with authority to the point 
whether the power structures are unable to distinguish whether the action is genuine enthusiasm or 
subtle dissent. . 
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The politicisation of the apolitical 
Niyazov's regime has totalising ambitions. It has aimed for, and to a great extent 
achieved, the closure of formal and informal political space. Furthermore, it has also 
sought to determine the parameters and content of social space, defined more broadly. As 
discussed in chapter four, opposition political parties are not allowed to. function in 
Turkmenistan. There are no independent-minded parliamentary deputies. The m edia is 
closely controlled by the state. Ind~vidual opposition activists are imprisoned, 
hospitalised or exiled. Samizdat publications are extremely rare. 
To reinforce the control of social space, the urban environment is flooded with the 
regime's imagery and vocabulary. Discourse in schools, universities, workplaces and in 
those permitted areas of associational life, is circumscribed and framed by official texts 
and rituals. Even further down the scale, Niyazov and his circle have aimed at the 
transformation of individual consciousness and behaviour through injunctions on the 
"correct" way to speak, dress, look, work, and organise one's family and home, 
encapsulated most obviously in Niyazov's book, Ruhnama. 
Two points arise here. Firstly, although Niyazov speaks regularly of the need for political 
unity and stability, he rarely enunciates directly the regime's totalising ambitions in the 
social sphere; secondly, although the state is highly effective in closing off political 
space, it is unevenly successful in doing so with social space, partly because of a lack of 
resources, but also because of a curious half-heartedness on the part of government 
officials, that probably has more to do with various dysfunctional characteristics of the 
regime. Indeed, the paradoxical impact of the accretion of surveillance, laws and 
injunctions governing the minutiae of social behaviour, particularly in urban areas where 
it can be most effectively regulated, serves to politicise actions that were hitherto simple 
expressions of social solidarity. 
When Niyazov does declare the purpose of his social injunctions - normally during 
televised Cabinet meetings - it is usually as an aside, rather than as a formal statement of 
policy. Thus, in September 2003, he ordered that walls and fences between private houses 
in Ashgabat should either be demolished or replaced by wire fences because "everyone 
must know about each other" (Gundogar: TWNB, 20 September 2003). A few months 
later, Niyazov ordered the installation. of closed circuit television (CCTV) across 
Ashgabat in order that the government would know "if a fly quietly buzzes by ... not due 
to lack of trust, but to avoid disorder" (Altyn Asyr: TWNB, 23 February 2004) .. 
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Interestingly, on two subsequent research visits to Ashgabat, in November 2004 and May 
2005, neither order appears to have been fulfilled.75 
In contrast, the state's ability to regulate behaviour, as opposed to physical space, has 
been much more vigorous and effective, reputedly bolstered by a large network of 
informers in apartment complexes and village neighbourhoods. Thus, unregulated civil 
society activities are discouraged. The establishment of independent clubs for sports and 
hobbies, or civic functions such as cleaning up the local environment, is not permitted (IS 
I). There are also severe limitations on religious worship. Even the few non-Muslim 
religious groups t hat have been legally registered, notably a small number of Baptist, 
Hare Krishna, and Seventh Day Adventist congregations, have been subject to 
harassment and threats from local KNB agents (IS 2). 
The government has also successfully suppressed social gatherings for specific events as 
well as for ongoing activities, although formal reasons are rarely given for the 
restrictions. Thus, parties celebrating Turkey's success in the football World Cup of 
2002 were forcibly dispersed, presumably to prevent any unsanctioned articulation of 
pan-Turkic solidarity that might evolve into anti-regime chants and slogans. Large 
wedding parties and high school graduation celebrations were prohibited in 2003, 
possibly because they simply involved a substantial, uncontrolled gathering of people 
consuming alcohol. Karaoke machines were removed from cafes and bars in 2005, 
perhaps because they deflected attention from the heavily stylised form of patriotic 
traditional music sponsored by Niyazov (IWPR RCA no. 203, 14 May 2003; IWPR RCS 
No. 410, 17 September 2005; Neutralny Turkmenistan: TWNB, 23 August 2005). 
The effect of these sanctions has been the reverse of their intention. Instead of 
eliminating dissent, hitherto anodyne and uncontroversial activities have been politicised. 
A group of men meeting to socialise and watch a football match on satellite television 
becomes an illicit and political act, a government decree effectively creating dissidence 
where previously there was none. Such measures also create possibilities for small acts of 
defiance and disobedience that simultaneously reaffim1 solidarity and individuality. Thus, 
75 In the former case, it would be impractical to destroy the walls of the small courtyards 
separating traditional dwellings, particularly as the walls function as a means to keep animals in 
and burglars out. The practical task of doing so in Ashgabat, let alone other urban centres would 
be considerable. It is likely that a lack of funds, technology and political will is responsible for the 
failure to install surveillance cameras comprehensively Although a small number of CCTV 
cameras were erected on major roads, these could just as well be to monitor traffic flows and 
record accidents. 
198 
the regime's attempts to flatten political life actually create politicisation and potential 
dissidence at every turn. 
Scott has argued that there are two potential and contrasting outcomes to this form of 
totalising power (1990: 9). The first is that the pressure to wear an outward mask of 
conformity creates a countervailing pressure that can be difficult to contain. Thus, the 
greater the regime's demands, the more radical becomes the "hidden transcript" of 
dissent, and the more inclined people become to dissent in no matter how small a way. 
The second outcome is that the public mask will eventually cause the face to fit it: the 
mask becomes normalised and is viewed as inevitable, legitimate and just. This was the 
intention, and often the reality, of socialisation in the Soviet period, most successfully 
during Stalinism (Fitzpatrick: 2005; Brooks: 2000; Petrone: 2000; Jones: 2004). 
In Turkmenistan, this binary distinction does not appear to capture a more complex and 
subtle reality of genuine ambivalence on the part of Turkmen, discussed below, in which 
different attitudes, e motions a nd a ctions often co-mingle. Nevertheless, interviews and 
field observation in Turkmenistan suggested that those respondents who had been 
educated almost exclusively in the post-Soviet era, and had profited from the regime by 
gaining university places, were more likely to accept the restrictions and requirements of 
the government (Interview 17), than those educated abroad (Interviewees 3 and 16) or 
older citizens who had lived through the Soviet era, and who were much more inclined to 
be cynical about Niyazov (Interviewees 7, 11, 13, 14,20,23 and 24). 
Interviewee 8; a British archaeologist who had worked in schools and colleges over a six 
year period purely on archaeological projects, had noticed a changing pattern of 
increasing s ocialisation among children and students into the regime's cultural output. 
This view was reinforced by participants in a workshop on Turkmenistan at Oxford . 
University in June 2004 (probably the largest conference that has occurred in Western 
Europe of people with experience of the regime), many of whom who expressed the view 
that Niyazov was successfully creating a nation of "sheep," principally through the 
repetitive use of Ruhnama in schools. 
In what way do these findings relate to political responses to Niyazov's governance? The 
reach and efficacy of the Niyaz~v regime's totalising ambitions are a reflection of the 
strength of the state. As Skocpol pointed out, mass disaffection towards a regime is a 
relatively rare phenomenon (1979). Revolutions indicate as much, if not more, about the 
strength of the state apparatus than of those forces that seek the regime's demise. In 
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Turkmenistan's case, the state has limits, but has had enough penetration to see off 
political threats. In terms of physically controlling the behaviour of individuals or small 
groups, these are human tasks that the security agencies can complete robustly and 
effectively. In sultanistic systems, long-term strategic thinking is subordinated to the 
caprice of the ruler. Ipstead, there is huge occupational insecurity, a significant turnover 
of personnel, and the demand for immediate, demonstrable outcomes. Accordingly, 
discrete and labour-intensive security operations, such as dispersing unauthorised 
gatherings, produce concrete results that can be reported back up the chain of command. 
Constructing a more sophisticated architecture of repression requires greater technical 
expertise, capital, political will and continuity. It does not yield results in the short-term 
and, therefore, officials in district and municipal administrations in Turkmenistan have 
much less interest in its implementation. 
The closure of formal political space 
(i) The role of opposition political parties 
How has this regime strategy played out in relation to orthodox, programmatic political 
party dissidence in the period 1992 to 2006? An important dimension of understanding 
how and why sultanistic regimes prove to be durable necessitates an examination of 
political responses to sultanism, a nd a n explanation of w hy alternative political forces 
often fail to cohere, notwithstanding the chronic inadequacies of the regime and 
idiosyncrasies of the ruler. To summarise, the political response to sultanism in the 
Turkmen case has been extremely weak. Opposition parties, largely functioning from 
exile, as distinct from sporadic single-issue protests (examined in the next section), have 
singularly failed to make any domestic political impact following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. It could be argued that their activities have even been counter-productive, 
given that their leaders have, in most cases, not provided the integrity that would have 
beneficially contrasted with Niyazov's behaviour. Indeed, most opposition leaders 
actually served happily in his government until they fell from favour, usually amid 
allegations of malfeasance. 
Between 1992 and 1994, the political opposition was effectively organised from exile in 
Moscow. Under the banner of the Turkmenistan Foundation (TF), it was headed by the 
former Soviet diplomat and first Turkmen Foreign Minister, Avdy Kuliyev, who resigned 
and fled abroad in August 1992, ostensibly in protest at Niyazov's emerging cult of 
personality. Although well-respected and not believed to be personally corrupt, Kuliyev 
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had a reputation for being difficult to work with, and his commitment to democratisation 
while in government was minimal (Ochs: 1997,323). Nevertheless, he is believed to have 
used his contacts within the former Soviet diplomatic elite to secure the support of a 
section of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (RMF A) for a coup attempt in 1993-
94. However, the importation ofTF materials by train from Russia in 1993, allied to 
rumours that a coup was being prepared by former Spetsnatz commandos with the aid of 
one Turkmen military unit, prompted Niyazov to act quickly. He hastily arranged a 
referendum, held in January 1994, to prolong his rule for a further eight years, purged the 
government of any officials believed to be sympathetic to the coup, and arranged quietly 
for the subsequent detention in Tashkent of some of those involved (Ochs: 1997). 
Remaining TF sympathisers then fled to Moscow, further diminishing the core of 
domestic opposition activists. 
Further secret cells of Turkmen opposition groups emerged after 1994 (Ponamarov 
2004). Recruitment and organisation for a potential coup was stepped up while Niyazov 
underwent heart surgery in the US during I ate 1 997. However, any chance 0 f 0 usting 
Niyazov was almost certainly missed at this point. Kuliyev arrived in Ashgabat in early 
1998 with the intention of seeking registration for an opposition party, and with an 
alleged promise from the Russian government to support regime change if 
demonstrations were sufficiently large and prolonged. However, Kuliyev was detained at 
the airport on arrival and, after three days, agreed to take safe passage back to Moscow, 
dismaying his supporters and probably damaging his credibility permanently. 
There are several aspects to this episode that remain unclear. Ponamarov (2004) and 
Kadyrov (2004) both raise the possibility that the 1994 and 1998 proposed coup attempts 
were orchestrated by the KNB to flush out potential opponents from within the regime. It 
is also unclear at what level, if at all, Kuliyev's activities and plans were sanctioned and 
supported by the RMF A. The Russian government was notoriously inchoate during the 
Yeltsin presidency, with different ministries frequently pursuing diametrically opposed 
agendas. Contradictory policy sometimes emanated from within the same ministry. 
Niyazov's nationalising rhetoric may have concerned senior Russian government 
officials, who saw in Kuliyev a potentially more compliant "Euro-Turkmen" or neo-
Soviet political figure. Nevertheless, it is far from certain whether these threats were 
simply designed to test Niyazov's resolve during a period in which prices for gas exports 
were under dispute, or whether the RMF A could have successfully organised a coup in 
any event, given the elevation of ethnic Turkmen to senior positions within the internal 
security apparatus by the mid-1990s. 
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The opposition parties currently operating from exile are poorly regarded, both within 
Turkmenistan, and by international human rights bodies and foreign governments. There 
are five main parties, essentially small splinter groups, comprised of former ministers and 
ambassadors, most of whom are believed to have embezzled large sums from the state 
and then defected abroad. 
The activities of TF diminished after Kuliyev was subjected to beatings in Moscow by 
unknown assailants (presumed to be either Turkmen KNB agents, or elements of the 
Russian FSB working on the KNB's behalf). The Watan ("Homeland") party, led by 
Khudaberdy Orazov, the former head of Turkmenistan's Central Bank who is wanted on 
charges of embezzlement, represents northern Yomuts abroad. The National Patriotic 
Movement (NPM), a tiny groupuscle, is comprised of western Yomuts. The Republican 
Party, led by former Turkmen ambassador to Turkey Nurmukhammet Khanamov (also 
sought on embezzlement charges) promotes the interests of southern Turkmen, notably 
the Salor tribe from the Tejen region. 
Although representatives of these parties met in Vienna on 13 June 2002 to form an 
opposition umbrella group named the Union of Democratic Forces of Turkmenistan 
(UDFT) , after that meeting virtually no further cooperation has materialised. Notably 
absent from the Vienna summit that created the UDFT was the People's Democratic 
Movement of Turkmenistan (PDMT), the political vehicle of the former Foreign Minister 
Boris Shikhmuradov, who was almost certainly in Turkmenistan at this point preparing 
the November 2002 coup attempt, for which he was subsequently sentenced to life 
imprisonmene6• The PDMT represents minority and mixed-race groups but has remained 
aloof from cooperating with other parties almost certainly because of personality clashes 
and enmity on ethno-triballines. 
The failure of the opposition parties to ,work government and public opinion in the US 
and Europe effectively, can be attributed to several discrete factors. Firstly,. the 
opposition parties in exile have little in common other than their opposition to Niyazov. 
There is scant evidence that they are committed to political pluralism or economic 
reform, Shikhmuradov, for example, was fairly open about the need for a period of 
authoritarian governance following Niyazov's departure. The parties are controlled by 
individuals who were happy to serve Niyazov loyally over many years, and defected 
76 There has been no information about Shikhmuradov's whereabouts or condition since early 
2003. He is presumed to have been killed in prison. 
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largely because other groups around Niyazov were prepared to expose the extent to 
which they were corrupt. Moreover, the differing sequence of defections has resulted in 
inimical relations between some of the cliques involved. Thus, the mutual hostility of the 
TF and PDMT stemmed from Shikhmuradov serving as one ofNiyazov's most outwardly 
loyal ministers for a decade after Kuliyev had defected. Indeed, Shikhmuradov was even 
instrumental in formulating the Khalk Maslahaty resolution that confirmed Niyazov as 
life president in December 1999. Thus, there is an absence of programmatic synergy 
between the various parties other than to support the removal ofNiyazov from power. 
The second main obstacle to unity between opposition parties is, according to Kadyrov 
(2004), that they have been constructed along ethno-tribal lines, and function principally 
to promote their clan interests. Kuliyev, who is a product of Soviet diplomatic training, 
has stood alone in advocating a secular, centralised political system in order to eliminate 
tribalism. The more regionally based parties have preferred a federal solution, 
underpinned by a national parliamentary system, in order to balance tribal interests, and 
disseminate power away from Ashgabat (and the Ahal Teke) to the regions77• Although 
these could be perceived as tactical disagreements, Watan, the Republican Party and the 
NPM effectively privilege the carving out of spheres of interest based along clan lines 
because their support bases begin and end at this level. This issue flags up one of the 
most acute political challenges to be faced by the post-Niyazov political elite, and also 
mirrors the variations in Soviet tribal policy, described in chapter three, between those 
CPSU elements who sought to balance tribal differences, with those who strove to 
eliminate them altogether. 
The third reason why the opposition in exile has proven to be ineffective is that it has had 
very limited grass-roots support within Turkmenistan. According to Interviewees 3 and 
10, these parties are perceived as corrupt, self-serving and remote, with little connection 
to most Turkmen. Their political activities are viewed as predominantly self-serving, 
either as hobbies or as self-promotion in an elite power game. The partial exception to 
this is Shikhmuradov. Firstly, as the highest ranking non-pure ethnic Turkmen in 
government he was considered by Russians, Armenians, Uzbeks and other ethnic 
minorities as their patron. Secondly, he showed himself genuinely prepared to take a 
personal risk to oust Niyazov in November 2002. As noted, it is unknown whether 
77 Occasionally, the parties have publicly disagreed on their Internet forums about which tribes 
constitute the more authentic etlmic Turkmen, while Niyazov's alleged mixed Kurd - Turkmen 
parentage is discussed in disparaging terms. 
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Shikhmuradov died in prison in 2003 but, if alive, he could have a role in shaping a post-
Niyazov succession scenario. 
The very few attempts to form a political party domestically have been terminated at an 
early stage. Taking the constitution at its word, 63 year old Gurbandurdy Dyrdykuliyev 
from Suvuchi, near the western city of Balkanabat, wrote to the municipal authorities in 
February 2004, requesting permission to hold a peaceful protest and to make preparations 
to form an opposition political party. He was detained and transferred to a psychiatric 
institution in Bojunazan, a remote part of Lebap velayet situated 450 miles away 
(Memorial HRC in TWNB, 13 February 2004), and his wife' was later informed that any 
attempts to speak to foreign media outlets would lead to the termination of her visiting 
rights (Memorial HRC in TWNB, 7 May 2004). 
The totalising aspirations of the Niyazov regime have therefore had several effects on the 
way that mainstream political opposition functions. At an individual level, the regime has 
effectively atomised the population, to make potential opposition activists feel politically 
"lonely", as can be seen most obviously in the Dyrdykuliyev case. The squeezing of 
political space has also shaped the development of opposition parties. No credible emigre 
opposition force has emerged to unite the Turkmen around obvious themes such as the 
regime's corruption, political repression and lack of democracy. Opposition parties are 
fatally compromised by their previous involvement with Niyazov and the well-
documented instances of corruption involving their leaders. Although they have provided 
principled opposition to the use of Ruhnama as the main focus of the education system, 
leading opposition figures were also instrumental in promoting Niyazov's cult of 
personality when it was personally beneficial to do so. In short, they offer little other than 
a change of team within the elite and the prospect of increasing tribal tensions. As a 
consequence, they have remained marginal to the limited efforts of the international 
community to promote democratisation within the country. 
Finally, the vast majority ,of emigrants from Turkmenistan since 1992 have been ethnic 
Slavs or Germans, most of whom have had little interest in political activism after their 
departure. The invalidation of foreign higher education degrees obtained after 1 January 
1993, pursuant to Presidential Decree No.126, has resulted in a declining number of 
students being educated abroad. Niyazov has publicly made clear his opposition to 
Turkmen students attending foreign universities, apart from under strictly controlled 
agreements reached at official level. The payment of remittances to students abroad from 
their parents has also been curtailed, and exit visas have periodically come into force 
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after 1992. The families of any students that failed to return to Turkmenistan would 
almost certa:inly lose their jobs and face official harassment As a result, there is barely 
any stratum of politicised, educated Turkmen abroad that is capable of formulating a 
sustained and coherent critique of the regime, can liaise intelligently with NGOs and 
foreign state actors, and has political credibility within Turkmenistan. Thus, while 
directly preventing the formation of domestic political opposition through coercion, 
Niyazov has also proven to be effective in curtailing the development of functioning 
opposition movements outside the country. 
(H) The Military as Political Actor 
The only other opposition activity designed to replace Niyazov appears to have been 
orchestrated principally by non-Teke Turkmen, ethnic minorities and those of mixed 
race. The two known plots involving army officers in March 1998 and the November 
2002 coup attempt, where it is believed a small number of troops and border guards were 
implicated, appeared to be driven to some degree by the gradual nativisation of the 
military and security agencies. 
The 1 998 military plot was recounted by Interviewee 1 , at that time a senior military 
officer in command of the Turkmen army's medical services unit. No supporting 
documentary evidence of this episode was found and, therefore, Interviewee 1 's account 
should be viewed cautiously. Nevertheless, he presented as a reliable and realistic 
interviewee in relation to other questions and had nothing to gain personally by inventing 
or embellishing the action. 
Interviewee 1 described how Niyazov had circulated an order in 1997 stipulating that all 
senior officers in the armed forces must be pure ethnic Turkmen. The army, in particular, 
had historically taken a high proportion of Turkmen citizens of Russian, Uzbek or mixed 
ethnicities. The decree effectively placed an arbitrary ceiling on the career paths of many 
young soldiers, while effectively ending the careers of several senior officers. In 
response, Interviewee 1 described how an underground political circle was formed, 
organised by mixed race and ethnic minority army officers, and led by Rustam Jumayev 
(a Turkmen-Tajik), who had close links with then Foreign Minister Boris Shikhmuradov 
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(himself Turkmen-Armenian). Shikhmuradov covertly supported the group and promoted 
his client Jumayev to be a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs78• 
An important member of the group was an unnamed ethnic Uzbek major, based in the 
eastern town of Kazanaryk (in an ethnic Uzbek region of Lebap velayet). According to 
Interviewee 1, who knew of but did not participate in the plot, in March 1998, the major 
and his son (also an army officer) gathered their followers, seized military equipment and 
vehicles, and set off to Ashgabat to stage a coup. Although the actual numbers involved 
, . 
in the rebellion were relatively small (under 30), they were able to travel more than 200 
km before being eliminated by a combination of regular army tanks and attack 
helicopters. The rebellion was spontaneous, weakly planned and highly unlikely to have 
succeeded, although it indicates the depth of opposition to Niyazov that appears to have 
developed. 
The involvement of the military in the 2002 coup attempt is more difficult to trace 
definitively, due to the number of conflicting versions of events that circulated. However, 
Interviewee 1, who fled the country after the arrest of Jumayev and Shikhmuradov, 
advised that many of those who knew in advance of the action, including some ethnic 
Turkmen officers, were dissatisfied with Niyazov's nativisation policy. A number of non-
Turkmen were arrested and tried for their involvement, including. Turks and Azerbaijanis. 
Of the 46 ethnic Turkmen sentenced in connection with the plot, over 70% were non-
Ahal Tekes, and many emanated from northern and eastern regions of the country 
associated with ethnic Uzbeks, Yomuts and Ersaris (Kadyrov: 2004). Some of these had 
links to border guards and KNB officers. Interviewee 22, an ethnic Uzbek paediatric 
neurologist from the northern city 0 fD ashoguz, explained how her husband had been 
able to utilise contacts within the KNB and border service to assist those involved in the 
plot to escape to Uzbekistan. Her husband was eventually arrested, however, and 
sentenced to 15 years hard labour in a desert penal colony. 
Moreover, the 1998 (if true) and 2002 coup attempts raise the issue of the extent to which 
the armed forces could emer.ge as significant political actors in Turknlenistan. In 
situations where other sultanistic leaders have faced crisis, the military has often acted as 
the broker with emerging political forces, or as a neutral guarantor of national stability. 
More rarely, the army has taken the lead in ousting the ruler - the cases of Jean-Claude 
78 Jumayev was one of those alTested a~d imprisoned for allegedly helping Shikhmuradov to 
organise the November 2002 coup attempt. 
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Duvalier in February 1986 and Paraguayan dictator Alfredo Stroessner in February 1989 
being two prominent examples. 
The November 2002 coup attempt should rather .be read as a last attempt to seize power 
by a mixture of forces that had fotmerly prospered under Niyazov but had subsequently 
found themselves to be marginalised, as a result of racism or their own acquisitiveness 
and political ambition. There is no guarantee that it would have succeeded even if the 
KNB had not located and successfully "broken" key organisers beforehand. There has 
been little evidence to suggest that the upper ranks of the military are likely to engage in 
any coordinated attempt to remove Niyazov. 
In Turkmenistan's case, the military is increasingly unlikely to emerge as either a major 
political threat to the regime or as a pivotal player in a post-Niyazov transition. Not only 
has Niyazov ensured that senior military officers are "well looked after" financially and 
in terms of personal benefits, by 2002, the upper and middle ranks had been thoroughly 
nativised, with barely any non-ethnic Turkmen wielding any position of power. 
Interviewee 1 's own career is a case in point. As an ethnic Talysh originally from 
Azerbaijan, he was advised that in order to stay in the army, he would be required to 
learn Turkmen. When he did so, passing language proficiency examinations, he was still 
discharged notwithstanding his competence and experience. 
More generally, the political role of the military across the FSU states has been 
constricted after 1992, despite often severe damage to its corporate interests. Brian Taylor 
contends that the prevailing organisational culture in the Soviet military was one of non-
involvement in politics, and that this has carried over beyond the collapse of the Soviet 
Union (2001: 924-953). He cites the army's reluctance to intervene in the Russian 
political crises of August 1991 and October 1993 as the outcome of a definitive ceding of 
political power to the CPSU during the Soviet period. While Taylor does not extrapolate 
his findings beyond Russia, the same preferences would certainly appear to hold true in 
other FSU states. On the very rare occasions when the army in an FSU state has openly 
come out against the government, notably in Azerbaijan in 1993, the causes were 
exceptional and specific (a failed war against Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh), and 
once the crisis was resolved, the army quickly returned to the barracks and has not been a 
political actor of consequence since. 
Although Niyazov emerged stronger from the 2002 coup events by effectively flushing 
out any opponents within military, internal security and other structures, Kadyrov (2004) 
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has argued that he has increased the number of Ahal Tekes in senior positions. Conscripts 
and junior officers would not have the following or seniority to present a threat to the 
regime. Of the senior ministers, the carefully sequenced purging of YoIly 
Gurbanmuradov (from the Chukan tribe) and Rejep Saparov Ca northern Yomut) in 2005, 
for example, would confirm the trend that Niyazov decided to rely increasingly on cadres 
from his own tribe. 
However, tribal favouritism is in no way institutionalised. Niyazov has built his political 
reputation on suppressing tribal disunity. Turkmen from the smaller tribes, such as 
Interviewee 11, conceded that Niyazov's record on tribal appointments could be much 
worse. There remains the strong possibility that an Ahal Teke successor would exercise 
much greater tribal discrimination in the military, and security services. Accordingly non-
. Teke Turkmen m ay well have calculated that they can still attain senior positions and 
privileges under Niyazov, and thus he represents a more attractive proposition than 
potential alternative leaders. 
Issue-based Protest: The Success and Failures of 'Rightful Resistance' 
The anatomy, content and reach of political power in post-Soviet Turlanenistan, clustered 
materially and symbolically around the persona of Niyazov, has determined, to a 
significant degree, the form and strategies ofTurkmen opposition movements and parties. 
The instruments of power -law, policing, the security agencies, political hospitalisation -
all of which promote and protect the totalising ambitions of the Niyazov regime, and 
reinforced by distinct structural peculiarities within Turkmen society, hav~ combined to 
stunt orthodox, programmatic challenges to the government. 
In an analogous fashion, t he government's discourse about its own performance is an 
integral component of its legitimacy, has shaped the context and outcomes of the few 
single-issue protests against the Niyazov regime. As Scott notes, "the weakness of 
ideological hegemony is that its claims can then be tested against its promises" (1985: 
389). Thus, the Turkmen regime's own ludicrous boasts (for example, year on year GDP 
growth exceeding 20%) provide a setting and an opportunity to oppose the regime within 
its own framework of reference (Scott: 1990: 104). Scott termed this critique "rightful 
resistance", the use of the rhetoric and commitments of the powerful to curb their own 
excesses, thereby turning the instruments and values associated with domination and 
control to new purposes (O'Brien: 1986,33). Resistance of this sort "works the territory 
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between elites and challenges malfeasors using an approved discourse" (O'Brien:1986: 
34), in order to make elites "prisoners of their own rhetoric" (Thompson: 1975,263). 
There are two important advantages to pursuing resistance by critiquing a regime along 
the grain of its own ideology. Firstly, such an approach is less laden with risks for those 
involved, as it relies on the appropriation of established and approved principles, statutes 
and values. Secondly, it also uses existing opportunity structures, exploiting divisions 
within an elite by co-opting influential advocates within the regime, and by using a 
persuasive and congenial normative language, while simultaneously disavowing 
revolutionary alternatives (O'Brien: 1986: 51). 
As a consequence, "rightful resistance" has proven to be a useful tactic in the armoury of 
those without formal, constitutional channels of redress. Its lineage in the modem age can 
be traced to the appeals of machine-breakers in the Industrial Revolution (Hobsbawm and 
Rude: 2001), the naIve monarchists who followed Emilian Pugachev in eighteenth 
century Russia, and the "rebels in the name of the Tsar" associated with the Bezdna and 
Chi grin Affairs in the nineteenth century (Field: 1989, 31-207). More recently, "rightful 
resistance" h as been a frequent 0 ccurrence in communist societies. In rural China, for 
example, villagers have regularly accused Communist Party cadres of being inauthentic 
communists in order to further local complaints (O'Brien: 1986: 36-36). Industrial 
workers in the German Democratic Republic employed the egalitarian language learned 
from Communist Party officials to voice wage demands and undermine the Stakhanovite 
'Activist' movement of the early 1950s (Kopstein: 1996,395-423). Polish workers in the 
1970s and 1980s similarly accused Communist Party officials of behaving like a "Red 
Bourgeoisie" (Scott: 1985,339). 
The successful use of "rightful resistance" as a mechanism to frame demands for policy 
change lies principally in the regime's own responsiveness. If concessions are made, 
perhaps by dismissing certain corrupt officials or by freezing prices on essential goods, a 
rudimentary contract is established between the protestors and the government, which can 
potentially be reproduced elsewhere. In essence, the protestors have established a 
relationship with their rulers, forged around a common awareness of rights and use of the 
regime's own vocabulary, which then tests the state's ideological commitment and serves 
as a pattern for future resistance. 
In post-Soviet Turkmenistan, resistance of this sort has framed virtually all of the 
significant social protests that have occurred in sporadic and uncoordinated form since 
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1992, but with only a mixed degree of success. The first verifiable episode of this type 
was a spontaneous protest on 12 July 1995 in Ashgabat against non-payment of wages, 
shortages of bread, and the termination of water supplies to city centre apartment blocks. 
At this point, the country was, in common with other former Soviet states, undergoing 
severe economic contraction. The EBRD estimates that GDP had fallen by 20% on the 
previous year in 1994, with inflation simultaneously rocketing to 2400% (IS 3). 
Economic reforms had been introduced sparingly in Turkmenistan, principally in the 
form of limited liberalisation of the agricultural sector and the introduction of a new 
taxation regime. Although protests 0 ver living standards were not uncommon in 0 ther 
Central Asian republics, the rarity of the Ashgabat protest meant that it was perceived as 
a major threat to regime security (Ponamarov: 2004). 
The protestors were apparently leaderless and focused entirely on their immediate 
grievances. According to Ochs (1997: 343) and Ponamarov (2004), they went out of their 
way to reassure local ethnic minority residents, some of whom had been scapegoated in 
the economic crisis of the late Soviet period, that the protest was aimed at the state and 
that they (principally Russians and Armenians) should join the demonstration. An 
important trigger for the protests was N (yazov's claim, made the same week, that the 
country's oil and gas reserves were transforming Turkmenistan into another Kuwait. In 
order to reinforce the impression of rapid urban modernisation, residential water supplies 
had been diverted to service a prestige complex of newly constructed fountains in central 
Ashgabat (IS 4). Thus, the demands of the protestors, who were mostly middle-aged 
women, was framed in terms of holding Niyazov to account against his rhetorical 
performance claims. The outcome was that the demonstration was forcibly suppressed by 
the security services, and the ringleaders arrested and castigated on state television, 
somewhat implausibly, as drug addicts and hooligans (IS 5). However, the government 
also moved to restore residential water supplies and restock local kiosks (Ochs: 1997, 
344) which would suggest that, while the protest organisers no doubt paid a heavy price, 
the framing of protest within the government's own discourse was, in this instance, 
effective. 
There were no further demonstrations recorded until April 2002, when another group of 
women protested a bout the treatment m et~d 0 ut to t heir imprisoned r e1atives by K NB 
agents. The women appealed to Niyazov to intervene personally in the matter, effectively 
petitioning him to make good on his rhetorical statements about the rights and freedoms 
enjoyed by Turkmen citizens (RFE/RL TS, 22 April 2002). Niyazov used the protests as 
a pretext to purge the upper echelons of the KNB, whom he wrongly suspected of 
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plotting against him79• Although conditions temporarily improved in prisons, it would 
appear that the protests were exploited by Niyazov as a mechanism to reinforce his 
political dominance, rather than to correct the excesses of his subordinates. Nevertheless, 
the perceived success of this protest appears to have encouraged a group of around 200 
women to petition Niyazov outside the presidential palace in Ashgabat on 1 August 2002 
to crack down on corruption in the education system and in local government (IS 6). 
Niyazov had, during 2001 and 2002, been. particularly active in dismissing and 
imprisoning senior officials with almost bewildering frequency on embezzlement and 
corruption charges. The close proximity of the earlier protest is likely to have encouraged 
the women in the belief that a peaceful appeal to Niyazov, framing the protest within 
current official discourse on the importance of clean government, might result in 
remedial action. On this occasion, however, the authorities reacted within 20 minutes, by 
bundling the women onto buses and detaining them at various detention centres, . 
The third recorded set of protests occurred in July 2004 in the Ashgabat suburb of Keshi. 
Niyazov gave an order t hat a number of streets were to be demolished with t en days 
notice, on the grounds that he had passed through the area each day en route to the 
presidential palace, ~nd found the roadside dwellings not to be in keeping with 
Ashgabat's new urban landscape. Sources differ on the number of people affected by the 
decision but the estimates varied between 500 and 900 families (Plate Three; IWPR RCA 
No. 301, 21 July 2004; RFEIRL TS, 21 July 2004; IHF, 16 July 2004). A group of 70 
women formed a protest group to oppose the decision, in this instance framing their 
demands in terms of Turkmenistan's international commitments as signatories of the 
United Nations Charter, rather than pursuant to government policy or Niyazov's informal 
statements. The entire settlement was subject to house arrest for three days. Women from 
neighbouring areas who brought in provisions were transported forcibly out of the area. 
The affected community was decanted to scrubland in an empty region north of 
. 
Ashgabat. Undeterred, the government ordered the arbitrary demolition of further well-
established residences in central Ashgabat, between u.Garashsyslyk and u.Bitarplyk, in 
October 2004 to make way for a new children's theme park (Plate Four). Attending the 
site to interview residents and observe the demolitions (Interview 15), residents explained 
to met hat they h ad been offered inadequate housing and been g ranted an insufficient 
79 Interviewee 1, as a senior army officer in 2002, explained that, while mixed race army officers 
had wanted to depose Niyazov to prevent the indigenisation of the armed forces in the late 1990s, 
the KNB actually remained entirely loyal throughout. The purging of almost 80% of senior KNB 
officers in April 2002 was therefore the result of Niyazov's paranoia, rather than out of any 
concrete evidence of disloyalty. Other sources (e.g. leG Reports) disagree. Ironically, the purges 
probably served to estrange Niyazov from the KNB. As a consequence, it is now the security 
agency upon whose loyalty Niyazov can least count. 
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time to vacate their properties and obtain alternative accommodation80• Although the 
displaced residents expressed anger and great anxiety about the process, the crackdown in 
Keshi a few weeks earlier had deterred them from organising formal protests although, 
according to. Interviewee 2, the Chair of the Faculty of Architecture at the Turkmen 
Polytechnic Institute, some residents had lodged (unsuccessful) claims to prevent the 
demolitions under city planning law. 
Holding the regime to account on its own performance claims through "rightful 
resistance" has been a tactic employed with diminishing success by protestors in 
Turkmenistan. It cannot be determined for certain whether Niyazov knew of the security 
services" response to the two protests held in 2004. However, the likelihood is that he did, 
given the rarity of political protests within the country, and the security concerns implicit 
in protests outside the presidential palace and along Niyazov's daily route to his office. 
There has been no 0 fficial reporting 0 f the incidents in 2002 and 2004, a nd thus it is 
difficult to gauge the rationale for the regime's very robust response to protests organised 
by women who had very specific, local grievances, rather than deeper political objections 
to the regime. 
However, in the 1995 demonstration, it would appear that the regime was simply under-
prepared to respond to the protests, and quickly caved in to prevent an escalation in the 
number and demands of the protestors. The second protest offered a convenient 
opportunity for Niyazov to pose as a populist (the only time he has done so in response to 
public action), while moving to strengthen his hold over the security apparatus. Protests 
after this date could be contained and there was no incentive for Niyazov to meet the 
demands, not least because to do so would have entailed a reversal of policy that he 
periodically originated. The regime has, therefore, successfully resisted being drawn into 
a bargaining game with single-issue protestors that would presage the sort of 
"contractual" relationship likely spill over into other areas. Following BeIIin's analysis of 
patterns of contemporary state coercion in the Middle East and North Africa (2005: 25-
41), it would appear that the Niyazov regime's willingness to curtail protests, violently if 
80 A similar event occurred in September 2004 when Niyazov flew over the settl~ment of Darvasa, 
situated in the centre of the Karakum desert. Niyazov apparently made disapproving remarks 
about the sprawling nature of the village and, within days, 200 soldiers were dispatched to destroy 
the settlement. The residents, mostly camel herders and roadside traders, were reportedly given 
one hour to collect all their belongings and leave. They were not offered alternative 
accommodation or compensation. A new mosque was demolished. One possible reason behind the 
destruction of the village is that its residents were mostly ethnic Uzbeks (Field observation in 
Darvasa, 6 August 2003; Memorial HRC, 24 September 2004). 
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necessary, has been an important determinant of the extent and outcome of popular 
mobilisation. 
In summary, sultanistic rule frames social responses by the inflated claims it makes about 
its own performance. When reality does not match these claims, an opportunity is opened 
to hold the regime to account on its own terms, against its pledges and alleged 
achievements. In the case of Turkmenistan under Niyazov, such protests have been 
sporadic, brave but not particularly well-organised. Although concessions were made by 
the government after the largest protest in Ashgabat in 1995, Niyazov has not had forced 
upon him the sort of "contractual" relationship that developed under late socialism in 
Eastern Europe. The protestors did not have links to sympathetic officials within security 
structures, and the ringleaders are believed to have suffered harsh punishments. 
Accordingly, women protesting against illegal detentions and arbitrary housing 
demolition in 2003 and 2004 attempted to activate the normative commitments made by 
the Turkmen government when it gained accession to the UN and the OSCE. Although 
these institutions have been sympathetic, their impact has been essentially marginal, 
temporarily embarrassing Niyazov without altering government policy. 
Thus, despite the often chaotic and arbitrary nature of policy execution, Niyazov has 
successfully atomised the Turkmen population by disrupting horizontal domains of 
communication and spaces for social connection and declining to institute vertical spires 
of communication with the p rotestors. By doing so, u nprogrammatic social resistance, 
based on exposing the regime's fraudulent performance claims, has been relatively 
unsuccessful, serving to underline the central importance of robust and loyal coercive 
apparatuses in neutralising opposition activities. 
The Ambiguities of Everyday Life 
In the previous sections, we evaluated the weak political and social resistance offered to 
Niyazov's rule by political parties functioning from exile and sporadic domestic protests 
organised around single issues. Separately, we can also move beyond the simplistic 
explanations of social behaviour offered by those who view Soviet and post-Soviet 
societies as pervaded by a passivity engendered by Communist orthodox/I. Social 
81 Such viewpoints are invariably coloured by the author's own ideological standpoint. One recent 
example, which erroneously appears to negate the notion of individual or corporate agency in 
Soviet society, is the assertion by Frank Ellis that: "Homo Sovieticus could never be more than a 
mouthpiece for the party's ideas and slogans, not so much a human being then, as a receptacle to 
be emptied and filled as party policy dictated" (1998: 288). 
213 
responses to hegemonic rule have a number of complex facets. Anthropological 
scholarship, influenced by the pioneering work of James C. Scott and, thereafter, by the 
Subaltern Studies network that emerged in post-colonial India, has focused in particular 
on patterns of "everyday resistance" by communities which enjoy very little formal 
political and economic power. 
In his seminal study of a Malaysian village conducted in the late 1970s, Scott observed a 
variety of informal practices, including sabotage, dissimulation, pilfering, false 
compliance, feigned ignorance, tardiness, absenteeism, gossip, character assassination 
and so on which, taken together, he described as "small arms fire in the class war" (Scott: 
1985, 17). This form of covert, disruptive resistance, "a carefully hedged affair that 
avoids all or nothing confrontation" (Scott: 1985: 285), required no organisation or 
leadership yet, when accumulated, could "make an utter shambles of the policies dreamed 
up by their [the perpetrators'] superiors in the capital" (Scott: 1985, xvi). Moreover, these 
tactics could represent more than a daily conflict or negotiation over time, dignity and 
material resources; they also embodied a struggle for control of symbols (symbolic 
compliance masking material defiance), memory, tradition, and the moral order82• 
Scott developed his critique in a later, more general survey which argued that "regimes of 
domination", characterised by relatively unfettered personalist rule of the sort associated 
with sultanism, shared important structural similarities. Such regimes create "public 
transcripts" - discursive affirmations of patterns of domination which produce "the self-
portrait of dominant elites as they would have themselves seen" (Scott: 1990: 18). Such 
transcripts create an illusion of a unified elite and willing subordinates. They serve to 
co~ceal or misrepresent what elites do not want the powerless to see, often through the 
use of euphemisms, symbols, and signs which both sanitise and legitimise aspects of 
domination. The purpose of such transcripts is therefore to sever autonomous horizontal 
ties within society, instead creating "a living tableau of centralised discipline and control" 
(Scott: 1990, 59-60). 
To counter this hegemony, the powerless sequester their own social space and create a 
separate discourse or "infrapolitics" (Scott: 1990, 20), in which resistance rebuilds the 
horizontal domains of communication disrupted by the powerful. This is often done 
. unobtrusively, without manifestly impacting on the formal political system. Tracing the 
82 Some scholars have questioned whether a ctions such a s pilfering and sabotage might not b e 
confused with simple delinquency. Korovkin argues that the test should be whether the actions are 
supported by a significant section of the local community (2000: 3). 
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patterns of cloaked resistance thus entails investigating the political landscape during 
periods of outward quiescence, thereby also extending our understanding of how and why 
sudden political ruptures occur when they do. 
Other scholars have developed Scott's work in their studies of everyday life under 
sultanistic regimes. Gail Kligman examined the Ceausescu regime's attempt to control 
reproduction in Romania through 'the infamous Ab~rtion Law 770 of 1966, as a lens 
through which to explore engrained patterns of duplicity in social conduct (1998). 
Kligman argued that, by the end of Ceausescu's rule, public representation and personal 
belief had diverged to the point of "transforming dissimulation and deceit into customary 
forms of interpersonal exchange" (1998: 37), thus compromising Romanian society as a 
whole. Lisa Wedeen's ethnographic study of the regime of President Hafiz AI-Asad in 
Syria focused on the way in which the numerous manifest absurdities of the cult 
surrounding Asad afforded the opportunity for disguised forms of resistance, notably the 
creation of subtle satire out of the ambiguities of official discourse and rhetoric (1998; 
1999). This, in itself, creates a paradox. Wedeen argued persuasively that the Asad 
regime actually derived its power from engendering compliance to the ridiculous aspects 
of the cult, forcing Syrians to "act as if' the regime's claims for Asad were true. Yet, 
these aspects, in turn, provided the material for, and symbolic language of, everyday 
resistance. 
The studies of Scott, Kligman, Wedeen and others undoubtedly offer crucial insights for 
any analysis of responses to sultanistic rule in Turkmenistan. They furnish us with an 
extended range of hitherto concealed data to evaluate, a more nuanced appreciation of 
social dynamics under conditions of personal rule, and a framework for understanding the 
way in which ordinary people can, in Eric Hobsbawm's phrase, "work the system to their 
minimum disadvantage" (1973: 3). 
Yet, important though the work of these scholars is, it presumes a form of subtle 
opposition to the hegemonic regime that might not, in reality, necessarily pertain. The 
subjects of Kligman's study were simultaneously duplicitous towards, and complicit in, 
Ceausescu's system. Like the practice of Ketman in The Captive Mind, Czeslaw Milosz's 
famous study of life under Communism in post-War Poland (2001: 54-81), Romanians 
were required to produce lies as part of a schizophrenic survival strategy. Underpinning 
Kligman's analysis, therefore, is that dedublare in fact masked real feelings of 
opposition, in order to perpetuate a myth of national/socialist achievement. What, 
however, if this complicity/duplicity binary also concealed genuine ambivalence towards 
215 
the regime in question, separate from the public self/private conflicts described by 
Milosz, Vaclav Havel (1986) and Slavoj Zizek (1991)? 
In his ethnographical study of the last Soviet generation, Alexei Yurchak perceptively 
identifies "a seemingly paradoxical coexistence of affinities and alienation, belonging 
and estrangement, meaningful work and pure formality" (2006: 98). Such an 
accommodation may have been accomplished by a "performative shift" enacted in 
different settings but was, nonetheless, expressive of genuine attachment to elements of 
the ruling system that was distinct from simple dissimulation. Thus, although people 
"worked the system", they also valued elements within it, built associationallife around 
it, and retained positive memories of it, despite the fact there was limited appreciation of, 
and belief in, its constative dimensions. 
What has developed in recent anthropological scholarship, therefore, is the charting of a 
complex array of social responses to ideological hegemony, traversing a wide spectrum 
between wholehearted support from a minority, to complete rejection by a smaller 
minority. In between, there are various responses - some genuine, some duplicitous and 
some in between which, taken together, represent a range of tactics deployed by ordinary 
people simply to get by in societies where there is great circumscription of political 
freedom. 
Field observation and interviews conducted in Turkmenistan illustrate an assortment of 
similar tactics in operation. They can be divided into four discrete categories to be looked 
at in turn: manipulation of the system in order to secure material or social advantage in 
the face of ideological hegemony; the use of satire or stiob in order to de-anchor and 
subvert the regime's messages; withdrawal and abstention from the official framework of 
moral imperatives; and also an acceptance of, and accommodation with, elements of 
official discourse and practice. 
(i) Manipulation and corn modification 
The Niyazov regime's dysfunctional characteristics afford significant opportunities for 
the manipulation ofthe system's failings for personal gain. In this respect, the situation in 
Turkrnenistan reflects that prevailing in other post-Soviet states, albeit in more extreme 
form. Unique to Turkmenistan, however, are the possibilities that the regime's own 
instruments of power, notably the paraphernalia of the cult around Niyazov, offer for 
commercial exploitation and even subtle forms of resistance. Such is the extent of the 
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Niyazov c u1t, that it has been semi-captured and c ommodified by autonomous trading 
entities for profit. As such, the "soft" instruments of sultanistic rule also mould a range of 
social and even economic responses to the regime. 
Taking the initial point made about the regime more generally, it is evident from 
undertaking only a limited amount of field observation that the confusion in government 
policy provides openings for profit and, in some cases, actually necessitates corruption 
and duplicity. It is beyond the scope and purpose of this study to enumerate these in great 
depth, not least because this phenomenon is partly the product of more general patterns of 
post-communist transition. To take a few brief examples, Interviewee 11 supplemented 
her income with cash in hand translation work, Interviewee 14 was involved in the import 
and export of contraband goods, Interviewee 20 was an unlicensed private hire taxi 
driver, and Interviewee 24 was involved in the illegal importation of goods from the 
United Arab Emirates with Turkmenistan Airlines cabin crew. 
Niyazov's personal intervention in the restructuring 0 f t he agricultural sector provides 
evidence of responses to systemic failure. Turkmenistan remains a predominantly rural 
society and, although the livestock and arable sectors form only a relative small 
component of national GDP, they do provide the livelihood for a significant proportion of 
the population. In the first case, the unusual restructuring of the livestock breeding sector 
after 1992 converted former state sheep flocks and wells in desert areas to a form of 
associational ownership, subject to state quotas. Meagre state payments are made in cash, 
rather than in animals as the farmers had preferred, thereby providing an opportunity and 
impetus to freeload their own animals, including privately owned camels, on state 
resources for private gain (Lunch: 2003, 188t3• 
Similarly, arable farmers are required to sell their grain to a state company at a fixed 
price of $2 per 100 kilograms, approximately 8% of its market value. In January 2004, 
Niyazov announced a record grain harvest of 2.5 million tons, three times domestic 
requirements, and ordered that 700,000 tons would be exported to Ukraine (IWPR ReA 
No. 262, 30 January 2004). According to local officials, the real harvest was nearer 
480,000 tons, and the shortfall led to KNB officers forming specialist squads to carry out 
farm inspections, in order to requisition grain to make up the export quota. Those farmers 
caught concealing grain were prosecuted for sabotaging the food supply. The 
83 Also field observation in Yerbent and Darvasa, August 2003. 
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interrogation methods and charges, reminiscent of the Stalinist period, encouraged 
farmers to under-report and either conceal or consume their harvest. 
The final case, from the banking sector, also illustrates how policy anomalies create the 
conditions for state officials to resort to manipulation and deception. Niyazov's insistence 
on fixing the official exchange rate for the non-convertible Turkmen manat at a rate of 
5200 to the dollar, four times more than the currency's real exchange value, illustrates 
how duplicity and corruption are embedded at all levels in the system. In 2004, the 
Central Bank was reportedly selling between $50,000 and $75,000 per day on the black 
market, thereby acquiring manats at a quarter oftheir official price (IWPR RCA No. 336, 
21 December 2004). These were then taken either as personal profit or used for essential 
government expenditure, such as wages and pensions. Introducing dollars into the black 
market also kept the illicit rate stable84• Niyazov's micromanaging tendencies thus 
encourage duplicity and corruption across the state sector both from those who form part 
of it and those who face it, both in order to keep the system functioning and for reasons 
of personal and economic security. 
A more unusual way of turning the regime back upon itself is to move beyond the 
exploitation of its systemic failures, and to manipulate the very symbols of power 
themselves for profit. This can be seen most strikingly in the commodification of 
Niyazov's own image, and even that of his mother. Small traders interviewed at the 
Tolkuchka and Russki bazaars in Ashgabat between 2002 and 2005 advised that, before 
the country's few foreign visitors (usually business executives from CIS countries) 
depart, they frequently purchase a souvenir of the country linked to the presidential 
image. Indeed, Niyazov is also undoubtedly the country's biggest draw for "rogue state 
tourists". Interviewee 10, who had access to senior officials, confirmed that private 
entrepreneurs and the managers of state companies obtain permission to brand goods with 
Niyazov's image and official titles. Niyazov is flattered by the requests, and senior 
officials presumably believe that by permitting such items to be sold, they are both 
gaining Niyazov's favour and disseminating the iconography of the regime more widely. 
Thus, a theatrical troupe in Ashgabat was able to profit from a production about the 
president's m other in 0 ctober 2005 (THI Press Release No. 143: 5 0 ctober 2005). A 
bottle of vodka or packet of tea carrying Niyazov's image means that he is "on display" 
84 .. The most curious feature of Turkmenistan's [currency] black market is that although it is 
entirely prohibited, and is by definition subversive of rigid state controls, the government 
recognises its existence and even intervenes to modify the illicit exchange rate" (IWPR ReA No. 
21 December 2004). 
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in each home. Meanwhile, the small traders are naturally stocking such products in order 
to sell more goods but, during the conversations conducted with the sellers, it became 
clear that they were aware that the items were actually being bought for their amusement 
value and, from observations of several transactions with foreign customers, traders 
initiated conversations in which they joked about Niyazov. 
The traders' economic response to the Niyazov regime, regardless of their personal views 
of the man, has been to market it for commercial purposes, knowing that the goods are 
valued less for their intrinsic utility than their kitschness. Indeed, on several second-hand 
stalls, "Turkmenbashiana" sits alongside similar products with Lenin and Stalin's image. 
Although the commodification of leadership cults is nothing new, and is probably most 
prevalent in Cuba, what distinguishes the Turkmen case is the simultaneous duplicity and 
complicity exercised by small traders in their unspoken compact with both suppliers and 
customers about t he nature, intention and purpose of the purchases. In this sense, the 
situation is analogous to that prevailing in Syria under President Hafiz al-Asad. As noted 
earlier, Wedeen records that the most important principle of public conduct was to act "as 
if' the regime's pronouncements made sense (1998, 503-523). What binds the trader to 
both supplier and customer in Turkmenistan is complicity in a lie, a common secret, in 
which all stand to benefit. Therefore, what appears, superficially, as an expression of 
pride in the ruler actually emerges as a nuanced combination of material gain, satire and 
resistance, often expressed through a series of complex negotiations within the regime's 
own political and aesthetic boundaries. 
(ii) Satire and subversion 
Given the closed political culture prevalent ID Turkmenistan and the unknown but 
probably significant penetration into society by the KNB, any satirising 0 f t he regime 
must necessarily be expressed either in a secure private environment, or in such an 
oblique way as to eliminate the risk of sanction. No printed material could be located that 
satirises the regime, although opposition web sites maintained from outside the country 
have periodically shown rudimentary animations and cartoons caricaturing Niyazov 
personally, particularly accentuating his predilection for expensive jewellery. 
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The jokes told about the regime by Interviewees 14, 21, 23 and 24 closely resembled and, 
in some cases, recycled jokes made about Soviet leaders, most commonly Lenin 85. In 
particular, they focus on the prevalence of Niyazov's image across the media (the 
television set itself is referred to as the "Niyazov" because Niyazov's image appears in 
the corner of all domestic TV programmes), or his self-aggrandisement, with God 
deferring to Niyazov on spiritual issues rather than the other way around. 
However, when jokes were told against the regime during interviews, there appeared to 
be some uneasiness, perhaps due to the presence of a foreigner, partly because of a fear of 
being overheard and partly, in the case of ethnic Turkmen, because they may be 
perceived to be disloyal or unpatriotic. Interviewee 21 became uncomfortable telling 
anekdoti about N iyazov, not 0 nly because he considered them to bed isrespectfui, but 
also because he viewed Niyazov as irrelevant to the country's broader problems. 
Undoubtedly the most openly cynical interviewees were those of minority ethnicities. 
Interviewee 20, an Armenian from Ashgabat, jokingly compared Niyazov to both Stalin 
and God. Interviewee 19, a Westernised mixed race Ukrainian-Turkrnen, joked about 
Niyazov's mental health, while Interviewee 22, an ethnic Uzbek from the northern city of 
Dashoguz, also satirised Niyazov as a "madman", 
However, open dissent was rare. Interviewee 16 was highly unusual in being the only 
ethnic Turkmen who publicly ridiculed Niyazov in my presence. A young, highly 
intelligent, and somewhat impetuous education officer on the Merv Project, he pretended 
to polish the gold leaf busts of Niyazov displayed in the lobbies of the larger hotels and, 
when travelling around Ashgabat and Mary, he openly ridiculed statues of Niyazov in 
different poses, despite the fact that KNB officers ~ere present and listening. He may 
have (wrongly) supposed that employment on a UK funded project afforded him some 
protection, or was over-compensating his cynicism to impress a foreigner. Nevertheless, 
his behaviour clearly a larmed members 0 f staff i n the hotel. Similarly, ethnic Russian 
store assistants in Ashgabat's airports joked about the ubiquity of Niyazov "endorsed" 
products, including books, wine, vodka and tea available for sale. The guarded response 
of most Turkmen interviewees undoubtedly restricts the access that a foreign researcher 
85 A number of jokes told about Niyazov correspond to the anekdoty compiled by Bruce Adams 
(2005), with the names of Lenin, Stalin, Brezhnev and so on now transcribed to Niyazov, where 
the context dictates. The celebrations held in 1970 across the Soviet Union to commemorate the 
centenary of Lenin's birth were widely viewed as a disaster. As Tumarkin notes, the overexposure 
of his image (such as the suspension of huge portraits from hot air balloons) provoked cynicism 
and disdain rather than enthusiasm (1983: 263). The Lenin jokes told during this period are dusted 
down and used about the iconography that surrounds Niyazov's cult. 
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has to the full array and textures of anti-regime satire of anekdoty. It also requires 
Turkmen citizens to be subtle and inventive in their humour. 
Yurchak describes how, in the Brezhnev era, stiob was used by younger people as a 
creative and absurdist form of dissent that confused those in authority, while affording 
some insulation against retributio~ - a sort of comedic variant o,f rightful resistance 
(2006: 252). Interviewee 24, an ethnic Russian and former Soviet army officer, had the 
confidence to enact this sort of performance. In August 2004, we travelled to the 
settlement of Darvasa in the centre of the Karakum desert, 350 km north of Ashgabat. 
Approximately 120 km into the car journey we were stopped at a remote roadside 
checkpoint in the heart of the desert. Despite obtaining permits for the journey, a KNB 
officer requested that we return to Ashgabat to secure a signature to accompany the 
official stamp. In an extremely angry mood at the intransigence of the officer, 
Interviewee 24 drove us back to Ashgabat, secured the corrected permit and purchased a 
T-shirt from the market sporting a large picture of Niyazov. Upon reaching the 
checkpoint again, the guards were clearly unsettled by his attire. As an ethnic Russian, a 
community increasingly discriminated against in Turkmenistan's public life, the wearing 
of the shirt was clearly suspect, an ironic gesture aimed at the officiousness of those 
representing his government. Interviewee 24 congratulated the officers for their diligence 
in spotting the error on the permit, advising them that Niyazov (pointing to the face on 
his shirt) would praise them for ensuring that national security had been upheld. When 
asked why he was wearing the shirt, he responded that by doing so he would be closer to 
Niyazov, who would be with him in bed and also at the toilet. Interviewee 24 was 
obviously pushing the boundaries by displaying "superpatriotism" of this sort, and yet he 
was effectively protected by speaking back to authority (albeit in the form of fairly low 
ranking security officials) with the messages that the regime itself was giving out about 
Niyazov's omnipotence. Interviewee 24 was effectively "deterritorialising" the regime's 
discourse by illustrating its absurdity, at the same time as remaining (almost) formally 
compliant. 
(Hi) Withdrawal and Autonomy 
A less risk-laden response to the Niyazov regime is simply to minimise as far as possible 
any interaction with authority structures or the state media. In rural areas the cult 
surrounding N iyazov, expressed in statues, portraits and slogans, is far less pervasive. 
Study sessions on Ruhnama in workplaces appear to be enforced less rigorously outside 
the major cities, although Ruhnama does form an integral part of the school curriculum, 
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even in towns as remote as Darvasa in the central Karakum desert, and Nokhur, situated 
in the Kopet Dagh mountain range on the Iranian border86 • Scott noted this trend when he 
described the Malaysian peasantry removing themselves "from the institutional circuits of 
symbolic power" (1985: 321), and Polish workers deliberately leaving home for the 
duration of state television new broadcasts in the 1980s (1990: 139-140). 
In Turkmenistan, the pattern of withdrawal follows that of other contemporary regimes 
where media output is subject to close state control. Hardly any interviewees watched 
domestic television, which is unsurprising given that it has virtually no drama, sport or 
documentary output. Samples of national news output were taken on each research visit. 
Between 14 November and 17 November 2004, for example, the First Channel devoted 
its first four news items to exactly the same subjects on each day, these being Niyazov's 
attendance at an Oil and Gas Exhibition in Ashgabat, meeting oil and gas executives at 
the exhibition, extending congratulations to a conference on Sanjar Sultan, and 
congratulations received by Niyazov from other countries to mark Eid-ul-Fitur. The final 
items reported production figures at bottling plants and a wool factory. There was no 
international news coverage. 
As in Havana and Tripoli, apartment complexes in Ashgabat are festooned with satellite 
dishes providing an ear to the outside world, and to Russian television programmes in 
particular (Plate Five). Residents in apartment blocks pool resources to install satellite. 
dishes on the roof which, with some creative electrical work, can be connected to every 
residence (RFEIRL TS, 25 July 2002). In the desert settlement of Darvasa, where there 
were no electricity power lines,8? a small generator had been rigged up to a television and 
satellite dish outdoors enabling residents to watch an international football match88. In 
Nokhur, residents watched Iranian television, despite their inadequate command of 
Farsi89. 
As visitors to the FSU states will testify, television plays an important part in post-Soviet 
society, functioning as the principal form of home entertainment. In Turkmenistan, this 
86 Field observation in both locations, August 2003 and May 2005. 
87 Soviet era power lines had fallen into disrepair further south. 
88 Field observation in Darvasa, 5-7 August 2003. 
89 Field observation in Nokhur, 11-12 May 2005. Although Niyazov has occasionally issued 
orders for a crackdown on access to satellite television (RFE/RL TS 22 July 2002; RFE/RL TS 25 
July 2002), he has not yet attempted to ban access to foreign television outright, possibly fearing a 
major backlash but also perhaps aware that the Russian, Uzbek and Iranian media offers very little 
direct comment on events in Turkmenistan. 
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was particularly apparent in all the places stayed during fieldwork. If Russian television 
was not available, most hosts had a stock of well-worn videotapes to play. Interviewees 
also constructed their social networks and their leisure away from the regime's gaze. 
Despite official injunctions by Niyazov to read Ruhnama every day for at least one hour, 
hardly any of the interviewees had read the book. The exceptions were Interviewee 9, a 
primary school teacher, and Interview 17 conducted with students at the Turkmen 
Poly technical Institute, who were t he most 0 utwardly 0 rthodox 0 fall the respondents. 
Other attempts to create officially sanctioned leisure activities also appeared to be 
unsuccessful. Despite the fact that they offered free entry, and were the coolest and most 
well-appointed buildings in Ashgabat's city centre, the National Museum, the National 
Carpet Museum, the city art gallery and the museum at the Independence Monument 
were completely empty on every visit made. Similarly, the vast parks and fountain 
complexes constructed in Ashgabat, Balkanabat and Turkmenbashi, which contained 
statues, amphitheatres, tableaux, monuments and, in one case, a giant mechanical copy of 
Ruhnama, were deserted. 
Turkmen appeared to have removed themselves from state directed leisure spaces in the 
same way that Yurchak records how late Soviet citizens lived vnye (outside), 
simultaneously within the regime's formal constraints and yet not following its 
parameters (2006: 128). Yurchak likened this process to a temporary internal emigration, 
in which people did not openly reject the Soviet system, but rather periodically absented 
themselves from it, in favour of obscheniye (discussion and companionship) in informal 
svoi (autonomously constructed) social networks. This was also apparent in 
Turkmenistan, where freely chosen sociality appeared to be almost always separate from, 
although officially operating within approved boundaries. 
(iv) Accommodation and acceptance 
The principal ambition of Subaltern Studies is to uncover the ways in which ordinary 
people create room for manoeuvre in societies where there is a marked disparity in power 
between the elite and the rest. As such; it has made an impressive contribution to 
recording the "hidden transcripts" of resistance to regimes marked by outward 
quiescence. What Scott, Wedeen and others did not quite capture, however, was the 
genuine ambivalence that often exists towards systems of hegemonic personal rule. 
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As discussed in the second section of the chapter, Scott mentions how the wearing of 
"public masks" (Le. the obligation of outward conformity) eventually causes the face to 
fit them, to the extent that the mask becomes normalised and viewed as inevitable, 
legitimate and just (Scott: 1990, 9). However, Scott's observation is never fully 
developed, notably because the focus of his study was on the "hidden transcripts" of 
resistance that lay behind the mask of public obedience. 
The point about the acceptance and accommodation ofhegemonic rule takes us back both 
to the tactics of rightful resistance detailed earlier and those of the native Turkmen 
Bolsheviks who, as Edgar noted, quickly learned to "speak Bolshevik" in order to 
advance Turkmen territorial claims during the Soviet border delimitation process. 
However, genuine ambivalence goes beyond individuals and groups using the regime's 
own language cynically or duplicitously to achieve tactical gains, and towards the 
possibility that some Turkmen find actual comfort, togetherness and identity in the 
Niyazov regime's practices, rituals and iconography. Official government propaganda 
would say so, but it is far removed from reality in so many areas as to be worth scant 
consideration. Scholarly and journalistic work on the Niyazov regime would appear to 
definitively exclude the possibility of the Niyazov regime "working" in a positive sense. 
The leading work on the nature and impact of Soviet ritual is not particularly helpful. 
Lane viewed Soviet rites as principally a device for cultural management, but does not 
record how they were actually received and processed (Lane: 1981, 260). Kertzer's 
seminal study of ritual in politics takes broadly the same line, focusing on ritual as "the 
propagation of a message through a complex symbolic performance," shot through with a 
condensed, polyvocal ambiguity that enables the regime to speak clearly to a wide 
audience, which can then take its own meanings from each sign (1988: 11). What these 
meanings might be, he does not elaborate. Returning to Yurchak's analysis of the lived 
experience of late Soviet socialism takes us further. He argues, from detailed 
ethnographic study of contemporaneous letters and diaries, that the last Soviet generation 
took Soviet ideals more seriously than has hitherto been recognised (2006: 98-128). 
Although they ignored or manoeuvred around parts of the system, perhaps by purchasing 
contraband items or doing their homework during Komsomol meetings - small tricks to 
escape the formal aspects of Party work and life - these should not be confused with a 
desire to disparage or bring down the Soviet system as a whole. On the contrary, unlike 
dissidents such as Vaclav Havel or Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who took Soviet official 
discourse at face value and urged their readers to "live in truth", many Soviets could 
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selectively ignore or pick up different aspects of official discourse as it suited them to do 
so. 
In Turkmenistan, this same pattern could be discerned when interviewing Turkmen about 
their views of the Niyazov regime. Interviewees 10 and 20, both critical of Niyazov, 
noted admiringly that, in diplomatic negotiations, he was a "cunning fox", outsmarting 
other regional leaders. Interviewees 1 and 3, both opponents of Niyazov, spoke 
respectively of their respect for the way in which he had successfully overlaid tribal 
differences, provided cheap fuel and food, and prevented the growth of organised crime 
and radical Islam. Interviewees 4, 11 and 19 all conflated Niyazov as the head and 
symbol of the state with the identity of the Turkmen state itself. Thus, while they 
believed Niyazov's regime was corrupt and disagreed with the insertion of Ruhnama into 
educational and occupational settings, they stopped short of condemning Niyazov 
outright, as this would be the equivalent of expressing disloyalty towards the country as a 
whole. 
Observing and circulating at concerts and celebrations in Ashgabat in 2002, ceremonies 
to open the Sultan Sanjar mausoleum in Merv and Mary in 2004 (Plates Ten and Eleven), 
and the VE Day celebrations in Ashgabat in 2005 (Plates Eighteen and Nineteen), it 
became clear that the state's authorised gatherings did provide an opportunity for people 
to dress up, meet, sing and socialise. Although participation by the performers was 
obligatory, the performances themselves were not necessarily perfunctory. Similarly, 
although attendance at the outdoor concerts and ceremonies was encouraged and, in the 
case of Merv required, the audience still manifestly enjoyed the events on their own 
terms as opportunities to mingle, flirt, dance and show off. 
The Niyazov regime's official imagery is undoubtedly one-dimensional and its 
vocabulary is constricted and tedious. Few attending the performances are likely to take 
its rhetoric at face value, just as the innumerable portraits and statues of Niyazov littering 
the urban landscape in Turkmenistan are "wallpaper" to most Turkmen, only noticeable 
when they are removed. That should not mean that other elements of the regime are 
unanimously rejected. Niyazov's modest policy achievements were recognised by some 
interviewees, and his creation of the state in his own image has been sufficiently effective 
as to mitigate criticisms of the regime on the grounds of patriotism. Even the ritualistic 
and iconographic elements of the regime can evoke genuine pleasure, although perhaps 
not on the terms that the regime would like. In this, the responses to Niyazov's rule evoke 
the polyvocality recorded by Plamper in his study of East German responses to Stalin's 
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death- a complex mixture of sorrow, fear, excitement and relief (Plamper: 2004b, 326-
327). As a consequence, the full horizon of responses to the Niyazov regime 
encompasses significant complexities and ambiguities that attend to its claims and 
requirements. 
Conclusion 
Looking at comparator FSU states, Turkmenistan can be viewed as an anomaly. In 
Azerbaijan, Presidents Heidar and Ilham Aliyev have retained firm control over the 
levers of power but have not prevented a "rough and tumble" semi-democracy emerging, 
with a vibrant and frequently militant civil society. Although President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev governs autocratically in Kazakhstan, liberal oligarchs have been able to 
construct their own political formations, complementing vociferous pressure groups 
advocating pensioners' rights and improved housing provision. The opposition to 
President Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan does not have either constitutional or media 
outlets. Although fragile and clandestine constitutional parties operate, responses to the 
Uzbek regime have increasingly taken the form of increasingly desperate and violent 
Islamist factions, seeking to establish shariat law in a regional caliphate stretching from 
the Caucasus to western China. 
President Niyazov, by contrast, has faced no coherent domestic political opposition of 
any consequence since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Periodic attempts by political 
parties based abroad to oust Niyazov have failed dismally. These parties, which are 
broadly constructed along ethno-triball ines, have 1 imited and diminishing connections 
inside the country. Moreover, they have almost all been formed and funded by former 
government ministers forced to flee abroad once their nefarious criminal activities had 
been uncovered. As such, they have limited credibility among ordinary Turkmen. Single-
issue protests have been spontaneous and sporadic. The authorities have dealt with them 
ruthlessly. Although protestors have attempted to utilise the regime's own performance 
claims and rhetoric to frame their demands, Niyazov has refused to be drawn into a 
"contractual game" by making concessions. Appeals to international institutions have 
largely failed to elicit a meaningful response from Niyazov. 
Any explanation for the failure of opposition groups to mobilise against Niyazov must 
address some underlying structural factors. Nomadism deprived Turkmen society of both 
the tradition and infrastructure of religious learning, which were to prove crucial to post-
Soviet opposition movements in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The failure to develop strong 
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academic institutions in the Turkmen SSR deprived the republic of a strong core of 
intellectual enquiry and potential dissidence. The comparatively small European 
population meant that Turkmen were far less exposed to currents of reformist thinking on 
democratisation and human rights issues than in, say, Kazakhstan or the former Soviet 
republics in the Caucasus. Ethno-tribal divisions have also played their part in limiting 
cooperation. Augmenting these factors is the government's rapid and ruthless deployment 
ofthe state's coercive apparatus, itself nurtured by exceptional access to rental income, in 
order to eliminate or atomise any nascent signs of protest. 
Social responses to Niyazov's rule run the panoply of everyday resistance tactics already 
charted by anthropologists of societies in which hegemonic rule is prevalent. Without 
political power, ordinary Turkmen seek to manipulate the systemic contradictions of 
sultanistic rule for personal protection and economic gain. Some 0 f these tactics have 
taken new and surprising forms not hitherto covered in the extant literature. One such is 
selling back Niyazov's cultic iconography through the production and marketing of 
goods bearing his image and slogans. By doing this, traders occupy a niche in which 
ideological orthodoxy and satire blend together in a profitable arrangement. Other tactics 
involve sly subversion, satire and "internal emigration" from the regime's messages. 
Nevertheless, such complicity/duplicity might also conceal genuine ambivalence in 
popular attitudes towards Niyazov. The creation of an independent Turkmen state, albeit 
embodied by Niyazov, does provide Turkmen with a sense of much-needed identity, 
however warped and incomplete. Moreover, Niyazov does provide some of life's 
essentials, notably water, salt and fuel, at no cost. Even the rituals and texts of the regime 
provide a comforting continuity with the Soviet period for some, to the extent that 
authorised gatherings can fulfil a genuine social function, bringing together people at the 
regime's behest, but ultimately relegating Niyazov to an incidental component of a wider 
set of social relationships. 
\ 
Attitudes a nd responses to s ultanistic rule a re barely covered in extant theoretical and 
empirical studies, and not at all in SRT. The case of Turkmenistan has uncovered a more 
complex array of resistance and accommodation than has hitherto been recorded or, in 
fact, was expected at the outset of the study. This is, in itself, significant for deeper 
scholarship on responses to personalistlsultanistic rule. Drawing from these findings, it is . 
far too simplistic to dismiss ordinary Turkmen simply as downtrodden, passive subjects 
of the Niyazov regime. While there has been limited overt resistance, a range of 
strategies, some more overtly political than others, have been adopted in order to reclaim 
social space. 
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An important question arising from these tactics, however, is the extent to which, in the 
long run, they prolong the regime's continuation or hasten its demise. Kligman's 
conclusion about Romania under Ceausescu is that they did both. Discussing the practice 
of formally upholding state policy while illegally facilitating abortions, she argues: "this 
intermeshed yet dual system of everyday life simultaneously chipped away at the 
system's formal structure and secured its increasingly fractured continuation" (1998: 39). 
The same could be said in Turkmenistan about the freeloading of private flocks and the 
grain hoarding that characterises the agricultural sector, or the informal currency trading 
that enables public sector wages to be paid. Even the sale of "Turkmenbashiana", which 
reduces Niyazov to the status of a niche tourist attraction, sustains the regime. Not only 
does it bring in hard currency, it still requires traders, suppliers and officials to behave 
"as if' the regime's claims ring true. 
Tying up these strands, the broader objective of the thesis was to account for the 
durability of sultanistic regimes, notwithstanding their manifestly dysfunctional 
character. Analysing popular political and non-political responses to sultanism leads to 
some key conclusions. Firstly, Bellin's (2005: 21-41) and Posusney's (2005: 1-18) 
argument that contemporary Middle Eastern monarchies are sustained by t he will and 
capacity of the state's coercive apparatus to suppress opposition holds good in the case of 
Turkmenistan. Yet this conclusion is insufficient on its own: Bellin, Posusney and 
Brownlee (2005: 43-62) all stop short at looking for deeper social responses to the 
regimes. 
In Turkmenistan, two supplementary factors linked to these responses are at work. The 
very dysfunctional practices that distinguish the regime contribute to its longevity by 
forcing people to work around the system to survive, either by manipulating its failings, 
withdrawing as far as possible from the regime's strictures, or via the safety valve 0 f 
satire in its various forms. Secondly, following Foucault's dictum that ifpower only ever 
says no it will cease to be obeyed, when the regime composes its public transcripts 
competently and comprehensively, it is able to garner a degree of genuine 
accommodation, if only to forms and structures that permit Turkmen to engage in other 
forms of socialisation. Given that Niyazov benefited from the long shadow of such 
practices under the Soviet system, it is unsurprising that they have continued to be 
effective after its demise. 
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Chapter Seven - SuItanistic Regimes in the International System 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapters, we traced the internal dynamics of the Niyazov regime from 
four perspectives. Chapter three considered the structural context presented by an 
isolated, traditionally acephalous and inchoate Turkmen society, endowed with rich 
natural resource potential. Chapter four traced the emergence of Niyazov as the central 
political actor and architect of the post-Soviet political order in Turkrnenistan. Chapter 
five offered an explanation of how the regime exercises control domestically through 
"disciplinary-symbolic" mechanisms, essentially a combination of coercion, patronage 
and the cult of personality. Chapter six analysed the complex responses engendered by 
sultanistic rule. This chapter takes the analysis a stage further by developing some of the 
theoretical insights made in chapter two in relation to the international dimension of 
sultanistic rule. Chehabi and Linz, and Snyder, separately stress the centrality of the 
relationship between sultanistic rulers and external actors to the emergence, continuation, 
and demise of sultanistic regimes. Any thorough critique of SRT must therefore engage 
with this aspect of their framework. 
In doing so, the remainder ofthis chapter is structured into four sections. Firstly, the 
theoretical component of the international dimension is revisited and extended in order to 
frame the empirical analysis. The second section looks at the three core elements of 
Turkmenistan's foreign policy under Niyazov: internationally recognised permanent 
neutrality; detachment from, and/or non-participation in, international institutional 
structures; and, carefully proscribed functional cooperation with other regional state 
actors. This section goes on to discuss the rationale for this relatively isolationist stance, 
in the context of the Turkmen government's geopolitical positioning, commercial 
interests and regional security dynamics. The third part examines the response of external 
state and institutional actors towards the Turkmen regime, in order to consider the extent 
to which Niyazov's actions have been limited, or in any way affected, either by 
realpolitik or the global discourse on human rights that has developed after the Cold War. 
A short concluding sectio~ ties the findings back to the theoretical framework and 
suggests that, if Niyazov's regime is to be constrained, a different terrain of opposition, 
focused on domestic actors, may need to be explored. 
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Sultanistic regimes in the international system: the theoretical context 
In chapter two, we reviewed the macrostructural factors instrumental to the emergence of 
sultanism. Chehabi and Linz argued that the states in which sultanistic regimes are, or 
were, present, have been characterised by persistent crises of sovereignty. They 
contended that many of these states had been subject to continual external interference, 
short of outright colonialism, citing the examples of various Central American states that 
have fallen periodically under US influence. Alternatively, sultanistic regimes may come 
to power in states with a formal history of colonialism, possibly with an additional legacy 
of post-colonial "informal" empire of the kind that characterises the relationship between 
various sub-Saharan countries and France. They also mentioned the influence of external 
loans and aid in sustaining the rent circuits that perpetuate sultanism (1998b: 28-33). 
Developing this theme in the critique of their theory, we considered how sultanistic 
leaders exploited their strategic leverage· during the Cold War in order to attract 
patronage from one or other of the global superpowers (usually the US). As the 
ideological rivalry between the US and USSR wound down from the mid-1980s, so too 
. did the willingness of superpower patrons to invest in their sultanistic clients. 
Contradicting the orthodox view of regime change in authoritarian societies, developed 
by O'Donnell and others, which placed primary emphasis on domestic drivers as agents 
of democratic transition in authoritarian regimes, Snyder argued that, when tracing the 
paths out of sultanistic regime behaviour, a focus on international actors was also crucial, 
because a change in the relationship of dependency often removed revenues that 
sustained internal security capabilities and patronage networks (1998: 58-62; 1992). 
Chehabi and Linz found that, when faced with sustained resistance, "soft liners" in the 
sultanistic leader's entourage begin either to defect or to open back channels of 
communication with both moderate opposition forces and the foreign patron in order to 
explore exit strategies for regime e lites. Citing the examples 0 f Jean-Claude D uvalier, 
Ferdinand Marcos and Reza Shah amongst others, Chehabi and· Linz describe how 
sultanistic regimes frequently crumbled very quickly, often leading to a confused 
interregnum in which regime associates sought to retain power90• In most instances 
following leadership changes, they conclude, "prospects for democracy are bleak" 
(1998b: 44). 
90 Although the Ceausescu regime collapsed quickly, regime "soft liners" assumed power without 
foreign assistance. 
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Brownlee's study of the persistence of "neopatrimonialism" sought to build on the work 
of Chehabi, Linz and Snyder, by introducing cases of "non-transition" regimes. Taking as 
his case studies four Middle Eastern and North African regimes, Brownlee's comparative 
analysis argued that the earlier studies had neglected to incorporate personalist regimes 
that had successfully faced down resistance, and survived in tact (2002b). 
Thus, SR theorists had focused on modes of transition out of sultanistic regimes, while 
neglecting the question of whether such regimes had undergone the process of transition 
in the first instance. Central to Brownlee's case was the ability and willingness of 
patrons, the US in particular, to exert a measure of constraint on the actions of the earlier 
sultanistic regimes discussed by Chehabi and Linz. Brownlee certainly does not deny the 
crucial role of external patrons in making and breaking these sultanistic rulers. Instead, he 
argues that where that constraint is missing - in effect, where there is no "disciplinary" 
relationship of patronage with an external power - personalist regimes (and presumably 
their more' extreme sultanistic variants), can be resilient and survive unscathed. 
Therefore, while Brownlee's study did not invalidate the comparative studies ofChehabi, 
Linz and Snyder, it provided an additional dimension by offering a more nuanced 
interpretation of the relationship between the regimes in question and external actors. 
The objective of this chapter is to develop these findings in relation to our study of 
Turkmenistan. Brownlee's own case studies were ofIraq, Libya, Egypt and Tunisia, all 
of whose leaders were in power both during and after the end of the Cold War. The 
regime in Turkmenistan emerged from the ashes of the Soviet Union. It therefore adds in 
the perspective of a state that could not be described as a "Cold War holdout", but came 
into being within a different geopolitical order, and without a specific patron, although 
the case for Russia being regarded as such is examined in detail below. 
The argument developed in this chapter is that Brownlee's broad findings also have value 
in explaining the resilience of Niyazov's regime. Moreover, it may be possible to extend 
Brownlee's conclusions. The attitude of the international community towards 
contemporary sultanistic regimes also challenges assumptions beyond the immediate 
scope of this study - on the limits of state sovereignty, the ethics and practice of 
humanitarian intervention, the measurement of violations of human rights, the holding of 
political leaders to account legally for their domestic actions, and evaluation of minimum 
standards of domestic conduct. Yet, what is apparent from this study is that Niyazov's 
regime has survived not in spite of the reconfigured international system, but rather 
because 0 fits inherent features. Cold War s ultanistic rulers could 0 ften be m ade, and 
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broken, by their sponsor. The central argument of this chapter, therefore, is that where 
such a complex relationship is absent or diminished, where international norms are not 
substantively breached by the regime91 , and where there is continued to access to the rent 
circuit, the sultanistic ruler may, paradoxically, experience less constraint on his 
behaviour than during the Cold War, when the international monitoring of human rights 
was largely subservient to ideological orthodoxy and superpower patronage. To 
paraphrase Franklin D. Roosevelt, sultanistic rulers have a better chance at survival when 
they are nobody's "sons of bitches" rather than "our sons of bitches." 
In the remainder of the chapter, we look at how and why Turkmen foreign policy has 
evolved in an isolationist direction, the international responses thereto, and their 
contribution to the longevity of the regime, in order to develop the central point further. 
Turkmenistan's Foreign Policy since 1991 
(i) Neutrality 
Turkmenistan's relationship with the outside world since 1992 has been largely 
predicated on its policy of permanent neutrality and consciously limited interaction with 
both states and international institutions92 , Turkrnenistan is, as a consequence, often 
described as isolationist, a closed society, or a "hermit kingdom," comparable with very 
few states in the international system. Given the nature and extent of the cult of 
personality surrounding Niyazov, the most common comparison is with the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). However, unlike Turkmenistan, the North Korean 
regime has developed an elaborate ideology of self-reliance, known as Juche, which 
blends traditional concepts of family and belonging linked to Confucianism, with the 
culture and productionist ethic of StaJinism, to create a "garrison state" in which over 
25% of a population of 23 million are either in regular armed service, or are reservists 
(Cumings: 2004, 158)93, The DPRK and much ofthe international community (headed by 
the US) has been in more or less persistent conflict since 1994 over efforts to lever the 
North Korean government into the International Atomic Energy Agency's inspection 
regime, in order to establish the extent of its weapons-grade plutonium stocks. Given the 
91 For example, through the invasion of another state or "gross" (itself a contested term) violations 
of human rights. 
92 See Sadykova (2002) and Sabol (2002) for brief discussions ofTurkmen foreign policy. 
93 The cultural origins of the North Korean regime are debated but, according to Moon Woong 
Lee, "the religion-like cult surrounding Kim Il Sung ... appears to be in large part an unplanned 
outgrowth of Confucian values placed in a new context ... a new and well-integrated family state 
that, in certain respects, resembles Confucian society" (quoted in Cumings: 2004, 196). 
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unresolved conflict with the Republic of Korea, the DPRK is therefore viewed as a 
significant source of global insecurity. 
In contrast, Turkmenistan' s brand of isolationist foreign policy is not perceived as in any 
way threatening to the regional security environment. Indeed, most scenarios of Central 
Asian instability involving Turkmenistan revolve around a presumption of internal state 
collapse, rather than external aggression94• Turkmenistan's armed forces remain weak in 
comparison with those of Iran and Uzbekistan, its principal bordering states, and Niyazov 
has stated his strong opposition to the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical 
weapons. There is no evidence that Niyazov possesses or intends to acquire such 
technology. In short, Turkmenistan cannot conceivably be described as a regional 
aggressor, sponsor of terrorism, or agent of insecurity in Central Asia or the Middle East. 
Instead, Niyazov has set in place the concept of positive and permanent neutrality as the 
cornerstone ofTurkmen foreign policy. The central presumption of political neutrality is 
neither to start nor participate in wars. In order to make that stance credible to other 
parties, a state should not accept obligations in peacetime that could lead to involvement 
in wars. The obligations of neutral states under international law were set out at the 
Hague Conference of 1907, and subsequently revised at further conferences in London 
(1909), Havana (1928) and Geneva (1949) (Karsh: 1988, 23-25). These established the 
principles that warring parties must not violate the territory of the neutral state for 
military purposes, including the transportation of troops, weapons and communications 
across the land, airspace and waters of the neutral party. In exchange, neutral states must 
not participate in blocs or alliances that lead to wartime obligations, and must not 
discriminate ideologically, politically, or through trading relationships, between warring 
parties (Vukadinovic: 1989, 36-40; Windsor: 1989,3-9). 
Niyazov initially articulated Turkmenistan's preference for neutrality at an early stage of 
Turkmenistan's independence by refusing to sign the CIS Collective Security Treaty 
(CST) in Tashkent on 15 May 1992, which provided a security guarantee of mutual 
assistance to CIS states attacked by external forces. The principle of "non-interference in 
the internal affairs of other governments" (Article Six) was enshrined into the State 
Constitution adopted on 18 May 1992, and this was followed by the first explicit 
94 This observation is taken from participation since 2003 in the Central Asian and Caucasian 
Prospects roundtable at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (part of its Russian and Eurasia 
programme), as well as participation in Foreign and Commonwealth Office briefing sessions on 
Turkmenistan in 2005. 
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declaration of positive neutrality at the Helsinki summit of the Conference for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (later the OSCE) on 10 July 1992. International affirmation 
for Turkmenistan's stance was given at the third summit of the Economic Cooperation 
Organisation .( ECO)9s in t he I slamabad Declaration 0 f 1 5 March 1 995, before the 90lh 
plenary session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) formally rec,ognised the country 
permanently neutral status on 12 December 1995 (UNGA Resolution: NRES/50/80). 
Finally, the resolution was codified into a Law on Permanent Neutrality approved by the 
Khalk Maslahaty on 27 December 1995 (Sadykova: 2002), in the amended State 
Constitution (Article One), and the state's official military doctrine in 1996. 
Turkrnenistan also formally joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) on 20 October 
1995 at the Cartagena summit in Colombia96. 
Since that date, neutrality has been projected by Niyazov as "the greatest achievement of 
our people" (TCA, 14 December 2005), and the term "independent and permanently 
neutral" prefaces any mention of Turkmenistan in news bulletins or formal state 
announcements. Neutral status has been immortalised in material form through the 
construction of the country's tallest monument, the Arch of Neutrality, a tripod tower in 
central Ashgabat at the top of which the 12 metre golden statue of Niyazov rotates each 
day to follow the sun. 
The 1995 UNGA resolution, passed unanimously and to which no state had reasonable 
grounds for objection, is routinely described as an astonishing foreign policy achievement 
on Niyazov's part, for which the nation must be eternally grateful. The anniversary of the 
UN vote, declared a public holiday, is marked by ritual celebrations and keynote 
speeches by Niyazov on the "hard and thorny path" to neutrality (TCA, 14 December 
2005)97. In one respect, Turkmenistan's incorporation of neutrality and non-alignment 
into national ideology mirrors the stance taken by many small, post-colonial states 
9S The ECO was originally established in 1964 by Iran, Turkey and Pakistan as the economic arm 
of the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), a pro-NATO security organisation. It enlarged in 
1992 to include the five former Soviet republics of Central Asia, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan. 
96 Neutrality, which essentially means non-participation in global diplomacy, should be 
distinguished from neutralism and non-alignment. The latter involves an independent foreign 
policy that involves a much more active role in world affairs, and which does not preclude positive 
identification with certain states over specific policy issues. Most NAM founder members, 
including Yugoslavia, India and post-independence Ghana, inclined towards the Soviet Union 
(Crabb: 1965). 
97 The most substantive foreign policy speech by Niyazov, and arguably his most wide-ranging 
and widely distributed speech, is his lecture entitled 'Neutrality of Turkmenistan: History, World 
Outlook and State Strategy' delivered on the 51h anniversary of the UN Resolution on 12 
December 2000. 
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searching for identity, security, internal political balance and strategic leverage with more 
powerful regional actors (Crabb: 1965,41-76). 
Interestingly, Latter has argued that Switzerland is predisposed towards neutrality 
because of its three distinct linguistic communities, implying that neutrality acts as an 
overlay to keep disparate communities within a single state (1991: 2). At the same time, 
smaller neutral states, such as Finland, can act effectively as "honest brokers," 
particularly where situated as buffer states between m ore powerful neighbours (Lyon: 
1963, 91-119). Thus, in generic terms, Turkmenistan's decision to adopt neutrality 
conforms to a tradition of inchoate, smaller, newly independent states seeking a relatively 
cost-free foreign policy course, which would alleviate tensions in a variegated and 
potentially conflictual regional security complex. 
(H) Disengagement and Isolation from Institutional Actors 
Putting Turkmen neutrality into practical effect meant a process of disengagement from 
CIS structures and non-participation in regional integration mechanisms. Niyazov has 
selectively attended CIS heads of state summits since 1992, usually only when they 
coincide with other business relating to the sale or transit of natural gas. In addition to 
opting out of the Tashkent CST of 1992, Turkmenistan declined to become a member of 
the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the permanent body created to 
administer the renewed Treaty, which was approved in April 1999. 
The Turkmen government has also not become involved in any CIS peacekeeping 
missions in FSU states, the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly or the Interstate Bank and, 
since 1999, has not even forwarded economic data to the CIS Interstate Statistical 
Committee (Izvestiya: 3 June 2004). Moreover, Niyazov has gradually disengaged from 
those CIS structures in which the government formerly participated, for example 
withdrawing from the CIS common visa agreement in 1999 (Pomfret: 2001, 165). 
Niyazov opted not attend the CIS Heads of State in Kazan (Russia) in August 2005, 
sending his former bodyguard and Deputy Prime Minister Aganiyaz Akiyev in his place. 
At the summit, Akiyev submitted an application to downgrade Turkmenistan to Associate 
status, the first member country to apply to leave the organisation. Given that states such 
as Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan, all of which have had more strained 
bilateral relations with Russia at one time or another, have not contemplated leaving the 
CIS, Turkmenistan's application was significant. The Russian government was incensed, 
fearing that Turkmenistan would cause the break-up of one of the few multilateral 
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organisations in which Moscow retained significant prestige and undisputed influence 
(Russica lzvestia, 27 August 2005). While Niyazov's absence at Kazan was not 
unexpected, it was taken as a lack of respect. Accordingly, contrary to claims in the 
Turkmen press that a resolution was adopted downgrading Turkmenistan's status (IS 1), 
the Russian delegation stated that the matter had not been discussed, could not be 
addressed in Niyazov's absence and, in any event, noted that Turkmenistan had not 
withdrawn from any of the constitutional documents (IS 2). 
Niyazov has also rejected any other attempts at regional political, security or economic 
integration. He has declined to participate in the CIS Customs Union, the Eurasian 
Economic Community (EurAsEC) (which boasts other regional isolationists Uzbekistan 
and Belarus), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and also withdrew in 1994 
from the Central Asian Commonwealth, which later mutated into the Central Asian 
Cooperation Organisation (CACO), a vehicle for economic cooperation between the 
Central Asian states. 
Interaction with those organisations in which Turkmenistan still retains membership has 
varied at levels between perfunctory and just short of complete disengagement. Although 
Turkmenistan was Central Asia's first signatory to NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
programme on 10 May 1994, participation has been sporadic at best, a civil emergency 
planning seminar held in Ashgabat in September 2005 being the only significant activity 
of note since 2000 (IS 3). Indeed, such has been the fall-off in cooperative endeavour, 
NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer issued a thinly veiled warning to the 
Turkmen government on 21 October 2004 that without additional effort on its part, the 
conditions would not exist for enhanced cooperation under PfP (IS 4). 
Involvement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to which the country gained 
accession on 22 September 1992, has followed this trend, with the Turkmen government 
as of 31 December 2005 having no payments committed to the fund, and no outstanding 
purchases or loans in train (IS 5). Similarly, Turkmenistan has no lending programme 
with the World Bank, with the only cooperation as of 2006 confined to low-level 
implementation of the Small Grants Programme (IS 6). The ECO has not achieved a great 
deal since its inception, and the introduction of seven new members in 1992 has, in 
practice, made very few demands on Niyazov and, as such, he has been happy to continue 
with Turkmenistan's membership. 
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The overall pattern of engagement between the Turkmen regime and international 
institutions was one of initial, cautious engagement in the period 1991 to 1994, followed 
by a phased reduction in participation, retaining only nominal membership of institutions 
in most cases. Attempts by other states, notably Kazakhstan, to promote regional 
cooperation in the economic, political or security sectors have been rebuffed, with 
Niyazov insisting that projects are best pursued through bilateral relationships rather than 
multilateral frameworks. Niyazov's principal motive in following this trajectory appears 
to have been twofold: firstly, to limit the capacity of international institutions to intrude 
too closely into Turkmenistan's internal affairs; secondly, to reduce Turkmenistan's 
treaty commitments to a bare minimum particularly where these might be directed at a 
third party. Nevertheless, retaining nominal membership of the various institutions also 
allows Niyazov to project the illusion domestically that Turkmenistan remains a player in 
regional affairs. 
(iii) Circumscribed Bilateralism with Regional State Actors 
If the Turkmen government's stance towards international institutions is characterised by 
gradual detachment and isolationism, bilateral relations with other states have developed 
within strictly circumscribed parameters linked to specific projects. A brief analysis of 
Turkmenistan's relations with three important regional neighbours, Turkey, Iran and 
Uzbekistan, illustrates Niyazov's policy of limited collaboration for specific tactical 
gains, rather than as part of a trend to create wide-ranging or enduring partnerships that 
might produce functional spill over into other areas of strategic cooperation. 
In the immediate aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey was Niyazov's 
choice of regional partner and, as noted in chapter four, a number of high-level exchanges 
occurred in Turkmenistan's first year of independence. However, much of the aid and 
investment promised at earlier summits did not materialise. Central Asian leaders were 
also not keen to exchange external domination from one source (Moscow) with that from 
another (Ankara). Consequently, ideas for the creation of a Turkic Commonwealth or 
Common Market, mooted by Turkish President Turgut Ozal in 1992, quickly evaporated 
(Winrow: 2001, 201). 
The inspiration that Niyazov gained from the model of Ataturk's creation of modem 
Turkey set the template for Niyazov's ambitions and his early' style of governance. 
However, as ,a more specifically Turkmen nationalist model crystallised and Niyazov 
reduced contact with the outside world, so the overt Kemalist influence on Niyazov's 
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policies has waned. Kemalist ideology was as much about state-building as nation-
building, and N iyazov h as shown little interest in the former. A Hied to this, nom ajor 
bilateral proj ect in the energy sector has materialised that would bind together the two 
countries' economies on a functional level. Proposed gas pipelines via Iran and across the 
Caspian Sea linking Turkmen gas fields to Turkish markets have never got beyond the 
planning stage.98 Military contacts remain relatively few and far between. Apart from 
close relations with individual Turkish businessmen such a s A hmed C halyk, who was 
appointed a Deputy Minister and is effectively in control of the country's textiles sector, 
the volume of high-level contacts has substantially diminished after the mid-1990s. 
Given their long joint border, Niyazov understandably also prioritised relations with Iran 
shortly after independence. Given the latter's diplomatic and economic isolation after the 
1979 Revolution, there was a keen mutual interest in developing a strong bilateral 
friendship. As of 2006, Turkmenistan remains the only state that has a significant land 
border with Iran without either a US troop presence or close military relationship with the 
US. Although periodic proselytising forays across the border were made by Iranian 
clerics during t he early 1 980s, the Iranian government has n ot attempted to sponsor a 
religious revival in post-Soviet Turkmenistan, the main reason being that the Sunni and 
Sufi religious traditions of the Turkmen are not particularly compatible with the radical 
Shi'ite brand of Islam propagated from Tehran. Unlike in the Turkish case, however, a 
symbolic project linking the two countries did come to fruition in 1997 with the opening 
of the Korpedze - Kurt-Kui (KKK) gas pipeline along in the south eastern seaboard of 
the Caspian. The KKK line does not, however, service directly any ofIran's northern 
population centres which, allied with Iran's prodigious domestic natural gas reserves, has 
ensured that annual throughput has never been more than a third to a half of its 14 bcm 
per annum design capacity (Roberts: 2001,61). 
Bilateral relations were constructed almost entirely on the personal trust developed 
between Niyazov and former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Consequently, the 
election victory in Ju ne 2005 of M ahmoud Ahmadinejad, a religious purist with little 
98 The Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project was under active consideration in 1998 but did not 
proceed due to Niyazov's erratic negotiating tactics, and a dispute between the Azerbaijani state 
oil company SOCAR and the Turkmen side over the proportion of Turkmen gas that would be 
allowed to fill the pipeline as it traversed Azerbaijani territory. Niyazov prematurely held a 
ceremony in' 1994 to inaugurate a Trans-lranian gas pipeline. However, the construction of the 
Blue Stream gas pipeline a cross the B lack Sea from D zhugba in Russia to S amsun in Turkey, 
allied to the South Caucasus gas pipeline linking from Baku to Erzerum in Turkey, has effectively 
saturated the Turkish domestic gas market for the foreseeable future, so any future Transcaspian 
line must now be predicated on gas sales to Central and western European customers (Roberts: 
2001,60-63). 
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time for Niyazov's attempts to fuse Islam with his own cult of personality, subsequently 
placed a limit on the scope for further cooperation. Although Niyazov would not 
participate in, or support, international action against Iran's nuclear programme, he is 
likely to remain outside any process of mediation convened to resolve Iran's conflict with 
the international community. 
Relations with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan's principal bordering state, were characterised 
by much greater hostility after 1992. Firstly, it is accepted that Niyazov and President 
Islam Karimov have never enjoyed close personal relations. For example, their first 
bilateral meeting surprisingly did not occur until 1996, five years after independence, and 
Niyazov opposed Karimov's appointment as the first president of the International Fund 
for the Aral Sea in 1997 (Horsman:"2001, 76). 
Secondly, the Soviet Union's demise left a complex infrastructurallegacy that was highly 
likely to create tension. The delimitation of the national republics in 1924 granted to the 
Turkmen SSR territory on the right bank of the Amu Darya, populated almost exclusively 
by ethnic Uzbeks. The creation of independent states in 1991 reactivated and exacerbated 
inter-ethnic tensions which, allied to the inadequate border delimitations in sparsely 
populated regions, numerous local territorial claims and incursions, has caused several 
shooting incidents between border guards (lCG Report No. 33: 2002, 9-10). Energy 
sector assets and grain silos were situated across the border from the communities and 
enterprises they served. The road and railway network now straddled the border. 
Communities were a rbitrarily cut off from other family members, jobs, farmland, and 
traditional burial sites. The mutual reliance on irrigation agriculture from the Amu Darya 
became a potential source of inter-state conflict, with each leader unwilling to back down 
or engage in meaningful negotiations and Niyazov threatening to divert more water into 
the Karakum canal. Rumours even surfaced in Russian newspapers in 1995 about 
Uzbekistan's contingency plans to occupy parts of northeastern Turkmenistan (Horsman: 
2001, 77). 
Although bilateral relations stabilised in the late 1990s, serious tensions resurfaced in late 
2002, when it transpired that Boris Shikhmuradov had been sheltered in the Uzbek 
embassy in Ashgabat for two weeks after his abortive assassination/coup attempt on 
Niyazov in November 2002. The Turkmen security services raided the Uzbek embassy 
after Shikhmuradov's departure, searched diplomatic cars and bags in contravention of 
protocol, and expelled Uzbek Ambassador Abdurashid Kadyrov on 2.1 December 2001. 
In response, Uzbek armoured infantry units stationed in its Bukhara, Khorezm, and 
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Kashkadryo oblasts were reportedly moved closer to the country's borders with 
Turkmenistan (IS 7). Although both countries preferred not to escalate the matter into 
military conflict, bilateral contacts were effectively suspended for two years, and not 
renewed until Karimov initiated a meeting in Bukhara on 19 November 2004. 
This summit proved exceptional probably because both leaders had a compelling and 
urgent mutual interest in reviving relations. Petrol smugglers from Turkmenistan were 
increasingly circumventing Uzbekistan's punitive tariffs on imported products, thereby 
undermining its domestic economy. Moreover, an incident in October 2004 at the 
Tuyamuyun hydro-electric station on the Turkmen-Uzbek border, in which 25 Uzbek 
police officers were detained by Turkmen border guards for over a month, had threatened 
to escalate (Islamov: 2 December 2004). For Niyazov, a belligerent and much more 
powerful Uzbekistan represented the biggest threat to his regime's security. With the 
Uzbek government facing a significant threat to internal security from radical Islamist 
groups, Niyazov was anxious to avoid any of these groups basing themselves within the 
ethnic Uzbek population of northern Turkmenistan, which could provide a pretext for 
Uzbek 0 ccupation 0 f lands t hat it claimed in any e vent. Moreover, the 0 ffer made by 
Karimov to monitor the movements of suspected Turkmen dissidents in Uzbekistan 
(although ironic given Uzbek complicity in the 2002 coup/assassination attempt) kept 
Niyazov aware of the activities of regime opponents in exile. Nevertheless, the 
agreements reached at the Bukhara summit were limited in scope, and designed to defuse 
immediate tensions, rather than provide a framework for a durable strategic partnership. 
If a common thread can be detected in these three sets of important bilateral relationships, 
it is one that is consistent with the pattern of disengagement that has characterised the 
Turkmen regime's relationship with international institutions. Officially, Niyazov has 
argued that he would privilege bilateral contacts ahead of multilateral engagement, but 
this has not occurred in practice99• In the first two years of his presidency (1992-1993), 
Niyazov made over 20 foreign trips, including to the US, UK, France and to several 
international summits in Europe. In a comparable period in 1999 and 2000, only five 
foreign trips were made - to Turkey, Russia and Iran. In the period from 2000 to 2006, 
that number has fallen yet further and, despite numerous invitations from important 
99 A notable exception was the hosting by Niyazov of peace talks to end Tajikistan's civil war in 
1995 and 1996. Turkrnenistan was a neutral-conflict-free zone situated between the protagonists, 
who were domiciled in Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Iran (hay; 2002, 38-43). 
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current and potential gas customers, such as Ukraine, Niyazov's only visit abroad in 2005 
was for the 60th anniversary VE celebrations in MoscowlOO• 
(iv) The Rationale for Niyazov's Foreign Policy 
The isolationism and disengagement that has characterised Niyazov's foreign policy 
since 1994 is explicable by a range of factors, some of which are common to other 
smaller post-Soviet states, and some of which are symptomatic of Niyazov's 
idiosyncratic approach to diplomatic relations. 
The disengagement from CIS structures might initially seem puzzling. Faced with 
volatile Islamist states in Iran and Afghanistan along its southern borders, and a 
potentially revanchist threat from a much more powerful and aggressive former Soviet 
neighbour in Uzbekistan, it would appear logical that, as one of the Soviet Union's most 
loyal supporters, Niyazov would orient Turkmen national security interests through 
multinational structures and seek security guarantees directly from RussialOl. In fact, the 
explanation for Niyazov's foreign policy trajectory lies in several interconnected factors. 
The first is the perceived loss of sovereignty that would have been entailed in signing up 
to the CIS Tashkent Treaty. While the Turkmen SSR was politically part of a larger 
entity, the USSR, it was one constituent of a single geopolitical actor. Although 
theoretically a union of equals, the CIS was a club of independent states, in which larger 
and more populous republics, principally Russia, but also Ukraine and Uzbekistan, could 
potentially yield disproportionate influence in the same way that France and Germany 
have historically done in EU structures. Thus, Turkmenistan could find itself being bound 
to policy positions that were inimical to its own interests and even, in the case of 
Afghanistan, potentially threatening to national security. For Turkmenistan, 
subordinating national interest to collective CIS positions could potentially mean putting 
itself on the frontline against states with which it had no individual quarrel. Opting out of 
CIS military and security structures therefore maximised Niyazov's room for manoeuvre 
100 The data on overseas trips is taken from aggregating recorded state visits between 1991 and 
2000 (Khramov: 2001), supplemented by my own detailed analysis and summary of various local 
and international news sources between 2000 and 2006 (see section on methodology in chapter 
one). Niyazov may have made some private overseas trips in this period that are not recorded, 
although he has shown a marked unwillingness to leave the country at all since 2000, generally 
holidaying near Krasnovodsk on the Caspian Sea coast (Interview 24). 
101 Other geographically marginalised Soviet republics with small populations, notably Armenia 
and Tajikistan, opted to develop close security alliances with Russia. 
241 
with Iran and Afghanistan and, in t he early days (1992), left open t he potential for a 
deeper partnership with Turkey. 
The Tashkent Treaty and the CSTO also had limited practical use for Turkmenistan. 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan all faced urgent security imperatives by virtue of 
their geographic locations bordering China, which still held substantial territorial claims 
on Central Asia dating from the nineteenth century. That China might go to war over 
these was evidenced by its history of territorial expansion and the Sino-Soviet border 
conflicts of 1969, some of which had occurred in the Kazakh SSR. Absorbing national 
defence capacities into a multilateral framework under Russia's control, and with a 
nuclear deterrent as a last resort, therefore afforded these relatively weak states a degree 
of protection. By contrast, the only real claims on Turkmen territory emanated from 
within the CIS itself, namely Uzbekistan and, if one includes disputes over the median 
line division of the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan (Roberts: 2001, 65). Given that the Tashkent 
Treaty of 1992 was silent on conflicts between CIS member states, and did not provide 
for conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, its utility as an instrument for 
Turkmenistan's national security was severely limited. 
Unlike Ukraine, whose official neutrality was rooted in careful geopolitical positioning 
between EU and NATO structures on the one hand, and persisting cultural, linguistic and 
economic affinities with Russia on the other hand, Turkmenistan's neutrality was 
predicated on two objectives: firstly, to maximise its customer base for sales of natur,al 
gas; secondly, not to prejudice potential transit routes to any customers. Accordingly, 
Niyazov has sought to pursue a studiously balanced policy with all the states in the 
region, restricting meaningful contacts only to those governments that could purchase or 
facilitate gas exports (Badykova: 2001, 231-243). 
As a consequence, Niyazov has run against the grain of the security policies adopted by 
other r egionall eaders. President K arimov, for example, has been highly suspicious 0 f 
Iran's attempts to develop bilateral relations in the region (Herzig; 2001, 176), while 
other CIS states, notably Azerbaijan, have been careful not to draw criticism from extra-
regional allies such the US and European states by developing close ties to Tehran. 
However, the clearest illustration of the centrality of natural gas exports is Niyazov's 
little documented relationship with the Taliban in Afghanistan between 1994 and 2001. 
The possibility of a gas pipeline connecting Turkmenistan's massive south eastern 
Dauletebad gas fields to the South Asian market was first raised by Pakistani Prime 
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Minister Nawaz Sharif at an ECO meeting in Ashgabat in May 1992 (Esenov: 2001, 
247). Subsequent meetings in 1993 led to Niyazov signing a memorandum on a projected 
pipeline with Pakistani President Benazir Bhutto in May 1995. No Afghani 
representatives were present, and the memorandum was strongly criticised by 
Afghanistan's de jure president, Burhanuddin Rabbani (OM RI Daily Digest, 7 March 
1995). 
As has been exhaustively reported, the Taliban was the chosen instrument of Pakistan 
Inter-Service Intelligence operatives to develop Pakistan's long-range geopolitical goal of 
attaining strategic depth to its north and west (Rashid: 2000, 17-30). The Taliban was 
used to secure trade cargoes from Turkmenistan from a very early stage after its 
formation, probably winter 1994 (Esenov: 2001, 249). Furthermore, as the Taliban's 
offensive rapidly advanced to the Turkmen border in 1994-95, it received a consignment 
of supposed humanitarian aid by rail which, given the poor state of the Turkmen 
economy at the time, was either an extremely generous gesture or, more likely, a 
shipment of arms. 
Thus, while the ClS Collective Security Council formed a working group in October 
1996 to consider the most appropriate method of securing borders and countering any 
aggressive expansion across Afghanistan's northern frontiers,lo2 Niyazov refused to 
participate, citing Turkmenistan's neutrality and its principle of non-interference in the 
affairs of other states. However, it would appear that Niyazov was actually cultivating the 
Taliban for two separate reasons. The T aliban, contrary to t heir later policy of poppy 
eradication, vigorously pursued a policy to maximise heroin trafficking outlets between 
1994 and 1999 (Rubin: 2002, xxiv-xxv). Turkmenistan, according to Esenov, turned into 
"one of the main transit routes for transporting drugs from Afghanistan and Pakistan to 
CIS countries and, via Russia, to Europe" (2001, 251), almost certainly with official 
sanction and involvement (lCG Asia Report No. 44,15-21; ICG Asia Report No. 85, 18-
20). Secondly, two foreign oil companies, Unocal and Bridas, were vying to construct oil 
and gas pipelines across Afghanistan to Pakistan and gained agreements with all the 
parties, including the Taliban, to commence construction (Rashid: 2000, 157-182). 
Notwithstanding the US cruise missile attacks on alleged Al Qaida training camps in 
Afghanistan during August 1998, Niyazov was prepared to host Taliban leaders for three 
days in Ashgabat in May 1999 and signed the only formal set of economic agreements 
102 A Taliban anti-aircraft missile downed a domestic civilian flight in southern Tajikistan in 1997, 
killing all on board. 
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with the Taliban of any head of state. Only the imposition of US sanctions against the 
Taliban in July 1999, in response to the Taliban's formal grant of asylum to Osama bin 
Laden, led to the shelving of the TAP project by Bridas and Unocal, although serious 
attempts have been made to revive the plans since 2002, only this time with President 
Hamid Karzai as a partner. 
A further indication of Niyazov's unwillingness to antagonise gas export routes or 
customers is the relatively low profile adopted on national defence issues (Table 7). 
Although the Ministry of Defence has been comparatively well-funded, much of the 
expenditure is directed towards retaining the privileges of senior officers (notably 
preferential housing, healthcare and education) rather than investment in training and 
hardware. As noted in the previous chapter, Niyazov's principal concern appears to be to 
ensure that the military does not become a hostile political actor. Any cursory observation 
of Turkmen regular forces, mostly conscripts from poor backgrounds whose main 
function appears to be to absorb youth unemployment, confirms the impression that they 
would be wholly ill-equipped to conduct even the most rudimentary defence of the 
country's borders. 
Table 7: Turkmenistan's Armed Forces (Source: The Military Balance, 2005-2006) 
Branch No. of Equipment 
of Personnel (1) 
Armed 
Forces 
Army 21,000 702 T -72 tanks; 942 Armoured Infantry Fighting 
Vehicles; 488 artillery pieces; 53 SA-8 and SA-13 
Surface to Air missiles; 70 Air Defence Guns 
Navy 700 Minor base at Turkmenbashi port with plans to 
acquire 5 boats 
Air 4300 92 combat capable aircraft including 65 SU-17s 
Force and 22 MIG-29s; 10 MI-24 attack helicopters and 
8 MI-8 support helicopters; 50 SA-2 Surface to Air 
missiles 
(1) The vast majority of the armed forces consist of conscripts with 2 year terms 
of service. By contrast, ofTurkmenistan's bordering states, Uzbekistan has 55,000 
active members of the armed services, with a further 36,000 paramilitary troops 
(91,000 in total). Kazakhstan has 65,800 active members of the armed services, 
together with a further 34,500 paramilitary troops (100,300 in total). Iran has 
420,000 active members of the armed forces, 40,000 paramilitary troops· and 
350,000 reservists (potentiaIIy 810,000 troops in total). Afghanistan's National 
Army is under development but, as of May 2006, has 33,000 trained recruits. 
244 
Moreover, Niyazov refused Turkmenistan's share of the Soviet Caspian fleet in 1992 and, 
as a consequence, Turkmenistan has much the smallest naval forces of the Caspian 
littoral states, numbering only 700 personnel (Kozhikov and Kaliyeva: 2002, 3-5). The 
implication of this (non-) posture is that the budget for national security has been oriented 
almost exclusively towards internal rather than external threats l03 , and that national 
security from external penetration almost exclusively hinges on whatever legal protection 
is afforded by the UNGA neutrality resolution of 1995. 
How is Turkmenistan viewed by international actors? 
Any comparison between the Cold War sultanistic regimes discussed by Chehabi and 
Linz and the Niyazov regime in Turkmenistan should be clarified by two important 
distinctions. Firstly, in the former cases, the role of the UN and other international 
institutions was much less significant. Secondly, the involvement of the superpower 
patron was much greater. An important question for the durability of contemporary 
sultanistic regimes, therefore, is whether external leverage on rulers has increased or 
decreased since the end of the Cold War. In other words, have evolving international 
norms of human rights, allied to the increasing frequency of armed humanitarian 
intervention, rendered contemporary regimes more or less vulnerable to external 
interference? 
The case of Turkmenistan would indicate that the post-Cold War international security 
environment has actually increased the domestic security of rulers like Niyazov. To 
consider how this situation has arisen, it is worth examining, in turn, the Niyazov 
regime's relationship with Russia, the closest state to an external patron, and the 
international community more broadly, to gauge the extent to which either actor would or 
could exercise leverage over Turkmenistan's internal affairs. 
(i) Russia as Patron? 
Russia's interests in post-Soviet Central Asia are conditioned by three broad issues: the 
wider regional security environment and, in particular, the implications for Russia's 
vulnerable southern flank of the insertion of hostile non-state actors (Islamist groups) and 
state actors (US military bases); the set of energy supply relationships that Russia has 
established across Eurasia, that involve the CARs as both source and transit states; and 
103 One such internal threat is heading off any unrest in the military. 
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the rights of ethnic Russians residing in the region, which can occasionally be a useful 
pretext for Russian policy-makers to pursue more substantive geopolitical and 
commercial objectives. 
All three of these factors are relevant to Russo-Turkmen relations. The absence of strong 
border controls across the empty steppes and deserts dividing the Central Asian 
Republics (CARs) means that the southern borders of the Soviet Union have remained as 
Russia's de facto frontiers. This fact in itself has provided the rationale for a self-
appointed Russian droit de regard over Central Asian security arrangements. However, 
in the case of Turkmenistan, the energy relationship is of much greater salience than the 
security issue. Unlike in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan has been neither a source nor a target 
of radical religious or separatist groups intent on de stabilising the region. Unlike in 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, autonomous organised crime groups have not been able 
penetrate the upper echelons of the political elite in Turkmenistan. Moreover, unlike the 
three aforementioned states, there has been no US military presence in Turkmenistan 
since the terrorist attacks on New York on 11 September 2001. 
Russia's relatively strong relationship with Iran since 1979, allied to Tehran's studious 
non-intervention policy in the Chechen conflict, means that Turkmenistan's long border 
with Iran is not viewed as a source of significant insecurity in Moscow. The border with 
Afghanistan is potentially more problematic. However, under the regional hegemony of 
General Abdul Rashid Dostum, a longstanding ally of the former Soviet states, the 
TurkmenlUzbek - Afghan border zone has been the quietest region of Afghanistan since 
1979. 
Furthermore, Niyazov's isolationism and manifest inability to project military force 
beyond the country's borders does not make Turkmenistan a significant player. in the 
regional security complex. This perception is magnified by the country's virtually non-
existent profile in Eurasian security affairs since the 11 September terrorist attacks. Given 
that Turkmenistan enjoys long land borders with both Afghanistan and Iran, it is 
surprising that US (and, reactively, Russian) engagement with Niyazov was so slight. As 
Niyazov makes very little contribution to regional diplomacy, and does not impact any 
other state's affairs, it would therefore appear to suit all the region's principal geopolitical 
actors to leave Turkmenistan as a "strategic black hole" in the heart of Central Asia, 
particularly given that Turkmenistan's very weakness and vulnerability to a pre-emptive 
assault could further disturb the region's security situation. 
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Consequently, the principal security issue arising for Russia is the potential for the 
internal fragmentation of the Turkmen state after Niyazov leaves office and, in particular, 
the implications this might have for control of the country's largest gas fields, given that 
they lie significant distances from Ashgabat, in regions not populated by the dominant 
Ahal Teke tribe. 
The energy relationship between Russia and Turkmenistan centres on the export of 
significant quantities ofTurkmen natural gas to Russia. Apart from a small volume of gas 
(approximately 5-7 bcm per year) exported through the KKK pipeline to Iran, the entirety 
of Turkmenistan's export output transits the Central Asia - Center (CA-C) pipeline, 
controlled by the Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom. CA-C links to the huge 
"Friendship" and "Brotherhood" gas pipelines connecting Russia with Central and 
Eastern Europe, thereby connecting Turkmenistan to the wider European network. 
Turkmen gas export volumes via the Russian pipeline network have fluctuated since 
1992, in part to due to pricing disputes, but also due to the degradation of the Turkmen 
gas infrastructure. Export volumes have run at between 30 and· 45 bcm per year on 
average. However, there is significant potential for expansion and, in April 2003, 
Niyazov signed a 25-year contract with Gazprom providing for the supply of up to 70-80 
bcm per year from 2009 (Stem: 2005, 77). These ambitious projections are unlikely to be 
realised given the erratic management of the Turkmen state gas complex and the 
continuing lack of domestic refining and transit capacity. 
Despite these problems, Turkmen gas has become increasingly important to Russia since 
the late 1990s. The main reason is that Gazprom has historically purchased Turkmen gas 
at r~tes well below global spot prices. Until 2003, Gazprom was typically paying $44 per 
1000 cm of gas, half of which was receivable in barter goodslO4.Gazprom was able to 
resell Turkmen gas with a mark-up of over 500% to its western European customers and, 
asa result, delay the massive capital investment required to put its vast Arctic gas fields 
into early production. 
So, do the constitutive components of this relationship imply that Russia could be 
categorised as a patron to the Niyazov regime and, moreover, if so, is its position 
analogous to that of the patronage relationships with external sponsors that characterised 
Cold War sultanistic regimes? The answer is not straightforward, largely because of the 
104 Many of the barter goods and services had minimal value, including the infamous delivery of 
12 million pairs of Russian galoshes, a ludicrous arrangement given that Turkmenistan has a 
population approximately 5 million, and is mostly covered by one of the hottest deserts on earth. 
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evolving dynamics between the two states. The Russian government could, if it desired, 
uses its monopsonistic position to close off the Central Asia-Center pipeline complex, 
thereby halting 85% of Turkmenistan's gas exports. This did occur for three months 
during 1997 over a pricing dispute, with seriously deleterious effects for the Turkmen 
economy. However, the pattern between 2001 and 2006 has actually been reversed, with 
Niyazov unilaterally cutting off gas exports temporarily to Turkmenistan's Russian and 
Ukrainian customers in search of higher prices (Stem: 2005, 79). 
The reasons are twofold: firstly, Niyazov is aware that in order to service its European 
contracts, Gazprom has been operating at near full capacity since 2000. The supply that 
Turkmenistan has provided has become progressively more vital to Gazprom in the short 
to medium term, a factor that Niyazov has been able to play on to extract more value 
from Turkmen exports, particularly as Gazprom has become increasingly conscious of its 
image as a major corporate player in the global energy market. 
The second factor is the transformation of the transit and energy security dynamic across 
Eurasia since 2003. The rapid expansion of the Far Eastern and South Asian economies 
has caused the Indian and Chinese governments in particular to seek new sources of 
energy security. Iran has been diplomatically and commercially isolated since 
Turkmenistan became an independent state in 1992 and, as of 2006, is likely to remain so 
for the short to medium term. As such, it has been an unattractive venue for major foreign 
investors. The overthrow of Afghanistan's Talibanregime in late 2001 also revived a 
potential energy corridor to South Asia. Concerns of energy security in Western Europe, 
precipitated by the Russia-Ukraine gas pricing dispute in January 2006, prompted E U 
member-states to seek to reduce their dependence on Russia as Central Europe's principal 
gas supplier. 
The rapid evolution of the Eurasian gas complex between 2003 and 2006 quickly moved 
beyond the notional and into material projects. The Chinese government, through the 
state-owned company Sinopec, has proven its ability to construct long-distance oil and 
gas pipelines quickly, with the completion in December 2005 of the Atasu-Alashankou 
pipeline connecting Kazakhstan to western China. A projected 6700 km gas pipeline 
linking the Urtabulok gas condensate field, situated on the right bank of the Amu Darya 
river in eastern Turkmenistan, to Guangzhou, Shanghai and the Yangtze river delta in 
China was approved when Niyazov made a rare foreign visit to Beijing in April 2006 
(TCA 8 December 2005; RIA Novosti, 6 April 2006). The pipeline is intended to carry 30 
bcm per year and be operational by 2010. 
248 
The TAP project, linking the Dauletebad gas field in southeastern Turkmenistan to key 
Pakistani and Indian urban centres, has had a more troubled gestation period. Although 
there has been considerable political drive behind its construction, its future construction 
is likely to be problematic given the delicate state of Indo-Pak relations, the continued 
absence of a major commercial operator, and the uneven security profile inside 
Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the plans have continued to be developed through a series of 
high-level working groups and they have provided a reminder to Gazprom and the 
Russian government that it should not take the reserves from Turkmenistan's largest gas 
fields for granted (NCA, 9 March 2006). 
Alongside these developments, the European Parliament's External Relations and Trade 
Committees approved a draft trading agreement in April 2006 for the direct supply of 
Turkmen gas (RFEIRL TS 28 April 2006). Such an agreement has the potential to revive 
the Caspian Sea gas corridor by taking liquefied natural gas (LNG) by tanker to the 
newly constructed BP South Caucasus Pipeline linking Baku to Erzerum in Turkey 
which, in turn, connects to the main southeastern European gas networks. 
Notwithstanding concerns about recoverable reserves, domestic management and the 
time-lag involved in putting in place new pipelines and tanker fleets, this panoply of new 
trading and transit networks significantly multiplied Turkmenistan's export options. The 
critical geopolitical corollary of this shift has been to diminish quite rapidly the leverage 
Russia retains over the Turkmen economy. Put simply, in the period 2003 to 2006, 
Russia's ability to exert economic and, therefore, political pressure on the Niyazov 
regime probably peaked, as alternative suppliers of rental income have come into play. 
The Niyazov regime has therefore moved away from a position in the immediate post-
Soviet period when Russia might have been fairly described as a patron, to one in which 
Niyazov has extracted the country from any regional institutional commitments and 
become the object of a number of commercial suitors for the country's gas reserves. 
An indication of this, relates to the third and least important factor on Russia's agenda -
the treatment of ethnic Russians in Central Asia. Although Niyazov's plan, outlined in 
2003, to abolish the longstanding dual citizenship arrangement for ethnic Russians in 
Turkmenistan, was temporarily suspended, no new dual citizenship applications would be 
processed and, in practice, the system is being phased out. Interviewee 24, one such 
ethnic Russian, found that his application for dual citizenship was not processed in late 
2003. The Russian government's stance indicated quite clearly that the gas trad~ng 
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relationship with Turkmenistan would not be sacrificed in order to preserve the rights of 
ethnic Russians in Turkmenistan 
An important proposition developed earlier in this study is that contemporary sultanistic 
rulers who play their diplomatic hand carefully are paradoxically much less likely to be 
subject to external interference in the post-Cold War environment than they would have 
been under US patronage during the Cold War. The explanation for this anomaly lies 
partly in the erosion of the patronage relationship and partly in the failure of international 
institutions to bridge the "disciplinary" gap left by the erstwhile patron. Once Cold War 
sultanistic regimes had either outlived their political and strategic usefulness to the US 
(for example, General Manuel Noriega in Panama), or there was a danger that repressive 
internal security actions by the ruler would unleash potentially unfavourable 
revolutionary forces (as with President Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines), such rulers 
were manoeuvred out of power by successive US administrations. 
The Russo-Turkmen bilateral relationship since 1992 has not mirrored the role that the 
US played out as external sponsor ofvarious Cold War sultanistic regimes. Changing 
geopolitical alignments and the proliferation of global commercial networks have 
reduced the scope for the creation of patron-client relationships between newly 
independent states and more powerful regional players. Moreover, with the exception of 
sporadic and rather perfunctory concerns ~bout ethnic Russians residing in the FSU 
states, the normative dimension in Russia's 'Near Abroad' policies has been almost 
entirely absent. 
More pragmatically, in the immediate post-Soviet period, Turkmenistan was simply not 
geographically proximate or strategically significant enough to Russia to warrant close 
and sustained attention. Although it has been, and remains, Turkmenistan's principal gas 
customer, Russia's economic influence over the Niyazov regime remains strong, but is 
likely to erode with the gradual reorientation of oil and gas supplies away from Soviet 
transit networks in the medium-term. The limitations of foreign patronage, in this case 
from Russia, has meant that a source of constraint on Niyazov's domestic policy 
preferences has been largely absent, and other potential economic patrons, perhaps China, 
are unlikely to seek to wield a comparative influence over Niyazov's domestic behaviour. 
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(ii) The (Non-) Influence of International Institutions 
Parallel to Russia's relationship with Turkmenistan has been the inability of international 
institutions to make a significant impact on the Turkmen regime's behaviour. External 
military intervention or judicial sanction under the auspices of UN Security Council 
Resolutions (UNSCRs) remains a rare occurrence, historically triggered ·by substantial 
breaches of the sovereignty of neighbouring states (UNSCR 661 following Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait, 1990), civil war (UNSCR 794 creating the UN Unified Task Force 
for Somalia, 1992) or major human rights violations (UNSCRs 955 and 978 in Rwanda, 
1994). Turkmenistan clearly does not fit into any of these categories and is thus unlikely 
to fall under the purview of a UNSCR. 
Nevertheless, a UNGA Resolution, passed on 20 December 2004 by 69 votes to 47, 
which called on Turkmenistan to release prisoners of conscience and ensure freedoms of 
thought, conscience, religion and belief (IS 8) did unsettle the regime temporarily, 
principally because the earlier 1995 UNGA Resolution, recognising Turkmenistan's 
permanent neutrality, has been such a source of such domestic prestige for Niyazov. UN 
single country resolutions are not binding. Their weight is principally symbolic, and the 
2004 resolution was opposed by a number of developing countries (there were also 63 
abstentions), the Pakistani Ambassador to the UN arguing that adopting such resolutions 
targeted developing countries unfairly (IS 8). Given that the EU sponsored the resolution, 
and then subsequently sought a major gas trade 'deal with Turkmenistan (possibly to be 
ratified by the E U Council 0 f Ministers in m id-2006), the critical resolution has been 
undercut by its proponents in any event (The Guardian, 21 April 2006). 
Pressure from the OSCE has arguably had marginally more impact. Niyazov publicised 
his attendance at OSCE summits in the immediate post-Soviet period, not least because 
they were important photo opportunities that could portray him conversing with the 
leaders of Western European states as a political equal. However, complaints by Turkmen 
dissidents, following the expedited trials of the suspects in the coup attempt of 25 
November 2002, triggered the OSCE's Moscow Mechanism for the first time since the 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia escalated in 1993. This component of the OSCE's 
Human Dimension mechanism allows member states to mandate an investigation into 
specific allegations of human rights violations into a third member country (IS 9). The 
resulting report, prepared by Professor Emmanuel Decaux, was highly critical of the 
policy of interrogating relatives of the suspects, ofthe conditions of the detention, and the 
judicial process right through to sentencing (Decaux: 2003). 
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Notionally, membership of the OSCE entails formal commitments on the part of the state 
to respect certain norms, notably in the sphere of human rights. In the later period of the 
Cold War, Eastern European dissident groups, such as Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, 
used the "Third Basket" issues contained in Article Seven of the Final Act of the 1975 
Helsinki Accords as a mechanism to highlight domestic human rights abuses. The 
Helsinki obligations proved to be an important component in transforming both domestic 
political agendas and the wider framework of East-West relations. They provided a 
symbolic and legal commitment around which activists and the international community 
were able to unite (Thomas: 2001; Sowula 2005). The use of the Decaux report by 
domestic activists in Turkmenistan might, in theory, represent a form of response to 
sultanistic rule that could potentially unsettle the Turkmen regime. However, it is more 
likely that Niyazov viewed both the UNGA resolution and the OSCE Moscow 
Mechanism report of 2003 simply as irritants, in the knowledge that few people in 
Turkmenistan were probably a ware (or cared) about their content or implications. UN 
and OSCE resolutions are thus more likely to provide the normative platform for the 
recognition 0 f a successor government, rather than a mechanism to disrupt 0 r hold to 
account the activities ofthe incumbent regime. 
The attention of the international community on the domestic situation in Turkmenistan 
increased in the period after 2002. Nevertheless, there is little evidence to suggest that it 
has modified Niyazov's behaviour or acted as a deterrent in respect offuture violations of 
international human rights norms. Bilateral pressure from individual EU member states 
has been slight and, while the US embassy in Ashgabat has successfully intervened in a 
handful of individual cases, the overall impact of US State Department criticisms of the 
regime has been negligible. To summarise, the UN and OSCE have not exerted 
significant influence on the behaviour of the Turkmen regime since 1992. Indeed, it could 
be argued that the critical UNGA Resolution of 2004 actually solidified a body of support 
for Turkmenistan from similarly criticised states in the developing world. As such, global 
discourses of human rights and democratisation that gained currency at the end of the 
Cold War do not appear to have restricted the Niyazov regime's room for manoeuvre to 
any significant degree and, indeed, may actually have give Niyazov breathing space. 
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Conclusion 
SRT holds that sultanistic regimes were often the beneficiaries of superpower 
sponsorship. When the relationship with the patron disintegrated and access to rent 
circuits was reduced, sultanistic rulers became vulnerable to regime breakdown. 
Accordingly, the relationship between sultanistic regimes and external actors was crucial 
to their continuation. Brownlee looked further at this issue by examining those regimes 
which had proven to be durable over extended periods. He found that the common thread 
in their durability lay in the shedding or absence of a patron-client relationship and the 
regime's continued access to rental income. 
As a post-Cold War sultanistic regime, Turkmenistan adds a new dimension to this 
paradigm. Looking at Turkmenistan's foreign policy trajectory under Niyazov, it 
becomes clear that the regime has largely adopted a policy of selective and minimal 
institutional engagement. Posing no threat to other states, it can be overlooked in regional 
calculations. Previous sultanistic leaders such as Mohammed Reza Shah spent inordinate 
amounts on military equipment, in the process unsettling neighbours and creating 
problems for their patron (pollack: 2004, 101-140). Niyazov has avoided this mistake. 
Bilateral relations with other states have been confined to specific issues, notably the sale 
of oil and gas. Turkmenistan's policy of neutrality has ensured that it remains outside 
security organisations and military alliances. As a consequence, the amount of leverage 
that can be exercised on the regime by regional security institutions and neighbouring 
states is severely circumscribed. 
Although Turkmenistan lacked many of the orthodox attributes of statehood on attaining 
independence, it did not fall into a conventional patron-client relationship with Russia. 
This was partly due toR ussia' sown lack 0 f interest, as T urkmenistan did not, in the 
immediate post-Soviet period, hold a great degree of strategic salience for Moscow. 
However, as the oil and gas sector has emerged as the central driver of Russia's post-
Soviet economic resurgence, and as its principal instrument for reasserting geopolitical 
influence, Turkmenistan has come back onto Moscow's foreign policy radar. While 
Russia has retained a monopsony over Turkmen gas exports, a new web of commercial 
possibilities has 0 pened for T urkmenistan, separate from the Soviet gas infrastructure, 
which requires Russia to behave less as a patron and more as a senior strategic partner. 
Moreover, Russian policy-makers have exhibited far less interest in the domestic policies 
of their regional partners/clients than their US counterparts historically did with their 
earlier sultanistic clients. 
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Generalising further, by adding in both Brownlee's case studies and others in Africa, 
notably Zimbabwe, it would appear ,that the end of the Cold War did not, as scholars of 
sultanistic regimes suggest, necessarily spell the beginning of the end for personalistic 
leaders (Snyder: 1992). Instead, for those regimes like Turkmenistan that either escaped 
or were not subject to full-blown external sponsorship, the post-Cold War security 
environment has proven to be one of the guarantors of regime survival. As long as the 
rulers do not disturb the international system in the forms previously noted, the 
international community is likely to leave them to behave internally with virtual 
impunity. By contrast, when leaders transgressed certain norms during the Cold War, the 
US was prepared, under certain circumstances, to intervene by shifting its support to the 
opposition. International institutions such as the UN, OSCE, EU or NATO have largely 
been unwilling to step into the breach by policing the behaviour of sultanistic regimes, 
except in the two very specific and exceptional cases of SerbiaIKosovo (where President 
Slobodan M ilosevic was n ot deposed in any event) in 1 999, a nd Iraq (where S addam 
Hussein was removed) in 2003, both of whose leaders had a history of expanding their 
regime's power into areas not formerly either under its de facto or de jure control. 
As a consequence, broader assumptions made about the beneficial legacies of the end of 
the Cold War, the enhanced role of international institutions, the increased accountability 
of leaders, both internally and externally, and wider concepts of order and justice in the 
international system are brought into question by the. durability of the Niyazov regime 
and others of similar type. If those sultanistic regimes that continue to enjoy secure rental 
income streams have fewer external constraints on their behaviour than previously, 
SRT's hitherto "top down" focus must be necessarily modified and extended in order to 
capture the domestic political and social responses to sultanistic behaviour examined in 
the previous chapter. 
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Chapter Eight - Conclusion 
Introduction 
The research question posed in this thesis can be summarised as follows: how do personal 
regimes like that of President Saparmurat Niyazov come to power, and how do they 
remain so durable? To answer this puzzle, the two theories of sultanistic regimes 
formulated by H.E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz in 1990 were employed to frame an in-
, 
depth case study of government in the Republic of Turkmenistan between 1992 and 2006. 
However, conducting the theoretical and empirical enquiry revealed a series of additional 
puzzles. How do sultanistic regimes in the contemporary international system differ from 
the Cold War predecessors described by Chehabi and Linz? What influence do external 
sponsors or the international community have on the behaviour of sultanistic rulers? 
Given that these regimes are frequently characterised by acute policy failure and 
administrative chaos, how do they avoid being overthrown or collapsing? Do the ordinary 
subjects of sultanism truly believe in the often ludicrous claims made by and about their 
ruler? How do people actually live under sultanistic rule? Beyond these general 
questions, the choice of Turkmenistan as the focus of the thesis raised a different, but 
nonetheless taxing, set of methodological and empirical questions, not the least of which 
concerns Turkmenistan's political trajectory once Niyazov leaves office. 
To engage with these queries, the remainder of this concluding chapter is structured into 
three parts. Firstly, the principal questions considered in the thesis are summarised and its 
main findings discussed, together with their implications for development of theoretical 
and comparative study. The second part looks at the challenges that Turkmen society will 
confront once Niyazov leaves office. Reconstructing the political order and managing the 
state's oil and gas revenues equitably, within the framework of a unified state, will almost 
certainly present a formidable task. Unfortunately, the track record of states in similar 
situations is decidedly mixed. Reviewing the scenarios for political change cannot be 
based on hard evidence but brief consideration of this issue is vital from a policy 
perspective, given Turkmenistan's location, volatile neighbours and globally significant 
gas reserves. The concluding section briefly considers some further research questions 
arising from this proj eet. 
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Research findings 
The first and most generically important findings of the project relate to the theoretical 
framework. By the time the collection of papers comprising the survey of sultanistic 
regimes was published, in 1998, it had the feel of a work of contemporary history. All the 
rulers evaluated in the country studies had long since departed the scene. Yet, at the same 
time, many of the core features of t he Pahlavi, M arcos, Duvalier and Batista regimes 
could be discerned in contemporary states. Some these were survivors, the "Big Men" of 
post-colonial African politics and the charismatic dictators, like Fidel Castro, Saddam 
Hussein and Colonel Qadhafi, who had successfully played off the superpowers against 
each other during the Cold War. 
Other leaders, though, were new to the international scene, and emerged out of the 
dissolution 0 f t he Soviet Union. Most were loyal Communist P arty bosses who found 
themselves having to navigate their previously comfortable fiefdoms into the hazardous 
waters of independent statehood. Some, such as Presidents Nazarbayev, Aliyev and 
Rakhmonov, presided over Soviet republics that were seemingly held together only by 
the overlay of Soviet power, which had acted as an arbitrator and enforcer of rival claims. 
Within that group, a handful rejected the fonnal dissemination of authority across 
different branches of national and local government, preferring instead to retain power 
within their immediate circle. The Soviet command economy handed these new rulers the 
keys to the national treasury, providing opportunities for self-enrichment as well as 
unfettered power. Within this milieu, techniques of Soviet political persuasion, both 
material and symbolic, were brought back into play. Of these, the regime of President 
Sapannurat Niyazov stood out as one in which the traits of personal rule had advanced 
furthest. The transitions undergone in several of these states appeared to contradict 
conventional explanations of postcommunist political behaviour. Indeed, far from 
moving towards democracy and the market economy, a handful of ex-Soviet republics 
appeared to be even losing the freedoms granted under perestroika. Alternative 
explanations, centred on post-imperial or political culture, proved to equally problematic, 
for the reasons set out in chapter one. 
The thinking behind this project therefore was to move to a different explanatory 
framework by testing whether these post-Soviet regimes, which had begun to outwardly 
resemble those described as sultanistic by Chehabi and Linz, actually possessed deeper 
structural congruencies with the earlier examples, notwithstanding the substantively 
different geopolitical environments in which they were operating. If that were the case 
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then, through cross-temporal and cross-regional comparison, we might be able to acquire 
deeper understanding of the process of regime formation, operation and evolution in 
certain FSU states. 
Initial investigations were made to determine whether the SRT framework was fit for its 
purpose. Careful interrogation of its content revealed that while SRT's basic tenets were 
sound, they needed to be put on a much more rigorous and firmer footing. Thus, the work 
undertaken on SRT had two components: firstly, introducing a situational dynamic that 
acknowledged the influence of contingency and opportunism in deinstitutionalised 
contexts; secondly, examining and developing the authors' analysis of structural causes 
of sultanism more carefully. By doing so, it became clear that certain assumptions needed 
to be revised. 
Work on the structural causes identified the need to sharpen up the macrostructural 
explanations for sultanism. The relatively loose formulation of the socio-economic 
conditions favouring sultanistic outcomes was tightened down to the prevalence of 
revenue streams derived from rental (unearned) income, normally from a natural resource 
endowment. These revenues have multiple functions: they liberate the ruler from having 
to tax heavily and the concomitant requirement to account for spending decisions. This 
blunts the edge of calls for political representation . .secondly, they provide the ruler with 
funds to buy in hard security provision. Thirdly, they enable the ruler to activate and 
direct new and pre-existing patronage networks that reinforce traditional socio-economic 
arrangements, sideline rivals, and keep a good number 0 f political actors interested in 
maintaining the political status quo. Finally, the rentier economy permits the ruler to 
indulge in the trappings of "soft" power, most frequently evident in forms of political 
symbol that glorify and legitimate the existing regime. 
The second substantive revision to SRT required a reconceptualisation of the relationship 
between sultanistic regimes and external actors. Chehabi and Linz made the important 
correlation between external interference,. either through formal empire or external 
sponsorship, and sultanistic regimes. As such, SRT theorists argued that Great Powers 
could "make or break" sultanistic regimes. Therefore, when the US withdrew its support 
from the Marcos and Duvalier regimes, the game was up for these leaders fairly quickly. 
Similarly, a number of longstanding African leaders became vulnerable at the end of the 
Cold War after the region had ceased to host proxy conflicts between the superpowers. 
However, theorists 0 f durable authoritarianism queried this interpretation. Instead they 
focused on those cases in the MENA region where the regime had survived intact and, 
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indeed, prospered without the direct interference of external powers. What emerged from 
this dichotomy is a realisation that SRT had tended to focus on those regimes that had 
collapsed, rather than on the survivors. Looking at the Cold War "holdouts" such as 
Qadhafi, Asad, and other leaders who exhibited varying tendencies towards personalism, 
it became clear t hat, in the post-Cold war era a t I east, it was a n asset not to have an 
external patron. 
Thirdly, SRT said very little about the nature and exercise of power itself - in short, after 
acquiring political control, how the ruler maintains his hegemony. This required a more 
sophisticated conceptualisation of power in order to capture the full panoply of 
techniques deployed by rulers not only to counter opposition activities, but to prevent 
them emerging in the first place. 
Finally, a significant lacuna in SRT was the absence of any perspective from those 
required to negotiate sultanistic rule. By adding in these voices, we could obtain a more 
nuanced assessment of the regime's social impact which would, in turn, contribute to our 
understanding of both its durable elements and its weaknesses. 
Applying these propositions to the Niyazov regime in Turkmenistan was a challenging 
task, not least because of the paucity of data and the practical difficulties in conducting 
field research, engendered by the Turkmen government's reluctance to grant visas to 
foreign researchers. The first and most basic task, therefore, was to determine how the 
research could be physically accomplished. Obtaining visas for field research, while 
problematic, was only the starting point. Once in the country, it was clear that spending 
time only in Ashgabat would not capture the complexities of the rural/urban, tribal, 
regional and ethnic cleavages within Turkmen society. Travel outside the capital brought 
me into greater contact both with the regime, principally through its security functions, 
and also with Turkmen who did not share the more metropolitan mindset of Ashgabat 
residents. Many were curious about my motives for visiting Turkmenistan and, in 
particular, straying outside Ashgabat, as foreign visitors were so rare. The novelty of my 
presence worked in my favour in that people proved more willing to discuss the regime 
frankly than I had expected, although I tried to remain as aware as possible of the impact 
of my role as a foreign researcher might have on the answers given. 
Nevertheless, it was possible, with the addition of data from other sources, to piece-
together a fairly full picture of the distinctive historical and structural characteristics that 
favoured the emergence of Niyazov as a sultanistic ruler from a fairly orthodox career as 
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a Soviet bureaucrat, the formal and informal map of power within the country, the 
rationale behind the regime's policies, and the responses to these policies by those most 
affected by them. 
The principal empirical findings were, firstly, that historical and structural legacies, from 
both the pre-Soviet and Soviet period, were crucial in the emergence of sultanistic rule in 
Turkmenistan. Inimical tribal relations, the legacy of external domination and enduring 
geographical isolation provided a setting and a rationale f?r Niyazov's accumulation of 
increasingly unchecked power. The collapse of the Soviet Union provided a favourable 
strategic context for Niyazov's opportunism, aided by the delivery of a significant natural 
resource base into his hands. 
Having acquired power, Niyazov has kept it by adopting three interlocking and mutually 
dependent control mechanisms. Unafraid to suppress dissent by force, he supplemented 
coercive techniques by acting as a "superpatron" supplying heavily subsidised essential 
goods direct to the population, while presiding over a system that permitted embedded 
clientelistic relationships to continue at regional and local level. 
The third element of the nexus was the creation of a pervasive cult of personality centred 
on Niyazov, his deceased parents, and his book, Ruhnama. The disciplinary, integrative 
and socialisational functions of the cult saturate public space, leaving little or no room for 
the autonomous civil society activities that might function as an alternative to the regime. 
A varied pattern of responses to the regime was gauged, ranging from sporadic, 
compromised and poorly organised political opposition in exile, through to an ambivalent 
acceptance of, and accommodation with, the regime within Turkmenistan. This, in itself, 
signified that Niyazov was not in imminent danger of removal. 
Marrying up the theoretical and empirical perspectives, the Niyazov regime conformed 
very closely to the sultanistic regime template laid down by Chehabi and Linz. However, 
in order to make their work relevant in a contemporary setting, particularly for those 
postcommunist leaders displaying sultanistic tendencies, their theoretical framework had 
to be revisited and renovated. This thesis has been a contribution to that process. 
After Niyazov 
While the research findings can give us a more fine grained appreciation of the political 
processes at work in Turkmenistan, they cannot predict how the political situation will 
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evolve with any degree of certainty. Although Niyazov periodically makes statements to 
the effect that he will retire, these are rarely taken seriously, either domestically or by the 
international community. Niyazov raised the issue of holding a presidential election'in 
2008 or 2009 with the Khalk Maslahaty . in 2005 but the motion was, as expected, 
unanimously voted down. The timetable for elections will not be considered again until 
2009. Given Niyazov's past troubled health, it is entirely likely that he will die in office. 
As of 2006, Niyazov has no apparent heir. His son Murat could be a short-term solution 
and it is noteworthy that constitutional amendments enacted in 2005 lifted the prohibition 
on non-Turkmen holding the presidency (Murat is mixed race Turkmen-Russian Jewish). 
However, Murat has almost no elite support and showed little political ambition between 
1992 and 2006. The lack of a natural successor illustrates the potential for a systemic 
crisis in the immediate post-Niyazov period. A number of major players and possible 
successors within the Turkmen political elite, notably Yolly Gurbanmuradov and Rejep 
Saparov, were both imprisoned in 2005 for long terms on embezzlement charges. 
The constitutional arrangements for death in office are wholly inadequate as ofmid-2006. 
The Khalk Maslahaty should be recalled to choose an interim successor but the time 
taken to arrange this convention, given that many delegates are based in remote parts of 
the country, allied to the lack of clear procedures for choosing a successor, means that 
Turkmenistan could become very vulnerable either to a coup d'etat or to an intervention 
by an external power, possibly Russia or Uzbekistan. Moreover, the Cabinet of Ministers 
is in such a state of permanent flux that it is impossible to predict who would be in situ 
when "the music stops". A more stable scenario therefore might be if Niyazov were to 
become incapacitated, for example through a stroke or heart attack. In this eventuality, 
the transition of power could be managed in more stable form. 
Snyder (1988) identified several paths out of sultanistic regimes, depending upon the 
strength and agenda of opposition groups, the historic role of the military, and the degree 
to which the ruler's patronage networks had successfully penetrated both state and 
society. In the case of Turkmenistan, the comparative weakness of the military, both in 
absolute terms and as a political actor, militates against it playing a role analogous to that 
. in the Philippines, Haiti, or even Romania during the overthrow of Ceausescu (Nicholls: 
1998; Behr: 1991; Thompson: 1998). 
The likelihood ofNiya~ov being ejected forcibly from office by popular unrest like Reza 
Shah, Somoza or Batista (Katouzian: 1998; Booth: 1998; Dominguez: 1998) also appears 
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to be relatively slim. Although the regime might be fundamentally quite brittle, the risk of 
incarceration or worse that faces protestors still outweighs the very uncertain benefits of 
popular mobilisation. Moreover, even though the management of the oil and gas sector 
leaves much to be desired (partly because many competent officials have been dismissed, 
and partly due to infrastructural legacies from the Soviet era), there is no sign that 
Niyazov cannot continue to subsidise t he essential commodities t hat take the edge 0 ff 
popular discontent. 
The more likely scenario for Niyazov's forcible removal is an ultimatum delivered by 
senior officials, supported by the upper echelons of the KNB and the military. In this 
instance, the role of the Presidential Guard, which retains a powerful and privileged 
position, would be decisive, as would the terms offered for his resignation. Should he be 
granted an honourable exit in the form of legal immunity, an honorific title and a 
generous settlement, Niyazov might cut his losses. However, there is, as of 2006, no 
evidence of a cabal forming that would be capable of challenging Niyazov. A factor in 
his political longevity is the ability to prevent any official forming an alternative power 
base, and it would require a substantial breakdown in Niyazov's personal surveillance 
networks for this situation to arise. 
Perhaps a more pertinent question than the individual fate of Niyazov is the country's 
political trajectory after he dies or steps down. The failure to develop the state's 
administrative capacity or a bureaucratic structure with an autonomous professional 
culture may cause significant difficulties if the patronage networks, upon which the 
system currently depends, are disrupted by the departure of the chief patron. The 
principal fault lines within Turkmen society are ethno-tribal in character. There is a 
strong likelihood that these identities might reassert themselves fairly rapidly without the 
overlay provided by Niyazov. The country's two major gas fields are both located in the 
southeast (Dauletebad) and the west (Nebit Dag to offshore) of the country, outside the 
traditional strongholds of Niyazov's powerful Ahal Teke tribe based in Ashgabat. 
Regional elites, resentful of the diversion of resources to fun? Niyazov's expensive 
construction projects in the capital, may seek the reconfiguration of the political order to 
accommodate regional interests, possibly via a federal solution. 
On the other hand, it is entirely feasible t hat, in the event of a lengthy and confused 
political interregnum, that power would be devolve by default to regional 
administrations. The aftermath of President Askar Akayev's ouster from the Kyrgyz 
presidency in March 2005, has illustrated how fragile the cohesion of a society can be 
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where clan and regional identities supersede those of nationality. Given the size and 
relatively sparse population of Turkmenistan and the relatively compact Uzbek minorities 
resident along border areas (analogous to the ethnic Uzbek community in southern 
Kyrgyzstan), the possibilities of either political interference from Tashkent or Uzbeks 
emerging autonomously as significant agents of political change (either as perpetrators or 
victims) is a salient consideration. 
The role of those officials imprisoned by Niyazov and the opposition based abroad could 
also be an unpredictable ingredient in any reordering 0 f hierarchies, not I east because 
some of the leading exiled figures reputedly have significant largesse to dispense 
following their embezzlement of state funds and manipulation of gas export volumes for 
pecuniary gain. 
The spectre of state collapse after Niyazov has been raised in several influential NGO 
reports (lCG Report No. 44: 2003; GW Report: 2006) and in policy-making and 
academic circles. Given the rarity of state failure in the international system, and the 
interests of the region's leading gas consumers in the country's internal stability, an 
informally mediated accommodation at elite level (if not in the regions) may be 
constructed in the medium-term. An apposite comparison might be with the bargaining 
games conducted over monarchical successions in the Middle East. In the Gulf dynastic 
monarchies, the patterns of succession are often keenly contested. However, Herb (1999: 
47-49) persuasively argues that e lites, crucially including those out of favour, bargain 
hard but then pact relatively quickly to avoid jeopardising what they have gained in the 
negotiations. Second best, it seems, is better than nothing. Given the regional and tribal 
dynamics at work in the Turkmen case, the Gulf model could be an interesting case for 
further comparative research. 
The political and economic uncertainties· that Niyazov will bequeath are virtually self-
evident given the highly personal nature of the regime. What, however, will be the fate of 
the cult of personality surrounding Niyazov after he leaves office? Is it a durable 
construction, analogous to that of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in contemporary Turkey, or 
will the cult system perish with its object like that of Ceausescu? Although in the short-
term, Nlyazov's sucCessor might seek to base his political credentials on being Niyazov's 
authorised choice, the prospects of the cult of personality enduring in the form that it took 
when Niyazov was in power, remain slim. 
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That is not to suggest that the decultification process will be straightforward. Recent 
scholarship (Jones: 2004,227-245) has revealed that the Stalin cult, far from disappearing 
overnight, proved surprisingly resilient and popular among many Russians. The 
explanations lie in the extent of the cult's penetration into society, the syncretic 
assimilation of older traditions in the cult's principal motifs and, crucially, the association 
of Stalin with victory in the Great Patriotic War. For many veterans, repudiating Stalin 
equated to the devaluation of the sacrifices they had made in wartime. The preservation 
of the Ataturk cult in Turkey is based not so much upon the individual, but rather his 
embodiment of Western mores and codes, and the secularism of the Turkish state. 
By contrast, Wedeen (1999) has argued that belief in the cult of Asad was much lower 
and, as such, the regime's discourses had not been internalised. Interviewees 11 and 24, 
respectively Turkmen and Russian, both believed that the cult would die with Niyazov, 
although the influence of teaching Ruhnama incessantly to a new generation ofTurkmen 
children may have problematic consequences. A politically pain-free way for Nlyazov's 
successor would be through criticism of the cult on aesthetic rather than political grounds. 
This could lead to the removal of much of the statuary and portraiture, while delaying or 
gradually lowering the socio-political dimension ofthe cult. 
Concluding Remarks 
The questions raised by this study might appear to apply to a small and diminishing 
number of states. However, given the human rights issues that they raise, allied to their 
invariably large natural resource base, they cannot simply be ignored by the international 
community, particular if their salient characteristics are replicated cross-regionally and 
cross-temporally. Moreover, the cases of Turkmenistan, and other similar states, enable 
us to raise more general questions about, to take three examples, the viability of 
isolationism in the international system, the role of international institutions in dealing 
with moderate but persistent human rights abusers, and the relationship between natural 
resource endowment and governance. 
The unusual characteristics of sultanistic regimes also permit further cross-disciplinary 
enquiry into the nature of belief and unbelief and the potential collision or fusion of the 
two, or the politics of urban space or everyday life under sultanistic regimes. Given this 
potential it remains surprising that non-democratic regime theory has not attracted more 
scholarly attention. It is hoped that this thesis takes a very modest step towards rectifying 
that situation. 
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Appendix Three: Biographies of Interviewees 
1. Dr. M.T. 
Location: Leeds, UK 
Date: 8 September 2005 
Ethnic Talysh originally from Azerbaijan, aged 46, graduated from Baku Medical 
Institute in 1983, then worked as a Soviet army doctor. Promoted to rank of captain and 
placed in charge of Turkmen army's medical supplies unit by 1998. Experience of 
medical service in armed forces and prisons. Part of underground circle of army officers 
who opposed Niyazov's decree of 1997 that only ethnic Turkmen should serve as army 
officers. A close associate of Rustam Jumayev., (half-Turkmen, half Tajik) who became 
Deputy Foreign Minister under longstanding Foreign Minister, Boris Shikhmuradov (half 
Turkmen-half Armenian). Part of circle of senior non-Turkmen, mixed race and 
"internationalist" officials involved in 25 November alleged 2002 coup attempt. Detained 
by police, but released and fled to Turkey and then UK, where he received political 
asylum in 2004. Interviewed for specialist knowledge of political elite, military and 
prison system. 
2. M.A., 
Location: Ashgabat 
Date: 16 November 2004 
Ethnic Turkmen. Senior position in the Faculty of Architecture and responsible for the 
plan to reconstruct the city centre of Ashgabat. M.A. works closely with President 
Niyazov to design and approve plans for new buildings, monuments and transport routes. 
Interview arranged informally with no official involvement. Interviewed for first-hand 
knowledge of commissioning process of public sculpture and urban redesign. 
3. M.N. 
Location: Ashgabat 
Date 16 November 2004 
Ethnic Turkmen. M.N. is 26 years old, a former Chevening scholar and graduate of the 
University of Birmingham. He was formerly head of the department of the Central Bank 
tasked with creating a national Stock Exchange, but now works as a financial manager 
for the Swiss company, Militzer & Munch Turkmenistan Ltd. Interview arranged 
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informally with no official involvement. Interviewed for insights into functioning of 
Central Bank. 
4. N.Z. 
Location: Ashgabat 
Date: 17 November 2004 
Ethnic 0 rigin unknown (probably Russian), A ge m id-60s. Widow 0 f prominent Soviet 
sculptor. An important figure in the visual arts in Turkmenistan, N.Z. runs a studio used 
by promising young artists and sculptors and has her own gallery. She organises 
exhibitions of Turkmen art from all over the country. Interview arranged informally with 
no official involvement. Interviewed for knowledge of cult production. 
5. RA. 
Location: Ashgabat 
Date: 15 November 2004 
Ethnic Turlanen, born in 1941. Prominent national sculptor, one of Niyazov's favoured 
"court" artists, and responsible for many of the sculptures of Niyazov and monuments to 
other mythical Turkmen fi~ures on display in Ashgabat and around the country. Graduate 
of the Art Academy in Ashgabat, he worked in Tashkent during the Soviet period. 
Chairman 0 f t he Turkmen Artists' Union between 1 991 and 2002. I nterview arranged 
informally with no official involvement. Interviewed for information about cult 
production and public sculpture. 
6. S.B. 
Location: Ashgabat 
Date: 15 November 2005 
Ethnic Turkmen, born in 1948. Graduated from Surikov Art Institute, Moscow and has 
exhibited in Moscow, Poland and Turkey. Turkmenistan's most prominent national 
sculptor, widely praised for the Soviet war memorial opened in 1985. Also responsible 
for most of the more ambitious monumental commissions, including the new War 
Memorial depicting Niyazov's father Atamurat Niyazov, the Earthquake Memorial and 
the statue of Niyazov on top of the Arch of Neutrality. Works closely with Niyazov and 
Ministry of Culture and is regarded as Niyazov's senior "court" sculptor. Interview 
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arranged informally with no official involvement. Interviewed for information about cult 
production and public sculpture. 
7. N.K., 
Location: Ashgabat 
Date: 20 November 2004 
Ethnic Russian, born 1967. One of Turkmenistan's few successful commercial 
photographers. Married to an ethnic Russian paediatrician, so also provided information 
on the state of hospitals and the replacement of qualified non-Turkmen medical personnel 
with unqualified Turkmen staff and untrained soldiers. Interview arranged informally 
with no official involvement. Provided insight on health system and treatment of Russian 
minority. 
8. Dr. T.II. 
Location: Ashgabat 
Date: 19 November 2004 
British academic. Dr. H. has worked extensively in Turkmen primary and high schools in 
the Bairamali etrap of southern Turkmenistan, explaining to local students his work as 
head of the Merv Project. Dr. H. has lived and worked in Turkmenistan, on and off, for 
six years and has a detailed knowledge of Niyazov's policy on arts and culture, the 
education sector at all levels, government bureaucracy and the use of Ruhnama in 
schools and universities. His lengthy period of residence in Turkmenistan has enabled 
him to observe patterns of change in arts and education policy, and de~l with a succession 
of ministers and senior officials. Provided information on education sector. 
9. M.G. 
Location: Ashgabat 
Date: 17 November 2004 
Ethnic Turkmen, late 20s. Teacher at high school and art college in central Ashgabat. 
Showed students' work, and explained role of Ruhnama in school curriculum and daily 
routine of students. Adopted a very strong nationalist stance in the interview and pictures 
of Niyazov around the room and on his desk. Appeared to be a genuine and enthusiastic 
regime loyalist. Interview arranged informally with no official involvement. Provided 
information on education sector. 
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10. T. T., Journalist 
Location: Ashgabat 
Date: 5 August 2003 
One of Turkmenistan's few resident independent journalists. Works for international 
news agency which provides daily updates on political and economic developments in 
Central Asia. Privately a trenchant critic of Niyazov regime but publicly neutral in order 
to work unhindered. Provided a great deal of unofficial information on Niyazov's 
background, method of governance, elite infighting and alleged assassination attempt of 
25 November 2002. Excellent knowledge of national politics and Niyazov's inner circle. 
11. A.T. 
Location: Ashgabat 
Date: 6 August 2003 
Etbrlic T urkmen. Age 26. Yomut married to Teke with two children. Expert 0 n tribal 
structure, Turkmen customs, and carpets. Provided comprehensive information on tribal 
histories and customs, inter-tribal relations in the Soviet period and following 
independence, and use of Ruhnama and other regime symbols and texts in schools. 
12. w.e. 
Location: Ashgabat 
Date: 7 August 2003 
British, late 50s. Turkmenistan's longest continuously resident western expatriate, 
working in Turkmenistan from 1995 to 2004. Headed up most successful and profitable 
Western company in Turkmenistan, working oilfields around Nebit Dag area of western 
Turkmenistan. Provided much information about the process of doing business in 
Turkmenistan, bureaucratic structures, legal environment, and informal political 
configurations within the Turkmen elite. 
13. G.N. 
Location: Nokhur 
Date: 12 May 2005 
From the Nokhur tribe in the Kopet Dagh mountains on the Turkmen-Iranian border. Late 
50s, married with a large family. The Nokhurli are regarded by Turkmen as the "Jews of 
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Turkmenistan" for their commercial acumen and insular marriage patterns. Most are 
devout Muslims and they speak a Farsi-Turkmen dialect.. G.N. was unusual in that he 
spoke Russian, was formerly in the Soviet army. He is now a prosperous sheep farmer 
and family patriarch. Provided information on inter-tribal relations and rural T urkmen 
customs. 
13. RC. 
Location: Ashgabat 
Date: 18 October 2002 ' 
Ethnic Turkmen graduate, fluent in English. Mid-20s. Worked for an import-export 
agency and as an assistant at academic conferences. He was extremely critical of the 
Niyazov regime, of the role of Ruhnama in society and the monuments and symbols of 
the regime. He indicated that were the regime to face difficulties, he would be actively 
involved in protests. Not entirely trustworthy and possibly worked for the government. 
Provided insights into reception a nd responses toe uit 0 f personality and regime m ore 
generally. 
14. Residents and workers in area between Garashsyslyk and Bitarplyk streets, 
Asbgabat 
Location: Ashgabat 
Date: 14 November 2004 
Interviews with ethnic Turkmen residents facing forcible eviction from homes in central 
Ashgabat that would be demolished to make way for a new children's theme park 
proposed by Niyazov. Many residents remained in half-destroyed buildings having not 
been offered alternative accommodation by the government, and provided with only a 
few days notice and no compensation to move out. Also, interviews with workers 
employed to demolish the homes. All workers were from outside Ashgabat, mostly from 
the Mary velayet. 
15. G.A. 
Location: Mary 
Date: 15 November 2004 
Ethnic Turkmen from Mary region. Early 20s. Protected to some degree by his job, G.A. 
expressed almost open contempt and mockery for ministry officials and the security 
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services. Openly ignored or obstructed government officials at an academic conference, 
and ridiculed portraits of Niyazov. Provided information on the attitude of Turkmen 
students who had studied outside the country. 
16. Students at Turkmen Poly technical Institute 
Location: Ashgabat 
Date: 16 November 2004 
Two separate sets of short interviews were conducted with students at the architectural 
faculty and mathematics faculty. The architecture students (five, all ethnic Turkmen, all 
male) appeared to be from wealthy backgrounds and were very assured. They were 
clearly from elite families and stated their loyalty to the regime and Niyazov unprompted. 
They provided details of their study schedules and curricula, and job prospects after 
graduation. The mathematics students (two female, both Turkmen) provided details as to 
their course and the amount of time spent studying Ruhnama as an important component 
of their course. They appeared to be less cosmopolitan and assured than the architecture 
students. 
17. Professor A.E. 
Location: Ashgabat 
Date: 16 November 2004 
Ethnic Turkmen. Professor A.E. is in control of planning design in Ashgabat, and is 
responsible for designing a nd/or approving the designs for n ew buildings, monuments 
and public spaces. He has drawn up the 2020 city plan for Ashgabat, together with 
Niyazov, and works closely with senior officials from various ministries as well as 
international construction companies such as Bouygues and Polymex to implement the 
approved architectural plans. Interviewed for first-hand knowledge of commissioning 
process of public sculpture and urban redesign. 
18. N.K. 
Location: Ashgabat 
Date: 15 October 2002 
Mixed Turkmen-Ukrainian heritage. General interview about position of mixed race 
officials in T urkmen government, and general interview about her views on T urkmen 
politics and Niyazov. Useful for insights in to official attitudes towards ethnic minorities. 
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19. G.E. 
Location: Ashgabat 
Date: 14/15 November 2004 
Ethnic Armenian, late 60s. G.E. provided a great deal of information on the situation of 
Caucasian ethnic minorities in Turkmenistan. Armenians, caricatured as successful, and 
sometimes miserly, traders in Turkmenistan faced significant discrimination during the 
Soviet period. Following the war between Armenian and Azerbaijan that began in 1988, 
many Armenian residents of Baku were airlifted across the Caspian Sea to prevent 
pogroms spreading from the Azerbaijani coastal town of Sumgait to the capital. The 
arrival of Armenians triggered riots in Nebit Dag and Ashgabat in 1989, over allegations 
that the incoming Armenians had been given preferential treatment in the allocation of 
new apartments. Armenian market traders were also accused increasing bread prices 
during food shortages in 1990. G.E.'s loyalties lay with the Soviet government, and he 
repeatedly compared Niyazov to StalIn. Interviewed to obtain perspective from Armenian 
minority, who were involved in inter-ethnic violence with Turkmen in late Soviet period. 
20. M.A. 
Location: Ashgabat 
Date: 6 August 2003 
Ethnic Turkmen, early 20s. Ambitious young Central Bank official who claimed that he 
did not have an outlet for his abilities. Married and lived in Bakharden (lOOkm west of 
Ashgabat) with his family. Muhammedgeldi was clearly deeply frustrated with the short-
termist working practices in the Central Bank. He insisted that he was apolitical, and was 
much more interested in Islam. Like other younger interviewees, he was eager to explore 
the possibility of study in Europe .. lnterviewed to obtain information on functioning of 
government bureaucracy and responses to regime. 
21. Dr. N.A. 
Location: Bamsley, UK 
Date: 7 November 2005 
Dr. NA. is an ethnic Uzbek from Dashoguz, aged around 40. Her husband worked for a 
private Uzbek-Turkmen trading company and was a frequent visitor to the Uzbek 
embassy in. Ashgabat. He was viewed as a suspect in the alleged attempt to assassinate 
Niyazov on 25 November 2002. He was subsequently charged with assisting fugitives to 
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cross the border into Uzbekistan. He was subsequently charged and sentenced to 15 years 
in a hard labour penal colony. Dr. N.A. had faced racial discrimination in her 
employment as a paediatric neurologist, and had lost her job to a less qualified ethnic 
Turkmen. She provided a great deal of information on the problems facing Uzbeks in 
Dashoguz, on health policy and the state of Turkmen medical care and on events 
surrounding the assassination attempt in November 2002. 
22. B.K. 
Location: Yerbent 
Date: 6 August 2003 
Ethnic Turkmen, late 40s. B.K. was an excellent interviewee because, as the owner of 
one of the very few chaihanas in the Karakum desert on the main north-south road 
connecting Ashgabat to Dashoguz, he was able to pick up a lot of informal information 
about official involvement in drug trafficking, about opposition to Niyazov, and about the 
political and economic situation in different parts of the country. Although B.K. 
displayed a picture of Niyazov in his window, this was clearly a perfunctory display of 
loyalty to assist him in dealing with government officials. In private he expressed 
criticism ofNiyazov's cult of personality. His wife was more wary about discussing these 
issues with a stranger. Interviewed to obtain perspective of regime from someone resident 
outside Ashgabat by somebody potentially affected by residential clearances. 
23. O.M. 
Locations: Ashgabat, Yerbent, Darvasa, Nebit Dag (Balkanabat), Nokhur, Turkrnenbashi 
Dates: 3-8 August 2004, 7-15 May 2005 
Ethnic Russian born in Turkmenistan, mid-40s. University graduate and former Soviet 
and Turkmen Army officer. Formerly worked as a smuggler of contraband goods. 
Married three times. O.M. was the designated companion for trips outside Ashgabat. 
Rarely for a Russian, he spoke Turkmen and great affection and respect for the Turkmen 
people. He was extremely critical of Niyazov and, through his wide travel, commercial, 
military and educational experiences extremely knowledgeable and impartial on issues 
such as inter-tribal relations, the Soviet legacy, the state of the Turkmen armed forces, 
and government policy towards minority ethnic groups. 
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Appendix Four: Note on Ethnicity of the Interviewees 
Of the 24 interviews used in the thesis, 21 were conducted with citizens ofTurkmenistan, 
two with British citizens and one with a Pakistani citizen, resident in Turkrnenistan. 
Of the 21 citizens ofTurkmenistan, 14 were ethnic Turkrnen, of which eight were from 
regions other than Ashgabat. 
Of the remaining seven interviewees, their ethnicity was as follows: 
Three ethnic Russians born in Turkmenistan; 
One mixed Ukrainian-Turkmen heritage born in Turkrnenistan; 
One Armenian, born in the Armenian SSR, and resident in Turkmenistan for many years; 
One Talysh (an Iranian minority) from Azerbaijan SSR, resident in Turkrnenistan for 20 
years, now resident in the UK pending decision on asylum status; 
One ethnic Uzbek born in Turkrnenistan, now resident in the UK pending decision on 
asylum status. 
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